Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. In this case the petitioner, Khan Bahadur Mahabat Jung, has obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the opposite parties to show cause why a writ In the nature of mandamus should not be issued commanding the opposite parties not to give effect to the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar Act 30 of 1950) with regard to the estates of the petitioner located in the districts of Patna, Santal Parganas and Purnea. Cause has been shown by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the State of Bihar and other opposite parties to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given, 2. The petitioner is the grandson of the late Nawab Nazim of Bengal. He owns very extensive properties, including the proprietary and tenure rights, in the districts of Purnea, the Santal Parganas and Patna in the State of Bihar. These properties once belonged to the late Nawab Nazim of Bengal, who on the 12th March 1891, entered into an agreement with the Secretary of State for India by which Nawab Nazim relinquished for himself, his heirs and successors all the claims to the position and dignity of Nawab Nazim in consideration of a covenant that the Nawab Bahadur and his successors would enjoy in perpetuity the properties in question. The agreement between the Nawab Nazim and the Secretary of State was duly ratified by the legislature, of the Government of India and the Moorshidabad Act (Act 15 of 1893) was duly passed recognising the terms of the aforesaid agreement. Sec. 5 of this Act provides :- - " 5. All property, moveable and immoveable, mentioned In the said indenture, or in any of the schedules thereto or in any addition which under Sec.3 may from time to time be made to those schedules or any of them, shall descend and, subject to the provisions of the said indenture, be enjoyed for ever by the Nawab Bahadur of Moorshidabad for the time being. " 3. In 1933another Act, namely, the Murshidabad Estate Administration Act, 1933 (Act 23 of 1933) was passed in order to provide for the appointment of a Manager of the properties of the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad and to define the powers and duties of the Manager. " 3. In 1933another Act, namely, the Murshidabad Estate Administration Act, 1933 (Act 23 of 1933) was passed in order to provide for the appointment of a Manager of the properties of the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad and to define the powers and duties of the Manager. This Act was passed in order to afford protection to the Nawab Bahadur who suffered disabilities by reason of his embarrassed circumstances and to prevent further increase in his debts arid to provide machinery for repayment to his creditors. In pursuance of the provisions of this Act, the Board of Revenue took possession and management of the estate of the petitioner. On the 26th September 1950, the Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar Act 30 of 1950) was promulgated. In exercise of the powers vested by Sec.3 of this Act opposite party No. 1 issued Notification No. 438-EV-II-1022/ 55 L. R., dated the 18th August 1955, for vesting of all the estates and rights held under such estates in the districts of Samal Parganas and Patna, and Notification No. A-VII-1022-54-631 L. R., dated the 26th January 1955, read with Notification No. 5404 L.. R., dated the 21st September 1954, for the vesting of all estates and rights held under such estates in the district of Purnea. These Notifications were duly published in the Bihar Gazette and are annexures A, A-1 and A-2 of the application. The case of the petitioner is that the Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar Act 30 of 1950) cannot override the provisions of the appeal Act, namely, the Moorshidabad Act (Act 15 of 1891), and the Notifications issued by the State Government under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act were illegal and ultra vires and ought to be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the opposite parties to forbear from giving effect to the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act with regard to the disputed properties. 4. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner argued in the first place that Act 15 of 1891, -namely, the Murshidabad Act, was special legislation dealing with the case of a special individual, and as a matter, of construction the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act cannot override the special law. 4. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner argued in the first place that Act 15 of 1891, -namely, the Murshidabad Act, was special legislation dealing with the case of a special individual, and as a matter, of construction the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act cannot override the special law. It was submitted by learned Counsel that the general provisions cannot supersede or derogate from special provisions and the, maxim " generalia specialibus non derogant" applied to this case. Learned Counsel referred to the preamble of Act 15 of 1891 which is in the following terms :- - "Whereas it is expedient to confirm and give effect to the indenture which is set forth in the schedule to this Act and which was made on the twelfth day of March 1891, between the Secretary of State for India in Council of the part and Ihtisham-ul-Mulk Rais-ud-Dowlah Amir-ul-Omrah Nawab Sir Syud Hussan AH Khan Bahadur Mohabatjung G. C. I. E., Nawab Bahadur of Murshedabad, eldest son of his late Highness Moontazim-ul-Mulk Mohsen ud-Dow-lah Fureedoon Jah Syud Monsoor All Khan Bahadur Nusrut Jung, late Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, of the other part; It is hereby enacted as follows :- -" It was. argued that the Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar Act 30 of 1950) was a general law and according to the accepted canon of construction a general Act cannot override the provisions of a special Act. In support of his argument learned Counsel referred to Corporation of Blackpool V/s. Starr Estate, Co. Ltd., (1922) 1 A C 27 (A), where the question at issue was whether the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, should be construed so as to override the provisions of the Blackpool Improvement Act, 1917. It was held by Viscount Finaly in that case that the Act of 1919 did not apply and that the compensation was to be ascertained in the manner provided by the Lands Clauses Acts as modified by the Act of 1917. It was further held that the general language of the Act of 1919 ought not, in the absence of clear words, to be construed so as to affect the special provisions of Section 70 of the Blackpool Improvement Act of 1917, which was a private Act. It was further held that the general language of the Act of 1919 ought not, in the absence of clear words, to be construed so as to affect the special provisions of Section 70 of the Blackpool Improvement Act of 1917, which was a private Act. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner also upon another case.The King V/s. Minister of Health, (1936) 2 K B 29 (B), where the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" was applied so as to prevent the Housing Act of 1925 overriding the special provisions of the London Open Spaces Act, 1893, with regard to Hackney Marshes. Reference was also made on behalf of the petitioner to another -case, In re Smiths Estate, Clements V/s. Ward, (1867) 35 Ch. D. 589 (C) where Stirling J. clearly states the basis of the rule as follows : "Now the rule, as I understand it, is this: that where there is an Act of Parliament which deals in a special way with a particular subject-matter, and that is followed by a general Act of Parliament which deals in a general way with the subject-matter of the previous legislation, the Court ought not to hold that general words in such a general Act of Parliament effect a repeal of the prior and special legislation unless it can find some reference in the general Act to the prior and special legislation, or unless effect cannot be given to the provisions of the general Act -without holding that there was such a repeal." I am unable to accept the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner as correct. I am definitely of opinion that the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant does not apply to the present case. The principle embodied in the maxim is only a presumption. The presumption would be displaced if a manifest intention to the contrary is declared by the statute either by express words or by necessary Implication. It is true that the Bihar Land Reforms Act has not expressly repealed Central Act 15 of 1891, but effect cannot be given to the intention of the Bihar Land Reforms Act unless it is held that there is such a repeal. It is true that the Bihar Land Reforms Act has not expressly repealed Central Act 15 of 1891, but effect cannot be given to the intention of the Bihar Land Reforms Act unless it is held that there is such a repeal. As pointed out by Mahajan J. in the State of Bihar V/s. Sir Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 S C 252 (D), the purpose behind the Land Reforms Act is to bring about a reform in the land distribution system of Bihar for the general benefit of the Community. The purpose of the Act is to prevent concentration of big blocks of land and the means of. production in the hands of a few individuals and so to distribute the ownership and control of the material resources which come in the hands of the State as to subserve the common good as best as possible. In other words, the object is the nationalisation of land by breaking up concentration of big blocks in the hands of zamindars. In this connection Mahajan J. referred to Article 39 of the Directive Principles which states : "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing, that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so-distributed as best to subserve the common, good; and that tile operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment." It cannot, therefore, be supposed that the legislature contemplated that the properties of the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad should be exempted from, the operation of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. In this connection the language of Section 4 (a) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is significant. Sec. 4 (a) is in the following terms : "4. (a) Subject to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, such estate or tenure including the interests of the proprietor or tenureholder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure and used primarily as office or cut-chery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars and ferries and all other satrati interests as also his Interest in all sub-soil Including any rights in mines and minerals, whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not. Inclusive of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised In such estate-or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats) shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interests in such estate or tenure, other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act." The opening words of Sec. 4 are : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Sec.3, or Sub-section (1) or (2) of s. 3A the following consequence shall ensue," Section 42 is also important in this connection. Sec. 42 is in the following terms:-- "42 When the interest of an intermediary in an estate or tenure which is under the management of the State Government under the Court of Wards Act, 1879, or the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876, or under any law for the time being in force relating to the management of private estates by the Government is transferred to the State under the provisions of this Act, then notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Acts, the estate qr tenure shall vest in the State and the Provisions of the said Acts shall cease to apply to the said estate or tenure and all the provisions of this Act shall apply thereto." It is clear that the legislature has expressed an unmistakable intention that the provisions of the Bihar Land, Reforms Act should override all previous laws and also private agreements and that the Act should also apply to the estates and tenures in the management of the State Government under the Court of Wards Act or similar statutes and that no exception was contemplated by the legislature with regard to any special case. For these reasons I hold that the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant" does not apply to the present case and as a matter of construction it should be held that the estates owned by the petitioner are hit by the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and that the provisions of Act XV of 1891 and Act XXIII of 1933 are repealed to the corresponding extent. 5. 5. It was then argued on behalf of the petitioner that Act XV of 1891 embodied a solemn agreement between the petitioner and the Government of India, and if it is held that the Bihar Land Reforms Act repealed the special Act, namely, Act No. XV of 1891, the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act would be constitutionally void and inoperative. The argument is put forward that Government could not derogate from its own grant and the permanent and hereditary right of the petitioner in the properties covered by the agreement could not be affected by any legislation made by the successor in interest of the British Government which was a party to the original agreement. I do not think that there is any substance in this argument. It is well established that the Parliament or the State egislatures are not debarred from legislating so as to vary the e fleet or cancel the effect of a Crown grant in the absence of any express provision in the Constitution, It is also well established that the State legislatures are endowed with plenary powers of legislation and the limits imposed on such plenary powers must be found in the Constitution itself and not in any extraneous legal principle. To adopt the language of Frankfurter J. in a recent American case, "the ultimate toucbstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not any general principle outside it." In my opinion, therefore, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner on this point must fail. I would refer in this connection to Surya Pal Singh V/s. Govt. of the State of U. P., A. I. R. 1952 S C. 252 (D) where a similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court with regard to hereditary rights of the Taluqdars of Oudh embodied in the Uttar Pradesh Act 1 of 1951. In rejecting the argument Mahajan, J. referred with approval to the following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in Jagannath Baksh Singh V/s. United Provinces, 1946 P. C. R. 111 at p. 119 : (A. I. R. 1946 P. C. 127 at p. 130) (E):- - "It is, however, desirable to examine the particular grounds on which it is sought to induce the Court to arrive at this paradoxical conclusion. Some of these are said to be based on the general principle of law that the Crown cannot derogate from its own grant, others are said to depend on particular provisions of the Government of India Act, It has not been possible for the appellant to adduce any authority for the principle involved, which their Lordships apprehend to be that Parliament, whether Imperial, Federal Or Provincial, in the absence of express prohibition, is debarred from legislating so as to vary the effect of a- Crown grant." The argument of the petitioner on this point must, therefore be rejected. 6 Lastly, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the tauzis covered by the notifications include some immoveable properties in the Malda district of West Bengal. It was argued that the notifications of the Bihar Government could not affect properties located outside its territorial jurisdiction and that the notifications of the Bihar Government under Sec.3 of the Land Reforms Act were illegal. I do not think that the argument is, correct. It was submitted by the Government Advocate that the notifications impeached in this case refer only to land which is situated within the territorial limits of the State of Bihar. If is true that Government revenues are paid by the petitioner Jointly for the lands in Purnea and Malda.. The question merely resolves itself into one of apportionment and there is no warrant for holding that the notifications were invalid for any reason, I would reject the argument of the petitioner on this point also. 7. For these reasons I hold that the notifications issued by the State Government under Sec.3 of the Land Reforms Act (annexures A, A-1 and A-2) are legally valid and no case has been made out by the petitioner for grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus. , In my opinion this application must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 8 I agree.