JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - This is a petition for the issue of writs of certiorari and mandamus. Zahid Husain is the Petitioner. The Addl. Commr., Alld. and the MB Alld. are the two Respondents. The Petitioner has filed an affidavit. One Beni Prasad Khanna, Tax Inspector of the MB Alld. has filed a counter-affidavit. 2. According to the Petitioner's affidavit, house No. 284, Rani Mandi, Alld. was formerly recorded in the Municipal registers as Imambara through Yusuf Husain. Later the entry was made in the name of Yusuf Husain in person. Yusuf Husain died in 1951. Thereafter there Were disputes about the correction of the assessment list. Smt. Fatima Begum and Smt. Chhoti Begum applied for mutation of their names against the property. Zahid Husain Petitioner filed an objection on the ground that, he was also an heir and Mutwalli of the Imambara. The Tax Superintendent of the MB gave a report recommending that, Zahid Husain's name be recorded along with those of Smt. Fatima Begum and Firozi Begum against house No. 284. But this report of the Tax Superintendent was not accepted by the Executive Officer. On 6 4 1954 the Executive Officer passed an order to the effect that, names of Smt. Fatima Begum and Smt. Firozi Begum alias Chhoti Begum only be recorded against houses Nos. 284 and 321. 3. The Petitioner took the matter in appeal before the Administrator of the MB But the Administrator dismissed the Petitioner's appeal on 26-6-1954. An application for review was dismissed by the Administrator on 1-4-1955. The Petitioner carried the matter further in appeal before the Commr. of Alld. But the learned Addl. Commr. of Alld. dismissed the Petitioner's appeal on 3-3-1956 on the ground that, no appeal lay from the mutation order. 4. The Petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the Addl. Commr's. order dated 3-3-1956 and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing him to dispose of the appeal on merits. 5. The learned Addl. Commr. disposed of the appeal before him on the short point that, only appeals against taxation are maintainable u S. 160 of the UP Municipalities Act, and no appeal from a mutation order. The first question for consideration is, therefore, whether the Addl. Commr. 5. The learned Addl. Commr. disposed of the appeal before him on the short point that, only appeals against taxation are maintainable u S. 160 of the UP Municipalities Act, and no appeal from a mutation order. The first question for consideration is, therefore, whether the Addl. Commr. was right in his view that, S. 160 of the UP Municipalties Act contemplates appeals against taxation orders only. 6. In order to understand the true scope of S. 160 of the UP Municipalities Act, it is necessary to examine the provisions of some of the preceding sections of the Act. S 141 of the Act provides for the preparation of an assessment list. Details enumerated in Cl. (a) to(c)of S. 141 ate to be noted in an assessment list. Cl. (c) of S. 141 deals with the names of the owner and occupiers if known. Cl. (d) is about the annual letting value; and Cl. (v) is about the amount of the tax assessed. The list prepared u/s 141 is published u/s 142. Objections to entries in the list are disposed of u/s 143 of the Act, Sub S. (3) of S. 143 enumerates various authorities, which may dispose of objections u/s 143. 7. S. 147 of the UP Municipalities Act provides for amendment and alteration of the list. Sub S. (1) of S. 147 states: The board may at any time alter or amend the assessment list (b) by substituting therein for the name of the owner or occupier of any property the name of any other person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the owner-ship or occupation of the property; 8. When Yusuf Husain died in 1951, it became necessary to substitute names of other persons in place of Yusuf Husain deceased. The matter fell under Cl. (b) of S. 147 (i) of the Act. Alterations of various kinds are described in Cls (a) to(g) of sub S. (l)of S. 147 of the Act. 9. Sub S. (2) of S. 147 States: Provided that the board shall give at least one month's notice to any person interested of any alteration.........under Cl. (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sub-section (l) and of the date on which the alteration will be made. 10. Sub S. (3)of S. 147 states: The provisions of sub Ss. 9. Sub S. (2) of S. 147 States: Provided that the board shall give at least one month's notice to any person interested of any alteration.........under Cl. (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sub-section (l) and of the date on which the alteration will be made. 10. Sub S. (3)of S. 147 states: The provisions of sub Ss. (2) and (3) of S. 143 applicable to the objections thereunder mentioned shall, so far as may be, apply to any objection made in pursuance of a notice issued u/s ub S. (2).... 11. Sub-S. (4) states: Every alteration made u/s ub-S. (1) shall be authenticated ... and, subject to the result of an appeal u/s 160, shall take effect from the date.... 12. It will be seen that, Sub-section (4) of S. 147 contemplates that, such decisions are subject to the result of an appeal u/s 160. 13. S. 160 of the Act appears under a heading, "appeals against taxation" Sub-section (1) of S. 160 states: In the case of a tax assessed upon the annual value of building or lands or both an appeal against an order passed u/s ub-S. (3) of S. 143 or u/s ub-S. (3) of S. 147 ... may be made to the District Magistrate or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf." It was not disputed before me that, the prescribed appellate authority in the present case was the Commissioner. The question to be considered is Whether in the circumstances of the present case an appeal lay to the Commissioner. 14. It is true that, the heading appearing above S. 160 suggests that, appeals lie against taxation only. But Sub-section (1) of S. 160 itself shows that, the scope of the section is wider. S. 160 provides for appeals against an order passed u/s ub-S. (3) of S. 147 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of S. 147 refers to Sub-section (2) of S. 147. Sub-section (2) of S. 147 covers alterations falling u/Cl. (a), (d), (c) and (b) of Sub-section (1). We have seen that, substitution of names falls under Clause (b) of S. 147 (i). So a decision about substitution of names will be a decision u/ Sub-section (3), of S. 147 of the Act. Originally, there was no tax assessed against the Imambara. (a), (d), (c) and (b) of Sub-section (1). We have seen that, substitution of names falls under Clause (b) of S. 147 (i). So a decision about substitution of names will be a decision u/ Sub-section (3), of S. 147 of the Act. Originally, there was no tax assessed against the Imambara. But the tax Superintendent noted in his report dated 31-10-1952/17 11-52 that, house No. 284 was assessed to municipal tax. This is, therefore, a case, in which tax was assessed upon annual alue of a building, and there was an order passed u/ Sub-section (3) of S. 147 of the Act. So an appeal lay u/s 160 of the UP Municipalities Act. The learned Addl. Commr's. view that appeals are confined to taxation only is not correct. 15. I, however, notice that there were certain other defects in the appeal filed before the Commissioner. Initially, the Executive Officer decided on 6-4-1954 that, the Petitioner's name should not be recorded against house No. 284. The Petitioner filed an appeal to the Administrator. The appeal was dismissed. The Petitioner carried the matter further by appealing to the Commissioner. Thus the appeal filed before the Commr. was analogous to a Second Appeal, The Municipalities Act does not provide for Second Appeals. 16. The Learned Counsel appearing for the MB suggested that, the Executive Officer passed orders for mutation u/s 147 of the Municipalities Act, as he had been empowered u/s 143 of the Act. This position is disputed by Mr. Misra appearing for the Petitioner. It is not clear from the record whether the Executive Officer of Alld. was empowered to pass orders u/s ub-S. (3) of S. 143 of the Act or not. On the one hand the Petitioner's affidavit does not mention that, the Executive Officer was not authorised to pass the order dated 6-4-1954, On the other hand the MB does not appear to have taken any objection before the Administrator that, no appeal lay to him against the order of the Executive Officer. It is not, therefore, clear whether the order passed by the Administrator is to be treated as an appellate order or an original order passed u/s 147 of the Act. 17. S. 161 of the UP Municipalities Act lays down certain limitations for appeals filed u/s 160 of the Act. It is not, therefore, clear whether the order passed by the Administrator is to be treated as an appellate order or an original order passed u/s 147 of the Act. 17. S. 161 of the UP Municipalities Act lays down certain limitations for appeals filed u/s 160 of the Act. S. 161 states: No such appeal shall be heard and determined unless (a) the appeal is, in the case of a tax assessed on the annual value of buildings or lands or both, brought within thirty days next after the date of communication of the order (exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof).... 18. The appeal filed before the Commr. was directed against the Administrator's order dated 1-4-1955. The appeal filed before the Administrator was dismissed by him on 26-6-1954. The subsequent order dated 1-4-1955 was merely an order refusing a review of his previous order. In other words, the appeal filed before the Commr. was directed against the Administrator's order refusing review. S. 160 of the UP Municipalities Act does not contemplate appeals against orders refusing review. So in the form in which the appeal was presented, it was not maintainable. 19. Mr. S.N. Misra, however, suggested that, the appeal was really directed against the Administrator's order dated 26-6-1954. The appeal before the Commr. was filed on 10-5-1955. The appeal was filed more than ten months after the Administrator had dismissed the appeal from the Executive Officer's order. Considering that the review application was disposed of on 1-4-1955, I take it that the order dated 26-6-1954 must have been communicated to the Petitioner some time before 1-4-1955 So the appeal to the Commr. was not filed within thirty days after the date of communication of the order as required by S. 161 of the Act. So, if we look upon the appeal to the Commr. as an appeal directed against the order dated 26-6 1954, the appeal was liable to be dismissed as time barred. 20. Mr. S. N. Misra pointed out that, the Addl. Commr. did not dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation. Had this matter been considered by him, the Appellant might have filed an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. But that as it may, the Appellant does not not appear to have filed any application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act before the Addl. Commr. did not dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation. Had this matter been considered by him, the Appellant might have filed an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. But that as it may, the Appellant does not not appear to have filed any application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act before the Addl. Commr. So the appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. So although the reasoning of the Addl. Commr. is not correct, his order dismissing the appeal may be allowed to stand. 21. It will be open to the Petitioner to approach the Addl. Commr. by way of an application for review in the light of this judgment. Since the Petitioner has succeeded on the main point raised in the petition, parties may be directed to bear their own costs. 22. The petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.