Judgment K.Sahai, J. 1. In execution of a money decree obtained by the respondent, some lands of the appellants were auction-sold, and the respondent himself purchased them on 6-2-1949. He took delivery of possession over the lands on 26-3-1949. The appellants filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 and Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, on that application, the sale was set aside by an order dated 31-5-1950. They then filed an application under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of possession of the lands covered by the sale to them and for mesne profits from the date of delivery of possession to the respondent up to the date on which possession was restored to the appellants. The respondent raised, among others, the objection that an application under Sec.144 was not maintainable. The appellants filed a petition on 13-12-1952, that their application should be treated to be one under Sec.151 of the Code. The Munsif of Gopalganj, who heard the appellants application, allowed it in part. He directed that possession of the lands be restored to the appellants, and that they would also get mesne profits from 31-5-1950, up to the date on which possession was restored to them, the actual amount of mesne profits to be ascertained later by appointment of a pleader commissioner. The respondent took an appeal against the learned Munsifs order, and it was heard by the Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, of Chapra. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the learned Munsifs order, and dismissed the application of the appellants. This appeal is directed against the learned Subordinate Judges order. 2. Mr. Kailash Ray, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has contended that the learned Subordinate Judges order is completely without jurisdiction as he could not entertain an appeal against the learned Munsifs order which was non-appealable. On the other hand, Mr. A. S. Sinha has argued on behalf of the respondent that, in the circumstances of this case, an appeal against the learned Munsifs order was maintainable. 3. The determination of any question under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a decree as defined in Sub-section (2) of Sec.2 of the Code. Under Section 96, an appeal lies against a decree. 3. The determination of any question under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a decree as defined in Sub-section (2) of Sec.2 of the Code. Under Section 96, an appeal lies against a decree. If, therefore, the Munsif passed the order in question in this case under Sec.144, there can be no doubt that an appeal lay against it As I have mentioned, however, it was on an objection raised by the respondent himself that the appellants filed a petition that their application under Sec.144 should be treated as an application under Sec.151. Mr. Sinha has also admitted that Sec.144 does not in terms apply to this case because the appellants did not become entitled to restitution on account of any decree being varied or reversed. He has also conceded that no appeal lies against an order passed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Sec.151; but he has contended that, where a Court exercises inherent powers under sec. 151 on the analogy of powers conferred upon it under Sec.144, the order becomes appealable. In support of his contention, he has relied upon several decisions of this Court and other Courts. He has pointed out that, in Banarsi Prasad V/s. Firm Hare Kishun Radhey Kishun, ILR 11 Pat 553 : (AIR 1932 Pat 317) (A), a Bench of this Court held that the application in question in that case was not strictly an application under Sec.144 but the order passed in that case was subject to an appeal. In my judgment, that case is clearly distinguishable. The applicant for restitution had, in that case, filed the application under Sec.144 and had not, subsequently, prayed for the application being treated as one under Sec.151. The Subordinate Judge, who heard the application also purported to act under Sec.144 read with Sec.151 of the Code. Fazl Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, Courtney Terrell, C. J., agreeing, observed : "If, therefore, the order was passed by the Subordinate Judge on the footing that the case was governed by Sec.144, it was certainly appealable and the District Judge had complete jurisdiction to deal with the matter in the way he has." The decision in that case thus proceeded upon the footing that the Court of first instance purported to have passed the order under Sec.144, and an appeal lay against an Order passed under that section. All that follows, therefore, from that decision is that an appeal lies against an order which purports to be one passed under Sec.144. It does not follow that an appeal lies even against an order which is specifically passed under Sec.151. In the present case, the learned Munsif has purported to act under Sec.151, and the Subordinate Judge has also proceeded in the appeal on the basis that the miscellaneous case before the Munsif was one under Sec.151. 4. Mr. Sinha has next relied upon the decision of Manohar Lall, J., in Jagarnath Das V/s. Srikant Missir, 19 Pat LT 118 (B). In that case, the learned Judge has not given any reason but has cited the observations of Fazl Ali, J., in Banarsi Prasads case in support of his observation that where a Court decides the rights of the parties and, in effect gives a decree, the order must be appealable irrespective of the fact whether it purports to be one under Section 144 or Sec.151. As I have already shown, however, Fazl Ali, J. made the observations in the particular circumstances of the case before him in which the Court of first instance had purported to act under Sec.144. 5. In Gnanada Sundari V/s. Chandra Kumar, 81 Cal W. N. 290: (AIR 1927 Cal 285) (C), a Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that an appeal lies against an order when the Court, in passing that order, exercises under Sec.151 the jurisdiction which is vested in it under Sec.144 because that section is not strictly applicable. Their Lordships have referred to a Bench decision of this Court in Sukhdeo Dass V/s. Rito Singh, 2 Pat LT 361: (AIR 1917 Pat 495) (D), which lays down that no appeal lies against an order passed in exercise of the powers under Sec.151 of the Code, but have given no reason for not following it. They have also referred to the decision of this Court in Jagdip Narain Singh V/s. F. H. Holloway, 2 Pat LJ 206 : (AIR 1918 Pat 52) (E); but they have themselves observed that the point in question was not actually decided in that case, though one of the Judges constituting the Bench which decided the case, "expressed an opinion, which no doubt is obiter, that an appeal did lie." 6. In Mt. In Mt. Champabai V/s. Shree Daulatram Sharma, AIR 1938 Nag 326 (F), the question was whether an appeal lay against an order passed under Sec.151 read with Sec.144. Mr. Sinha has drawn my attention to the following observations of their Lordships who decided that case : "If, however, the inherent powers are used to expand a remedy in order to do justice to cover a case not within the exact words of, but within the purpose pf, a procedural section, the Court is in effect using its inherent powers to act as if the order were made under the section in question, in this case Sec.144. In such a case even justice demanded that one side should be given a remedy, restitution, as if Sec.144 applied so the other side should, as a matter of justice, be allowed the right to appeal that would, have existed, had Sec.144 really applied instead of its being applied by means of a fiction. Some such reason seems to be involved in those cases where orders for restitution passed under the inherent powers have been held appealable ..... ..... .It is clear that two views can be taken upon the subject. We prefer the above view which is consonant with the conclusions arrived at by the Calcutta High Court in Amirannessa V/s. Karimannessa, AIR 1914 Cal 692 (G) and AIR 1927 Cal 285 (C)." With great respect to the views expressed by their Lordships, I am unable to agree that an appeal can be maintainable merely on the basis of analogy. Acting in exercise of inherent powers under Sec.151, a Court can pass any order in the ends of justice or in order to prevent abuse of the processes of the Court. The order passed in exercise of these powers is neither appealable as a decree under section 96 nor as an order under Section 104 or Rule 1 of Order XLIII. The mere fact that an order passed under Sec.151 deals with matters similar to those which might have been dealt with under Sec. 47 or 144 cannot, in my judgment, be made a ground for holding that the order is subject to an appeal. An appeal can only lie from an order against which an appeal is expressly provided for in the Code or any other law in force. Sec.104 makes it clear that no appeal lies from any other order. An appeal can only lie from an order against which an appeal is expressly provided for in the Code or any other law in force. Sec.104 makes it clear that no appeal lies from any other order. Had the Legislature intended that an appeal should lie against an order passed under Sec.151 when the order is similar to one which might have been passed under any other section of the Code, they could certainly have made such a provision in the Code. In several clauses of Rule 1 of Order XLIII, a right of appeal only in certain circumstances is provided for. For instance, an appeal lies against orders referred to in Clauses (c), (d) and (n) only if they are passed in cases open to appeal. 7. No question of justice to the opposite party in an application under Section 151 also appears to me to be involved in the matter. If once an appeal is held to lie, it will lie not only at the instance of the opposite party but also at the instance of the applicant under Sec.151 if the application is dismissed. In any case, an appeal cannot be entertained merely on the ground that the opposite partys grievance must be heard by a higher Court if the Court of first instance has exercised its inherent powers in favour of the applicant. 8. In Mt. Champabais case (F) also, the attention of the learned Judges was drawn to the decision of this Court in 2 Pat LJ 361 : AIR 1917 Pat 495 (D). Their Lordships did not give any reason for not following that decision. So far as I am concerned, however, the decision of this Court is binding upon me. In that case, the Court of first instance exercised a power similar to that which could be exercised under Sec.144. Their Lordships held that the order must have been passed under Sec.151 because Sec.144 was not applicable, and hence no appeal lay against it. Mr. Kailash Ray has drawn my attention to another Bench decision of this Court in Ram Ratan Prasad V/s. Banarsi Lal, 11 Pat LT 156 : (AIR 1930 Pat 280) (H). The facts of that case were very similar to those of the present case, and it was held that the Munsif could only have acted under Sec.151! of the Code because the provisions of Sec.144 did not apply. The facts of that case were very similar to those of the present case, and it was held that the Munsif could only have acted under Sec.151! of the Code because the provisions of Sec.144 did not apply. Fazl Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, repelled an argument that an order for restitution should be deemed to have been passed under Sec.144, though that section did not in terms apply. It was further held that no appeal lay against the Munsif s order, and that the order of the District Judge, who entertained an appeal and set aside the Munsifs order, was without jurisdiction I, therefore, hold that the order passed by the learned Munsif in the present case was not appealable, and that the Subordinate Judge acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal and setting aside the Munsifs order. 9. For the reasons given above, I allow the appeal and vacate the learned Subordinate Judges order. In the circumstances of this case, there will no order as to costs.