SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : The only point which we are concerned 1 decide at present in these appeals is whether the security bonds executed by the decree-holder respondents in pursuance of our order dated 9t July, 1956 are valid. The security bonds in question were executed to enable the decree-holder to withdraw the decretal amount deposited in court and to secure repayment of the money withdraw in case the decrees were reversed on appeal. It may be observed that the decrees are money decrees and we therefore refused to stay execution thereof, but we provided that in case the decretal amount is deposited in court the decree holders would be entitled to withdraw the same o furnishing security to the satisfaction of the executing court. We understand that the decretal amounts were deposited in court and in order to take out the money, the decree-holders execute the security bonds in question. The validity of the security bonds has bee challenged on the ground that the documents were unregistered and under S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act the documents which hypothecate certain immovable properties had to be registered. On behalf of the decree-holders it was claimed that the documents did not require registration they being security bonds executed in favour c the Court and the Court having accepted tr. same by its order in question, no registration c the documents was necessary even though the purported to give in security certain immoveable properties. On behalf of the decree-holders reference is made to the exception provided in S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act and it is urged that the security bonds in question are covered by this exception. The learned Subordinate Judge by it order dated 5th September 1956 has accepted the validity of the security bonds and has decided in favour of the decree-holders. The judgment debtors have therefore moved us against this order There is a divergence of judicial opinion o: the point. We considered it proper to hear the learned Advocate General also inasmuch as the question affected the Government revenue as we! We have had the advantage of listening to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and also of the assistance of the learned Advocate General as amicus curiae. We considered it proper to hear the learned Advocate General also inasmuch as the question affected the Government revenue as we! We have had the advantage of listening to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and also of the assistance of the learned Advocate General as amicus curiae. (2) Dealing with the question of registration the learned Subordinate Judge has purported t rely upon certain decisions of the Bombay and the Lahore High Court': which seem to favour the view that a document of this character which is given in security in connection with stay of execution proceedings under O. 41, R. 5, Civil Procedure Code, did not require stamp or registration inasmuch as unless the document is accepted by the Court not only in regard to the sufficiency of its security but also in regard to its validity, the document cannot be operative and confer any rights on the parties. This view has not been accepted by the Mad­ras, Rangoon and the Calcutta High Courts who have taken the opposite view. They are of opi­nion that in a matter like this the Court merely decides about the sufficiency of the amount of security offered; but it cannot give validity to a document which per se is invalid and therefore the document had to be registered before it could be acted upon by the Court. I would briefly refer to those decisions in order to appreciate the different view points. In 'Jayappa Lokappa v. Shivangouda Dyaman-gouda', AIR 1928 Bom 42: ILR 52 Bom 72 (A), it was held that a security bond, being a part of judi­cial proceedings and incorporated with it, the pro­visions of S. 17, Registration Act, do not apply to it, as proper judicial proceedings whether con­sisting of pleadings filed by the parties or of or­ders made by the Court, do not require registra­tion. The learned Judges there recognized that the security bond given in such cases fell within, the scope of S. 17 (1) of the Registration Act, 1908 and ordinarily such a document would be compulsorily registered; but they relied upon several decisions of the Privy Council in support of the view that the document was exempt from regis­tration, in view of the fact that it formed part of a judicial proceeding. The first case referred to is a decision of the Privy Council in 'Bindesri Naik v. Gangasaran Sahu', 25 Ind App 9: ILR 20 All, 171 (B). This was a case decided with reference to the provi­sions of the Indian Registration Act of 1877 and for the purposes of the case before them there was no substantial difference between the terms of the Act of 1877 and the Act of 1908. Lord Watson who delivered the judgment of the Court remark­ed that the provisions of S. 17 of the Act did not apply to proper judicial proceedings, whether con­sisting of pleadings filed by the parties, or of or­ders made by the court. This dictum was in general terms and ap­parently as it was recognized by the learned Judges themselves was not based on any specific provisions of the Act. The learned Judges ob­served that it was difficult to bring such peti­tions within the words 'decree or order of the Court or any award'. The next case is a deci­sion in 'Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee', ILR 22 Mad 508: 26 Ind App 101 (C). It is not necessary to refer to the facts of the case. Here again. Lord Watson who deliver­ed the judgment of the Board held with refer­ence to a razinamah which was unregistered that, except in so far as its terms were incorporated in the consent decree founded thereon, was in­effectual in law to create title to the lands in suit. In other words, it was implied that if all the terms thereof had been submitted to the Court and made the foundation of an order, the razinamah though unregistered would have been a step in the judicial procedure not requiring registration. In regard to this case also it was recognized that the order was made not with reference to any special exemption created by the Registration Act itself and the judgment as in that of Bin­desri Naik's case (B). rested on a broad general principle that the proceedings of the court did not require registration. Lastly reference was made to the decision of the Privy Council in 'Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari', ILR 47 Cal 485: 46 Ind App 240: (AIR 1919 PC 79) (D). rested on a broad general principle that the proceedings of the court did not require registration. Lastly reference was made to the decision of the Privy Council in 'Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari', ILR 47 Cal 485: 46 Ind App 240: (AIR 1919 PC 79) (D). In that case also it was held that" the provi­sions of S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act, extend to exempt from registration the whole of the decree of a Court and not merely that part of it which is the operative part of the decree and relates to the scope of the suit. Consequent­ly S. 49 of the Registration Act did not preclude the decree from being given as evidence of the agreement, which related to properties outside the scope of the suit, even though it was unregis­tered. On the analogy of these cases the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that the surety bond which though not embodied in the Court's order, but nonetheless the Court's order being based thereon, did not require registration as it was held to be exempt under S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Indian Registration Act. This decision was for similar reasons followed in 'Kasturi Lai v. Goverdhan Bass', AIR 1934 Lah 138 (E), a Full Bench decision of that Court - where it was held that a security bond executed in accordance with an order passed under O. 41, Rr. 5, 6 of the Civil Procedure Code staying execution of a de­cree pending decision of an appeal; whereby the surety hypothecates his immoveable property for satisfaction' of such decree as might be passed by the appellate Court, and which is duly accepted by the Court and execution stayed accordingly, does not require registration as it is a step in judicial proceeding, and the decree-holders can move the Court to realise the decretal amount from the immovable property of the surety mentioned in the bond, even though it had not been registered. Tek Chand J., who delivered the judgment in that case observed that "it is not the execution of the bond which effects the transfer of rights in the immovable property described therein, so as to make it avail­able for the satisfaction of the decree which might be passed by the appellate Court, but it is the order of the Court accepting the bond which creates these rights." He pointed out that "even if the bond had been duly registered im­mediately after its execution, it would not be­come operative until and unless it was accepted by the Court. If by reason of the insufficiency of the security or on other ground the Court chose not to accept the bond, it would remain a wholly ineffectual and inoperative document, des­pite the fact that it contained all the terms of the transaction and had been duly executed and registered.” The point therefore which the learned Judge em­phasized was that it was not the execution or registration of the document which was really material as the fact that the document had been accepted by the Court and made a part of the judicial proceeding, its decree or order, thereby insuring certain rights to the parties. These observations of Tek Chand J., have been doubted in subsequent decisions of Calcutta and Rangoon; but speaking for myself I attach great importance to the line of reasoning con­tained in this Full Bench decision and I would have been inclined to accept the observations of the learned Judge without reservation, but for the fact that S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act itself was amended in 1929- (3) Prior to the amendment, Cl. (vi) stood as follows: "Nothing in Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) ap­plies to any decree or order of a Court and any award." But by the amendment the clause now runs diffe­rently. The amendment says- "Nothing in Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) ap­plies to any decree or order except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceed­ing. The amendment says- "Nothing in Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) ap­plies to any decree or order except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceed­ing. It is to be remembered that in ILR 47 Cal 435; (AIR 1919 PC 79) (D), the Privy Council held that even though a part of the compromise related to property which was beyond the subject-matter of the suit, since it had been incorporated in the compromise decree and although not being part of the operative portion thereof, did not require registration. The legislature must have been con­scious of this decision. In spite of this, it narrowed the scope of the exemption clause and provided that if the com­promise decree or order referred to the property other than that which was the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding, it would require registra­tion. In this case the properties which-have been given in security were evidently not the subject-matter of the litigation and the question is whe­ther by the mere adoption pi the security bond by the court it would be saved from registration under this exemption clause. The answer evidently would be in the nega­tive; because on the terms of this clause if the compromise decree or order refers to any pro­perty which is not the subject-matter of the suit, it would require registration. The analogy in my opinion applies to the present case; and this dis­tinction was prominently noticed by Page, C. J., in 'A. S. P. S. S. Chettyar Firm v. Lloyds Bank', AIR 1935 Rang 168 (P). The analogy in my opinion applies to the present case; and this dis­tinction was prominently noticed by Page, C. J., in 'A. S. P. S. S. Chettyar Firm v. Lloyds Bank', AIR 1935 Rang 168 (P). The learned Chief Justice therefore observed that the Privy Council decisions aforesaid on which the Bombay and the Lahore High Courts relied have to be read subject to S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act as amended in 1929 and held that simply by approving the substance of the security tendered, the Court could not con­vert instruments, which were otherwise by law in­capable of affecting the title to immoveable pro­perty, into operative, valid and admissible docu­ments of title; and that the legislature when amending S. 17 (2) (vi) plainly had in mind the decision of the Privy Council to which reference has been made earlier and yet expressly- refrain­ed from re-enacting S. 17 (2) (vi) in general terms or in such a form as could give colour to the view held by the High Courts of Bombay and Lahore. According to the learned C. J., the Court was bound to give effect to the provision of the statute which did not exempt the security bonds in ques­tion from liability for registration. Though I may respectfully demur in regard to some of the other reasonings given in that judgment criticising the judgment of Tek Chand J., I feel that I am bound to accept this view of the learned Chief Justice. As to the application of S. 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act this view of the Rangoon High Court has found favour in a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court in 'Kasemali v. Ajoyendra Paul', 60 Cal WN 224: ((S) AIR 1956 Cal 375 ) (G). In this case also the learned Judges held that in order to make the security bond effective and valid, it should be registered and consequent­ly, the filing of an unregistered security bond is not sufficient compliance with the condition laid down in S. 17 (1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act and is not exempt under S 17 (2) (vi) of the Act. I need not refer to the various other cases cited at the Bar which are not really germane to the question under investigation. I need not refer to the various other cases cited at the Bar which are not really germane to the question under investigation. Whatever the law may have been prior to the amendment of 1929 the decisions after the amendment are all one way, namely that such a security bond does require registration. (4) I understand that in this State the prac­tice so far is that such security bonds are accept­ed as valid without registration, but in the view we have taken of the law, it is apparent that the procedure is invalid and the security bonds in question have to be stamped and registered accord­ing to law when they purport to hypothecate im­moveable property, as falling under S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. This procedure will also obviate the chances of risks to which bona fide transferees might have been exposed otherwise in dealing with such pro­perties. In our opinion therefore these security bonds should be properly stamped and registered and if necessary fresh security bonds may be executed by the decree-holders. (5; DEKA, J.:- I agree. V.R.B. Order accordingly.