JUDGMENT R. Dayal, J. - This is a revision under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure against the order of the District Judge allowing an appeal under Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure and ordering the dropping of the proceedings based on an order for filing a complaint against the opposite-party for an offence under Section 193, Indian Panel Code. 2. The Civil Judge recorded a finding that a complaint be made against the opposite-party on the 22nd of January, 1951. An appeal was filed before the District Judge on the 19th of February, 1951. 3. It has been strenuously contended for the applicant that the appeal to the District judge was incompetent. Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure allows an appeal against the making of a complaint and not against the recording of a finding about the expediency of lodging a complaint under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance is placed on the case reported in Mohammad Illayas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 A.L.J. 241,. This contention was not raised in the grounds of revision and it does not appear to have been raised before the District Judge. Even if the contention be correct in law, there is nothing on the record to indicate that a complaint had not actually been made by the Civil Judge prior to the 19th of February, 1951. If a complaint had been made prior to the 19th of February, 1951, the opposite-party would have the right to appeal and the appeal would be competent in view of the provisions of Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure and within the observations in Mohammad Illayas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 A.L.J. 241. As the question was not raised and is dependent on a question of fact, I do not consider it. 4. I need not discuss at length how far the appeal to the District Judge under Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure would have been a good appeal even if it had been filed prior to the making of the complaint. I, however, see no good reason why the order of the District Judge on such an appeal be considered to be void. The complaint must be made actually as a necessary consequence of the order recording a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint be made. I, however, see no good reason why the order of the District Judge on such an appeal be considered to be void. The complaint must be made actually as a necessary consequence of the order recording a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint be made. If the party, against whom a complaint is to be made, is alert and files an appeal against the order about whose definite existence he does know and when he may possibly never know promptly about the complaint being actually sent by the court concerned to the Magistrate, there seems no harm in it and there is no good reason to consider such an appeal Void or incompetent. 5. The cases reported in Mohammad Illayas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 A.L.J. 241, Fitzholmes v. The Crown, A.I.R. 1927 Lahore 54, and Daga Devji Patil v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1928 Bombay 64, really dealt with the question of the stage from which limitation for such an appeal is to be computed. The question about the validity of an appeal filed Under Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure but before the actual making of the complaint was not for consideration in those cases. Undoubtedly, it has been held in those cases that a person gets a right of appeal when a complaint is made against him or when the court has refused to lodge a complaint on his application. For practical purposes, a complaint is made against a person when the court has ordered that a complaint be filed. Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, itself contemplates the expression `making of a complaint' in a loose sense and not in the strict sense of presentation of a complaint to the Magistrate for the purpose of taking cognisance of the case. It speaks of the court's recording a finding, making a complaint, forwarding it to a magistrate, and either sending the accused in custody to the court concerned or to take sufficient security from him for his appearance in court. The court does this thing against the accused even before the actual presentation of the complaint before the Magistrate. It should not, therefore, be stretching the language of Section 476-B if it be considered that an order under Section 476 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, comes within the expression `making of a complaint' by the court concerned. The court does this thing against the accused even before the actual presentation of the complaint before the Magistrate. It should not, therefore, be stretching the language of Section 476-B if it be considered that an order under Section 476 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, comes within the expression `making of a complaint' by the court concerned. In this connection it may also be considered that Section 476 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure makes no mention of the court's actually recording any order refusing to make a complaint. It only deals with the contingency of the court's making a complaint which it can only do after it has come to the opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lodge a complaint. 6. It is also a matter for consideration that Section 476-B, Code of Criminal Procedure itself does not say against what an appeal is to be filed. It only describes the person who can file an appeal. In the Bombay case it was considered that an appeal is filed against the order directing that a complaint be filed. Section 419, Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates an appeal against a sentence or order. Articles 154 and 155 of the Limitation Act lay down the date of the sentence or order as , the starting point of limitation. It has been observed in Mohammad Illayas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 A.L.J. 241, that the making of a complaint is neither a sentence nor order but has to be treated as such in view of the provisions of Articles 154 and 155, Limitation Act, and Section 419, Code of Criminal Procedure. If the making of the complaint is not a sentence or order, and certainly it is not so, these provisions should not apply and no artificial meaning be given to the `making of a complaint.' 7. On the merits too, I am of opinion that the order of the court below holding that it was not expedient to lodge a complaint seems to me to be sound. 8. I, therefor, reject this revision with costs.