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1957 DIGILAW 58 (GAU)

H. G. Henson v. M. Sultan, Deputy Commissioner Lakhimpur

1957-08-20

H.DEKA, SARJOO PROSAD

body1957
SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: These are applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners, who are Managers of different tea estates, pray for a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing an order dated 16-1-1954 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur District, Dibrugarh, acting as an Authority under the Minimum Wages Act and directing payment of compensation and arrears of wages to the labourers employed in the tea estates. (2) The proceedings under the Minimum Wages Act were initiated at the instance of Respondent No. 2, the Government Labour In­spector at Dibrugarh. He presented appli­cations under S. 20 (2) of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner, claiming that the labourers employed in the tea estates in ques­tion should be paid minimum wages : (i) in the Hattiali tea estate (Civil Rule No. 22/1954) at the rate of 12 annas for seven seers of tea leaves plucked by each male adult and at the rate of 11 annas for six seers of tea leaves plucked by each female adult; (ii) in the Dikom tea estate (Civil Rule No. 23/1954) at the rate of 12 annas for eight seers of tea leaves plucked by each male adult and at the rate of 11 annas for eight seers of tea leaves plucked by each female adult; and (iii) in the Lengrai tea estate (Civil Rule No. 24/1954) at the rate of 12 annas for ten seers of tea leaves plucked by each male adult and at the rate of 11 annas for eight seers of tea leaves plucked by each female adult. He alleged that before the enforcement of the Minimum Wages Act, these were the existing tasks in the respective tea gardens in question. The period in claim in each case related to the period from 2-6-1952 till 10-12-1952. The ap­plications were opposed by the petitioners, who contended that they were not maintainable in law, and that the facts disclosed in the peti­tions did not attract the jurisdiction of the offi­cer to take any action under S. 20 of the Act. The period in claim in each case related to the period from 2-6-1952 till 10-12-1952. The ap­plications were opposed by the petitioners, who contended that they were not maintainable in law, and that the facts disclosed in the peti­tions did not attract the jurisdiction of the offi­cer to take any action under S. 20 of the Act. They also disputed the claim of the Res­pondent that there were existing tasks in the tea gardens in question in respect of pluck­ing of leaves, though they admitted that there were such tasks in the case of hoeing or pruning; and they asserted that in no case the pluckers had received less than the minimum rates of wages fixed by the Government. The petitioners also stated that the appli­cations were barred by limitation as the same had been filed on 18-4-1953 beyond the requisite period of six months. The Deputy Com­missioner, after taking evidence in the cases and hearing the parties, concerned, allowed the claim of the Respondent in each case by his order in question before us. (3) To appreciate the contentions of the parties, one has to refer to a few other relevant facts bearing on the point. With a view to give effect to the provisions of the Mini­mum Wages Act, the Government issued a notification on 11th March 1952 under sub-s. (2) of S. 5 of the Act, as amended, fix­ing minimum wages, which were to come into force with effect from 30-3-1952. The minimum wages so fixed consisted of basic wage and dearness allowance in terms of clause (i) of sub-s. (1) of S. 4 of the said Act according to the rates specified in the schedule to the notification. As per schedule, the basic wage fixed for an adult male labourer in res­pect of tea estates in the rest of the Assam Valley (excluding Kamrup, Nowgong and North Lakhimpur) districts was 12 annas with dear-ness allowance of six annas, i. e. a total of Re. 1-2-0 per day; and in the case of an adult fe­male, the basic wage fixed was 11 annas, with dearness allowance of five annas, i. e. a total of Re. I/- per day. The rates fixed under the schedule were exclusive of concessions enjoyed by workers in respect of supply of foodstuff and other essen­tial commodities and amenities, which were to remain unaffected. I/- per day. The rates fixed under the schedule were exclusive of concessions enjoyed by workers in respect of supply of foodstuff and other essen­tial commodities and amenities, which were to remain unaffected. The notification further pro­vided that the existing tasks and hours of work would continue until further orders. This was followed by other notifications making chang­es in the minimum wages so as to make them more rational and uniform. The subsequent notifications, however, do not affect the period in question before us, which ended with the 10th December 1952. The present cases, therefore, are governed by the notification dated 11-3-1952, the gardens in question being situated in the Assam Valley, South Lakhimpur area. The complaint before the Deputy Commissioner was that prior to the introduction of the minimum wages afore­said, the existing tasks for a male and female labourer in the matter of plucking leaves were as follows:- (i) In the Hattiali Tea Estate (C. R. No, ] 22/1954). Male labourer - 7 seers per day. Female labourer - 6 seers per day. (ii) In the Dikom Tea Estate (C. R. No, 23/1954). Male labourer - 8 seers per day. Female labourer - 8 seers per day. (iii) In the Lengrai Tea Estate (C. R. No, 24/1954). Male labourer - 10 seers per day. Female labourer - 8 seers per day. The managements of the tea estates, however, illegally raised the existing tasks to sixteen seers and twelve seers per day in the case of each male and female labourer respectively. The labourers, both male and female, in these gardens were getting wages per day for the existing tasks aforesaid in addition to payment for any extra work that they put in and the increase in the wages by virtue of the notifi­cation thus operated on the existing tasks. The effect according to the contention of the Respondent of increasing the existing tasks was to nullify the benefit, which accrued to the labourers under the Government notification mentioned above, because the minimum wag­es had been fixed therein in relation to the existing tasks and hours of work. In the gar­dens in question, the labourers were conse­quently entitled to the minimum wages with reference to the existing tasks as stated above and the managements had to pay extra to the labourers for increase in the task load. The managements of course disputed this position. In the gar­dens in question, the labourers were conse­quently entitled to the minimum wages with reference to the existing tasks as stated above and the managements had to pay extra to the labourers for increase in the task load. The managements of course disputed this position. Their contention was that they were pay­ing to the labourers according to the rates mentioned in the Government notification, and the claim of the Respondent demanding ex­cess payment of wages to the labourers was al­together unjustified. It is to be noticed that the Government notification did not make it clear that these existing tasks and hours of work in the gardens in that area were; and, therefore, in deciding about the minimum wag­es payable, in case any dispute arose, the Authority concerned had to come to a finding about the existing tasks and hours of work prevailing in each garden. Of course, with a view to standardise the minimum wages payable to the labourers in the gardens in that area, it was essential that the basic task also should have been 'specified by the Government; but this was not done, and it was left to the Authority to find, in each case, what this existing task was, in order to •determine the minimum wages payable to the labourers in a particular garden. If this exist­ing task varied in certain gardens, as apparent­ly it did, the minimum wages proportionately was bound to increase or decrease. (4) It may be stated here that there is no •dispute in respect of the hours of work. It is contended for the Respondent that the manage­ments by increasing the existing tasks or task loads for plucking since 30-3-1952 violated the terms of the Government notification and in­fringed the provisions of the Minimum Wag­es Act, as they paid less wages to the employees in the gardens than those to which they were entitled. The managements do not appear to have seriously disputed before the Deputy Commis­sioner, except for a bare denial in their writ­ten statements, that there was an increase in the task load, as stated earlier; but they con­tended that they did so on account of the In­dian Tea Association circular asking them to bring the conditions of service of the employ­ees in these gardens in line with those in other gardens in the Dibrugarh zone. The managements further pleaded that it would be a hardship on the proprietors of the gardens concerned to compel them to pay mi­nimum wages at higher rates than what the neighbouring gardens were paying on approxi­mately double the quantity of green leaves plucked per day. These contentions did not prevail with the learned Deputy Commissioner. The Authority realised that although the existing task had not been Specified in the Gov­ernment notification, yet the minimum wages prescribed thereunder would be completely meaningless if they were not correlated to the existing tasks for all normal working days; and it is for this reason that the Government enjoined in the notification that the minimum •wage's operated upon the existing tasks and hours of working which were to continue until •further orders. If, therefore, the existing tasks were in­creased, it was bound to affect the minimum wages fixed by the Government as payable to the employees in question; and therefore, any such action taken by the managements was il­legal and infringed the provisions of the Mini­mum Wages Act. It does not appear that the contention, which is now sought to be raised before us, namely that there were no existing tasks in the gardens, was seriously pressed be­fore the Authority; on the contrary, it was as­sumed before it that there were such existing tasks prior to the introduction of the Minimum Wages Act, but that the tasks had to be varied on account of the reasons mentioned earlier, which reasons, of course, could not find favour with the Authority deciding the matter. The Deputy Commissioner in his order, which is substantially common to all the cases, observ­ed thus:- . "But it is not a question of payment of less than minimum wages fixed by Government, but in this case it is one of payment of these wages by the garden increasing the task rate, and this, I am afraid, cannot be done without affecting the minimum wages which Govern­ment Legislation had in view." Much stress has been laid by the learned coun­sel appearing on behalf of the petitioners on the first part of this quotation. It must be said that the sentence is not very happily worded and is somewhat obscure in the first part; but the Authority makes its meaning clear that the gardens could not increase the task rates, be­cause any such action would affect the mini­mum wages, which the Government notifica­tion had in view. Reading the judgments as a whole, the meaning is quite 'clear, as shown by the following passage in the judgments, which comes in the wake of the earlier quota­tion:- '"The minimum wages for a normal work­ing day would be completely meaningless if these were not related to task rate for normal working day. That is why Government preser­ved the old task rate existing before 30-3-52 and made it compulsory that the task or rate or the time rate per day as existing before 30-3-52, shall not be disturbed." In this view of the matter, the learned Deputy Commissioner allowed the applications. (5) It may be that on account of the Gov­ernment notification fixing the minimum wag­es, the tea gardens in that area tried to remove the disparity existing amongst them and the minimum wages payable by them were so ad­justed as to find a standard level; but in view of the language of the Government notification directing that the existing tasks were to con­tinue, those attempts at standardisation had to be ruled out of account. The Authority had to determine the minimum wages payable on the terms of the notification itself as it stood during the period. We are, therefore, unable to see that there is any error on the part of the Authority con­cerned in construing the above notification of the Government. In an earlier case in C. R. Nos. 147 and 148 of 1952, D/-7-7-1953 (Assam) (A), this Court observed that all the three items, namely, the basic wage, the existing task and the hours of work had to be correlated in order to ascertain the minimum wage payable on the strength of the said Government notifi­cation. The above decision was affirmed by the Su­preme Court in A. M. Allison v. B. L. Sen, (S) AIR 1957 SC 227 (B). The above decision was affirmed by the Su­preme Court in A. M. Allison v. B. L. Sen, (S) AIR 1957 SC 227 (B). Their Lordships observ­ed in that case that where, before the fixation of the minimum wages for labourers on tea plantations, there was a basic work-load or task of 16 seers of leaves for the male labour­ers and 12 seers of leaves for the female la­bourers, and this was recognised by the Gov­ernment when it stated in the notification fix­ing the minimum wages that 'the existing tasks and hours of work shall continue until further orders', the basic wages mentioned in the sche­dule were correlated to the existing work-load or task and the minimum wages per day were fixed in regard to the existing work load or task. The sole intention of the Government in is­suing the notification was to increase these ba­sic wages while maintaining the Same basic work-load or task assigned to the male and female labourers. The workmen were entitled to extra wages for every seer of green leaves plucked by them over and above the basic work­load. The Authority, therefore, did not com­mit any error in construing the notification as it did. I have already shown that it was re­lieved of the duty of finding out the existing tasks as they were practically admitted in each case. (6) We are very much impressed by the ar­gument of the learned counsel for the petition­ers that the effect of this interpretation is like­ly to cause a great deal of hardship to the petitioners. It is recognised even by the Au­thority concerned that the existing tasks in these gardens varied to a large extent and e.g., the existing task in the Hattiali tea estate for plucking was only seven Seers and six seers of leaves per day by male and female labourers , respectively, while in the other gardens in the neighbourhood it was sixteen seers per day be­fore 30-3-1952; and, on account of this disparity, the petitioners would be compelled to pay in some cases even almost double the minimum wage, which other gardens in the same valley mentioned in the Government notification were paying. This would be quite anomalous and would, instead of standardising the wages payable, re­sult in discrimination against the petitioners' gardens. The obvious effect is that the peti­tioners have been called upon to pay in one case a claim of about Rs. This would be quite anomalous and would, instead of standardising the wages payable, re­sult in discrimination against the petitioners' gardens. The obvious effect is that the peti­tioners have been called upon to pay in one case a claim of about Rs. 40,000 and in another Rs. 20,000 on account of the arrears of mini­mum wages. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the employees themselves had not raised the question before the Authority, and that the whole proceedings had been initiated by the Labour Inspector merely taking advantage of the technicalities of the situation, if any. Otherwise, the labourers were quite happy and satisfied and were carrying on their work in an atmosphere of friendliness and cordiality. All this might be true; but the eventuality that the existing tasks might vary in the different gardens in the same locality ought to have been visualised by the Government. It is quite ob­vious that the object of standardisation, at which the Government presumably aimed in fixing the basic wages was not achieved. One would rather think that to an extent in these cases it appears to have been defeat­ed. But even so, in view of the Government notification and the law on the point, I am un­able to find that we can in this Court give any relief to the petitioners in that respect. We understand that the Government have, by a subsequent notification, achieved this standardi­sation in the payment of minimum wages in the gardens in this area; and for that reason, we directed that the parties might be well ad­vised to come to a settlement on the basis of this latest notification of the Government. But it appears to us that now that there are orders in favour of the employees by the Authority concerned, they are unable to lose the advantage of these orders by agreeing to ) any such settlement. Therefore, on the terms-of the Government notification, we have no op­tion but to hold that the view taken by the Authority is correct, and, if the existing tasks in these gardens are what they have been found to be, we see no justification to interfere with the order of the Deputy Commissioner on that point. (7) There are, however, two other questions,, which have to be considered before we dispose of this matter. (7) There are, however, two other questions,, which have to be considered before we dispose of this matter. It is to be remembered that the applications in these cases were Sled by the-Labour Inspector on 18-4-1953 and they relate to a period commencing from 2-6-1952 to 10-12-1952. As provided in S. 20 of the Act, an ap­plication under sub-s. (2) of that section has to be presented in every case within six months, from the date on which the minimum wages became payable. The claim, therefore, on the basis of these applications, in respect of a large part of the period, was apparently barred by limitation. The Deputy Commissioner has completely over­looked this aspect of the question. It was clear­ly erroneous on the part of the Authority to entertain applications, which were beyond time without assigning any reason for the same and without even considering the petitioners' ob­jections in the matter. If the application is beyond time, the em­ployer acquires a valuable right, and it is an elementary principle of law that a Court or Tri­bunal or Authority cannot deprive a party of a valuable right without hearing him. The proper procedure in such cases, where an ap­plication is filed beyond the period of six months mentioned in S. 20 of the Act, should have been not to admit the application, but to keep it pending, and to merely issue a notice upon the other side to show cause why the de­lay, if there was any good reason for it, should not be condoned. Chagla, C. J., in dealing with a similar pro­vision under S. 17 of the Bombay Payment of Wages Act, 1936, took a similar view on the question of limitation applicable to such cases: (vide Prem Narayan Amritlal Varma v. Divi­sional Traffic Manager, AIR 1954 Bom 78 (C) ). It is only after the application is admitted that I the employer should be called soon to meet the" I case on merits. In these cases, it appears that the question of limitation has been completely ignored by the learned Deputy Commissioner, though the point manifestly arose in them. It was necessary for the Deputy Commis­sioner to deal with this question of. limitation before allowing the claim of the Respondent. In these cases, it appears that the question of limitation has been completely ignored by the learned Deputy Commissioner, though the point manifestly arose in them. It was necessary for the Deputy Commis­sioner to deal with this question of. limitation before allowing the claim of the Respondent. It is to be remembered that in these cases the employees themselves had not moved, but the matter had been taken up by the Labour Ins­pector with the ostensible purpose of protect­ing the interest of the employees. It is sugges­ted by the petitioners that there was good re­lationship between the employers and the em­ployees in these gardens, who had been work­ing smoothly and in harmony, and yet this trouble was started by the Labour Inspector at his own instance. It is true that the Labour Inspector was authorised under the law to move in the mat­ter, but the Authority concerned should have been astute in entertaining a stale claim unless adequately satisfied about the reasons for the delay. These proceedings undeniably result in a conflict of interest between the parties. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to have a consideration of the question of limitation, which affected the claim to a large extent. It should be further pointed out that the order of the Deputy Commissioner does not specify on what basis he has decreed the entire claim. All that he says is that the claims should be allowed, as it were, in toto; but he has come to no decision on the question whether the claims as such were justified and really amoun­ted to the difference between the wages in fact paid to the employees and the minimum wages payable under the Government notification. The Deputy Commissioner should have judi­cially determined this vital aspect of the mat­ter as to the quantum of wages really due to the employees. (8) With the above directions, we in effect allow the applications of the petitioners. The cases must go back to the Authority concerned for a decision of the matter according to law in the light of the directions, which we have given above. I may as well point out that apart from the powers vested in this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the order of the Authority is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I may as well point out that apart from the powers vested in this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the order of the Authority is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. On this point, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Lahore and the Patna High Courts in Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Moghalpura v. Hashmat, ILR (1947) Lah 1: (AIR 1946 Lah 316) (FB) (D); Mt. Dirji v. Goblin, ILR 20 Pat 373: (AIR 1941 Pat 65) (FB) (E); and A. Hasan v. Mo­hamad Shamsuddin, AIR 1951 Pat 140 (F). The parties will bear their own costs of these applications. (9) DEKA, J.:- I agree. D.H.Z. Applications allowed.