ORDER This is a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 24-12-1955 passed by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur in Revenue Appeal No. 70 of 1955 on the ground that the said order was without jurisdiction. The petitioners who belong to village Sapam have filed this petition for invoking the power of superintendence which this court has over all courts and tribunals in this territory, on behalf of themselves and as representing the other villagers of Sapam. Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 have been similarly joined as representing village Tekcham. 2 It is necessary to state at some length the facts and the history of the case for the proper appreciation of the questions involved. The dispute relates to a road running through a waste land bordered on the east by the Imphal-Burmah road, and on the north, west and south respectively by the villages known as Sapam, Tekcham and Papan. The road in question connects Tekcham village directly with the Imphal-Burmah road. There is a separate and parallel road connecting each of the two-villages Sapam and Papan, directly with the Imphal-Burmah road, and those roads also run through this waste land. It is an admitted fact that this waste land which is about 450 bighas in area, and bears Dag Nos. 195, 324, 1071, 1091, 1170 and 1160 belongs to the Government, but is allotted as grazing ground and is recorded as such in the Government papers. There is however some dispute over the right of persons entitled to graze thereon. While petitioners claim that only Sapam village has that right, the respondents who belong to Tekcham village claim that all the 3 villages mentioned above have this right. The remarks in some of the previous cases and on the map however go to show that this grazing ground is intended for all the surrounding villages. In this connection my attention was also drawn to Ext. A/2 which is a copy of the application filed in C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1954 by the father of the present petitioner Chaoba Singh and some others of Sapam village, in which it was admitted that this grazing ground was the recorded grazing ground of all these three villages. A/2 which is a copy of the application filed in C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1954 by the father of the present petitioner Chaoba Singh and some others of Sapam village, in which it was admitted that this grazing ground was the recorded grazing ground of all these three villages. 3 Whether there was a path since long before on the site of the road in question is in dispute, but it is an admitted fact that this area also came under the Community Project Scheme and in pursuance of it the Government decided to build a pucca road connecting the Burmah road with Loushi Hill and in October, 1954, the Project Executive Officer demarcated on the spot the road in question 22 feet wide. Thereafter the work of construction was taken in hand by Tekcham Road Committee under the supervision of the Project Executive Officer, and I was told that free labour was provided by the villagers of Tekcham and the Government gave some materials and some monetary help. Dino Singh who is one of the respondents in this petition and belongs to Imphal was appointed as the contractor for the said construction and also the President of the Tekcham Road Committee. In this way earth work 2 feet in height, and the construction of some culverts, and some other work was finished by the villagers of Tekcham. 4 In the meantime petitioner Chaoba Singh and his father Chaobi Singh on behalf of themselves and the other villagers of Sapam had served a notice of suit on the Government under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code in April, 1955, asserting that they had acquired a prescriptive right to graze their cattle on this land, as they and their ancestors had been grazing their cattle on it since time immemorial, that is for more than 60 years before 1954. as of right openly and peaceably and the construction of this road being in derogation of that right they were entitled to a declaration of that right and injunction permanently restraining the Government from interfering with this right by the construction of the said road and for the removal of the earth work etc. done and the restoration of that site to its previous condition. 5 In October, 1955. done and the restoration of that site to its previous condition. 5 In October, 1955. the Government decided to drop the further construction of the proposed Burmah-Loushi Hill road and the Project Officer and others were duly informed of it, but it is not known whether this decision was taken in consequence of the notice served by some of the petitioners or for some other reasons. Since the construction was to extend beyond Tekcham village, that is, upto Loushi Hill and the order was for the dropping of further work only and not for the demolition of the work already done, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that it was in consequence of the notice served by the petitioners. Rather the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, dated 24-12-1955 goes to show that what the Government had really decided was that they would not give any financial assistance to the construction of that portion of the road. 6 An application was then made to the Development Commissioner, Manipur (the Deputy Commissioner holds that office also) by petitioner Chaoba Singh on behalf of the villagers of Sapam that since the further construction of the road from Burmah road to Loushi Hill had been dropped, an order should be passed permitting them to level the area or directing the opposite party to level it, that is, the work already done should be allowed to be demolished. Dino Singh who was described as contractor and President, Tekcham Road Committee was alone made a party to that application. The application was forwarded to the E.A.C. (Revenue), who also exercises the powers of a Deputy Commissioner and the E.A.C. forwarded it to the S.D.C., Thoubal. for report. The S.D.C. who appears to have had no information on the matter asked for a report from the Amin. The Amin reported that the road had almost been completed by the Tekcham Road Committee, but the construction of the same had been dropped by the order of the Chief Commissioner and therefore in pursuance of that order the petitioner requested for the road being levelled to its original position. He seems to have presumed that the effect of the order of the Chief Commissioner was that the work done should be demolished, while in fact as already stated what was decided was the dropping of the further construction of the road. He seems to have presumed that the effect of the order of the Chief Commissioner was that the work done should be demolished, while in fact as already stated what was decided was the dropping of the further construction of the road. The S.D.C. then made a report of these facts to the E.A.C. (Revenue) and also suggested that the Community Project Scheme people ought to be able to give full particulars of the road. The E.A.C. (Revenue) then asked for the comments of the Project Executive Officer who reported that since the construction of the road had been dropped they had nothing to do with it. He also suggested that the culverts or materials that might have been fixed or provided on this portion may be handed over at the time of levelling to the Road Committee. The E.A.C. after perusing these reports came to the conclusion that the construction of the road had been dropped altogether and because the Project Executive Officer had no objection, ordered that the disputed portion of the road may be dismantled or cut up with the direction that any culvert or materials found on this portion should be handed over to the Road Committee. The E.A.C. before passing this order did not issue any notice to Dino Singh, who was named the opposite party in the application or to the villagers of Tekcham who had supplied the labour, and it was conceded by all before me that the enquiry did not go beyond asking for reports from the above Officers and no effort was made to ascertain and no chance was given to the villagers of Tekcham who had supplied the labour and constructed the road to put forward their objections. 7 It may be noticed here that the order of the E.A.C. (Revenue) that the road should be dismantled or cut up, went beyond the Government order which was only to the effect that no financial aid would be given by the Government and the further construction of the road should be dropped. The Government did not say that the work already done should be demolished. The Government did not say that the work already done should be demolished. In these circumstances it might very well be held that the E. A. C. (Revenue) had no power to modily the order of the Government by directing the demolition of the road, and ought to have referred the matter to the Government for orders, if he considered that an order for demolition was necessary. 8 Naturally the villagers of Tekcham felt aggrieved and present respondents Nos. 2 to 5 as representing Tekcham village preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner which was registered as a Revenue Appeal Case No. 70 of 1955. Only Chaoba Singh and Dino Singh were impleaded as respondents to that appeal. An order was endorsed on the memo of appeal that the record be sent for and notices be issued to the respondents inviting their objections. The main grounds urged in that appeal were that on the site of the present road in dispute there was always a village path in existence for the last about 200 years and the villagers of Tekcham had been using it and had thereby acquired a right of way over it as an easement. During the last War the military made this road broad and used to pass their vehicles over it. and this fact of user by the Military was also admitted by the present petitioners. There was some dispute over this road in 1950 also and the Deputy Commissioner had passed an order dated 30-5-1951 prohibiting the villagers of Tekcham from interfering and preventing people from passing by the road. The appellants also contended on the strength of this order that this order not having been got set aside the order of the E.A.C. for the demolition of the road was illegal. Both the respondents to that appeal filed their written statements in reply to the memorandum of appeal, but no date was fixed for hearing and no chance was given to the parties to argue the cage in person or through counsel. The order that the Chief Commissioner passed in that appeal on 24-12-55 is reproduced below :- "The D.C.s order that the road may be demolished or cut up (the order does not say by whom) cannot be supported by the Government decision that they would not give any financial assistance to the construction of that portion of the road. The order that the Chief Commissioner passed in that appeal on 24-12-55 is reproduced below :- "The D.C.s order that the road may be demolished or cut up (the order does not say by whom) cannot be supported by the Government decision that they would not give any financial assistance to the construction of that portion of the road. As observed by the previous D. C. "A grazing ground will remain a grazing ground even if a path is constructed across it". I feel that the order for demolition is infructuous as it did not direct any particular party to do the demolition and that it was also unnecessary since a path like this will not materially interfere with the use of a grazing ground as grazing ground. The order is accordingly set aside a requested in the appeal petition." 9 Thus it will be seen that the following important questions are involved in the dispute :- (1) Whether the Sapam village has acquired an exclusive and prescriptive right of pasturage over this grazing ground including the portion occupied by the road in dispute, (2) Whether the road in dispute has been in existence for the last 200 years and has been used by Tekcham village and have they acquired a right of way thereby. 10 But they are questions which can be finally decided only by a civil court, and the petitioners were conscious of it, when they gave the notice under S. 80. 11 It is admitted on all hands that this land bad been allotted as a grazing ground by the Government and is recorded as such, and it might be worthwhile examining the rights that accrue under the law by such allotment in favour of those for whom the land is reserved as a grazing ground. The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 has been in force in Manipur also, and Ss. 13 and 15 of that Regulation run as follows : "13. The Provincial Government may make rules for the allotment from the land referred to in S. 12 of grazing ground to the inhabitants of any village in the neighbourhood whom they consider to stand in need of such allotment, and for regulating and controlling the enjoyment of those grazing grounds by persons permitted to resort thereto". "15. The Provincial Government may make rules for the allotment from the land referred to in S. 12 of grazing ground to the inhabitants of any village in the neighbourhood whom they consider to stand in need of such allotment, and for regulating and controlling the enjoyment of those grazing grounds by persons permitted to resort thereto". "15. No person shall acquire, by length of possession or otherwise, any right over lands disposed of or allotted under S. 12, S. 13 or S. 14 beyond that which is given by the rules made under the section." 12. Rule 92 framed under S. 13 of that Regulation prohibits the occupation or disposal for any other purpose of land allotted for grazing unless the Government so direct, and Rules 93 and 94 give the Deputy Commissioner the power to prescribe conditions on which a grazing ground may be used and to issue passes for the same and to charge fees from professional graziers. These provisions of the law thus make it amply clear that the Government have the power to divert land allotted for grazing to other purposes. It is therefore difficult to understand how a prescriptive grazing right can be acquired over such land. The Government had therefore every right to permit the construction of a public road over this grazing ground unless it could be shown that others had acquired a property right over the land, which took away this right of the Government.Rule 18 provides for the ejectment of trespassers on the grazing ground or other communal land, but it is an admitted fact that the petitioners did not resort to that provision of law. 13 It is in the light of this back-ground that the question raised by the petitioners has to be examined. The main contention that the learned counsel for the petitioners pressed is that the order of the E.A.C. for dismantling the road was purely an executive or administrative order and was not therefore amenable to the Revenue jurisdiction of the C.C. as the highest appellate authority on the Revenue side. He however conceded that the C.C. in his executive or administrative capacity had every power to set aside the said order and if it is found that he acted in that capacity then the petitioners would not be entitled to invoke Art. 227 of the Constitution. He however conceded that the C.C. in his executive or administrative capacity had every power to set aside the said order and if it is found that he acted in that capacity then the petitioners would not be entitled to invoke Art. 227 of the Constitution. But what he urged was that he was neither approached nor did he act in that capacity was evident from the fact that what was preferred before him was styled an appeal and it was also registered as an appeal. Thus the order was without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. 14The other side while admitting that the order of the E.A.C. was purely an executive order, contended that in fact the C.C. also acted in his executive or administrative capacity when he dealt with the matter and set aside the order of the E.A.C, and the real character of the proceeding will not be taken away by the mistake committed by the applicants in naming that representation as an appeal, and by the clerical staff under the C.C. in registering it as Appellant Revenue appeal case. He submitted that such mistakes were due to the fact that the technicalities involved were still not understood in these parts, and because some confusion was also caused due to the Chief Commissioner exercising the functions of an executive authority and also that of a Revenue Tribunal. In my opinion there is considerable force in that argument, and an examination of the record also lends support to it. The fact that no order sheet was opened and no date was fixed for hearing and the order for notice to file objections was endorsed on the memo of appeal itself all incline one to the view that the matter was treated on the executive side. As such, on petitioners own contention this petition under Art. 227 would be incompetent. 15 But even if it were to be held that the C. C. acted in the exercise of his revenue appellate jurisdiction I do not think that this is a fit case where this court would be justified in exercising its supervisory powers and interfering with the order. 16. 15 But even if it were to be held that the C. C. acted in the exercise of his revenue appellate jurisdiction I do not think that this is a fit case where this court would be justified in exercising its supervisory powers and interfering with the order. 16. It is well settled that the powers under Art. 227 are of an extra-ordinary and discretionary nature, and ought to be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty for which no other remedy is available and which would have serious consequences if not remedied. These powers cannot be claimed as a matter of right and there is case law in support of the view that even in cases of want of jurisdiction, it is not obligatory on the High Court to interfere under Art. 227, when such interference is not called for in the interest of justice. Thus the power of superintendence under Art. 227 ought to be exercised only in exceptional cases, and the High Court will take into consideration the conduct of the party which invokes its powers (see Pambi v. State, AIR 1952 All 526 (A); Jodhey v. State, AIR 1952 All 788 (B); Indra Narayan v. Girindra Nath, AIR 1952 Cal 192 (C); Harinada Dutta v. Anante Mandal AIR 1952 Cal 526 (D); Pulin Behari v. Byom Kesh Mitra, AIR 1953 Cal 40 (E); Joges Chandra Pal v. Budhram Lohar, AIR 1953 Assam 103 (F) and Esthappan v. M. Anna, AIR 1953 Trav Co 41 (G). ) 17 As already seen, it is clear in the present case that what the Government had decided was to give up the further construction of the disputed road, and not that the construction already done should be demolished, and the E. A. C. clearly mis-interpreted this order of the Government. His order, therefore, went beyond the order of the Government. Again that order was passed without giving any kind of hearing whatsoever to the villagers of Tektham who had constructed the road, and were interested in it, and which omission was opposed to every principle of natural justice. The villagers were not made parties to that proceeding and even Dino Singh who alone was joined as a party by the petitioner, when they must have known that he had no more interest in the subject matter, was not given any kind of notice. The villagers were not made parties to that proceeding and even Dino Singh who alone was joined as a party by the petitioner, when they must have known that he had no more interest in the subject matter, was not given any kind of notice. Such an order cannot on the face of it be sustained, and if the order of the Chief Commissioner which did substantial justice by doing away with it were to be set aside, it will have the effect of restoring the order of the E. A. C, which as already seen, will result in the perpetration of a glaring injustice. It is needless to say that the powers under Art. 227 can neither be invoked for that purpose nor can this court be a party to the perpetration of such injustice. Taking all this into consideration, I think that this is not a case where the exercise of the power under Art. 227 is called for. 18 An attempt was also made to show that the order of the Chief Commissioner was also vitiated because no opportunity to argue in person or through counsel was given to the parties, and the matter was decided only after calling for objections from the opposite parties. But it is not necessary to enter into that question in view of the conclusions which I have already reached, because any view that might be taken on that question will make no difference to the result. 19 The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.