SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: A petition was filed by the respondent No. 2, Abdul Bari Sarkar, for setting aside an election under S. 80. read with S. 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. He prayed that the election of respondent No. 3, Prakritish Chandra Barua, from the Gauripur Constituency to the Assam Legislative Assembly be declared void on the ground of his disqualifications and other ille­galities mentioned in the petition. He also prayed that he should be declared to have been duly elected from the said Consti­tuency. He made a further prayer that the Tri­bunal might be pleased to issue notice on certain persons, including the petitioner Amjad Ali, to show cause why they should not be named in the order of the Tribunal as persons guilty of corrupt practice. In pursuance of the said prayer, the Election Tribunal issued a notice on the peti­tioner Amjad Ali. The notice, inter alia, is in these words:- "And, whereas, in the said petition, the peti­tioner has prayed that you should be named as being guilty of corrupt practices under the Re­presentation of the People Act, 1951; Notice is hereby given to you under the pro­viso to S. 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to appear before the Tribunal to show cause on or before 16-7-1957, why you should not be so named as guilty of corrupt practices, in terms of the petition (copy enclosed), and, in case of your failure to appear and show cause, as aforesaid, the Tribunal may proceed ex parte against you." The notice is dated the 26th of June, 1957. The petitioner appeared before the Tribunal and ob­jected to his being made a party to the proceed­ings at that stage. He submitted that the notice was premature, and that the stage for such a notice did not arise until the trial had conclud­ed and the Tribunal proposed to make an order within the terms of S 96 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Tribunal did not accept the contention of the petitioner. He submitted that the notice was premature, and that the stage for such a notice did not arise until the trial had conclud­ed and the Tribunal proposed to make an order within the terms of S 96 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Tribunal did not accept the contention of the petitioner. It was of the view that S. 82 of the Representation of the People Act was not exhaustive, and that, although the petitioner was not a necessary party to the application for set­ting aside the election, inasmuch as allegations had been made against him of corrupt practices invalidating the election, he was virtually a pro­per party to the application filed by respondent No. 2, Abdul Bari Sarkar, and, as such, the Mem­ber of the Tribunal held that the notice issued on the petitioner to show cause was in order. The petitioner has now moved for a writ of Certiorari or Mandamus quashing the order in question and preventing the Tribunal from pro­ceeding against him. (2) The learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the order of the Election Tribunal as without jurisdiction. His contention is that the petitioner was not a party to the application for setting aside the election, and, as such, he could not be compelled to appear before the Tribunal. The notice sent to the petitioner was a notice-under the proviso to S. 99 of the Representation of the People Act, as the notice itself recites. S. 82. of the said Act enumerates the persons who should be made parties or respondents to an election petition. It provides that "A petitioner shall join, as respondents to his petition- (a) where the petitioner, in addition to claim­ing a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a fur­ther declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contest­ing candidates other than the petitioner, and where, no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom alle­gations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition." The word 'candidate' has been defined in S. 79-of the said Act. It means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in pros­pect, he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. It is not disputed that the petitioner before us' does not come under the category of 'candidate', returned or contesting, and, as such, he could not be made a party to the petition for setting aside the election, within the meaning of j S. 82 of the said Act. Indeed, the Member of the; Tribunal himself is of the same view. He con-; cedes that the petitioner does not come under S. 82 of the Act, but, in "his view, S. 82 is not exhaustive, and inasmuch as certain allegations of corrupt practice were made against the peti­tioner, with a prayer that he should be named as such, the Court thought that virtually he was in the position of a party to the petition. In our opinion, this assumption of the Member of the Tribunal is not correct, when the petitioner did not fall in the category of a party to the petition within the meaning of S. 82 of the Act. This is the only specific provision dealing with parties to an election petition, and S. 99 is ano­ther specific provision which deals with the pro­cedure for bringing before the Tribunal persons against whom allegations of corrupt practice are substantiated at the trial. S. 98 of the Act says: "At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition, the Tribunal shall make an order" - either dismissing the election petition or declar­ing the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or, at the same time declar­ing the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. No such stage has ad­mittedly arisen so far. Then comes S 99, where­in it is provided under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. No such stage has ad­mittedly arisen so far. Then comes S 99, where­in it is provided under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) that at the time of making an order under S. 98, the 'Tribunal shall also make an order, where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, recording - the names of all persons, if any, who-have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice, and the nature of that practice. There is a proviso added to this section that a person who is not a party to the petition, shall not be named in the order under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl. (a), unless he has been given notice to ap­pear before the Tribunal and to show cause why he should not be so named. It was apparently under this proviso that the notice appears to-have been issued to the petitioner; but, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the stage for such a procedure had not arisen at all. It is only after the conclusion of the trial that this question of issuing notice on the petitioner, within the meaning of the proviso, could have arisen, provided the Court held, on the materials produced, that the petitioner before us, against whom corrupt practices were alleged, was found guilty of such corrupt practices. Even before being so named for the alleged corrupt practices under the law, the petitioner had to be given an opportunity of cross-examining any wit­ness who had already been examined by the Tri­bunal and who had given evidence against the petitioner; and also of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard in the matter. It is, therefore, obvious on a clear reading of these provisions, that the stage for a notice to the peti­tioner under the proviso to S. 99 of the Act, had not arisen at all. The suggestion that he could be made a party to the proceeding at this stage under some residuary provision or even under O. 1, R. 8, C. P. C., cannot be entertained in view of the specific provisions quoted above. The action, therefore, of the Member of the Tri­bunal is unjustified under the law. The suggestion that he could be made a party to the proceeding at this stage under some residuary provision or even under O. 1, R. 8, C. P. C., cannot be entertained in view of the specific provisions quoted above. The action, therefore, of the Member of the Tri­bunal is unjustified under the law. The order is clearly, in our opinion, without jurisdiction and not warranted, at this stage, by any provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. That being so, we think that the order has to be quash­ed. The Member of the Tribunal may, after the conclusion of the trial, proceed according to law and, if necessary, issue notice on the petitioner to show cause within the meaning of the proviso, as stated above. (3) It is also argued that the petitioner had a remedy by way of appeal, but having regard to the anomalous nature of the order in question before us, we do not think that we shall be justi­fied in refusing to entertain this petition on this ground. (4) The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The respondent who was directed to deposit addi­tional security in view of this order, may be allowed to withdraw that amount, but the peti­tioner is entitled to his costs; hearing fee Rs. 50/-. (5; MEHROTRA J. : I agree. D.R.R. Rule made absolute.