Judgment :- 1. This is a revision by the plaintiff in 0. S.174/57 District Munsiff's Court, Meenachil against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Meenachil reversing the order of the trial court issuing a temporary injunction in his favour. 2. It is unnecessary for me to go in any great detail in this matter, because I am satisfied that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge refusing to grant the temporary injunction, is perfectly within his jurisdiction and correct in law. 3. The application was for restraining the defendant from executing a decree obtained by him in O. S.509/1112. There is no dispute that the decree itself is not being challenged in the present proceedings and what the plaintiff claims is some special rights in the properties before he can be dispossessed. 4. It cannot be certainly said, that a party like the defendant here executing a decree lawfully obtained by him, which has become final and which is not challenged in any way, is causing any property to be sold or delivered wrongfully in execution of the decree. It cannot be said, within the meaning of Order XXXIX R.1 C. P. C., that the property is being wrongfully sold or delivered in execution of a decree. There is a direct decision on this point of the Madras High Court of the learned Chief Justice Stodart in Sankara Ayyar v. Muhammad Ganni Rowther (I. L. R.59 Madras 744) and I respectfully agree with that decision. The learned judges state that the decree-holder, who is taking steps in pursuance of a decree lawfully obtained by him and which is not being challenged, cannot be said to bring the property to sale wrongfully in execution of his decree. 5. Mr. Paikaday very vehemently contended that the plaintiff's case will come under R.2 of Order XXXIX and that there is an injury which his client is likely to suffer by allowing the defendant to execute the decree and thus dispossess him from the property. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel, because, in my opinion, a person who has obtained a decree which has become final, and trying to get a sale or possession of the property in pursuance of that decree, cannot be said to commit any injury in the sense it is understood in law in respect of any party or property. In this view, even the second contention of Mr. Paikaday fails. More than that, there is also the admitted fact that the present plaintiff took steps to have the sale, in pursuance of which possession is now sought to be taken by the defendant, set aside and he has miserably failed in that application also. Further, there is also no dispute that the plaintiff claims rights, if any, only as a purchaser pendente lite. The Civil Revision Petition is devoid of substance and is dismissed with costs. The learned trial judge will dispose of the suit on the merits without having any reference to the observations contained in the judgments of this court, or of both the lower courts in these proceedings. Dismissed.