This is a second appeal arising out of an execution case. The appellant in this Court happens to be a person who claimed to be a represen­tative of the judgment-debtor and wanted to be impleaded as a party to the execution case, as such. A preliminary mortgage decree was passed in favour of the decree-holder respondent on 3-5-38. As the mortgage dues were not paid within the period of grace, eventually a final decree followed on 17-11-38* It appears that the decree in question had bees purchased by one Garganarayan, who is the present decree-holder executing the decree. The appellant, who is a brother of the judgment-debtor, appears, to have purchased the mortgaged properties in an execution sale on 19-9-39. The sale was confirmed in November 1939, and delivery of possession was given to the appellant in May 1940. It is, therefore, obvious, from the dates mentioned above, that the appellant purchased the mortgagee! property after the final mortgage decree had beer* passed. The purchase of the appellant, therefore, was subject to the mortgage decree. The decree-holder respondent started various execution procee­dings on the basis of the decree, which proved infructuous and had to be dismissed for one reason on another. It is not necessary for me to refer to those exe­cution proceedings. The last execution case, to which/ this appeal relates, was started on 27-9-49 for sale of the mortgage property. The appellant Golok Chandra Khataniar then filed a petition praying to-be added as a party and objecting to the execution proceedings. His prayer was disallowed; but the execution case itself was dismissed for default on 3-10-50 on the ground that it was time-barred. The decree-holder appealed against that order; the dismis­sal was set aside, and the execution case was restored to its file. This time again the appellant Golok filer a fresh objection on 1-5-51 claiming to be added' as- a party. His claim was resisted by the decree-holder respondent, and the Court rejected the prayer of the appellant, but again dismissed the execution case or* the ground that it was not maintainable. The decree-holder had to prefer an appeal against the order, and succeeded in having the dismissal set aside, with leave to amend the execution petition. His claim was resisted by the decree-holder respondent, and the Court rejected the prayer of the appellant, but again dismissed the execution case or* the ground that it was not maintainable. The decree-holder had to prefer an appeal against the order, and succeeded in having the dismissal set aside, with leave to amend the execution petition. This time, when the appellant wanted his objection to be heard by the Court, the executing Court held that the ap­pellant had no locus stand to raise any objection ten the execution case or to be added as a party. The Court also inclined to the view that the previous order not having been appealed against, it stood against the appellant as final and effective. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has confirmed that order and dismissed the claim of the appellant to be added as a party. It appears, that before the learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, the argument proceeded on the footing that the peti­tioner appellant was entitled to be added as a party to the suit and to redeem the mortgage decree under O. 34, R. 5, sub-rule (1), C. P. Code. This argument did not find favour with the learned Subordinate Judge who held that the appellant Golok was not a defendant, either directly or by implication of law, in the mortgage suit in question, he being a purchaser alter the passing of the final decree. The net result is that the appellant's application to be made a party to the execution case has failed before both the Courts below. (2) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to me that to a large extent the appellant himself was to blame in the matter, be­cause he did not claim to be added as a party to the execution case on the ground that he was a successor-in-interest or representative of the judgment-debtor by virtue of his purchase of the mortgaged property, but wanted to be added as a party to the suit and to redeem the mortgage. Under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure the word 'representatives' was not -limited merely to the legal representatives, but includ­ed persons on whom the interest of the judgment-debtor devolved by assignment, transfer or otherwise. Under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure the word 'representatives' was not -limited merely to the legal representatives, but includ­ed persons on whom the interest of the judgment-debtor devolved by assignment, transfer or otherwise. In this case, there is no doubt that the mortgag­ed property was purchased in Court auction by the appellant, and that he obtained delivery of posses­sion. He was, therefore, a successor-in-interest of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of sec. 47, and ' was, as such, entitled to be added as a party to the execution case. On behalf of the respondent decree-.holder, Mr. Sarma has strenuously contended that after the final mortgage decree had been passed in the suit, under O. 34, R. 5, C. P. Code no transfer of the mortgaged property could take place; and, as such, any purchase made by the appellant could not .foe at all considered for the purpose of making him a party to the suit or to the execution proceeding. He relies upon the provisions of O. 34, R. 5 (1), C. P. Code in support of his contention. As I have said, sub-rule (1), in my opinion, has little or nothing (to do with this case, because the final mortgage decree had been already passed under sub-rule (3) of O. 34, R. 5, C. P. Code. The simple question here is •- whether, as a successor-in-interest of the judgment-debtor, the appellant can now be added as a party to the execution case so as to be able to pay up the dues under the decree. Mr. Sarma urges that the mortgage security and the right of redemption having both merged in the final mortgage decree in ques­tion, nothing remained which the judgment-debtor could transfer to the appellant, or could be sold in • execution of the decree. This submission, in my opinion, is clearly misconceived. A final mortgage decree does not deprive the mortgagor of his interest in the property mortgaged until that property is sold and the sale confirmed in execution of that decree. A final decree only directs the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof, to be sold, and the proceeds of the sale to be applied in satisfaction of the decree, and for such other matters as provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 4, O. 34, C. P. Code. A final decree only directs the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof, to be sold, and the proceeds of the sale to be applied in satisfaction of the decree, and for such other matters as provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 4, O. 34, C. P. Code. It is, therefore, idle to con­tend that in view of the final decree, the rights of the mortgagor judgment-debtor have been extinguished In such a manner that, by the purchase of the property in auction sale as against the judgment-debtor, the appellant acquired no interest in the property. It is undoubted that the appellant did acquire, by right of his purchase, all the interest which the judgment-debtor had in the property in question, subject to the mortgage decree in favour of the decree-holder respondent; and that, if in the execution case the judgment-debtor could satisfy the decree at any stage or make a deposit within the meaning of R. 89,; O. 21, C. P. Code there was no reason why his successor-in-interest also should not enjoy a similar right. The petitioner appellant may not be a defendant in the suit within the meaning of O. 34, R. 5(1), C.P. Code but that does not deprive him of the right, which he acquired by virtue of his purchase of the judgment-debtor's interest in the property, to be added as a party to the execution case and to pay up the decretal dues. Mr. Sarma has relied upon a decision in Sheo Narain Sah v. Mt. Deolochan Kuer, AIR 1948 Pat £08 in support of his extreme argument that alter the final mortgage decree, the mortgaged property could not be sold, either by private contract or in auction sale. The case, in my opinion, does not lay down any such proposition. In that case, a mortgagee had purchased a part of the mortgaged properties-, but that notwithstanding, a mortgage decree for sale had been passed. It was held that the claim of the mortgagor in execution to an automatic reduction of the mortgage debt or to a right of set-off against the mortgage debt, could not o entertained as it did not relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree itself within the meaning of sec. 47, C. P. Code. It was held that the claim of the mortgagor in execution to an automatic reduction of the mortgage debt or to a right of set-off against the mortgage debt, could not o entertained as it did not relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree itself within the meaning of sec. 47, C. P. Code. The mortgage debt having merged in the decretal debt, it could not be contended that the decretal debt had been automatically reduced by something which took place prior to the date of the decree. Mr. Justice Imam, who was a party to the judgment, observed further that it was not open to the executing Court to go behind a final decree or to question the find­ings arrived at in the suit on which the final decree was based. This case, therefore, has no bearing on the point for consideration in this appeal. The other decision, on which also reliance has been placed, namely, Thakorebai Shrinivas v. Cen­tral Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1944 Bom 35, is equally distinguishable. In that case, it was pointed out that an assignee of a mortgagor's interest was not a de­fendant within the meaning of O. 34, R. 1, C. P. Code. As I have said, even if that were so, it has nothing to do with the present case, because here the final mortgage decree has been already passed and we are concerned to decide whether or not the appellant can be added as a party to the execution proceedings as a representative of the judgment-debtor, he having purchased the judgment-debtor's interest in the mortgaged property after the final decree. (3) The appeal, therefore, in my opinion, must be allowed, and the order of the Court below must be set aside. I direct that the appellant be added as a party to the execution case, and the execution should proceed after considering such of his objec­tions as may be validly urged. The appellant will have the right to pay up the mortgage decree in satisfaction of the decree-holder's claim. (4) In view of the fact that the appellant made some false allegations in his petition about the alleged satisfaction of the decree, and that he wanted to be added as a party to the suit, which led to the confusion, the appellant, in my opinion, is not entitl­ed to his costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.