The plaintiff sought to amend the original plaint by making an application on the ground that the defendants had denied their tenancy and had claimed ownership in 2 Bighas and some Biswas of land in the remaining portion of the land they were clearly trespassers who were liable to ejectment as well as to penalty for use and occupation of the land. In the original plaint he had contended that they were his tenants and as they were not paying him his share of the produce by way of rent he did not desire that they should continue in possession as tenants. Held that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to convert a tenant into a trespasser unless he alters the whole cause of action thereby changing the basis of his claim. Gokul Narain Sharma, Advocate, for Applicant; Naval Kishore Mathur, Vakil, for Opposite-Party This revision is directed against an appellate order of the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur, dated 24.8.1956 which reversed an order of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, dated 18th May, 1956, relating to amendment of plaint in a suit for possession and mesne profits which was instituted by the applicant against the opposite-party in the court of the Munsif, Jaipur, in the first instance, and was subsequently transferred under sec. 3, clause (2) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 to the Nazim Sawai Jaipur for disposal on 3.3.1947. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have also examined the record. The only point which was strenuously urged before us on behalf of the applicant was that the learned Additional Commissioner was not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint which had been allowed by the learned Assistant Collector under Order 6, Rule 17 on the ground that the amendment of the pleading was necessary for securing the ends of justice and was not intended to take the defendant by surprise. In seeking this amendment the plaintiff had no malafide intention nor would any injury accrue to the defendants which could not be compensated by costs. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Asstt. Collector the defendants preferred an appeal to the learned Additional Commissioner. In seeking this amendment the plaintiff had no malafide intention nor would any injury accrue to the defendants which could not be compensated by costs. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Asstt. Collector the defendants preferred an appeal to the learned Additional Commissioner. After considering the pros and cons of the matter and carefully examining the amendment which was sought to be introduced by the plaintiff the learned Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Asstt. Collector mainly on two grounds— (1) The application for amendment of the plaint was presented at a late stage. (2) The amendment if allowed would convert a suit of one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. Against this order the plaintiff has filed a revision in the Board. He has impugned the propriety and validity of the order chiefly on the ground that the learned Additional Commissioner erred in construing the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 and holding that the amendment sought was inconsistent with the allegations set out in the original plaint. There was no such inconsistency as would substitute one cause of action for another or would materially alter the character of the suit. It was urged that the learned Additional Commissioner had committed an illegality or a material irregularity in the exercise of a jurisdiction which was vested in him by law. 4. The only crucial point which falls for determination in this case relates to the construction that is to be put upon Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. which runs as follows— "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties." The powers of amendment under the present Code are much wide than they were under the old Code. The proviso in the old section that no amendment could be allowed which altered the character of the suit has been purposely omitted. The proviso in the old section that no amendment could be allowed which altered the character of the suit has been purposely omitted. Though in the present Code there is no such rigid rule as was enacted in the old Code against allowing an amendment which would convert a suit of one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character and the whole matter is entirely in the discretion of the court still, as a general rule, the court can in the exercise of such discretion refuse to allow an amendment which would substitute one cause of action for another or change the subject matter of the suit. The leading authority on the subject is Ma Shwe Mya vs. Maung Po Hnaug, 9 A.I. R. 1922 P. C. 249, in which their Lordships of the Privy Council while construing the provisions of Order 6, rule 17, C. P. C. observed as follows— "All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised but non the less, no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit." The real question in. controversy between the parties in that case was the existence and character of an agreement alleged to have been made in 1912 for the delivery of certain sites of oil wells specified by the numbers stated in the plaint. After considering the provisions as to amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 their Lordships went on to say "When once that contract has been negatived to permit the plaintiff to set up and establish another and an independent contract together would, in their Lordships opinion, be to go out-side the provisions established by the Code of Civil Procedure to which reference was made. Dealing with the argument that a rigid application of such rules would prevent the determination of the controversy between the parties their Lordships pointed out that in that case the Rules did have that operation and that it was not open to the court to frame a new case to be made. Dealing with the argument that a rigid application of such rules would prevent the determination of the controversy between the parties their Lordships pointed out that in that case the Rules did have that operation and that it was not open to the court to frame a new case to be made. The learned counsel for the applicant has invited our attent on to a long track of authorities which according to him lay down a clear proposition that amendments which are necessary and just should be liberally allowed. It is necessary to examine these authorities closely in order to deduce from them the principle which they lay down. 5 The first I authority on which he has relied is AIR 1941 Nagpur 289. The facts of that case were different from the facts of the present case. There the plaintiff brought a suit on the last day of limitation to recover a certain sum on the basis of a stamped acknowledgement executed by the defendant in the plaintiffs account book. The defendant admitted execution of the acknowledgement but denied receipt of cash consideration and pleaded that the suit was not maintainable as based on mere acknowledgement and that if it was maintainable previous transactions between the parties be reopened as the acknowledgement was executed on taking account of those transactions. As the defendants denied cash consideration the plaintiff sought to amend the plaint and to base his claim on the original transaction. The amendment was allowed on the ground that the plaintiff was not seeking to introduce an inconsistent case. The learned Judge went on to observe "even if could be said that the amendment was sought at a late stage and that it sought to introduce a new and inconsistent cause of action the special circumstances of the case justified the amendment of the plaint. This authority refers to the Privy Council decision in 11 M. I. A. 468 (P. G.) where an amendment of the pleading was allowed long after the suit which would have been barred by limitation if it had been freshly instituted on that date. Their Lordships observed that "in the circumstances of the case before them the defence of limitation would be inequitable." 6. Their Lordships observed that "in the circumstances of the case before them the defence of limitation would be inequitable." 6. Another case in which their Lordships allowed an amendment of the pleadings on the ground that the special circumstances of the case warranted an amendment of the plaint after the expiry of the period of limitation is 8 AIR 1921 P.C. 50. They observed at page 1.16 that "that there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are out-weighed by the special circums-tances of the case and their Lordships are not prepared to differ from the Judicial Commissioner in thinking that the present case is one". In an earlier Nagpur case reported in I. L R. 1939, Nagpur 194 it was held that unless there were special circumstances such as existed in 11 M. I. A. 468 and 48 Calcutta 1910, the effect should be given to the rule laid down by their Lordships in 36 Calcutta 780 to the effect that the court should refuse to entertain at a late stage of the case a new question the solution of which must depend on evidence. The Division Bench was careful to observe that an amendment should always be made with great readiness but where one sees an amendment asked for at so late a stage which introduces a new cause of action after the period of limitation for a fresh suit has expired then exceptional circumstan-ces must be present to justify a court letting the plaintiff do in one litigation what he cannot do in another. In this authority, as will be abundantly clear from what has been stated above, stress is laid on the existance of special circumstances which would justify an amendment, though in the particular case on which it is based the plaintiff sought an amendment which did not introduce an inconsistent case. 7. The second case on which reliance was placed is A.I.R. 1932 Mad., p. 603. This authority is based on a case the facts of which were dis-similar to the facts of the present case. 7. The second case on which reliance was placed is A.I.R. 1932 Mad., p. 603. This authority is based on a case the facts of which were dis-similar to the facts of the present case. In that case the plaintiff who was a Mahant of two Maths brought a suit to set aside a scheme framed for them by the Hindu Religious Endowment Board on the ground that there had been no such mis-management as would justify the Board to frame a scheme. He subsequently applied for the amendment of the plaint by which he wished to add another reason why the Board was precluded from interfering with his institutions. It was held that as the amendment applied for did not change the nature of the suit nor deprived the Board of a right which had accrued to it by lapse of time it should have been allowed. 8. The third authority which was cited before us on behalf of the applicant is AIR 1946 Mad , p. 325. This was a case decided by a single Judge who observed "too technical a view should not be taken by courts in discharging their duties as to amendment. All amendments which do not throw an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the other side should be allowed and only those amendments which cannot be compensated by an award of costs should be refused. In that case the plaint itself had obviously asked for delivery of one-fourth share of the entire property and that was obviously meant to be after partition and when the matter was sought to be put more clearly all manners of technical pleas were advanced by the defendant. The learned Judge pointed out that the amendment would not change the nature of the suit. 9. The fourth case which has been relied upon is AIR 1955, Hyderabad 1. The case was referred to the Full Bench in order to resolve the conflict between the case of Dwarka Bai vs. Prayag Bai, 37 Dn. L. R. 591 (A) and Gaaindi Bai vs. Sundra Bai 10 Nazir-i-Osmania 532. The brief facts of the case were that the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of ownership and an injunction against the defendants. L. R. 591 (A) and Gaaindi Bai vs. Sundra Bai 10 Nazir-i-Osmania 532. The brief facts of the case were that the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of ownership and an injunction against the defendants. One of the pleas raised in the written statement was that the plaintiff was out of possession at the time of the institution of the suit and could not, therefore, bring a mere declaratory suit. The plaintiff applied for the amendment of the plaint alleging that he was dispossessed some time after the institution of the suit and, therefore, he might be allowed to amend the plaint so as to add a prayer for possession. It was laid down that, however, negligent or careless might have been the first omission and, however, late the proposed amendment it should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There if no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs. A further principle which should be usually considered was that as far as possible multiplicity of suits should be avoided. An additional amendment was allowed on the ground that the addition of a payer for possession would not alter the cause of action or change the essential nature of the suit. 10. The fifth case is A. T. R. 29, 1942 Outh. 161. In that case the amendment was allowed because it did not alter the cause of action upon which the plaintiff had come to the court but merely elucidated the reasons upon which the liability was sought. The suit was instituted on the basis of a pronote which was executed by the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family. Subsequently after the death of the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant on the renewed pronote and sought to amend the plaint after limitation by adding that that was borrowed for the benefit of the family and, therefore, the defendant was liable also as a member of the family. 11. The learned counsel for the opposite-party relied on 1925 Allahabad 705 in which it was held that it was not open to the plaintiffs to shift their ground and claim to eject the defendants as trespassers and that the plaintiff should not be allowed to amend their plaint. In this case the plaintiffs brought a suit on the footing that the defendants were their tenants. In this case the plaintiffs brought a suit on the footing that the defendants were their tenants. The defendant pleaded that they were tenants under the plaintiffs and set up title in a third party who was in possession. The plaintiffs sought to amend their plaint and desired ejectment of the defendants on the ground that they were trespassers. 12. Another case relied upon by the opposite-party was AIR 1934 Oudh, 118. In this case an application for amendment made at a late stage by which the applicant sought to introduce a case which was quite inconsistent with the allegations in the plaint was rejected,, A I. R. 1927 Oudh was referred to in support of the view that in the circumstances of the case the amendment should not be allowed As would be clear from the wording of Order 6, Rule 17 its object is to allow an amendment for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. That being the purpose for which an amendment is allowed no amendment should be allowed which would introduce a totally new and different case. 13. The general Rule which we can deduce from current authorities including some of the authorities cited above is that any amendment allowed must be such as is either raised in the pleadings or is consistent with the case as originally laid, and that the state of facts and the equities and ground of relief originally alleged and pleaded by the plaintiff should not be departed from. This principle is laid down by their lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Ishan Chandra vs. Shama Charan Bhutto, 14 Indian Appeals 168. From the general rule stated above the following propositions clearly emerge :— (1) Where a plaintiff bases his claim upon a specific legal relation alleged to exist between him and the defendant he may not be allowed to amend the plaint so as to base it on a different legal relation. Note :—Even if the legal relation between the plaintiff and the defendant remains unchanged the plaint will not be allowed to be amended if it completely alters the cause of action. (2) Where a plaintiff bases his claim on a specific title he may not be allowed to amend the plaint so as to base it on a different title. Note :—Even if the legal relation between the plaintiff and the defendant remains unchanged the plaint will not be allowed to be amended if it completely alters the cause of action. (2) Where a plaintiff bases his claim on a specific title he may not be allowed to amend the plaint so as to base it on a different title. But this is subject to the first proposition and when the title by which the plaintiff claims remains un-altered the plaint will not be allowed to be amended if it completely alters the cause of action. (See the Code of Civil Procedure by Shri D. F. Mullah 12th edition page 601). It is apparent from these propositions that any amendment which seeks to substitute one cause of action for another should not be allowed. 14. It is, therefore, necessary to find out what the term cause of action implies. The expression cause of action has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove such fact but every fact which is necessary to be proved. In other words it means the whole bundle of material facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to establish his right to the relief he claims or the media upon which he asks the court to proceed in order to grant relief prayed for in the plaint. In Halsburys laws of England the term has been defined as meaning every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed on that very fact which the defendant would have right to traverse and which forms an essential part of the cause of action which occurs upon the happening of the latest of such facts. In delivering the judgment of the Board in Chand Kanwar vs. Pratap Singh, 16 Gal. 1908, Lord Watson observed as follows :— "Now cause of action has no relation what-ever to the evidence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. In delivering the judgment of the Board in Chand Kanwar vs. Pratap Singh, 16 Gal. 1908, Lord Watson observed as follows :— "Now cause of action has no relation what-ever to the evidence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or :in other words to the media upon which the plaintiff asked the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Where the bundle of facts on which the cause of action is founded is materially change it may lead to the emergence of a new cause of action " Applying this test to the facts of the present case we are clearly of opinion that a suit for possession on the footing of a subsisting lease cannot be converted at a late stage of the proceedings into a suit for ejectment. (602 Newly vs. Sharp (1878) 8 C.D. 39, 49). Again a claim based on a trespass cannot be converted into a claim on the basis of a subsisting lease or vice versa. In the present case the plaintiff sought to amend the original plaint by making an application on 5.12.1955 on the around that the defendants had denied their tenancy and had claimed ownership in 2 bighas, and some biswas of land and in the remaining portion of the land they were clearly trespassers who were liable to ejectment as well as to penalty for use an occupation of the land. In the original plaint he had contended in paras 5 and 8 that they were his tenants and as they were not paying him his share of the produce by way of rent he did not desire that they should continue in possession as tenants. He cannot convert a tenant into a trespasser unless he alters the whole cause of action thereby changing the basis of his claim. The applicant has not made out any peculiar circumstances in his application which would entitle him to indulgence on this core. For the reasons detailed above we are clearly of opinion that the learned Assistant Collector had not acted rightly in allowing an amendment which would alter the basis of the claim of the plaintiff by substituting one cause of action for another. For the reasons detailed above we are clearly of opinion that the learned Assistant Collector had not acted rightly in allowing an amendment which would alter the basis of the claim of the plaintiff by substituting one cause of action for another. The learned Additional Commissioner was correct in his approach to the matter. His order which is in consonance with a long array of decision does not call for any interference. We, therefore, uphold his order and reject the application in revision. The file should now go back to the learned Asstt. Collector for disposal of the original suit in accordance with law, as it had already been inordinately delayed.