JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This Second appeal has been filed by the Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate court arising out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession after finding that the surrender made by the Plaintiff in favour of the landlord was by coercion. Plaintiff's version is that he made an application to the office of the ex-state of Narasinghpur surrendering his rights in respect of the lands in dispute on 2nd of March, 1945. The said application is Ext. 12. He is challenging the surrender on the ground that this was procured by coercive measures taken by the authorities of the Narasinghpur ex-state and as proceedings u/s 182 of the Indian Penal Code were started against him. The surrender in deed was accepted by the ex-state but he was in possession after the surrender and It is only after dispossession that he has brought the present suit. The defence was that the surrender was valid and not vitiated by coercion and the second defence was that the suit was barred by limitation as the case comes directly under the provisions of Article 91 of the Limitation Act. The trial court found that there was no coercion, the application of surrender was voluntary and it was duly accepted by the ex-state authorities. The lower appellate court, however, found that the surrender cannot be given effect to as it was procured by coercion. He has given the antecedent circumstances leading to the application of surrender to come to this conclusion. In my opinion, the finding of the lower appellate court on the question of coercion may be accepted. But that is not enough to confirm the decree passed by the lower appellate court and give a decree in favour of the Plaintiff. The suit appears to have been barred by Article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act which runs as follows: When the facts entitling the Plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. Article 91. - To cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for. 2. The learned lower appellate court discussed this question of limitation. But, nevertheless, according to him, the case comes under Article 120, that Is, the residuary article and will be governed by six years period of limitation. Article 91. - To cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for. 2. The learned lower appellate court discussed this question of limitation. But, nevertheless, according to him, the case comes under Article 120, that Is, the residuary article and will be governed by six years period of limitation. The suit was filed on 18th of January, 1950 while the deed of surrender is dated 2nd of March, 1945. Manifestly, if the case comes under Article 91 of the Limitation Act, the suit must be thrown off as barred by limitation. The point arises whether in the present case, there is any instrument which required to be avoided by the present Plaintiff. There is no doubt over the position that an instrument procured by coercion is only voidable and not void (sic) initio and particularly when the party who has executed the instrument comes with a suit to avoid it, the case comes under Article 91 of the Limitation Act; provided, the document which he executed is an instrument. Undoubtedly, all documents cannot be treated to be instruments as used in the language of Article 91 of the Limitation Act. There is no definition of the word 'instrument in the Limitation Act, but, it appears in the Stamp Act which runs as follows:- 'Instrument includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. This application was with the contents that the rights of the Plaintiff are extinguished on the basis of the application and the surrender which transpires from the body of the application. The application and the order of acceptance do constitute one transaction and as the transaction extinguished the rights of the Plaintiff, It comes within the meaning of the word 'instrument as used under Article 91. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the Respondents however, argued that this was a suit primarily for possession and not for cancelling the document of surrender. As I have indicated above, the instrument of surrender is only voidable and not void. If it stands without being avoided, Plaintiff?s rights had already been extinguished on the basis of the instrument. Even if the Plaintiff continued to be in possession after the deed of surrender his? possession was that of a trespasser as the deed of surrender was not avoided. If it stands without being avoided, Plaintiff?s rights had already been extinguished on the basis of the instrument. Even if the Plaintiff continued to be in possession after the deed of surrender his? possession was that of a trespasser as the deed of surrender was not avoided. In order to give relief to the present Plaintiff in the present suit, It is essential to avoid the deed of surrender and, as such, Article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act Is a very pertinent provision applicable to the present suit. 3. In conclusion, therefore, the Plaintiff's suit must be held to be barred by Limitation and is therefore dismissed. The judgment and decree of the appellate court are set aside. But the parties are to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed