ORDER This is a revision petition and arises out of a suit which Angom Atomchouba Singh has brought as Sebaiyet and next friend or the deities Laipureiromba and Yumjao Lairembi situated at the Lamlai basti for a declaration that the amount of compensation amounting to Rs. 407/- awarded by the Government on account of the damage done to the temple of the deities during World War 2nd, was payable to him as the Sebaiyet of the deities and not to defendants Nos. 2 and 3, who had applied for it. Defendant No. 1 was joined as a party as a similar suit by him against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 is also pending. 2 The case of the plaintiff is that these deities belong to the Angom Sagei and the said sagei has been managing the properties belonging to the deities and performing the religious ceremonies since time immemorial and had appointed the plaintiff Angom Atomchouba Singh as the Sebaiyet and as such he was entitled to recover or receive the amount of compensation on behalf of the deities and not the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 who were merely Laipanabas (minor officials) for the purpose of ceremonial functions connected with the deities. 3 The relevant part of the defence is, that the deities belong to the Maharajah and are under his control and defendant No. 1 was appointed the Angom Ningthou (Headman of the sagei) by the Maharajah about 13 years ago and he has been incharge of all the properties of the deities since then. The Maharajah was, therefore, a necessary party to the present suit. Another contention raised by the defence was that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to try the suit as it is about a religious matter. The learned Additional Munsiff, who tried these 2 points as preliminary issues negatived the contentions of the defence, hence this revision. 4 Civil Procedure Code has been applied to this territory only very recently, but it is not disputed that the principles laid down in the Civil Procedure Code were always followed by the courts of Manipur, and the principles laid down in section 9 of that Code will govern the case. 4 Civil Procedure Code has been applied to this territory only very recently, but it is not disputed that the principles laid down in the Civil Procedure Code were always followed by the courts of Manipur, and the principles laid down in section 9 of that Code will govern the case. Under that section the civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizances is either expressly or impliedly barred, and the explanation to that section makes it clear that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such rights may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. It will be thus clear that if the principal or only question in the suit is a caste question or a question relating to religious rites or ceremonies then the suit is not of a civil nature, because it does not deal with rights of the citizen, but with matters which are purely social. But when a caste question or a question relating to religious rites or ceremonies is not the principal question in the suit, but is merely a subsidiary question, and the principal question involved is of a civil nature, as for example, Appellant question as to any right to property or to an office or to any other civil right and the principal question which is of Appellant civil nature cannot be decided without deciding the question relating to caste or religious rites or ceremonies, civil courts have the power to decide even the caste question or the question relating to religious rites or ceremonies to enable them to decide the principal question : See Lalji v. Walji, ILR 19 Bom 507 (A), and Pragji v. Govind, ILR 11 Bom 534 (B). 5 It thus follows that a suit is of a civil nature if the principal question in the suit relates to a civil right. It is obvious that in the present suit what is principally or mainly in dispute is a right to receive the compensation which is a civil right, and therefore, civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6 My attention was drawn to an old Council Resolution (Ext. It is obvious that in the present suit what is principally or mainly in dispute is a right to receive the compensation which is a civil right, and therefore, civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6 My attention was drawn to an old Council Resolution (Ext. A1), but it is clear from that resolution that jurisdiction of civil courts was excluded and reserved for the Maharajah, only in respect of matters like the appointment of Sebaiyet and the performance of ceremonies such as Laiharaoba etc., that is in matters purely concerning religious ceremonies or office. Nothing more was held in civil revision petition No. 13 of 1952 of this court on which decision reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner. Under the Merger Agreement also these rights only have been reserved for the Maharajah. Thus by its very nature the present suit is cognizable by civil courts and this contention of the petitioner must stand overruled. 7 The other contention of the petitioner, namely, that the Maharajah is a necessary party to the suit also stands on a weak ground. A necessary party is a party without whose presence a suit cannot be proceeded with, that is, a party necessary to the constitution of the suit without whom no decree can at all be passed. But that is not the case here and no relief is claimed against the Maharajah. If the defendant proves that the deities belong to the Maharajah and he has been appointed the Manager or Sebaiyet of the properties of the deities then the plaintiff will be non-suited. 8 Some evidence was allowed to be led on the question of ownership of the deities but it was not necessary for the purposes of these preliminary issues. The learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out and raised an objection that the previous opinion given to another by Chandra Singh (P. W. 1) who is the Pandi Achouba (Head Pandit) of the Pandit Loisang was not admissible for any purpose. In the view already taken that question is not really material for the purpose of this revision petition. But, in any case, in my opinion, there is no force in this contention. In the view already taken that question is not really material for the purpose of this revision petition. But, in any case, in my opinion, there is no force in this contention. A previous statement is certainly admissible for the purpose of contradiction and can also be used for corroboration, it being a question of fact as to what probative value should be attached to it, to be decided on the circumstances present in each case. 9 There is thus no substance in this revision petition and it fails and is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.