JUDGMENT Gopalji Mehrotra, J. - This is a petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution on behalf of tenant of premises No. 43/177, Chowk Kanpur. The opposite parlies Nos. 3 and 4 who are the owners and landlords of the premises in dispute filed an application on 27-7-1955 u/s 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act against the present applicants before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for permission to to file a suit for ejectment of the Petitioners on the ground that the shop was needed for the personal use of the landlords. It. was urged that Sri Munna Lal, one of the owners, was in the service of firm Messrs. Ragunath Prasad and Sons, Chowk Kanpur, and his services had been terminated on 30-6-1955, and he had been thrown out of employment, and wanted the shop for carrying on his own business of repairing fountain-pens. An objection was filed by the present Petitioners and they contended that they have been in the occupation of the shop for more than 17 years. It was also disputed that Messrs Raghunath Prasad and Sons had employed Munna Lal in service. The proprietor of that firm was the uncle of Munna Lal. Munna Lal was living jointly with Hari Har Prasad Goel in the upper storey of (he shop of Messrs Raghunath Prasad and Sons and he was doing fountain-pen business in a small cabin attached to that shop. There were several other grounds on which the application was opposed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer got an enquiry made through the inspector. After his report and on consideration of all the circumstances the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application for permission on 31-1-1956. No revision was filed against that order before the Commr. and the order became final. On 13-2-1955, however, opposite party No. 4 Smt. Ram Katori Goel made an application to the Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur, pointing out that the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was wrong and that Sri Munna Lal who was employed by Hari Har Prasad Goel had been removed from service and is no longer doing any work there and that he had no place where he could carry on his business. On this the Distt. Magistrate directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reopen the case and to rehear it on merits. On this the Distt. Magistrate directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reopen the case and to rehear it on merits. Thereafter the Rent Control and Eviction Officer again heard the whole matter and on 1-10-1956 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted the necessary permission to the opposite parties to file a suit. A revision was filed against the order granting permission to the Commr. who rejected it on 12-1-1957. The present petition has been filed challenging the order of the Kent Control and Eviction Officer dated 1-10-1956 and the order of the Commr. dated 12-1-1957 confirming the aforesaid order in revision. 2. The Petitioner has urged a number of points in support of the petition. Firstly, it is argued by him that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 31-1-1956 refusing permission became final and it was not open to the Distt. Magistrate who had a concurrent jurisdiction with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to set aside that order and direct re-hearing of the Petitioner for permission. Secondly, it was contended that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer duted 1-10-1956 granting permission was no order inasmuch as he passed the order on the direction of the Distt. Magistrate and did not apply his own independent mind. Thirdly, it was contended that the Rent Control and Eviction 3. Officer had held in the first enquiry that the evidence had been manufactured by the other side to establish the fact that the services of Munna Lal had been terminated, and having recorded that finding it was not open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to come to a contrary conclusion that his services had in fact been terminated on looking into the Salary Register of the firm Raghunath Prasad and Sons. In this connection it was also argued that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having once rejected the application of the opposite parties on the ground that the need of the landlords is not genuine and also on the ground that the need of the tenants was genuine and they would be put to great hardship if they were ejected it was not open to him to set aside that order merely on the finding that the need of the landlords is bonafide. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4. Relevant facts given in the counter-affidavit are that the order of 31-1-1956 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was based on misapprehension as the relevant material evidence could not be adduced before him. An application is alleged to have been filed on the 19-9-1955 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in which it was prayed that the record of the firm Raghunath Prasad and Sons should be sent for and looked into. No orders were passed on that application and consequently the opposite parties did not get full opportunity to adduce sufficient evidence. It is further alleged in the counter-affidavit that the Distt. Magistrate only passed the following order on the application sent by the opposite parties to him after the orders have been passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 31-1-1956: Please reconsider the matter after hearing the parties. 5. From this order it is clear that the Distt. Magistrate issued no direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the application in a particular manner, nor did the Distt. Magistrate express any opinion on the merits of the application for grant of permission u/s 3. The Rent Control Officer was free to exercise his own discretion when the matter went back to him. Under the circumstances it cannot be argued that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 1-10-1956 was not his own order. 6. On the merits also it was contended that the order was perfectly valid inasmuch as the register of firm Raghunath Prasad and Sons clearly established that the opposite party No. 3 was an employee in that firm and his services had been terminated. It is also strenuously contended by the counsel for the opposite parties that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having come to the conclusion on the facts of the case on 1-10-1956 that the need of the landlords was genuine it was not necessary for him to consider the hardship to the tenants in order to exercise his discretion u/s 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. It was further contended by the counsel for the opposite parties that orders u/s 3 are administrative orders and it is always open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel his previous order even at the instance of the superior officer. this Court will not exercise its discretion u/Art. 226 of the Constitution and set aside the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer unless it found that the order was no order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but was an order passed by the District Magistrate himself. 7. It has been held by this Court in a number of cases that the orders passed Under Sections 3 and 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act are administrative orders and it is open to an authority which has got power to pass an administraiive order to cancel that order. Reference(sic) in this connection may be made to the following cases: Mannu Lal v. Chakradhar Hans 1952 AWR (HC) 279 Sri Syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fatima Begum 1955 AWR (HC) 194 and Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur. 1955 AWR HC 384 . 8. It has, however, also been held by this Court that the District Magistrate who has a concurrent jurisdiction with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has no jurisdiction to set aside an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. I he Act provides the procedure by which an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer can be set aside. A revision is provided against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the Commr. It is therefore not open to the District Magistrate exercising a coucurrent jurisdiction to set aside an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He may be entitled to exercise his own independent judgment and act u/s 3 or 7 of the Act even though the powers have been delegated by him to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, but he cannot sit as a court of appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He may be entitled to exercise his own independent judgment and act u/s 3 or 7 of the Act even though the powers have been delegated by him to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, but he cannot sit as a court of appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observations in the case of Sri Bishambhar Nath Saxena v. District Magistrate, Jalaun 1956 AWR (HC) 804 at page 274: Under the Act the District Magistrate is empowered to exercise administrative as well as quasi judicial functions. It is a characteristic of a judicial or quasi judicial power that it has to be exercised by the person upon whom the power is conferred, and that in the exercise of that power he cannot be controlled by superior authority. That is not so in the case of administrative functions. In the exercise of administrative functions there is scope for the officer exercising them being controlled by superior officer unless the exercise of the discretion is vested in the particular officer by a statutory provision. As already stated the Act authorises the District Magistrate to perform the functions mentioned therein. It also authorises an officer authorised by him to act on his behalf to do the same so far as his authority will extend. It follows therefore that in administrative matters the agent of the District Magistrate may be guided by the latter as to the manner in which he will exercise the functions entrusted to him.... Before the Rent Control and Eviction officer has exercised any of the powers vested in the District Magistrate under the Act he may be controlled and guided by the District Magistrate, his principal. Once he has so exercised his powers his order is an order under the Act, and it can be interfered with only as provided under the Act and not otherwise. In other words, when once an order has been made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer it is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to set aside or to revise it unless the Act empowers him to do so. The act however does not empower the District Magistrate to set aside or revise the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 10. The act however does not empower the District Magistrate to set aside or revise the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 10. Relying upon the passage it was contended by the counsel for the Petitioners that in the present case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having exercised his powers u/s 3 by refusing to grant permission this order could not have been set aside by the District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction at the direction of the District Magistrate to set aside his previous order and grant permission afresh. Reliance was also placed in this connection on the unreportea case of Mohd. Yunus & Mohd. Yusuf v. The District Magistrate Kanpur and two others (Writ Petition No. 33 of 1956 decided on 4-12-1956) by a Bench of this Court. There a permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. A second application on behalf of the tenants to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was rejected on the ground that the remedy of tenants was to go up in revision against the earlier order. Thereafter the tenants made an application to the D.M. and the D.M. directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to re-hear the matter and submit his report to him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer thereafter heard the parties and submitted his report to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate on the receipt of the report again directed the Rem Control and Eviction Officer to cancel the previous order and to issue a direction to the landlords not to file a suit. On the receipt of this direction the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cancelled the permission granted by him. A petition was filed by the landlords in this Court and that was allowed and the order cancelling the previous permission granted was set aside. It was held by the Bench that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having once exercised his delegated power it was not open to the District Magistrate to set aside that order. The only manner in which such an order could be set aside was by the Commr. in revision. 11. In the case of R.N. Seth Vs. It was held by the Bench that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having once exercised his delegated power it was not open to the District Magistrate to set aside that order. The only manner in which such an order could be set aside was by the Commr. in revision. 11. In the case of R.N. Seth Vs. Girja Shanker Srivastava, AIR 1952 All 819 it was held by a Bench of this Court that a permission u/s 3 of the Act given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot be revoked or cancelled by the District Magistrate himself. u/s 21, UP General Clauses Act, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer can presumably rescind the order which had been previously passed by him. But the provision contained in this section cannot be interpreted as authorising the District Magistrate to rescind any order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the authority given to him u/s 2 (d) of the Act. The power to add, to amend, vary or rescind is to be exercised in the like manner. "The power exercised by the District Magistrate in cancelling the order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is in the nature of an appellate or revisional power which cannot be exercised in the absence of an express statutory enactment." 12. From the examination of these authorities it is clear that the orders passed u/s 3 and S. 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act and administrative orders. The power once exercised by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who has a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Magistrate cannot be revoked or set aside by the District Magistrate as the District Magistrate has not been given any revisional jurisdiction over the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself, however, has always jurisdiction to rescind or modify his own previous order as it is an administrative order. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself, however, has always jurisdiction to rescind or modify his own previous order as it is an administrative order. It strikes me, however, that in cases where the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has refused to exercise his powers u/s 3 or S 7 it is always open to a party to move the Rent Control and Eviction Officer again for the exercise of such a power, It is not necessary for me in this case to point out the circumstances under which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having once failed as exercise his powers u/s 3 or 7 of the Act can be asked to exercise his powers again; but it is sufficient to point out that in such a case it cannot be regarded as the cancellation or modification of his previous order within the meaning of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act. The question therefore to be considered in the present case is whether on the facts of this case it can be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer when he reconsidered the matter was doing so on a fresh application made to him by the landlord or on the directions of the District Magistrate who had in fact set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing permission and has directed him to reconsider the matter on merits. 13. The District Magistrate on the application of the opposite party landlord directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reconsider the matter. The District Magistrate's order in effect set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting permission and directed him to reconsider the matter on facts and to decide whether it was a fit case in which he would exercise his powers u/s 3. It was contended by the counsel for the opposite party landlord that the District Magistrate in this case did not give out his own opinion on the merits of the application for permission to file a suit. It was also pointed out that from the perusal of the order of the Rent Conrol and Eviction Officer passed on 1-10-1956 it will be clear that he considered the question whether it was a fit case in which his previous order should or should not be revoked. 14. It was also pointed out that from the perusal of the order of the Rent Conrol and Eviction Officer passed on 1-10-1956 it will be clear that he considered the question whether it was a fit case in which his previous order should or should not be revoked. 14. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has no doubt in his order said that the application was one for review, and he has not referred to the order of the District Magistrate at all but the only inference which can be drawn from the order of the District Magistrate is that he in effect set aside the previous order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and directed him to reconsider the matter on the merits. 15. It was urged by the counsel for the opposite party landlord that when the Rent (Control and Eviction Officer made his earlier order he did not consider the application of the landlord made on 19-9-1955 under which he had asked for permission to produce certain documents. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer does not in his order state that he was reviewing his previous order as the material evidence could not be brought by the landlord before him due to his failure to consider the application of 19-9-1955. He has also not considered the matter whether in the circumstances of the present case there was sufficient ground for him to review his previous order. He has held that as the record shows that the opposite party Munna Lal was sitting on the chabutra of Raghunath Prasad and Sons as he was in the service and that his service has now been terminated. The need of Munna Lal is therefore genuine. That is a matter which is relevant to the consideration of the application for permission on merits and not on the question whether in the circumstances the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should or should not review his earlier order. As I have already pointed out earlier it was open to the landlord to apply afresh to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for grant of permission and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer would have considered the matter independently and not at the direction of the District Magistrate. 16. As I have already pointed out earlier it was open to the landlord to apply afresh to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for grant of permission and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer would have considered the matter independently and not at the direction of the District Magistrate. 16. It was next contended by the Petitioners that on 31-1-1956 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application u/s 3 for permission on the finding that the landlord's need was not genuine and he also found that the tenants had an established business in the shop and will suffer if they were allowed to be evicted unnecessarily. After considering the need of the landlord and also the inconvenience caused to the tenants the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the petition. By a subsequent order of 1-10-1956 he has re-considered the matter of the genuine need by the landlord but has completely ignored his earlier finding that the tenants will suffer great harm if the landlord is permitted to file the ejectment suit. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of 1-10-1956 therefore is arbitrary. 17. It was strongly urged by the counsel for the opposite party landlord that u/s 3 it is not incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider the question of inconvenience or harm to the tenant; if he is satisfied that the need of the landlord is genuine the permission must be granted. Reliance was placed for this proposition on the unreported decision of this Court in the case or Sri hi Shanker Prasad Shukla v. Kent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and Ors. (Civil Misc. Writ No. 583 of 1957 decided on 148-1957). In my opnion this case does not support the opposite party landlord. It is enough to point out the following observations made by the single Judge-that: I think that the duty of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commr.-is to weigh the points for and against the landlord and tenant and, after weighing them, to come to a conclusion whether to grant permission or not. The stature(sic) itself has not given any indication under what conditions the permission should be granted, but as observed in the case of Dr. The stature(sic) itself has not given any indication under what conditions the permission should be granted, but as observed in the case of Dr. J. R. Bhatia v. Smt. Victoria Rani Sahiba 1957 AWR HC 396 the officers concerned are to take into consideration the purpose for which the Act has been passed by the legislature. I am unable to say that the only purpose of the Act is to stop ejectment of tenants. I think the Act tries to be fair both to the landlord and to the tenant. 18. What the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to consider is the points of view of both the landlord and the tenant, and to grant relief after such a consideration. It cannot be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in considering the matter u/s 3 has not to consider the need of the tenant or inconvenience to him at all. Ordinarily if the power has been exercised by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer after weighing the different points of view urged by the landlord and the tenant this Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion u/Art. 226 of the Constitution, but in the present case, as I have already pointed out, by an earlier order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the application u/s 3 after considering the points of view of both the landlord and the tenant. In the subsequent order he has no doubt come to a different finding so far as the need of the landlord is concerned but he has not considered the point of view of the tenants at all. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Oficer had independently applied his mind to all the relevant considerations u/s 3. 19. In the result therefore I would set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 1-10-1956. It is open to the landlord to make a fresh application for the permission to file a suit which will be dealt with by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.