JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the tenant in chief Sri Kishan has sublet the premises. 2. It appears that the owner of the house, a part of which is alleged to have been sublet, was one Lakshmi Narain. He granted lease to Piarelal who is the father of Sri Krishna. One Basdeo is the uncle of Sri Krishna. Sri Krishna and Basdeo were living in the house when it is alleged they sublet a room thereof to Dharam Das. It appears also that the allegation is that Dharamdas had the use of a Baithak as well. 3. The landlord sued to eject the tenant and he claimed that, by virtue of the subletting, the disability which is otherwise imposed by S. 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act on landlords seeking to eject had been removed. The defence on this point was that there had been no subletting but that Dharamdas had only been allowed to live in a portion of the house with a view that he may look after and watch the things kept in the locked portion of the house. The question is whether there has been subletting of the house to Dharamdas. 4. The trial court found that in law a sublease has been created and decreed the suit for possession. Upon appeal the court below has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit so far as it relates to ejectment. 5. In this appeal which is by the owner of the house, the landlord, it is contended before me that a sub-lease had duly come into existence in favour of Dharamdas. It is contended that this is a case where rent has been reserved not in cash but in terms of service. There seems to be substance in this contention. It appears from a postcard Ext. A27 that before the letting in of Dharamdas, the tenant in chiefs namely, Sri Krishna and Basdeo had appointed a person called Balkrishna as a chaukidar and fixed his remuneration at Rs. 12 per mensem. There seems to be substance in this contention. It appears from a postcard Ext. A27 that before the letting in of Dharamdas, the tenant in chiefs namely, Sri Krishna and Basdeo had appointed a person called Balkrishna as a chaukidar and fixed his remuneration at Rs. 12 per mensem. That after Dharamdas had been let into the premises, payment to the chaukidar ceased and this postcard shows that the chaukidar by name Balkrishna made a demand to Basdeo for the balance of the agreed pay because as the letter shows that, according to Balkrishna, Basdeo and Sri Krishna had told him that the balance of his salary would be paid by Dharamdas. Although this postcard may not establish that the rent was agreed to be paid in cash by Dharamdas in this indirect way i.e. by remunerating the tenant in chief's alleged servant, nonetheless this postcard gives a clear indi cation of the fact that the tenant in chief had employed on a salary a person who looked after his premises duriug the tenant in chief's absence and that in consequence of the letting in of Dharamdas, who took over the duty of looking after the locked portion of the house still retained by the tenant the services of Balkrishna the watchman were virtually terminated and he was left unremunerated. 6. It is evident therefore that Dharamdas was required to look after the locked portion of the house and he agreed to do so and in lieu of the service rendered he was given the right to live in the Kothri. The evidence is that he and his family lived uninterruptedly there for a period of more than three years. This is indicative of the fact that this was not an arrangement which had merely a moral basis bur it was an arrangement which was of a binding and legal character and, as a result of that arrangement, services were and had to be rendered by Dharamdas and Dharamdas became entitled to remain in the kothri because of the services rendered and to be rendered. 7. In regard to the Baithak the evidence seems to suggest that whenever the tenants in chief came to occupy the locked up portion they also had the use of this baithak and so qua the Baithak, I am not prepared to find that the arrangement necessarily was that of subletting. 7. In regard to the Baithak the evidence seems to suggest that whenever the tenants in chief came to occupy the locked up portion they also had the use of this baithak and so qua the Baithak, I am not prepared to find that the arrangement necessarily was that of subletting. It may well have been an arrangement by way of license but qua the room it was in the sole and continuous occupation over a period of three years of Dharamdas. My view is that there was a subletting. 8. It is true that the word "subletting" as used in the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, S. 3, Sub-section (1), Sub-clause (e) has a legal connotation of a sub lease and it clearly means that there is an under tenancy and not mere occupation by a licensee or an invitee of the premises Vijai Singh v. ADC Akola 1952 Nag LJ 62 DB. It is also true that there cannot be subletting unless the tenant in chief has parted with legal possession and that a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property has been conferred by the tenant in chief upon his sub lessee. In this case, however, such a right was undoubtedly conferred and qua the room in possession of Dharamdas was not that of a mere licensee. I think the test is this. Would Dharamdas have been given exclusive possession of this Kothri and allowed to remain there for three years with his children without being disturbed by the tenant in chief, had he not undertaken to look after the rest of the premises still in the occupation of the tenant in chief? The answer must be in the negative. 9. In India as in England rent may be fixed other than by money payment. It may be fixed by the delivery of cattle, corn or share of the crop, or the rendering of service. (See Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1956 Edition, top of p. 610 and the cases cited in support of the statement of law made by Mulla at that page.) In the General Law of Landlord and tenant by Foa, 1947 Edn. (See Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1956 Edition, top of p. 610 and the cases cited in support of the statement of law made by Mulla at that page.) In the General Law of Landlord and tenant by Foa, 1947 Edn. at p. 98 is a paragraph which runs as follows: Nor it is necessary that the rent should consist of money; it may be rendered for instance, in specific articles, such as wine, corn or horses or by" manual services for the lessors benefit, e.g. shearing sheep, doing team work, cleaning the parish church, ringing the church" bell etc. or partly by such services and partly in money." The authorities in support of this statement of the law are also to be found at the foot of pages 88 and 99 of Foa. The general position is therefore clear, but I think I might yet invite specific attention to the case of Jyotish Chandra Mukerji v. Ramnath Bhadra ILR 32 Cal 243 where A the owner of a house by an agreement allowed B to occupy a house in consideration of his rendering services as a medical practitioner to A and his family in lieu of rent. It was held that such an agreement amounted to a 'lease' as defined in S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 10. I do not see that there is any distinction between the instant and this cited case. It is not necessary that it should be expressly mentioned that the service to be rendered is in lieu of rent as the learned court below seems to think. An inference may be drawn from the facts proved that such service is in lieu of rent. It is not necessary that the document of sub lease should state in so many words that the service was in lieu of rent if from the facts recited therein it can be inferred that snch was the case. 11. In the case of Governor-General of India in Council Vs. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1948 Cal 8 it has been indicated that in the case of a servant who has been allowed to occupy quarters owned by his masters in part remuneration of his services the relationship of landlord and tenant comes into existence. The exception is where the occupation is related to the performance of the service that the occupier is rendering to his employes. The exception is where the occupation is related to the performance of the service that the occupier is rendering to his employes. Thus it is evident that rent may be reserved in terms other than of cash and if in a case as in this case it is clear that the person who has been let into possession has been let into possession upon a clear understanding that he will render service during the period of his sole and exclusive occupation then such a person becomes a tenant and cannot be treated merely as a licensee or an invitee. 12. For the reasons stated above, I have come to the conclusion that in this case Dharamdas's occupation was that of a sublessee. That being so, the landlord was entitled to the benefit of S. 3, Sub-section (1) Sub-clause (e) of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and a ground was afforded to him on the basis of which he could sue to eject the tenant in chief. 13. Accordingly, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and restore the decree of the trial court. I further direct that the decree for ejectment shall not be executed for a period of three months from today's date. The Appellant will have his costs.