ORDER By this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or a writ of like nature or an order quashing the order dated 12-5-56 by which he was removed from the office of Sebaiyet of a deity and certain other orders. 2. It is an admitted fact that the Maharajah of Manipur was the religious head of the State and controlled ail the religious functions and institutions in the State. He was the final authority in such matters, and the same rights were preserved to him even after the merger of the State by the Merger Agreement, Art. VI of which runs thus : "The Dominion Government guarantees the succession, according to law and custom, to the gaddi of the State and to His Highness the Maharajas personal rights, privileges, dignities, titles, authority over religious observances, customs, usages, rights and ceremonies and institutions incharge of the same in the State". 3. The then Maraharaja Bodhchandra had appointed the petitioner K. Tombi Singh as the Sebaiyet (Lai-seluugba) of the deity known as Ningthou Lai Karouhanba at village Moidangpok on 9-10-47, and thereafter the petitioner was managing the properties of the deity and performing the customary ceremonies under the directions of the Pandit Loisang (Pandits of the Maharajah). 4. Maharajah Bodhchandra died and was succeeded by his minor son the present Maharajah, and hid Administrator has been exercising the powers of Maharajah in such matters on his behalf. 5. Certain disputes arose between the petitioner and opposite party Nos. 2 to 8 (the Administrator being opposite party No. 1) over the land of the deity and also the performance of the Laiharaoba ceremony which is performed every year. An application was made to the Administrator that the petitioner was going to commence the performance of the Laiharaoba from 11-5-56, the date fixed for it by the Pandit Loisang, without having completely performed the Lamdaiba ceremony, which is necessary to be performed before Laiharaoba can be commenced, and there was a likelihood of breach of the peace on that account. The Administrator then directed on 10-5-56 that the performance of the Laiharaoba should be stopped till an enquiry was made into the complaint and the same disposed of. The order was also served on the petitioner. 6. The Administrator then directed on 10-5-56 that the performance of the Laiharaoba should be stopped till an enquiry was made into the complaint and the same disposed of. The order was also served on the petitioner. 6. Opposite party No. 2 and others of the village also moved the Administrator for the removal of the petitioner from the office of Sebaiyet for the same reason. The Private Secretary of the Maharajah was then deputed to make a local enquiry, and he carried out the same on 12-5-56 with the help of a Pandit from the Pandit Loisang, but without giving the petitioner a chance to defend, in fact the enquiry was held during the absence of the petitioner from the village. The Administrator also on the basis of that report which was unfavourable to the petitioner and without giving a hearing to the petitioner passed an order on 12-5-56 dismissing the petitioner from the office of Sebaiyet as he considered that the attempt to perform Laiharaoba without Lamdaiba was a serious offence of breach of custom. Thereafter he allowed the opposite party Nos. 2 to 8 and others to perform the Laiharaoba. According to the petitioner he had performed the necessary ceremony of Lamdaiba and he questioned all these orders mainly on the ground that the Administrator acted in violation of the principle of natural justice and without jurisdiction or in excess of it, though he was bound to act as a quasi-judicial body in such matters. 7. Opposite party No. 1 did not put in an appearance. The other opposite parties opposed the petition mainly on the ground that such matters were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Maharajah and a writ under Art. 226 could not be issued in respect of them and they joined issues. 8. The arguments of learned counsel however centred round the question of dismissal of the petitioner only, that being obviously of the greatest importance to him, and his counsel tried to make the point that in dealing with that question, the Administrator was bound to proceed in a quasi-judicial manner, and in any case he acted against the principles of natural justice. 9. In my opinion there is no force in these contentions. As already seen the Maharajah is the final and exclusive authority in such matters and no writ can issue to such an independent authority. 9. In my opinion there is no force in these contentions. As already seen the Maharajah is the final and exclusive authority in such matters and no writ can issue to such an independent authority. It is also admitted that there are no rules on the subject according to which the Maharajah has to act in such matters, that is, his discretion has not been fettered in any way. It is then difficult to see how the Maharajah is bound to act in a quasi-judicial way when deciding the question whether a Sebaiyet should be continued or discharged. There being also no legal or other provision as regards the terms of service or appointment of Sebaiyets, the only conclusion that can be reasonably drawn would be that a Sebaiyet holds office during the pleasure of the Maharajah. 10. It follows from the position stated above that the decisions of the Maharajah in such matters will necessarily be of a purely administrative nature,, that is, they will be subjective in nature, and in deciding such matters he is not bound by any rules such as bind a judicial tribunal. The grounds upon which he acts and the means which he takes to inform himself before acting will therefore be left entirely to his discretion. Similarly, the obligation to observe the rules of natural justice arises only if there is a statute or a contract which obliges the tribunal authority to make due enquiry. It is therefore not open to the petitioner to say that he was entitled to be heard and he must be given a chance to adduce evidence and to put forward his arguments. The Administrator sent a responsible officer and also a Pandit of Loisang and got a local enquiry made through them. They found that the petitioner had not performed the preliminary ceremony of Lamdaiba and reported to him accordingly that was in my opinion enough. The Administrator considered this to be a serious matter against the prevailing customs and did not consider the petitioner to be a fit person to continue in the office of Sebaiyet. That was a matter within his discretion and it is well-settled that this court will not go into those reasons and examine them as an Appellate Court. 11. The Administrator considered this to be a serious matter against the prevailing customs and did not consider the petitioner to be a fit person to continue in the office of Sebaiyet. That was a matter within his discretion and it is well-settled that this court will not go into those reasons and examine them as an Appellate Court. 11. In view of all the above facts I am satisfied that the Maharajah acting as the Head of all the religious institutions is an independent tribunal to which a writ cannot be issued under Art. 226, and in any case the question of appointment or dismissal of a Sebaiyet and other allied matters are matters purely within his discretion and he need not proceed in a quasi-judicial way when deciding them. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on, Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasuveda Ayyar, AIR 1917 PC 71 (A), but that was a case under an Act of the Legislature. That is however not the position here. Another case relied upon on behalf of the petitioner was Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. de S. Jayaratne, 54 Cal WN 883 (PC) (B) but that also does not help the petitioner. It was held in that case that for bringing a body under the certiorari jurisdiction it, was absolutely necessary that that body must be under a duty to act judicially. I have already shown above that it is not so in the present case. It is obvious for the same reasons that the petitioner is also not entitled to any writ or order as regards the other orders which he challenged in the petition, but which point was not pressed before me. 12. The result is that this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels tee Rs. 50/-. Petition dismissed.