Judgment Sinha, J. 1. These appeals have been filed by the decree-holders-auction -purchasers against the orders of the Courts below setting aside sales held on 14-12-1937 in Execution Case No. 570 of 1937 and on 10-7-1944 in Execution Case No. 216 of 1944. 2. The facts, shortly stated, are that the appellants had obtained a mortgage decree in Mortgage Suit No. 104 of 1932 against the opposite party 3rd party and the applicants respondents, who were then minors under the guardianship of Mr. Ata Hussain, Pleader, guardian-ad-litem. In the first execution case, the appellants had impleaded the applicants respondents under the guardianship of their father, and satisfied a part of their decree by sale of the mortgaged properties. As the decree was not satisfied in full, steps were taken for a money decree under Order 34, Rule 6, Civil P. C. In that proceeding, the applicants respondents were impleaded as majors, and, in execution of the said decree, properties belonging to the applicants and their father were sold and purchased by the decree-holders appellants on the date mentioned above. It is said that the applicants Nos. 1 and 2 attained majority in 1949 and 1948, respectively, and filed the present applications for setting aside the two sales on 8-6-1950, under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 90, Civil P.C. and Sec. 47 of the Code, on the ground that the sales were void inasmuch as no notice was either issued or served upon the applicants who were then minors under the guardianship of the aforesaid pleader, and that all the notices were fraudulently sup-pressed. 3. The appellants decree-holders refuted the allegations of the applicants, and submitted that the applications were barred by limitation, that notices under Order 21, Rule 22, of the Code had been properly served on them, and that these applicants had full knowledge of the proceedings under Order 34, Rule 6 of the Code. They denied that the processes in the execution cases had been fraudulently suppressed. They also submitted that, after auction sales, the auction-purchasers had obtained delivery of possession and had been coming in possession to the knowledge of everybody concerned. It was further said that the father of the applicants had filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code on his own behalf as well as on behalf of these applicants, but the application had been dismissed. 4. It was further said that the father of the applicants had filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code on his own behalf as well as on behalf of these applicants, but the application had been dismissed. 4. The Courts below have found that these applicants were minors at the time of the execution proceedings and they were under the guardianship of the pleader aforementioned, and that the service Of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, on their father in the one case and on the applicants themselves as majors in the other was no compliance at all with the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C. In effect, they held that the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 had not been issued or served upon the applicants at all, the reason being that in the one case the service of notices upon the applicants through their father, when, as a matter of fact, a pleader guardian had been appointed, amounted to no service at all; and in the second case service on the applicants, who were then minors, as majors was equally of, no avail. The Courts below also held that the article of the Limitation Act applicable to a case of this kind, where sales were void, was 181, and the applications, having been filed within three years of the applicants attaining majority, were not barred by time. 5. These appeals were formerly heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court, who referred these cases for decision by a Division Bench. 6. Mr. 5. These appeals were formerly heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court, who referred these cases for decision by a Division Bench. 6. Mr. Rai T.N. Sahai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted - (1) that the service of notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code was at the most irregular, and the Courts below have erred in law in holding that there was no issue or service of notices at all on the applicants; and (2) that, in view of the amendments of years 1936 and 1947 of Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C., it should be held that the non-service of notices under Order 21, Rule 22, was a mere irregularity not going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree, and, therefore, the sales held in violation of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22, were voidable and not void; and, in that view, of the matter, the applications for setting aside the sales should be governed by Article 166, which prescribes thirty days from the date of sale, and not Article 181 of the Limitation Act. 7. On the facts of the present case, I should have been inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Sahai that notices under Order 21, Rule 22, were issued, but at the most the service on the minors (the applicants) was irregular. My reasons had been that, though a guardian-ad-litem had been appointed by the Court, the service of the notices on these minors under Order 21, Rule 22, had been effected on the father as their guardian. The father never raised the objection that the service was improper, and not only that, he filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code for setting aside the sales, on his behalf and on behalf of these minors. But I am confronted with an authority of this Court reported as Shiva Sahai Ram V/s. Sundar Mandal, AIR 1948 Pat 91 (A), where the facts were not very dissimilar to the facts of the present case, the only difference being that, instead of the notice having been served upon the father as guardian of the minors, in that case the notice had been served upon the brother of the minors, although in both these cases a pleader guardian had been appointed by the Court. It was held by their Lordships in that case that a guardian-ad-litem appointed in the suit continued to be so in the execution proceedings till his removal or death, and that the elder brother had authority to represent his minor brothers in the execution, as there was no order of the Court removing the pleader guardian and appointing him in his place; and in that view of the matter, the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22, as to notice had not been complied with so far as the minors were concerned, and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the minors" share in the property. The whole purpose of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, in my view, is that the person against whom execution is levied must have the information about the execution and an opportunity to make submission as to why the execution shall not proceed against him. If, as I conceive, that was the purpose of issuing notice under Order 21, R, 22, it was enough if the father or any adult member of the family of the minors had the requisite notice under Order 21, Rule 22. Though the notices should have been served upon the pleader guardian, it was merely an irregularity to serve the notices on the father or the other natural guardian of the minors. I, however, think that as the appeals can be disposed of on the other submission made by Mr. Sahai, it is not necessary to pursue this matter any further. 8. in the case of Raghunath Das V/s. Sundar Das Khetri, 41 Ind App 251: (AIR 1914 PC 129) (B), it was held, as pointed out by many decisions, that the omission to issue notice under Order 21, Rule 22, of the Code went to the jurisdiction of the Court executing, the decree, and that an irregularity in the service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree, and does not make the sale wholly ineffective (Ramlal Sahu V/s. Mt. Ramia, ILR 26 Pat 340: (AIR 1947 Pat 454) (FB) (C). For the present case, however, I will assume that notices under Order 21, Rule 22, were hot issued against the applicants who were then minors. The sale had taken place on 14-12-1937 in the one case and on 10-7-1944, in the other. Ramia, ILR 26 Pat 340: (AIR 1947 Pat 454) (FB) (C). For the present case, however, I will assume that notices under Order 21, Rule 22, were hot issued against the applicants who were then minors. The sale had taken place on 14-12-1937 in the one case and on 10-7-1944, in the other. Order 21, Rule 22 (1) Civil P.C., before the amendment by this Court on 1-4-1936 was as follows:- - (1) Where an application for execution is made- (a) more than one year after the date of the decree, or, (b) against the legal representative of a party to the decree, the Court executing the decree shall issue a notice to the person against whom execution is applied for requiring him to show cause, on a date to be fixed, why the decree should not be executed against him. Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in consequence of more than one year having elapsed between the date of the decree and the application for execution if the application is made within one year from the date of the last order against the party against whom execution is applied for, made on any previous application for execution, or in consequence of the application being male against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, if upon a previous application for execution against the same person the Court has ordered execution to issue against him." But Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 22 of Order 21, after the aforesaid amendment, stand as follows:- - "(1) Where an application for execution is made in writing under Rule 11 (2) the Court executing the decree shall issue a notice to the person against whom execution is applied for requiring him to show cause, on a date to be fixed, why the decree should not be executed against him." Sub-rule (2): "(2) Nothing in the foregoing sub-rule shall be deemed to preclude the Court from issuing any process in execution of a decree without issuing the notice thereby prescribed, if, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that the issue of such notice would cause unreasonable delay or would defeat the ends of justice." In view of these sub-rules, it appears the rigour of the rule and the effect of it, as held by the Privy Council in the above-mentioned case, has been very greatly softened, and it is no more a question of jurisdiction if notice is not issued because if the non-issue of notice was a question of jurisdiction, the notice had to be issued in all cases. The rule, however, provides that in some cases, though reasons have to be recorded, notice may not issue at all. I am, therefore, inclined to the view that the non-issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, was not a matter affecting the jurisdiction of the executing Court. In that view of the matter, there was no lack of jurisdiction when the executing Court put the properties at auction sale in these two execution cases. If any authority were needed, 1 would refer to the case of Sukhdeo Gond V/s. Brahmdeo Tewari, S.A. No. 1308 of 1949, D/- 29-11-1956: ( AIR 1957 Pat 431 (D). In that view of the matter, there was no lack of jurisdiction when the executing Court put the properties at auction sale in these two execution cases. If any authority were needed, 1 would refer to the case of Sukhdeo Gond V/s. Brahmdeo Tewari, S.A. No. 1308 of 1949, D/- 29-11-1956: ( AIR 1957 Pat 431 (D). I must, however, make it clear with reference to that case that, although that point may have been obiter dictum, I should have come to the same conclusion even without that authority. 9. There is still another amendment of Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code (vide Bihar Gazette dated 14-5-1947) by which Sub-rule (3) to Order 21, Rule 22, was added in the following terms:- - "(3) Proceedings held in execution of a decree shall not be invalid solely by reason of any omission to issue or failure to serve a notice under Sub-rule (1) or to record reasons where such notice is dispensed with under Sub-rule (2) unless the judgment-debtor has sustained substantial injury thereby." This amendment, in my opinion, makes the matter clear beyond doubt that the proceedings in execution, without issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, must be held not to affect the jurisdiction of the Court, and that it is, at the most, a mere irregularity, and that was the intention of the Legislature in enacting Order 21, Rule 22. As the case laws had decided to the contrary, the Legislature had to intervene and make its intention clear by inserting Sub-rule (3) to Rule 22 of Order 21 of the Code. In the case of Sourendra Mohan Sinha V/s. Secy. of State, ILR 14 Pat 283; (AIR 1934 Pat 701) (E), it was pointed out as follows:- - "It is a well-settled principle of law that the Legislature must be taken to be aware of the interpretation of the statute enacted by them by the Courts; and if they find that the interpretations by Courts of Justice are not in conformity with their intention they should amend it to bring it in conformity with their intention." Although this amendment came in 1947, in my opinion, the amendment declares what the intention of the Legislature was in enacting Order 21, Rule 22. In the present case, there is no material to hold that any substantial injury was caused to the applicants by non-issue of notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 It must, therefore, be held that the non-issue of notices under Order 21, Rule 22, was a mere irregularity and that the sales held in the two execution cases were not without jurisdiction and void, but they were merely voidable. I would further hold that the applicants must be deemed to have knowledge of the sales as and when they took place because their father was looking after the case on their behalf as well and he had filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code, though unsuccessfully. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no scope for the application of Article 181 of the Limitation Act and that Article 166 of the Act would apply. The applications having been filed more than thirty days after the sales, therefore, must be dismissed as being barred by time. 11. In the circumstances above-mentioned, I would allow these appeals, set aside the order of the Courts below and dismiss the applications for setting aside the sales with costs throughout. Dayal, J. 12 I agree.