JUDGMENT B. Mukerji, J. - This is a first appeal from order against the decision of the learned Civil Judge Shahjahanpur, remanding a rent suit for decision to the Asstt. Collector in accordance with law. 2. A suit was filed by Amir Mohammad Khan against certain Defendants for a declaration that he was a joint tenant in respect of some 26 plots in village Udaipur Bhoora, u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act, in the Court of Asstt. Collector, Shahjanpur. To this suit of Amir Mohammad Khan the landholder was also a party. It may further be mentioned that the relief for declaration, which was claimed in the suit, was claimed against all the Defendants without any exception. The defence to the suit was a denial by Mohammad Yaqoob Khan, one of the Defendants, specifically, that the Plaintiff was ever a joint tenant or that the Plaintiff's father, Wazir Mohammad Khan, was ever a joint tenant of the plots in suit. It was alleged further that the Plaintiff had never been in possession of the plots in suit within the period of limitation and, therefore, the suit was not only barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act but also barred by limitation. It was further contended that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to try the 3. It appears that in this suit the Custodian, Evacuee Properties, also stepped in as a party and an objection was raised on his behalf that since the property in suit was evacuee property the revenue court, before which the suit had been filed, had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 4. The Asstt. Collector struck the following three issues: (1) Whether the revenue court is competent to try the suit ? (2) Whether the Plaintiff or his ancestors ever acquired ex-proprietary tenancy rights ? (3) Whether the Plaintiff is in possession of the land in suit ? if so, to what effect ? It appears that the learned Asstt. Collector went on to decide the first issue first and while deciding that issue he came to the conclusion that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. He held, following a decision of the Board of Revenue, that "a claim for co-tenancy lies in a civil court, inasmuch as, the tenant concerned is not aggrieved by any act of the landholder." The learned Asstt. He held, following a decision of the Board of Revenue, that "a claim for co-tenancy lies in a civil court, inasmuch as, the tenant concerned is not aggrieved by any act of the landholder." The learned Asstt. Collector further held that there being no claim and no proof that the Plaintiff was aggrieved by any action of the landholder no suit u/s 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for a declaration could lie. The Asstt. Collector, however, overruled the objection preferred on behalf of the Custodian to the effect that the suit was not triable by him on the ground that it necessitated adjudication of the rights of any evacuee. The Asstt. Collector, therefore, dismissed the suit with costs. 5. An appeal was preferred to the District Judge, because under the circumstances of the case the appeal lay to the civil court, -although the suit had been filed in a revenue court. The lower appellate court has come to the conclusion that Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act did apply to the facts of the case and the revenue court, therefore, had jurisdiction to try the suit. It has, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal of the suit and has remanded the suit to the court below for being restored to its original number and for decision on the merits in accordance with law. 6. The present first appeal from order has been filed on behalf of Defendant Mohammad Yaqoob Khan. The memorandum of appeal shows that the appeal has been filed under the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On behalf of the Respondents a preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies. The provisions of the CPC have undoubtedly been made applicable to proceedings under the Tenancy Act, but nevertheless, it has been stated that the provisions of the Code apply only to the extent to which they are not inconsistent with anything contained in the Tenancy Act itself, this is so provided by Section 243 of the U.P. Tenancy Act: No appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any court under this Act except as provided in this Act. 7. 7. The Tenancy Act makes no provision for an appeal from an order of remand by a District Judge This question is no more res integra, for there are several decisions of this Court on this question, and I may refer only to two such decisions. 8. In Pancham v. Rameshwar 1936 A.W.R. (H.C.) 393 Sulaiman, C.J. and Bennet, J. held that an order of remand passed by the District Judge in appeal is not a decree and no appeal lies from such an order. 9. The same view was reiterated in the case of Hat Ram alias Udit Narain v. The Collector of Aligarh and Manager of the Estates of Raja Bahadur Kishor Raman Singh 1941 A.W.R. (Rev) 702. 10. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the preliminary objection must prevail and I accordingly hold that no appeal lies. 11. Learned Counsel for the Appellant prayed that if I was of the opinion that no appeal lay, then I should treat this appeal as a revision. It may be pointed out at the outset that in my view the revisional powers of this Court that can be exercised in respect of a suit filed in a revenue court can only be that powers as are provided for in Section 276 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and not the powers of revision as provided for by Section 115 of the CPC Section 576 of the Tenancy Act in these words: The High Court or this Chief Court, as the case may be ma(sic) call for the record of any suit or application which has been decided by any subordinate revenue court and in which an appeal lies to the district judge and in which no I appeal lies to the High Court or to the Chief Court, as the case may be; and if the district Judge or such subordinate court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted is the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the court may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit. 12. 12. The revisional powers which are exercisable by this Court u/s 276 are more or less the same is their scope at the powers conferred on this Court u/s (sic) CPC So that, it could merely be a (sic) of form and not a matter of subs- (sic) Court will be competent to (sic) the order of the District Judge (sic)own that the District Judge exercised jurisdiction where he had none or he failed to exercise jurisdiction where he had such a jurisdiction or he acted in the the exercise of that jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The District Judge had undoubtedly the power to entertain the appeal and further he undoubtedly had the power to remand the case to the Court below, as the power of remand, as contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, would be available to a. Court deciding revenue appeals because of the provisions of Section 243 of the Tenancy Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal or to make the order that he has. The point that has been raised is that the District Judge by taking a wrong view of the nature of the suit has wrongly held suit to fall within the purview of Section 59 of the tenancy Act and it is because of this mistake of the District Judge that he has come to the conclusion that the revenue court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was further contended that because of this error of law committed by the District Judge in his interpretation of Section 59 of the Tenancy Act he has created a jurisdiction in the revenue court where the revenue court had no such jurisdiction. 13. Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act is in these words: (1) Any person claiming to be a tenant or a joint tenant may sue the landholder for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in such joint tenancy. (2) In any suit under this section any person claiming to hold through the landholder, whether as a tenant or otherwise, shall be joined as a party. As I have pointed out, the present suit was filed by a person who was claiming to be a joint tenant for a declaration of his right. (2) In any suit under this section any person claiming to hold through the landholder, whether as a tenant or otherwise, shall be joined as a party. As I have pointed out, the present suit was filed by a person who was claiming to be a joint tenant for a declaration of his right. I have further pointed out that the landholder was a party to the suit. Therefore, the. Suit fell clearly within the four corners of Section 59 of the Tenancy Act, the fact that no specific allegation had been made against the landholder in the body of the plaint, in my opinion, makes no difference to the nature of the suit. The nature of a suit has to be determined not only on the allegations of the plaint but also on the reliefs claimed by the suit and the persons against whom such reliefs are claimed. 14. The learned Assistant Collector relied on a decision of the Board of Revenue for holding that since there was no allegation against the landholder in the suit, the suit did not fall under the purview of Section 59 of the Tenancy Act: the learned Assistant Collector relied on the decision of Bachha Sh. v. Baaruddin Ahmad Sh. 1953 A.W.R. (Rev.) 94. It is interesting to note that the Board of Revenue itself in a later decision, namely, in the decision of Sundari Smt. v. Jagai, etc. 1953 A.W.R. (Rev.) 73 took a different view. 15. Reliance was placed on the decision of Pheru Ahir v. Mangru Gandaria 1950 A.W.R. 593 a decision by Seth, J. for contending that where there were no allegations against the landholder the suit did not fall within the purview of Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. It is not clear from the decision of Seth, J., whether or not the landholder was a party to the suit. If the landholder was a party to the suit, then I regret I am unable to share the view expressed by Seth, J., in Pheru Ahir's 1950 A.W.R. 593 case; but if the landholder was not a party to the suit, then I have no difficulty in accepting the view of Seth, J., expressed in this case. 16. If the landholder was a party to the suit, then I regret I am unable to share the view expressed by Seth, J., in Pheru Ahir's 1950 A.W.R. 593 case; but if the landholder was not a party to the suit, then I have no difficulty in accepting the view of Seth, J., expressed in this case. 16. From what I have said above, it would be dear that the present case is not a case in which it can be said that the court below has taken an erroneous view of a certain provision of law and has thereby forced a subordinate court to exercise jurisdiction over a matter over which that court had really no jurisdiction. In this view of the matter I do not see how I can interfere with the order of the court below. 17. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.