SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. : The petitioner, who is a Khasi tribal and resident of Mawphlang in the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District, has applied for a writ of mandamus questioning an order, dated 2-9-57, passed by the respondents, (1) The Durbar of the Lyngdoh of Mawphlang Lyngdoship, and (2) the Lyngdoh himself; and praying that they should be prevented from giving effect to the order in question. By virtue of the said order, the respondents have cancelled the licence of the petitioner for distilling India-made foreign liquor, and further directed that the distillery should be settled with some other person. By an order, dated 11-7-1947, the Governor of Assam sanctioned the establishment of a distil­lery for the distillation of foreign liquor at Maw­phlang and authorised the petitioner to distil foreign liquor there, and to sell the same to the inhabitants of Mawphlang. The licence fur the purpose of running the distillery was valid up to the end of July, 1948, but was to be renewed from year to year on payment of the prescribed licence fee, which admittedly in this case was Rs. 250/- per year. The petitioner claims that since 1947 she has been in possession of the distillery on pay­ment of the above fee, her licence being renewed from year to year. On 23-3-57, the Lyngdoh (respondent No. 2 before us) informed the peti­tioner that the licence fee for her distillery had been increased to Rs. 500/- for the year 1957-58. The petitioner protested against the increase, without any effect; and eventually, on 24-6-1957, the petitioner was directed by the Lyngdoh to stop distillation from the date of receipt of the order, otherwise she was liable to be punished, with the result that the petitioner had to stop distilling since the date of that order. This was followed by the order, which is now impugned before us, passed on the 2-9-1957, under which her licence was cancelled and a further direc­tion given that the settlement be made with some other person. (2) The order is challenged on the ground that it is completely without jurisdiction. This was followed by the order, which is now impugned before us, passed on the 2-9-1957, under which her licence was cancelled and a further direc­tion given that the settlement be made with some other person. (2) The order is challenged on the ground that it is completely without jurisdiction. It is submitted that under paragraph 8 of the sixth schedule to the Constitution of India, it is only the District Council for the autonomous district of the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills that has power to assess and collect, in respect of lands or the purpose of land revenue, as also the power to levy and collect taxes on lands and buildings, and tolls on persons resident within such area. It is further submitted that the Respon­dents have no authority whatsoever either to settle distilleries or to enhance the licence fees payable in respect thereof, which the respon­dents purported to do. Whatever the position may have been prior to the Constitution, it is argued that after the constitution of the Dis­trict Council, as contemplated by the sixth sche­dule, it is the District Council which alone has this power of levying taxes or fees, and that the Lyngdoh has no such power at all. It is also to be noticed that, under the rules framed by the District Council, no such power has been delegated by it to the Lyngdoh con­cerned. These contentions, in our opinion, ap­pear to be well-founded, and that being so, the respondents have therefore no power to enhance the licence fee and direct the cancellation of the licence of the petitioner or proceed to make settlement of the distillery with some other party. That the petitioner has been in possession of the distillery ever since 1947 and has been carrying on her business of distillation on payment of the licence fee of Rs. 250/- per year, which was originally payable, is not disputed. It is, how-ever, claimed on behalf of the respondents that, by virtue of an order, dated 1-4-53, passed by the Lyrigdoh concerned, it was provided that the petitioner's licence to distil foreign liquor was to be renewed subject to certain conditions, one of the conditions being that she should obey al] orders of the Lyngdoh that might be issued from time to time. This order was passed by the Lyngdoh himself. This order was passed by the Lyngdoh himself. It is true that the petitioner had not protested against that order, but it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, under the law, the Lyngdoh had no authority to impose any such condition, and that the pos­session of the petitioner of the distillery in ques­tion could not be limited by any such condition, which the Lyngdoh had no authority or power to impose. Under the Constitution, the Lyngdoh having no power to make settlement of the dis­tillery, it is not open to the respondents to take advantage of any order which the Lyngdoh pass­ed in April, 1953, imposing such conditions upon 'the petitioner. The petitioner's possession of the distillery would be deemed to be under the original terms, and the Lyngdoh having no authority, under the law, to interfere with her running the distillery or to cancel the licence, the action taken by the Lyngdoh is quite un­justified. (3) The next contention of the learned coun­sel for the respondents is that the petitioner had moved the District Council, and the District Council having passed no final order, she had no right to come up to this Court. It appears that the petitioner did move the District Council, which called for a report from the respondents on 16-5-1957, and although the report appears to have been submitted on 20-5-1957, no ac­tion seems to have been so far taken by the District Council ratifying or refusing to ratify the steps taken by the Lyngdoh. This would be no ground for rejecting the application of the petitioner whose right to run the distillery has been interfered with by illegal orders of the respondents; and, as this has been done under colour of authority by the respon­dents, the Lyngdoh and his Durbar, the peti­tioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus direct­ing that the respondents be restrained from giv­ing effect to those orders. It was also suggest­ed, by the learned counsel for the respondents, that the respondents had a sort of customary right to make settlement of distilleries and to levy taxes or licence fees payable in respect there­of. The point of customary right was not rais­ed at any earlier stage. On the contrary, it ap­pears that at the time when the settlement was made, the Lyngdoh purported to act on the orders of the Governor. The point of customary right was not rais­ed at any earlier stage. On the contrary, it ap­pears that at the time when the settlement was made, the Lyngdoh purported to act on the orders of the Governor. We, however, do not desire to express any definite opinion on the point, and leave the parties to their appropriate remedy. (4) In view of the fact that the order im­pugned is entirely without authority, we direct that it should not be given effect to. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The petitioner is entitled to her costs; hearing fee Rs. 50/-. The amount of costs deposited by the petitioner, in pursuance of the Rule nisi, may be refunded to her. (5) MEHROTRA J.: I agree. H.G.P. Rule made absolute.