JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. This is an appeal by the 3rd defendant against an order of remand passed by the Additional District Judge of Quilon. 2. The plaintiff had filed the suit for redemption and recovery of his half share in the suit properties after partition by metes and bounds. The suit was resisted by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff has no subsisting title in the suit properties and that, in any event, the suit is barred under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. There were also other contentions on merits. The Trial Court took up issue No. 4 regarding the plea of limitation as a preliminary issue and came to the conclusion that the suit was barred under Art.122 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the suit without going into the other issues. It is regrettable that in deciding this issue, the Trial Court has disposed off the matter rather summarily. 3. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Additional District Judge, Quilon differed from the Trial Court on the question of limitation. According to the learned Judge, the suit is not barred by limitation. In this view, he set aside the decree and judgment of the Trial Court and remanded the suit for disposal on other issues. 4. Against the order of remand, the 3rd defendant has filed the appeal. 5. So far as the actual facts are concerned, there is not much dispute. One Chackuvan Thomman executed an Otti on 6-7-1084 under Ext. I for Rs. 400/- in favour of his sons, Idichandi and Kochu Thoman. The plaintiff is the son of Idichandi and the 1st defendant is Kochu Thoman. On 29-5-1085, the father, Chakuvan Thomman executed a will bequeathing his properties to his different children. It is unnecessary to go into the details of that will expecting to state that the father gave the properties covered by Ext. I to the plaintiffs father and the 1st defendant together with the Otti debts. There is significant recital in the said will as follows: "xxx" This recital clearly shows that though the properties were given to the two sons, the sons had to discharge the encumbrance if the father did not discharge hem during his lifetime. 6. I to the plaintiffs father and the 1st defendant together with the Otti debts. There is significant recital in the said will as follows: "xxx" This recital clearly shows that though the properties were given to the two sons, the sons had to discharge the encumbrance if the father did not discharge hem during his lifetime. 6. The father appears to have died in or about 1087 and the equity of redemption in the suit properties should have vested in the plaintiffs father and the 1st defendant by virtue of the will, Ext. A. 7. On 18-6-1085, the plaintiff executed a for 1400 Fanmas in favour of the 1st defendant. On 23-8-1112, the 1st defendant executed a Ext. III for Rs. 400/- in favour of the father of defendants 2 and 3. Ultimately, there is no dispute that the 3rd defendant has acquired the entire rights obtained by his father under Ext. III. The effect and scope of the two documents Exts. II and III will be dealt with later in the judgment, as the main decision in the case depends upon what was conveyed under Ext. II to the 1st defendants and what in turn, was conveyed by the first defendant under Ext. III. 8. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 21-5-1952 for redemption of the mortgage right and for partition and separate possession of his half share in the suit properties. The defence is that the plaintiff has conveyed his entire rights under Ext. II and that he has no subsisting title. Alternatively, it is also pleaded that, in any event, the 1st defendant has executed Ext. III as full owner and conveyed the entire rights in the property to the father of defendants 2 and 3 as such, the suit is barred by limitation under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. 9. Before going into the contentions of the learned counsel on both sides, it may be stated that Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act corresponds to Art.134 of the Central Act IX of 1908 as it stood prior to its amendment in 1929. The first column of the article provides for recovery of possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration. The second column provides a period of 12 years. The first column of the article provides for recovery of possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration. The second column provides a period of 12 years. The third column, as it stood then, stated the date of the transfer. 10. Mr. Paikeday, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the suit is barred by limitation under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. His argument is that under Ext. II, the plaintiff has transferred his entire rights in the suit properties in favour of the 1st defendant and therefore, he has no right to sue or ask for redemption. He also contended that by executing Ext. III as full owner, Kochu Thomman has acted in denial either expressly or impliedly of the rights, if any, of the plaintiff. Therefore, the matter comes within the scope of Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act and the suit should have been filed within 12 years from the date of Ext. III namely, 23-8-1112. The present suit having been instituted long after a period of 12 years, it is barred by limitation under the said Article. 11. Mr. Bhoothalinga Ayyar, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, contends that there has been no complete transfer of all the plaintiffs interests under Ext. II to the 1st defendant. Further, he contends that what was transferred by plaintiff under Ext. II was only the mortgage right in favour of his father under Ext. I and on this basis, he finally contended that Kochu Thomman transferred under Ext. III only his full half rights in the property along with the mortgage right of his brother, Idichandy. Therefore, the equity of redemption was always with the plaintiff and he is entitled to redeem the mortgage under the corresponding provision of the Travancore Limitation Act. 12. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel on both sides, it is essential to find out what was conveyed under Exts. II and III by the transferrors therein to the respective transferees. 13. As stated earlier, the father had bequeathed the properties to the plaintiffs father and to the 1st defendant along with the Otti debt. He had also specifically stated in the will, Ext. A, that the respective parties should discharge the liabilities. II and III by the transferrors therein to the respective transferees. 13. As stated earlier, the father had bequeathed the properties to the plaintiffs father and to the 1st defendant along with the Otti debt. He had also specifically stated in the will, Ext. A, that the respective parties should discharge the liabilities. Therefore, immediately on the death of the father in 1087, both the sons Idichandy and the 1st defendant had the Otti rights in their favour and had also become the owners of the equity of redemption originally owned by their father. No doubt, an argument has been advanced by Mr. Paikeday that there was a complete merger of both the rights in the two sons Idichandy and the 1st defendant and that it was not open to Idichandy to keep alive his rights as a mortgagee after his fathers death. This was controverted by Mr. Bhoothalinga Ayyar that the question of merger is one of intention and that Idichandy had a right to keep alive the mortgage right for his own benefit. It is not necessary for me to decide this point in these proceedings, as I am only concerned with the question of limitation. These are all points which arise on the contention of the parties and I also find that issues 1 to 3 deal with the competency of the plaintiff to redeem, his right over the equity of redemption, and the liability of the suit properties for the proportionate mortgage amount. As they are all points arising in the suit, I am not expressing any opinion on those contentions. 14. In Ext. II, there is no reference at all to the rights acquired by the plaintiffs father under the will Ext. A. On the date of Ext. II, the plaintiffs father, by virtue of Ext. A, had become also entitled to a joint share in the equity of redemption along with the 1st defendant. In Ext. II, the plaintiff traces his origin of titles for the purpose of the transfer only to the Otti Ext. A1 executed by his grandfather in favour of his father Idichandy and the 1st defendant, It also says that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant have been in joint enjoyment by virtue of the Otti Ext. I and it further specifically says that the plaintiff is transferring his half share in such right by means of that hmtbm-e-bm-[mcw . A1 executed by his grandfather in favour of his father Idichandy and the 1st defendant, It also says that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant have been in joint enjoyment by virtue of the Otti Ext. I and it further specifically says that the plaintiff is transferring his half share in such right by means of that hmtbm-e-bm-[mcw . Whatever may be the position in law, it is clear that under this document, the plaintiff does not purport to transfer anything more than the half mortgage right that he has under Ext. 1. 15. I have endeavoured to discuss Ext. II above a little elaborately because it is only by understanding that document we can get at the real scope of Ext. III. Under Ext. III the 1st defendant effects a hne-bm-[mcw . In tracing his title to the properties, it is significant to note that he refers to the Otti, Ext. I executed by his father in favour of himself and his deceased brother Idichandy and his getting a transfer from the plaintiff of the hoXm-h-Imiw of his brother Idichandy. After this recital, he further traces his title to the will Ext. A of his father. The following recital in the document is very significant. "xxx" The above recital clearly states what the 1st defendant got from the plaintiff under Ext. II and what he independently got also under the will of his father. Therefore, the document is quite clear that the transfer was only the complete half-share of defendant 1 in the properties and the mortgage rights of Idichandy assigned to him under Ext. II. 16. Mr. Bhoothalinga Ayyar very strongly relied upon the expression "xxx" "This sentence occurring immediately after the recital about the joint mortgage rights in favour of the 1st defendant and his deceased brother can refer, according to Mr. Bhoothalinga Ayyar, only to the mortgage rights of Idichandy and nothing more. 17. On the other hand, Mr. Paikeday, very strongly relies upon the subsequent statements in the document to the effect "xxx" and the further statements: "xxx" He relies upon the further statements in Ext. III directing the vendees to obtain Pattas and pay Government revenue, etc. 18. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Paikeday. On the other hand, I am inclined to accept Mr. III directing the vendees to obtain Pattas and pay Government revenue, etc. 18. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Paikeday. On the other hand, I am inclined to accept Mr. Bhoothalingam Ayyar's contention that the expression in the particular context refers only to the right of Idichandy as a joint mortgagee. The portions relied upon by Mr. Paikeday refer only to the second source of title which is traced by the 1st defendant to the will of his father. That statement is perfectly correct, because apart from the rights acquired under Ext. II, the 1st defendant has also got the half share in the equity of redemption under the will Ext. A. So far as the 1st defendant is concerned, he has treated himself as the complete owner of the half share in the properties. Therefore, this recital does not, in any way, detract from the earlier provisions in the document which specifically refer to his source of title from the plaintiff and that is, only Idichandys mortgage rights. The portions relating to the vendee obtaining Pattas and payment of revenue will not certainly make the document as transferring anything more than what it really did in the operative portions earlier. The expression can only refer to all the rights that the 1st defendant had and those rights have been specifically referred to in the earlier portions of Ext. III. Therefore, that expression cannot be cut out from its context and understood to mean that the vendor was purporting to sell something more than what he really had. 19. In my opinion, the transfer effected under Ext. III is nothing more than the half right of the 1st defendant and the mortgage right obtained by him under assignment from the plaintiff under Ext. II. 20. On this finding, the question arises whether the suit for redemption and possession of the half share by the plaintiff is barred under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. Under the corresponding Article 134 of the Central Act as it stood prior to the amendment, the Privy Council in Skinner v. Kunwar Naunihal Singh ( AIR 1929 PC 158 at p. 161) observed as follows: The transfer of property mortgaged contemplated by Art.134 is admittedly something other than an express transfer of the original mortgage. Under the corresponding Article 134 of the Central Act as it stood prior to the amendment, the Privy Council in Skinner v. Kunwar Naunihal Singh ( AIR 1929 PC 158 at p. 161) observed as follows: The transfer of property mortgaged contemplated by Art.134 is admittedly something other than an express transfer of the original mortgage. The article contemplated a transfer by larger interest than that given by the mortgage or at any rate an interest unencumbered by a mortgage. Again at page 162 their Lordships observed as follows : It is conceded and is plain that Art.134 does not protect the transferee of a mortgage by express transfer, and it appears to their Lordships idle to suppose that it protects a person who has taken a transfer only of a mortgage, but has taken it without his knowledge mistakingly supposing that he was getting something better in circumstances like the present, where he cannot maintain his superior title by reliance on any period of limitation. Resting as he does on the interest of mortgagee he is liable to be redeemed. Reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of Spencer and Odgers, JJ. reported in Lakshmana Ayyar v. Sankarapandiam Pillai (AIR 1926 Mad. 311 at 313). The following passage quoted by the learned Judges at page 313 is very opposite. The question whether the transferee from a mortgagee took an absolute interest or only a mortgage interest is a question of intention. I may also refer to a Division Bench decision of the Travancore - Cochin High Court reported in Venkitasubramania Iyer v. Narayanan ( 1954 KLT 113 at 120) comprising Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillai. The following passage in the judgment of Mr. Justice Sankaran, at page 120, brings out very forcibly the true position in such suits. The mortgagors suit for recovery of possession of the property from such transferee will be governed by Article 136 of the Travancore Limitation Act corresponding to Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act as in the case of such suits when brought against the original mortgagee of his heirs. A transfer of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee in favour of a third party for valuable consideration will be attracted by Article 122 only when such transfer is made in denial or in defiance of the mortgagors title in express terms. A transfer of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee in favour of a third party for valuable consideration will be attracted by Article 122 only when such transfer is made in denial or in defiance of the mortgagors title in express terms. It is enough if such denial is apparent at least by implication. The transferror must however be purporting to transfer a right, title or interest independent of and unconnected with the mortgage in his favour. Then alone can it be said that the transferee from the mortgage is prescribing against the mortgagor who is the real owner of the property. The essential features of a transfer coming under Article 122 is the commencement of such prescriptive right in favour of the transferee for valuable consideration from the mortgage. This position is now well settled. With great respect to the learned Judge, I entirely agree with these observations of Mr. Justice Sankaran and they are in accordance with the principles laid down by the Privy Council in the earlier judgment mentioned above. To a similar effect is the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chunai v. Ram Prasad (F. B.) (AIR 1951 Allahabad 167). 21. In this case, taking Ext. II, it is very clear that the transfer by the plaintiff was only the mortgage rights that his father had in the property. The transfer under Ext. III by the 1st defendant is again only of his rights in the property and also the half share of the mortgaged rights of Idichandy transferred to him, by his son, the plaintiff, under Ext. II. The 1st defendant knows full well what he is transferring under Ext. III and the vendees equally know what they are getting under Ext. III. After the clear recitals in Ext. III regarding the different titles of the 1st defendant, it is idle to contend that the father of defendants 2 and 3 acquired absolute title to the entire suit properties. The document is quite clear. Even if the vendee was under the impression that he was getting something more, it cannot help him, as pointed out in the passage quoted from the decision of the Privy Council in Skinner v. Kunwar Nauhihal Singh ( AIR 1929 PC 158 at p. 161). Applying the test laid down by the decisions discussed above, it cannot be stated that under Ext. Applying the test laid down by the decisions discussed above, it cannot be stated that under Ext. III, the 1st defendant has done anything which will amount to a denial or negativing of the rights of the plaintiff either expressly or even impliedly. The transaction covered by Ext. III will not stand in the way of the plaintiff filing the present suit for redemption, if he is otherwise entitled to. There is no scope in this case, for the application of Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act corresponding to Art.134 of the Central Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1929. 22. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff. 23. Being a suit of 1952, the Trial Court is directed to take up immediately for trial and dispose of the other points arising in the suit.