This is an appeal against an appellate order of the Additional Collector, Jaipur, dated 5.5.1956 upholding the order of the Assistant Collector directing resumption of the appellants grant under the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945. 2. A simple point of law is involved for determination in this second appeal before us, and to appreciate if it is necessary to give the facts in brief. Shri Bux, the last holder of the grant died about 40 years prior to the presentation of the application for grant of Matmi by the appellant Bhuramal in 1949. Bhuramal who gave out his age as 50 years on 5.6.49 when examined stated that his father Shri Bux died 40 years ago and that he was not in a position to give the year or samvat of his demise. He further stated that in Shialu Svt. 2005 the grant measuring about 300 bighas was placed under Arai Khalsa and hence he was thereby compelled to apply for grant of Matmi. During the course of the enquiry that was held by the subordinate officers it was found that the grant stood entered in Nuskha Punya and in the Daftar Mawazna in the name of Sukhram S/o Jagram and grandson of Harkishan, a descendant of Madho and that the appellant Bhuramal was a direct male lineal descendant of this Sukhram. It was also found that Bhuramal was in possession of the grant which measured about 128 bighas 18 biswas by an iron chain. The subordinate officers, came to the conclusion that as far as the appellants title to the grant was concerned it was established beyond all possibilities of doubt. They, however, directed resumption of the grant on the ground that as the last-holder had died prior to 15th April, 1927 and as no application for Matmi was made within 6 months from the 20th May, 1936, hence the grant was liable to resumption under sec. 16(1) (c) of the Jaipur Matmi Rules. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued before us that the case is not governed by this provision of law. 3. 16(1) (c) of the Jaipur Matmi Rules. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued before us that the case is not governed by this provision of law. 3. Rule 16, on which the learned counsel for the appellant bases his argument runs as below :— (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), a grant shall be resumed— (a) if there is no applicant for Matmi or if for any reason, the applicant is not entitled to succeed ; or (b) if the last holder was out of possession and the applicant is not entitled to recover possession ; or (c) if the application is time-barred under rule 12 or, in the case of a holder who died before the 15th April, 1927, no application for matmi was made within six months from the 20th May, 1936 ; or (d) if no State Sanad or Patta is produced, the grant is not recorded in the State offices, and no matmi has been sanctioned in the past; or (e) If it was made without the prior sanction of the Ruler, by (1) a Zenana Sarkar or a member of the ruling family— upon the death of such sarkar or member ; or (ii) any other State-grant upon the reversion to the State of the village or land held by such State grantee, even though matmi may have been sanctioned in the past; or (f) if the claimant is the son of a dismissed tankhadar,—even though matmi may have been sanctioned in the past ; (g) to the extent of such portion as was not disclosed at the last matmi ; Provided that if the grant was made for the maintenance of a pakka temple or mosque, Government will arrange for the maintenance of such temple or mosque by making a suitable cash grant. (2) A grant shall not be liable to resumption— (i) on the ground of absence of entry in the State offices or failure to produce a State Sanad or Patta—If matmi has been sanctioned in the past ; (ii) on the ground that no matmi was sanctioned in the past or no State Sanad or Patta has been produced—if entries exist in the State records ; (iii) on the ground mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of sub-rule (i)—-if the land is situated in a non-khalsa village and the person in possession of the land is a trespasser. In such case the Government will refrain from interference for so long as the village remains non-khalsa." 4. It has been argued before us that as entries exist in the State records in respect of this grant it is not liable to resumption under rule 16 (a) (ii) and hence the provisions of Rule 16 (1) (c) should not be allowed to come into operation in this case. To our mind this is a clear fallacy. On examining the provisions of sub-rule (2) carefully it will be found that the intention of the law framers was that a grant shall not be liable to resumption on the ground of absence of entry in the State offices or failure to produce a State Sanad if matmi was sanctioned in the past. Similarly there could be no resumption on the ground that no matmi was sanctioned in the past or any State Sanad or Patta was not produced if the grant stood entered in the State records. It has been further laid down in this sub-rule that in cases covered by sub-clauses (ii) of clause (e) of sub-rule (1) the grant shall not be resumed if the land is situated in a non-khalsa village and the person in possession of the land is a trespasser. These provisions are manifestly by way of amplification of the provisions given in clauses (d) and (e) of sub-rule (1) which lay down that the grant shall be resumed if no State Sanad or Patta is produced, or if it is not recorded in the State offices or if no matmi has been sanctioned in the past. These provisions are manifestly by way of amplification of the provisions given in clauses (d) and (e) of sub-rule (1) which lay down that the grant shall be resumed if no State Sanad or Patta is produced, or if it is not recorded in the State offices or if no matmi has been sanctioned in the past. These provisions have been circumscribed by sub-rule (2) which lays down that even if no such State Sanad or Patta is produced the grant shall not be resumed if matmi has been sanctioned in the past and if no matmi has been sanctioned in the past the grant shall not be resumed if entries exist in the State records. Obviously these provisions of sub-rule (2) have a reference to and can govern the provisions contained in clauses (d) and (e) of sub-rule (1). It cannot be argued on the basis of the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) that a grant is not to be resumed, even if there is no application fur matmi or even if the applicant is not entitled to succeed or the last-holder was out of possession and the applicant has become disentitled to recover possession even if the grant finds entry in the Stale records or matmi has been sanctioned in the past. To put such an interpretation would lead to obvious absurd results. Similarly to argue that a grant finds entry in the State records cannot be resumed even when no application is provided in clause (c) of sub rule (1) has been produced would lead to equally meaningless conclusions. The provisions have to be so interpreted as to avoid absurdities and to give effect to the intentions of the legislature. The apparent and logical interpretation of sub-rule (1) vis-a-vis sub- rule (2) would be that the provisions contained in clauses (d) and (e) of sub-rule (1) would be further governed by the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) and that the provisions of sub-rule (2) can have no application to cases which are governed by clause (a) (b), (c), (f) & (g) of sub-rule (1). We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the contention raised on behalf of the appellants counsel before us is without any substance. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the contention raised on behalf of the appellants counsel before us is without any substance. The appellant was bound to apply for grant of matmi in accordance with the provisions of a notification issued by the former Jaipur State Government in 1927, fixing a period of one year for applications for matmi. The appellant was further bound to comply with the provisions of a notification issued by the same Government on 20th of May, 1936. As he had failed to apply for matmi under the provisions of the first notification the limitation allowed by the subsequent notification was available to him. He made default in applying in accordance therewith. Consequences of such failure as laid down in Rule 16(1)(c) of the Jaipur matmi Rules, 1946, must, therefore, follow inevitably. In the result we find that the orders of the lower courts are correct and call for no interference. The appeal is hereby rejected.