Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has been convicted by the Second Class Magistrate of Cochin in Calendar Case No. 619 of 1954 by his judgment dated 22.12.1955. The concluding portion of the judgment reads as follows: "In the result I convict the accused under S.45(1) of Act IX of 1125 read with S.41(3) of the said Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rupees Twenty-five or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks". 2. Act IX of 1125 is the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125. Sub-s. (1) of S.45 of that Act provides that any employer who contravenes any of the provisions of the sections enumerated in that sub-section "shall be punishable, for a first offence, with fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees and for a second and subsequent offence, with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees". S.41 is one of the sections mentioned in S.45(1) and it reads as follows: "(1) No employer shall dispense with the services of a person employed continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such person at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice, provided, however that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such persons are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. (2) The person employed shall have a right to appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer, (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed". 3. It is clear from the wording of sub-s. (3) of S.41 that a non-compliance with a decision of the appellate authority has not been made penal and the conviction therefore for a contravention of the provisions of that sub-section cannot be sustained. 4. The provisions of S.41 which if contravened will constitute an offence liable to be punished under S.45(1) are those embodied in sub-s. (1) of S.41. 4. The provisions of S.41 which if contravened will constitute an offence liable to be punished under S.45(1) are those embodied in sub-s. (1) of S.41. There was no complaint before the Second Class Magistrate to the effect that the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S.41 had been contravened by the employer. 5. The Second Class Magistrate also seems to have been labouring under a misapprehension as to the scope of a trial for the contravention of the provisions of S.41 in view of sub-s. (3) of that section which says that "the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed". Para.13 of his judgment reads as follows: "S. 41(3) is explicitly worded and states that'the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed'. In the face of this, I do not think that this court is competent to question Ext. A (the decision of the appellate authority under S.41(2) dated 21.11.1952) or to find that it has been passed without jurisdiction. I therefore reject this argument". 6. S.41 and 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, and S.41 and 51 of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125, are identical in wording and in LXX Madras Law Weekly 87 the question as to what exactly is the effect of the words "shall be final" in sub-s. (3) of S.41 came up for consideration. Somasundaran, J., said: "The main question in this revision is whether the Court can refuse to go into the question about the legality or illegality of the dismissal of Pw. 2. S.41 of the Act provides the procedure to be adopted by the employer before he dismisses an employee, that is under Cl. (1). Under Cl. (2) a right of appeal is given to the authority prescribed under the Act, that is, the Commissioner of Labour. Under Cl. (3) the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed. It is the provision of this Cl. (d) which has given trouble in this case. The question is whether on a count of this clause, the Court can refuse to go into that question. In connection with this, it is necessary to compare the provisions of S.51 of the same Act. It is the provision of this Cl. (d) which has given trouble in this case. The question is whether on a count of this clause, the Court can refuse to go into that question. In connection with this, it is necessary to compare the provisions of S.51 of the same Act. S.51 is as follows: 'If any question arises whether all or any of the provisions of this Act apply to an establishment or to a person employed therein or whether S.50 applies to any case or not, it shall be decided by the Commissioner of Labour and his decision thereon shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law.' Under S.51 therefore the decision given by the Commissioner of Labour cannot be questioned in a Court of Law. There is no such prohibition in Cl. (3) of S.41. It merely lays down that the decision is final. It does not say that such a decision shall not be questioned in a Court of Law. Where in the same Act the decisions under two sections are final with respect to the matters mentioned therein and in one of the sections it is specifically stated that that decision cannot be questioned in a Court of Law and in the other section there is no such prohibition the ordinary and legitimate inference is that where there is no such prohibition in a section the Court of Law can question the legality, although the decision may be final as between the parties". We are in entire agreement with this view. 7. The Sessions Judge of Anjikaimal before whom an appeal was filed by the petitioner against his conviction and sentence by the Second Class Magistrate - Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1956 - appears to have been labouring under a misapprehension of a different type. He came to the conclusion that the Second Class Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence only under S.190(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and said: "A perusal of S.530 Cl. (k) will show that if the Magistrate was not empowered under S.191(c) then his proceedings shall be void. Since there is no evidence on that point in this case, the case has to go back for decision on that point. (k) will show that if the Magistrate was not empowered under S.191(c) then his proceedings shall be void. Since there is no evidence on that point in this case, the case has to go back for decision on that point. If the Magistrate has not been empowered by Government in this behalf then necessarily he has to throw out the complaint. Therefore the conviction at the appellant is set aside and the case sent back to the trial court for disposal afresh in the light of the observations made above". 8. S.190(1) reads: "Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence - (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed". There is no provision in the Travancore - Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125, like for example, S.43 of the Hyderabad Shops and Establishments Act (a provision which we consider eminently reasonable and which with advantage could be incorporated in the local enactment): "No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder except on a complaint in writing by the Chief Inspector or an Inspector specifying the facts constituting such offence and made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed" and in the absence of such a provision we do not see why the complaint filed by the Labour Officer before the Second Class Magistrate should not be considered as a complaint of facts constituting the offence under S.190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. "Complaint" is defined in S.4(h) of the Code as follows: It "complaint" means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police-officer". 9. "Complaint" is defined in S.4(h) of the Code as follows: It "complaint" means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police-officer". As pointed out in ILR XIII Bombay 600: "As a general rule any person, having knowledge of the commission of an offence, may set the law in motion by a complaint, even though he is not personally interested or affected by the offence. The exceptions to this rule, of which S.195 and 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code are examples, are exceptions created by statute. There is nothing in the Code showing an intention to confine prosecutions to the persons directly injured". 10. In order to take cognizance of offences under S.190(1)(a) the Second Class Magistrate should of course have been specially empowered in that behalf. All the Second Class Magistrates of Travancore - Cochin have been so empowered by a notification of the Government of Travancore-Cochin dated the 5th November 1951 and published in the Gazette dated the 13th November 1951 (1951 Statutory Rules and Notifications, page 582). 11. In the light of what we have stated in Para.3 above the judgments in C.C. No. 619 of the 1954 and Crl. Appeal No. 8 of 1956 have to be set aside and the petitioner acquitted. We order accordingly. The fine, if paid, will be refunded to him. Allowed.