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1957 DIGILAW 408 (ALL)

State of UP v. Vijaya Anand Maharaja

1957-11-26

MOOTHAM, SRIVASTAVA

body1957
JUDGMENT Srivastava, J. - This is a special A. by the State against an order of Mr. Justice Mehrotra dismissing the Appellants application for review. 2. The Respondent was assessed to Agricultural income tax by the Addl. Collector of Banaras in respect of the year 1359F. He questioned the validity of the assessment and filed a petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that the assessment order be quashed. The main ground urged in support of the petition was that the Addl. Collector of Banaras who had assessed the Respondent had NO power to assess him as his income exceeded a lac of rupees and he owned properties in different States. The writ petition was allowed by this Court and the assessment order was quashed. An Ordinance No. 11 of 19 6 was then promulgated. By that Ordinance the definition of the term 'Collector' in S. 2(4) of the UP Agricultural Income Tax, 1948 was altered so as to include an Addl. Collector and the amendment was given retrospective effect The effect was that all assessments made by Addl. Collectors in respect of persons like the Respondent were to be considered valid in law. This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the UP Agricultural income tax (Amendment) Act, 1956 (UP Act No. XIV of 1956) and S. 11 of the Act provided Where before the commencement of this Act any Court or authority has, in any proceedings under the Principal Act, set aside any assessment made by an Addl. Collector or Addl. Assistant Collector in charge of a sub division merely on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make an assessment, any party to the proceedings may, at any time within ninety days from the date of commencement of this Act apply to the Court or authority for a review of the proceedings in the light of the provisions of this Act, and the Court or authority to which the application is made shall review the proceedings accordingly and make such order, if any, varying or revising the order previously made, as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by Sections 2 and 8 of this Act.... 3. Taking advantage of this provision the State filed the application, the dismissal of which has given rise to this appeal. 3. Taking advantage of this provision the State filed the application, the dismissal of which has given rise to this appeal. By that application the State wanted this Court to review the order made u/Art. 226 of the Constitution by which the assessment of the Respondent has been quashed. The application was rejected on the ground that S. 11 of the Amendment was intended to provide for the review of orders which had been passed in any proceedings under the principal Act, namely the UP Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948 and could not apply to orders passed by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. 4. The State has now come up in appeal and questions the correctness of the dismissal of the application for review. 5. Office has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal It is pointed out that u/Chapter VIII, R. 5 of the Rules of Court a special appeal against an order of a Single Judge of the Court can be maintained only if that order amount to a "judgment " An order refusing an application for review not being a "judgment" cannot be the subject of an appeal. The objection appears to us to be well founded. Our view on this point is in consonance with two earlier decisions of this Court one, in Tirmal Singh v. Kanhaiya Singh ILR XLV All 535 and the other, in an unreported decision in Special A. No. 139 of 1956 Mewa Lal v. Raja Ram decided on 12-11-1956. Only the decision finally determining the rights of the parties can be considered to be a "judgment" for purposes of that rule. The rights of the parties in the present case were finally determined by the order passed by this Court on 2-11-1955 by which the assessment was quashed and not by the order which is now under appeal. The latter order cannot therefore be considered a "judgment" against which an appeal can be u/Chapter VIII, R. 5. It was urged that an order rejecting an ordinary application for review under the CPC may not amount to a judgment, but if an application for review is filed under the provisions of a statute like S. 11 of the UP Agricultural income tax (Amendment) Act, the order rejecting it will stand on a different footing. It was urged that an order rejecting an ordinary application for review under the CPC may not amount to a judgment, but if an application for review is filed under the provisions of a statute like S. 11 of the UP Agricultural income tax (Amendment) Act, the order rejecting it will stand on a different footing. We can, however, see no difference in principle between the two orders so far as their appealability is concerned Whatever may be the grounds put forward in support of the application for review, the fact remains that the final decision determining the rights of the parties is the one that was sought to be reviewed and not the order by which the review application was refused. The order appealed against was therefore not an appealable order and the appeal is consequently not maintainable. 6. The appeal must fail even on merits. The view taken by the learned Single Judge is supported by an earlier Devision Bench decision of this Court in Miscellaneous A. Nos. 327, 328 and 329 of 1956 decided on 13-3-1957 and the Learned Counsel for the Appellant has not been able to urge anything against that decision. 7. The appeal has therefore no force and is dismissed.