JUDGMENT This appeal is by 28 Defendants who were ordered by the trial Court to be ejected from suit lands described in Schedule C of the plaint. The facts of the case are as follows: The Plaintiffs and the Defendants are related. The following genealogy shows their relationship: [The genealogy is not reproduced. It shows how the 28 Defendants are related to the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Bishnoo Prasad, Lambardar. The defendents are Plaintiffs' brothers, cousins, nephews and their wives-Editor. ] In the year 1947 an application for an imperfect partition in respect of village Amdi was made by the present Respondents. A preliminary order in the partition case was made on 11th September 1947. The Amin who was asked to prepare the pattis, prepared them, and filed what are commonly known as kachcha papers in the Court on 13th July 1949. The co-sharers were given time to file objections, which were heard and disposed of by 10th August 1949. On 27th September 1949 the paccu papers were filed, and partition was confirmed in accordance with the map drawn by the Amin on 16th May 1950. During the pendency of this partition, Bishnoo Prasad, who was the Lambardar and who is Appellant No. 1, created certain tenancies on lands which are the subject-matter of the present suit. By Exhibits D-2 to D-11 he created tenancies in favour of all the relations, except Tikaram and Jageshwar, the Plaintiffs. According to the Defendants (appellants) all the co-sharers met together and decided to create these tenancies. The case of the Plaintiffs was that they were not consulted and that these tenancies were created mala fide out of lands which Bishnoo Prasad knew were to be allotted to the patti of the Plaintiff and with a view to depriving them of the benefits of these lands. The present suit was therefore filed on 29th March 1951 for ejectment of these tenants on the averment that the tenancies were created mala fide and not in the ordinary course of village management and were therefore not binding upon the Plaintiffs. The lower Court found in favour of the Plaintiffs. It held that these tenancies were created by Bishnoo Prasad from lands which he knew were to be allotted to the patti of the Plaintiffs, merely to benefit his own near relatives to the disadvantage of the Plaintiffs. The lower Court found in favour of the Plaintiffs. It held that these tenancies were created by Bishnoo Prasad from lands which he knew were to be allotted to the patti of the Plaintiffs, merely to benefit his own near relatives to the disadvantage of the Plaintiffs. The learned Judge also held that the Plaintiffs were neither present nor consulted at the alleged meeting of the co-sharers. We have looked into the evidence and also heard the Learned Counsel for the Appellants against the decision of the Court below. We are satisfied that in the circumstances of this case the finding given by the learned Judge was not only appropriate but was the only one possible. Considering the fact that Bishnoo Prasad and also the other Defendants knew that partition proceedings were pending, it was incumbent on them to have taken the consent of the present Plaintiffs. The position of a Lambardar with regard to the rest of the proprietary body after a partition proceeding has commenced was stated by one of us (Chief Justice) in Second Appeal No. 235 of 1953 decided on 6th October 1953. It was there stated that the transaction is binding if the Lambardar could be shown to have acted bona fide and in the course of village management. The words 'course of village management' indicate that it should be for the benefit of the proprietary body as a whole. Technically, on the filing of an application for imperfect partition the agency of the Lambardar is at an end, except in so far as it enables him to carry on the village administration. If the Lambardar, after an application for an imperfect partition has been made, attempts to benefit his near relatives to the disadvantage of more distant kindred who were also co-sharers, his action cannot be described as bona fide, and no power to act in that manner can be said to flow to him from the entire proprietary body. This is exactly what has happened in this case, and so far as the lease is concerned, the statement contained in the decided case completely applies to the present facts. We accordingly confirm the finding of the learned trial Judge that the action of the Lambardar was not bona fide and was not in the course of village management. This is exactly what has happened in this case, and so far as the lease is concerned, the statement contained in the decided case completely applies to the present facts. We accordingly confirm the finding of the learned trial Judge that the action of the Lambardar was not bona fide and was not in the course of village management. As a result of this finding, the suit of the Plaintiffs ought to succeed, as in fact it has succeeded in the Court below. It was, however, argued that in the appeal filed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner confirming the partition, the Board of Revenue stated that the appeal had abated because the matter concerned grass lands and grass lands had become vested in Government as a result of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (I of 1951). This argument was pressed upon us, and it was stated that in view of the passing of that Act the present suit of the Plaintiffs must be treated as having become in fructuous. Reliance was placed upon Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla Khan 1953 N L J 254 : I.L.R. 1953 Nag. 703 (F B) while the other side relied on a later decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Rahmatullah Khan v. Mahabirsingh 1956 N L J 1 : I.L.R. 1955 Nag. 983. The short question is whether the present suit which was filed in respect of grass lands has become instructions by reason of the passing of the said Act. Now, undoubtedly under that Act, grass lands vest in Government, and there would be no dispute left on the authority of Chhote Khan's case. This case, however, is distinguishable in that the imperfect partition had come to fruition as early as 27th September 1949 and only awaited confirmation by the Deputy Commissioner. The present suit was filed on 29th March 1951, i.e. two days before the Act came into operation. Presumably, on the date on which the suit was filed the lands had already been brought under cultivation and did not remain grass lands. Under the scheme of the Act, if any land was on the appointed date under cultivation, then it did not vest in Government but was to be settled with Government. Presumably, on the date on which the suit was filed the lands had already been brought under cultivation and did not remain grass lands. Under the scheme of the Act, if any land was on the appointed date under cultivation, then it did not vest in Government but was to be settled with Government. Section 40 of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act states that the land is to be settled with the proprietor, even though it may not be directly in his cultivation. If the lands had been in the patti of the Plaintiffs and tenancies had not been created on them contrary to the reported rulings of this Court, the Plaintiffs would have been in a position to bring them within their own cultivation and claim the benefit of that cultivation from Government. Unfortunately, they were forestalled by Bishnoo Prasad, who wanted to create tenancies in favour of his own nearer relatives and to the disadvantage of the Plaintiffs. The act of Bishnoo Prasad, therefore, which is after the filing of the application for partition, cannot bind the present Plaintiffs, and that is what has been held by the Court below. In our opinion, Chhotekhan's case is not exactly in point, and it has been limited in the later ruling relied upon by the Respondents to the case of abaci sites only. We are therefore free to decide whether the present suit can continue or not. Applying the ordinary rule that a suit has to be decided upon the cause of action as it existed on the date the suit was filed, we should reject this appeal and leave the successful party to deal with Government on the point whether the land has to be regarded as grass land or not. It was stated that Government had been receiving rent from the Defendants and therefore the tenancies in their favour have been confirmed. If these people are to be ejected by an order of the Civil Court, Government will then deal with the substituted people and with the Plaintiffs who will be in their place. The form which is prepared under Section 13 of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act is not conclusive against the Claims Officer, who has the power to revise it in accordance with the Civil Court's decision. The form which is prepared under Section 13 of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act is not conclusive against the Claims Officer, who has the power to revise it in accordance with the Civil Court's decision. Even if the Plaintiffs were to lose this land to Government, that is no concern of the defendants, who cannot be held entitled to be on the land because of a mala fide action on the part of the Lambardar. We therefore do not think that the rulings on which reliance has been placed affect the decision of this appeal. The appeal is based upon facts which we accept as having been finally found by the trial Court. The appeal must be rejected because it has no substance in it. It fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.