DEKA J.: This rule was issued at the instance of Kiron Chandra Das a Railway employee who had entered into the Burma Railway service sometime in the year 1925. During the exigencies of the last war he left Burma and got an appointment as a Guard at Chittagong in the Bengal Assam Railway on 18-1-43 with an initial pay of Rs, 507- in the scale of Rs. 30-60/-. After the partition of India he opted for India and as a result of regrouping of the Railways, he worked in the Assam Railway which had subsequently merged with the North Eastern Railway and is still working in the capacity of a Guard in the said Railway and drawing at pre­sent, or strictly speaking-at the time of making this application, a sum of Rs. 96/- as basic pay. His contention is that in terms of CTM's letter No. 80E/19/16 of 4-12-45 the pay of the Ex-Burma Rail­way employees have been fixed at the rate at which they drew it while employed in the Burma Rail­way from the date of their appointment in the Indian Railway with usual increments. He based this contention on an office note of the District Traffic Superintendent, Lumding dated 4-3-46. It is urged that since he was drawing Rs. 80/- per month as his pay under the Burma Rail­way at the time of evacuation, he was entitled to get Rs. 80/- per month on the date of his appoint­ment and should have received Rs. 201/- as his basic pay on 5-3-54. He submits further that on 8-9-49 his representation was considered by the Chief Administrative Officer, Assam Railway, and he gave an assurance that the petitioner shall be given the full benefit of the Burma Railway pay of Rs. 80/-per month, but subsequent events show that no effect was given to this assurance. Though he produced an original certificate of the Burma Railway to the effect that he was draw­ing a pay of Rs. 80/- per month and the same was verified by the department itself, on the 16th March, 1954 he was informed by the Regional Tra­ffic Superintendent, Pandu, that the petitioner's Burma Railway service will not count and he was refused permission to take his case to the civil Court, where he intended to seek relief. 80/- per month and the same was verified by the department itself, on the 16th March, 1954 he was informed by the Regional Tra­ffic Superintendent, Pandu, that the petitioner's Burma Railway service will not count and he was refused permission to take his case to the civil Court, where he intended to seek relief. He further contends that the interpretation put on his case in the District Traffic Superintendent, Dibriigarh's letter No. ES/K-42 of 11th January 1954 is most misleading and deprived the petitioner of his legiti­mate dues. He further urges that he was entitled to up­grading by virtue of the circular issued from the General Manager's Office Personnel Branch, Gorakhpur, it being S. No. 650 No. E/255/1, dated 28th August, 1954 which dealt with the cases of the ex-employees of the Burma Railway and contends that he has not been given the pay that he was last drawing in the Burma Railway. His conten­tion is that his case had been discriminated in tae matter of his pay and promotion which has pre­judiced him greatly and the said discrimination comes under Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. Under the circumstances he prays for a writ of mandamus or a writ of the like nature of the opposite parties to recall or cancel the orders dated 11-1-54 (relating to fixation of his pay) and 6-7-54 (relating to his seniority) and to direct the oppo­site parties to give his due pay scale as per CTM's letter No. 80E/10/16 of 4-12-45 and give effect to the order dated 28th August, 1954 vide S No. 650/N0J3/255/1. (2) He asked for this relief against the Gene­ral Manager, North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur and Regional Traffic Superintendent (Personnel), North Eastern Railway, Pandu, who were made opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. The case was contested on behalf of the opposite par­ties and an affidavit was filed opposing the peti­tioner's claim by Sri S. N. Barua, Regional Traffic Superintendent, Pandu. 1 and 2 respectively. The case was contested on behalf of the opposite par­ties and an affidavit was filed opposing the peti­tioner's claim by Sri S. N. Barua, Regional Traffic Superintendent, Pandu. There were some disputes as to the facts al­leged by the petitioner and the main contention is that the office note of the District Traffic Super­intendent, Lumding dated 4-3-46 which had been relied on by the petitioner had no effect and that even the CTM's letter on which this office note was purported to be based had subsequently been neu­tralised or effaced and the terms and conditions finally settled for employment of ex-Burma Rail­way employees evacuated to India are stated in the Circular Letter Nos. E 42A P HI/2 dated 25-4-42, 6-6-42 and 16-2-43 of the Railway Board, copies of which had been marked as annexures to the coun­ter-affidavit filed by the Opposite Party No. 2. The Department further contended that the conten­tion of the petitioner to receive Rs. 2017- on 5-3-54 is without any legal basis. (3) The case of the Department is that the petitioner being appointed as a Guard on the scale of Rs. 30-607- has been confirmed in that post and he has been given his legitimate pay without any discrimination as alleged. There are other legal contentions as to the maintainability of this ap­plication they being primarily as argued by Mr. Goswami, the Junior Government Advocate: (1) The Railway Board or the Union of India not being made a party, no relief can be given by issuing a writ on the subordinate officers; (2) the Gene­ral Manager's office not being situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, no writ can be issued on the General Manager; (3) the Dis­trict Traffic Superintendent is not competent to give effect to any writ as to the promotion or pay of the petitioner, (4) the petitioner has no legal right for the enforcement of which he can ask for a writ; (5) when the facts are disputed, the- High Court cannot decide the facts on a writ petition and the petition itself is liable to be dis­missed. (4) On the facts it is argued that the instruc­tions of the Railway Board have been fol­lowed and there has been no discrimi­nation in the case of the petitioner as alleged, the promotion and upgrading of the officials being done on their competency, efficiency and other qualifications. (4) On the facts it is argued that the instruc­tions of the Railway Board have been fol­lowed and there has been no discrimi­nation in the case of the petitioner as alleged, the promotion and upgrading of the officials being done on their competency, efficiency and other qualifications. (5) I need not discuss the objections raised by Mr. R. Goswami on behalf of the opposite parties seriatim, but two things mainly emerge from his contentions that need special consideration. (1) Whether the writ if at all issued, is likely to be effective; (2) whether the circumstances have been sufficiently proved which would induce this Court to issue a prerogative writ either of the nature of mandamus or certiorari as prayed for. It is con­ceded that opposite party No. 1 the General Ma­nager, North Eastern Railway does neither live nor work within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, his head office being at Gorakhpur, outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction. Article 226 of the Constitution definitely lays down that the High Court shall have the power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue an appropriate writ within those territories and not outside. On the face of it, therefore, we cannot issue an appropriate writ on the General Manager oppo­site party No. 1, unless we find from the facts that he works through some local agent here who can be effectively stopped from doing a particular thing or can be directed to do a particular thing as the writ will command. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before us in support of his contention a case reported in Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti, (S) AIR 1956 SO 246 (A). The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before us in support of his contention a case reported in Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti, (S) AIR 1956 SO 246 (A). There a writ was prayed for on the In­dian Income-tax Investigation Commission, which had its head office or establishment at New Delhi outside the jurisdiction of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, but it was held that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ on the authorised official appointed under S. 6 of the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commis­sion, who was working within the jurisdiction of the Court, since he was not merely a mouth-piece of the Commissioner or a conduit-pipe transmitting the orders or the directions of the Commission, but he used to perform various functions assigned to him on his own initiative and in the exercise of his jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that in such circum­stances, if the said agent doss anything in the dis­charge of his functions as authorised official which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fun­damental rights of the petitioner, he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court un­der Art. 226. In the present case, no such agent of the General Manager is made a party to this writ petition. The only person who is joined as a party is the Regional Traffic Superintendent (Per­sonnel) of the North Eastern Railway with his head office at Pandu. The petitioner nowhere says that his functions are and whether he has any part in the matter of appointment or of promotion of the petitioner who is an employee in the Pandu Divi­sion of the North Eastern Railway. Mr. H. Goswami contends that the Regional Traffic Superintendent has the power to recommend the pay and promotion of the petitioner The matter not being set out in the petition, we cannot accept a statement of facts unless some authoritative document or order is placed before us for our consideration. Mr. H. Goswami contends that the Regional Traffic Superintendent has the power to recommend the pay and promotion of the petitioner The matter not being set out in the petition, we cannot accept a statement of facts unless some authoritative document or order is placed before us for our consideration. It is laid down in a circular placed before us by the Railway Department (marked as annexure C) dated the 16th February, 1943 No. E42APIII/2 that in case of Burma Rail­way employees with other officials who have been evacuated from Burma or Malaya the appointment should be made by the Railway so far as the gazet­ted posts are concerned, by the Railway Board and by the General Manager of a Railway in respect of the non-gazetted posts including the essential categories of staff. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Kiron Chandra Das was a Guard and as such was an essential service man, and it is conceded by him that it is the General Mana­ger of the Railway who is responsible for the ap­pointment, pay and promotion of the employee. In these circumstances we cannot assume that the Regional Traffic Superintendent had any hand in the matter or was even an agent of the General Manager for the purpose. Even if we issue a writ as prayed for on the Regional Traffic Superinten­dent, he might say with ease that it is no part of my function to fix pay or grade of the petitioner. The only document, on which Mr. H. Goswami relied for the success of the petition was an office note of the District Traffic Superintendent of Lumding dated 4-3-46 which was marked as an­nexure C attached to the writ petition. The said office note only refers to the terms of CTM's letter No. 80E/10/16 of 4-12-45, a document which is not before us and which the Department contends to be subsequently modified or amended by an order of the Railway Board. We cannot say with any amount of definiteness that the C.T.M's letter above quoted still stands, and even if it does, it could not be construed to be on par with a direction either from the Gene­ral Manager of the Railway or an order of the Railway Board which alone would be binding. We cannot say with any amount of definiteness that the C.T.M's letter above quoted still stands, and even if it does, it could not be construed to be on par with a direction either from the Gene­ral Manager of the Railway or an order of the Railway Board which alone would be binding. In these circumstances we do not think that the con­tention of the petitioner is sound to the extent that those office notes should govern the relation between the employer and the ex-employees of the Burma Railway who are now serving in the North Eastern Railway. (6) It is a well established principle by now that no administrative order should be interfered with by issue of a writ unless the Court is convinc-1 ed that the order is in violation of the principle of natural justice or in flagrant disregard of any statutory rules or orders. In this case no such violation of any statutory rules or principles has been 'placed before us and the order being evi­dently an administrative order, we do not feel competent to issue any writ even on the facts as placed before us. Therefore, it is mainly on two grounds that we reject the petition: (1) that the General Manager has not his head office within the jurisdiction of this Court and he being personally responsible for the fixation of the pay or promotion of the peti­tioner, who is a non-gazetted officer, we cannot issue any writ on him, even if for argument's sake the allegations are true; (2) the circumstances have not been proved to our satisfaction that there has been any violation of any principle of natural justice, or of a statute or rules framed thereunder by which the petitioner is prejudiced. It does not seem either that there was any error manifest on. the face of the record. (7) The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on his contention that there has been a case of discrimination which comes under Art. 14 of the Constitution, since some of the ex-Burma Railway employees have got better grades and pay than the petitioner himself. the face of the record. (7) The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on his contention that there has been a case of discrimination which comes under Art. 14 of the Constitution, since some of the ex-Burma Railway employees have got better grades and pay than the petitioner himself. The fixation of pay or promotion might depend on so many facts and circumstances and we need not express any opinion as to whether there has been any such discrimination in the case of the petitioner, but that discrimination even if there be, will not come under Art. 14 of the Constitution and this argu­ment has not much force. What emerges from the materials placed before us is, that at a time the petitioner got an assurance from the then Chief Administrative Officer of the Railway that his case would receive further considerations. It is how­ever a matter for the Department about which we would express no opinion. Of course it is natural to expect that everybody should get justice from the employer so far as conditions would permit. (3) Mr. Goswami for the petitioner further contended that the policy of the Government with respect to the ex-Burma employees had not been given effect to by the General Manager, or the Re­gional Traffic Superintendent,-in respect of the pay and promotion of the petitioner. But what­ever the policy may be, we are not supposed to know or judge unless it is made clear through codi­fied law or rules and here in this case we find none favouring the case of the petitioner. (9) The learned Advocate for the opposite parties has submitted before us that the Depart­ment will have no objection to the petitioner's seeking redress in the Civil Court subject to the condition that he will have to defray the expenses of the litigation himself. (10) In the circumstances of the case we dis­miss the petition, but make no order for costs. The rule is accordingly discharged. SAIUOO PKOSAD C. J.: (11) I agree. The facts placed before us by the petitioner have been controverted in material par­ticulars on behalf of the opposite party. In view of the disputed facts We will not be justified in issuing a writ. The rule is accordingly discharged. SAIUOO PKOSAD C. J.: (11) I agree. The facts placed before us by the petitioner have been controverted in material par­ticulars on behalf of the opposite party. In view of the disputed facts We will not be justified in issuing a writ. Then there is the legal difficulty that the matter is entirely in the hands of the General Manager, who resides and has his Head office outside the territorial limits of this Court and the Regional Traffic Superintendent, who has his office at Pandu, cannot take any effective ac­tion in the matter. It seems to me even on the inadequate mate­rials that we have, that the case of the petitioner deserved serious consideration, particularly in view of the promise of the General Manager to recon­sider his previous orders: vide Memo No. E/301/ HI/7, Pandu, dated 23-5-55 (Annexure "G" to the petition). A copy of our order along with a copy of the annexure referred to above may be transmit­ted to the General Manager for any action that he may deem fit and proper. Petition dismissed.