JUDGMENT This is a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge, Manipur, in Civil Suit No. 39 of 1954, by which he dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants instituted for a declaration that the decrees passed by the Chief Court, in suits Nos. 7-12 of 1945-46 dated 7-5-46 and the decree of the Maharajah confirming those decrees on appeal in C. A. No. 197 of 1946-47 dated 5-4-1948 were without jurisdiction and should be set aside. 2. For a proper appreciation of tire point involved, it is necessary to set out the facts at some length. The six suits of 1945-46 instituted in the Chief Court, were instituted by the present defendant-respondent No. 1 against the present plaintiffs-appellants or against the predecessor-in-title of some, on the ground that these defendants had for a total consideration of Rs. 10,000/- agreed to sell some land and also executed six sale deeds, which he got executed benami in favour of the present defendant-respondent No. 2, for reason stated in that suit, and which are not necessary to be stated for the purpose of this appeal. The executants raised certain objections to the registration of those sale deeds and registration was ultimately refused on the ground that those deeds were admittedly benami documents. The present defendant-respondent No. 1, therefore, claimed a decree in each suit for specific performance of the contract, that is, for enforcing registration or in the alternative for such relief as he may be found entitled to for the breach of the contract. 3. The Chief Court after holding a joint trial of the suits as common questions of law and fact were involved, up-held the plea of the plaintiff (present defendant-respondent No. 1) and passed a money decree for the refund of the consideration of each of the six sale deeds, and also charged those amounts upon the lands which were agreed to be conveyed. And as already stated those decrees were affirmed by His Highness the Maharajah in appeal. 4. It might be mentioned that there was a review petition to the Maharajah against his appellate judgment and the Maharajah allowed that review petition, resulting in the dismissal of those suits. All this happened before the merger of the then, Manipur State with the rest of India. 5. 4. It might be mentioned that there was a review petition to the Maharajah against his appellate judgment and the Maharajah allowed that review petition, resulting in the dismissal of those suits. All this happened before the merger of the then, Manipur State with the rest of India. 5. A suit was then brought by the present defendant-respondent No. 1 in the court of Sub-Judge, Manipur, (Civil Suit No. 91 of 1951) against the present plaintiffs-appellants for a declaration that the order of the Maharajah reviewing his appellate judgment was null and void for want of notice to the opposite party. That suit succeeded with the result that the decrees of the Chief Court and of the Maharajah on appeal in the six suits in question revived, and the present defendant-respondent No. 1 started execution of those decrees for the recovery of money. The appeal to the Judicial Commissioner, also failed (Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1952 dated 28-1-1953). 6. The present plaintiffs-appellants, then brought the suit out of which this first appeal arises for declaration that the judgments and decrees in the six suits in question were null and void on the allegations which are best stated in the words of the plaintiffs themselves as they occur in para 6 of the plaint : "That though the aforesaid final order of the superior court of H. H. the Maharajah is said to have been vacated, those former judgments of Chief Court are still illegal and null and void and ultra vires having been passed without jurisdiction as the claims were based on false, fraudulent and invalid documents in respect of consideration for liability and properties of the pltffs. lawfully in possession worth for exceeding Rs. 15/- being in contravention of the Manipur State Registration Laws and local rules preventing benami transactions in particular and general of law of India." 7. Thus the plea was worded in very vague language and may be taken to mean that the judgments of the Chief Court and the Maharajah were being challenged on two grounds, namely, (1) that they mis-interpreted and mis-applied the law and came to wrong conclusions on questions of fact and law and (2) that they had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The decisions were, therefore, null and. void. 8. The decisions were, therefore, null and. void. 8. Taking the first point first and even assuming for the sake of argument that the Chief Court and the Maharajah erred on questions of law and fact, the question, and an important one at that, which arises for decision is whether the suit is maintainable to have a decision set aside on such grounds. In other words whether the court before whom such a suit is filed has the power to sit in appeal over the challenged judgment, because if it has the power then the new suit will be nothing different from an appeal. 9. It cannot be disputed that where there is want of jurisdiction as distinguished from an irregularity in its exercise, the judgment is a nullity, and though all the High Courts are not in agreement on the point, some have held that even if no objection was raised in the suit, a suit may be afterwards brought for having such a judgment declared to be null and void (see commentaries under S. 21 of Mullas C.P.C.). Such a judgment may also not operate as res judicata. Again it is permissible to have a judgment set aside on the ground of fraud practised on the court, but I have never heard or come1 across a case where a fresh suit has been allowed to succeed on the ground that in coming to the decision the court whose judgment is in question erred on a question of law or fact. Such a course if allowed would be virtually opening the door for a new kind of appeal, which is not permissible under the law. In that case, there would be also no end to the litigation because a party will go on in this way till he succeeds and when that happens the defeated party will start the litigation all over again. Thus there can be no force in the first point. 10. Now coming to the second point the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the sale deed in question being unregistered the jurisdiction of the Chief Court was ousted to entertain the suit by virtue of the provisions of the Registration Rules that were then in force. 10. Now coming to the second point the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the sale deed in question being unregistered the jurisdiction of the Chief Court was ousted to entertain the suit by virtue of the provisions of the Registration Rules that were then in force. The relevant part of the rule in question, which was also quoted in the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge is in these terms : "Registration of the documents is compulsory. No suit of the following nature will be entertained by any State courts unless supported by a registered document. (1) Mortgages and deeds of gift or sale of :- (a) land. (b) crops. (c) cattle and ponies. (2) Deeds of a cash value of more than Rs. 15/-". 11. In my opinion here also the plaintiffs-appellants do not stand on firm ground. The rule in question is not happily worded, but it is not difficult to see the underlying intention, which was to make unregistered documents inadmissible, and the utmost interpretation that can be placed on the rule taking its language into consideration can be only this, that the courts were debarred from entertaining a suit based on a document which required registration under the rule, but was not got registered. But the suits in question cannot be said to have been based on the unregistered sale deeds, whose registration the appellants had opposed. A suit can be said to be based on a document when the document goes to the very root of it. But that cannot be said to be the case here. The suits in question were clearly based on the original contract which preceded the execution of the sale deeds and by necessary implication included an agreement that the executors will not only execute the sale deeds but also get them registered. 12. It may also be observed that what the rule means is plainly that if a party accepts an unregistered document for a transaction when it is necessary to have a registered document under the rule, then he will not be entitled to found his suit on that document. Here the defendant-respondent No. 1 was not guilty of such a conduct and he wanted that the appellants should have those sale deeds registered. He could not get that done by force and a suit was the only remedy. Here the defendant-respondent No. 1 was not guilty of such a conduct and he wanted that the appellants should have those sale deeds registered. He could not get that done by force and a suit was the only remedy. It is then difficult to see how he could be blamed for that and his suit thrown out on that ground. After a careful examination of the rule, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the rule in question does not cover such a case when the suit is for enforcing the registration itself. In other words the rule was intended to apply to cases where a party voluntarily accepts an unregistered document for a transaction and not to a case where by his very suit He seeks to have it registered. The case reported in Nepram Kali Singh v. Mutum Chana Singh, AIR 1955 Manipur 39 (A), is thus distinguishable on the facts. 13. In view of the conclusion reached by me, it is not necessary to enter into any other point, and this appeal must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.