ORDER This petition is in essence a petition for transfer of Civil Suit No. 173 of 1953 pending on the file of the Munsiff, Manipur, under section 24 of the C. P. Code, and is treated as such. The District Judge was previously moved for transferring the suit, but without success. 2 The suit out of which this petition arises was instituted by the 3 plaintiffs under Or. 1, R. 8, C. P. C., on behalf of themselves and others in all numbering 342 persons (all women) against the Municipal Board of Imphal. 3 The dispute relates to the site known as Lakshmi Bazar, in the market area of the Town of Imphal. That site vested in the Imphal Town Fund Committee and now vests in the defendant Board, which succeeded the said Town Fund Committee in September, 1956. The plaintiffs contention is that they and their predecessors have been holding a market (for selling cloth) on this site as of right and without interruption for the last more than 60 years, and have thereby acquired a right of easement to hold a market there. Some 18 months ago the Town Fund Committee put up some sheds or covered stalls on the site assuring the plaintiffs that their right to hold the market will not be interfered with and they could occupy the sheds when completed. The plaintiffs continued to hold the market even when the construction of these sheds was going on an on their completion occupied them. But the defendant Board after it succeeded the Town Fund Committee has been trying to interfere with the enjoyment of this right of the plaintiffs through its agents provocateurs (women cloth-sellers of the New Market) whom it has granted permission to move to the stalls in question. On these allegations the main relief claimed by the plaintiffs is the declaration of their right and grant of permanent injunction against the defendant Board and its agents provocateurs, restraining them from interfering with the enjoyment of this right of the plaintiffs. 4 The plaint was presented on 18-12-56. The learned Munsiff admitted the plaint and also granted permission to sue in a representative capacity under Or. 1, R. 8, C. P. C., the same day and directed issue of summons to the defendant fixing the date of next hearing for 15-2-57. 4 The plaint was presented on 18-12-56. The learned Munsiff admitted the plaint and also granted permission to sue in a representative capacity under Or. 1, R. 8, C. P. C., the same day and directed issue of summons to the defendant fixing the date of next hearing for 15-2-57. On the same day he also granted an ex parte injunction against the defendant on the application of the plaintiffs, and fixed 2-1-57 for deciding the matter finally after hearing the defendant to whom notice was directed to go. 5 On 2-1-57 appearance was put in along with an objection to the grant of temporary injunction supported by an affidavit on behalf of the defendant. Nineteen women some of whom were said to be the agents provocateurs of the defendant, also applied on that date for being made parties and the learned Munsiff ordered that they be joined as defendants. The case was then adjourned to 4-1-57 for plaintiffs counter-affidavit. It might be observed that in the objection filed by the Municipal Board and also the application filed by the 19 women to be made parties to the suit it was admitted that the site of the Lakshmi Bazar before the new constructions were put up was used exclusively by about a thousand women cloth-sellers for vending cloth. 6. On 4-1-57 plaintiffs filed their counter-affidavit and the learned Munsiff after hearing the arguments fixed 7-1-57 for order in the matter of temporary injunction. On that date the plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint as regards the relief. They had alleged in the plaint that the defendant Board could not take away their right to hold the market without paying compensation for the same and there was a prayer in the alternative that the plaintiffs right to a total compensation of Rs. 1,900/- be declared. It was alleged in the application for permission to amend that the alternative relief was put down as a result of accidental slip or mistake and they wanted to substitute in place of it a clause only reserving their right to claim compensation to the extent of Rs. 1,900/- if the defendant Board makes an acquisition of their right pending the suit. 1,900/- if the defendant Board makes an acquisition of their right pending the suit. They even stated in that application for amendment that if such leave could not be granted that they would relinquish that alternative claim of compensation and they might be permitted to amend the plaint accordingly. Arguments were heard on that application on 7-1-57 and the case was adjourned to 9-1-1957 for order in that matter. No order was passed on 7-1-57 in the matter of temporary injunction and as regards it the learned Munsiff gave the following direction : "The parties have been directed to make a further development of the law on the facts of the case. They like to do so on 9-1-57." 7 On 9-1-57 he passed an order rejecting the amendment petition, and heard further arguments in the matter of injunction. The case was then posted to 15-1-57 for orders. On 15-1-57 the learned Munsiff rejected the plaint under Or. 7 R. 11 as he held that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action and vacated the temporary injunction, a rather unusual course to follow, when it is noticed that the point was not either raised by the defendant Board in its written objection or by the other defendants in their application, and the main question before the court was whether the order for temporary injunction should be maintained or set aside. An examination of the written objection of the defendant Board and the application filed by the other defendants rather goes to show that nothing could be further from their mind. That would be evident from what the defendant Board stated in para (h) of its written objection and what the other defendants stated in para 6 of their application which are respectively reproduced below : "(h) This defendant submits that if at all the plaintiffs have any grievance or cause of action or right either competitively or conjunctively it is against or with the said Phiyonbis abovementioned and the said Phiyonbis are necessary parties in whose absence there can be no effective or conclusive determination of suck disputes as may exist and this defendant must eventually be bound by the decision of such dispute." "6. That if at all any body of persons have a justiciable case against the Municipality it is these petitioners, as a body." It, however, appears from the order of the learned Munsiff that the question that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action was raised for the first time in the arguments. The learned Munsiff also allowed Rs. 100/- as compensatory costs to the defendant Board under section 95 of the C. P. C., even though there was no application for the same as required by that section, and the compensatory costs were allowed in addition t" the ordinary costs awarded to the defendants. 8 The plaintiffs then took an appeal against this order to the District Judge and the District Judge set aside the order and remanded the case to the learned Munsiff for trial according to law holding that the learned Munsiff had erred in coming to the conclusion that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. There can be no doubt that the learned Munsiff erred in reaching that finding for the obvious reason that for deciding that question the court has to presume that every allegation made in the plaint is true. Similarly, the fact that the court when considering the question whether a temporary injunction should or should not be granted has to see whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case does not mean anything more than this, that there is a serious question to be tried and there is a probability of success if the allegations of fact made by the plaintiff are proved. In the present case this was even borne out by the allegations made in the written objection filed by the defendant Board and also the application of the other defendants some of which have already been quoted above. 9. It is well-settled that a case ought to be transferred when a party reasonably apprehends that he is not likely to have a fair trial before a particular court and the question for decision is whether in the circumstances referred to above the plaintiffs could be reasonably expected to have such an apprehension. 10 In Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar. 10 In Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar. AIR 1957 Pat 198 (A) it was observed : "Therefore, if there are circumstances in a case, which raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person applying for transfer that he would not receive fair dealings at his trial or in other words, that he may not have a fair and impartial trial, and may not get justice in the court, where the suit is pending, the case should be transferred. In such a case, in order to decide whether the facts and circumstances are sufficient to raise such a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party applying for transfer, the court should put himself in such a partys arm-chair; and then alone the court is at liberty to place himself in the position of, and, the same situation in which, the party himself stood, with the knowledge of all the facts with which the party was acquainted, and, then only the court can see and judge for himself how these facts would have affected the partys mind, and, if they are reasonable and sufficient to raise the reasonable apprehension complained of in the mind of even a reasonable person." 11 I am in respectful agreement with those observations and am of the opinion that the cumulative effect of all the circumstances narrated above must have had the effect of raising such an apprehension in the minds of the plaintiffs, who are nothing but illiterate women belonging to the class of petty cloth-sellers. 12 I am, however, satisfied that the learned Munsiff acted in the honest belief that what he was doing was right, but it is clear that in doing so he fell into the mistake of deciding nearly the entire case, though there was no trial of the case, the defendants had not filed even their written statements and the plaintiffs did not have a chance to prove their assertions by giving evidence. In doing this the learned Munsiff also expressed his views so definitely and strongly that he might not only now find it difficult to change them, but may also find it embarrassing to try the case. In doing this the learned Munsiff also expressed his views so definitely and strongly that he might not only now find it difficult to change them, but may also find it embarrassing to try the case. The report of the learned Munsiff also to some extent supports the view that it might be difficult for him to take a different view and that the learned Munsiff has taken to heart the fact that there has been an application for transfer against him. Besides this such strong expression of views at a preliminary stage of the case is bound to make the aggrieved party feel that most probably he will not have a fair trial. In this view of the matter also I consider it desirable in the interest of all that the suit should be transferred to some other court. 13. The learned Munsiff also found fault with the pleadings of the plaintiffs and condemned them as vague and misleading. I hardly think that they can be dubbed as misleading, and if there was any vagueness, the proper course was to order the party to remove the vagueness and not to reject the plaint under Or. 7, R. 11 on that ground. 14 In his report, the learned Munsiff has also suggested that action for contempt may by taken against the petitioners and their counsel because they have used the expression "biased frame of mind" in relation to him in support of their contention. I fail to see how that would be contempt of court, when the whole case of the plaintiffs was that the suit should be transferred from his file because they had a reasonable apprehension that they will not get justice in his court on account of the events to which reference has already been made earlier. Bias means nothing more than prejudice or want of open mind, and if a party seeking transfer of a suit on the ground of such apprehension is not to use such words, then it is difficult to see how he can put forward his apprehensions, which as already seen above in the present case have been found to be not without good reasons. I may here add a word of advice and caution that courts cannot afford to be so touchy in such matters and such expressions of feelings and objections in the matter may more often than not give a handle to the party aggrieved to argue that on account of the injured feelings entertained by the Judge it is unlikely that he will approach the case in future with an open mind. 15 I, therefore, withdraw the suit from the file of the Munsiff, and looking into the nature of and questions involved in the suit, transfer it to the Subordinate Judge, Manipur, for trial according to law. Taking all the circumstances into consideration I make no order for costs. Suit transferred.