SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : These appeals, which have been preferred by the decree-holder arise out of an execution case-and are directed against an order dated the 24th May,1954, dismissing the execution. (2) The decree-holder instituted a suit in March, 1948, for recovery of a sum of money against one Prema Lama. During the pendency of the suit, he applied for attachment before judgment of certain movable properties of the defendant and an order of attachment was even­tually made after due notice to the parties on the 7th of July, 1948. The defendant then furnished security and the present respondents, Dorjay Lama, Rampro­sad Jayaswal, Dalbir Singh Lohar and one Para-suram Datta stood sureties for the said defendant and executed a surety bond making themselves liable for the performance of the decree to the tune of Rs. 25,0087- and undertaking to produce and place at the disposal of the Court the pro­perties specified In the schedule attached to the surety bond for the due performance of any de­cree that might be eventually passed in the suit to the extent indicated above. In default, the sureties also bound them­selves to pay to the Court the said sum of Rs. 25,008/- or such sum not exceeding the above amount as the Court might adjudge. The bond in question was executed by these respondents on the 7th of July, 1948. and on such security being furnished, the attached properties belonging to the defendant Prema Lama were ordered to be released. The plaintiff, however, was not apparently satisfied as to the validity of the surety bond and filed objections on the ground that it had not been duly executed on stamped paper in the name of any officer of the Court; as such, the plaintiff asserted that the security bond was not in order and should be rejected. The defendant on his part refuted the contentions of the plain­tiff and asserted that the bond was valid and according to law. In view of these objections, the parties were again heard as to the sufficiency and validity of the security bond in question and the Court on the 8th of July, 1948, directed on agreement of the parties that the name of the presiding officer Rai Bahadur P. N. Das, M. A., B. L., be insert­ed in the document. In view of these objections, the parties were again heard as to the sufficiency and validity of the security bond in question and the Court on the 8th of July, 1948, directed on agreement of the parties that the name of the presiding officer Rai Bahadur P. N. Das, M. A., B. L., be insert­ed in the document. Accordingly, the defendant's lawyer Sri D. C. Mitra entered the name of the Court in his own hand in the document and then the plaintiff did not press his objection to the validity of the bond. The surety bond was thus accepted by the Court. (3) The suit was actually decreed on con­test on the 26th February, 1951, for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with future interest against the defendant Prema Lama. The decree-holder then took out execution of the decree against the sure­ties as provided by S. 145 of the Civil Procedure Code in Execution Case No. 38/1952. It appears that in that execution some amount of money was realised from some of the respondents. The sureties then filed three separate appli­cations under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging the validity of the surety bond exe­cuted by them on the 7th July, 1948, and con­tending that inasmuch as the document as origi­nally executed was not in the name of any officer of the Court, it was inoperative in law and any subsequent amendment thereof was not binding on the parties. They further disputed the position that they had given their consent to the amendment of the document or that the insertion of the name of the presiding officer by the lawyer Sri D. C. Mitra was made under their authority or with their consent. The Court below upheld the objection of the respondents and dismissed the execution case. The Court proceeded to examine the legality of the document on the assumption that the in­sertion of the name of the presiding officer had been duly made, as apparently it was not in­clined to attach any importance to the objec­tion of the respondents on this score. The Court was, however, of opinion that in order to accept the rectified bond on the 9th of July, 1948, there should have been re-attachment of the defen­dants' properties which had already been releas­ed on the 7th July, 1948. The Court was, however, of opinion that in order to accept the rectified bond on the 9th of July, 1948, there should have been re-attachment of the defen­dants' properties which had already been releas­ed on the 7th July, 1948. The Court further was of the view that the bond not having been addressed in the name of the Court or any officer thereof was inoperative in law and could not be given effect to for pur­poses of execution within the meaning of S, 145 of the Civil Procedure Code. (4) It has been rightly urged by the learned Advocate-General who appears on behalf of the appellant, that both the above reasons of the learned Subordinate Judge on which he dismiss­ed the execution case and pronounced against the validity of the document are unsound. The first reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge that the document could not be rectified on the 9th of July, 1948, without a fresh attachment of the defendants' properties, which had been already released on the 7th of July, 1948, is clearly un­tenable. The properties were released on the distinct undertaking given by the sureties as per terms embodied in the security bond; and if otherwise the security bond was in order and valid, there is no reason why there should have been any re-attachment of the released properties merely to enable the parties to rectify the mistake in that bond. It was open to the parties to rectify the mistake if the validity of the bond was not otherwise affected. The next contention of the respondents, which found favour with the learned Subordinate Judge is equally ill-founded. Rule 6 of Order 38 provides that where the defendant shows cause or furnishes the required security, the Court should order the attachment to be withdrawn, or make such other order as it thinks fit. The form prescribed by the Code according to which the security bond has to be executed is Form No. 6 I of Appendix "P" of the Code. The form does not show that the name of the Court was reauired to be mentioned and the I original surety bond executed in this case on the 7th July, 1948. is in conformity with that form. Therefore, the document was not illegal, mere­ly because the name of the presiding officer of that Court or any other officer thereof had not been mentioned therein. is in conformity with that form. Therefore, the document was not illegal, mere­ly because the name of the presiding officer of that Court or any other officer thereof had not been mentioned therein. The document could still be enforceable as a security bond under S. 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure against these sureties by process of execution. S. 145 deals with the enforcement of liability of sureties. It provides that where any person has be­come liable as surety for the payment of any money or for the fulfilment of any condition im­posed on any person under an order of a Court in any suit or in any proceeding consequent thereon, the decree or order may be executed against him to the extent to which he has render­ed himself personally liable in the manner provid­ed for the execution of decrees and such a per­son shall for the purposes of appeal be deemed as a party within the meaning of S. 47. It is, therefore, obvious that a security bond of this nature under which the respondents ren­dered themselves personally liable for the per­formance of the decree to the extent of the amount mentioned therein and on the basis of which and subject to the conditions whereof the Court passed an order releasing the properties attached, could be enforced by processes of exe­cution against these respondents. (5) On behalf of the respondents, reliance has been placed upon certain observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ka3 Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh, 46 Ind App 228: (AIR 1919 PC 55) (A). In that case also, an instrument of surety ship was sought to be enforced in execution against the sureties. It was contended that there should have been a separate suit to enforce the charge mentioned in the surety bond under consideration in that case. On examination of the terms of the docu­ment, it appeared that there was no person men­tioned in the instrument to whom the security was given. The instrument simply recited that since the judgment-debtor had been directed to furnish security the sureties had hypothecated their property; there was, however, nothing to show that the sureties undertook any personal liability for the payment of the decree. The instrument simply recited that since the judgment-debtor had been directed to furnish security the sureties had hypothecated their property; there was, however, nothing to show that the sureties undertook any personal liability for the payment of the decree. In deal­ing with such a bond, their Lordships observed that the bond could not be executed in the name of the Court as the Court was not a juridical per­son ; it could not be sued nor could it' take pro­perty or assign the same. It is only on this observation taken in its isolation that reliance has been placed for the respondents for the contention that the bond was invalid and continued to be so even alter its rectification. The above observation of the Judicial Committee as contained in a quotation from the commentary of Chitale appears to have misled the learned Subordinate Judge, who un­fortunately did not appreciate the danger of relying upon such quotations without looking into the authoritative report of the case itself and un­derstanding the context in which the observa­tions occurred. A mere examination of the decision would show that their Lordships allowed the instru­ment of surety given in that case to be enforced by way of execution and they simply made the observation quoted to repel the contention that a separate suit was necessary for the purpose of enforcing it. They held thus: "It remains, therefore, that there is an un­questioned liability, and there must be some mode enforcing it and that the only mode of enforcing it must be by the Court making an order in the suit upon an application to which the sureties are parties, that the property charged be sold unless before a day named the sureties find the money." In other words, they held that even apart from S 145 of the Code, the undertaking given under the surety bond could be enforced by the Court by directing the sale of the properties without 1 resort to a specific suit for that purpose. In the present case, there is no question that here not only certain movable properties had been placed at the disposal of the Court, but that also the sureties had made themselves personally liable and S. 145 of the Code, therefore, clearly applied. In the present case, there is no question that here not only certain movable properties had been placed at the disposal of the Court, but that also the sureties had made themselves personally liable and S. 145 of the Code, therefore, clearly applied. The same view was reiterated by the Privy Council in Kohani Ramandhwaj Prasad Singh v. Har Prasad Singh, AIR 1943 P. C. 189 (B), where again it was held that an application to enforce the security need not be made by a separate suit. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Subordi­nate Judge was not right in holding that merely because the security bond had not been executed specifically in the name of some officer, it could not be enforced. Even as the bond stood on the 7th of July, 3948, prior to its correction, the security bond was in order and could be enforced against the respondents under S. 145 of the Code on account of their personal liability. The addition of the name of the presiding officer of the Court at a later stage did not make any material difference in law as to the validity of the document and its enforceability by processes of execution. (6) The next contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee, who appears to support the order, is that the security bond is invalid, because it has not been prepared on a duly stamped paper. He contends that under S. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the instrument could not be admitted in evid­ence for any purpose, unless it was duly stamped and he further tries to fortify his submission by reference to the fact that the plaintiff himself at an earlier stage asserted before the learned Subordinate Judge that the instrument had not been duly stamped. In the context of the facts disclosed, the argument is peculiarly ironical. The validity of the document was not challenged on this ground in the objections raised by the respondents un­der S. 47 of the Code and as such, the question doe.-; not strictly arise before us at this stage. It is further to be noted that the argument fails to take notice of the fact that the document had already been accepted by the Court as being suffi­ciently stamped. It is further to be noted that the argument fails to take notice of the fact that the document had already been accepted by the Court as being suffi­ciently stamped. On the 9th July, 1948, the Court passed an order to the following effect:- "Plaintiff filed a petition on 7th July, 1948 stating that the surety bond should have been addressed to the Judge in his name and engrossed on a non-judicial stamp and so preys that the bond may be rejected. Defendant objects to this and prays that the plaintiff's objections may be overruled and the bond accepted. The defendant's pleader has since rectified the bond as required by the plaintiff. No non-judicial stamp is necessary. Plaintiff's pleaders have agreed to this. Issue notice to the sureties for releasing the properties." The Court was thus satisfied that no non-judi­cial stamp was necessary and accepted the in­strument as such and under S. 36 of the Stamp I1 Act, when an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as Pro­vided in S. 61, be called into question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. It may be observed that the document hav­ing been accepted by the Court, there was no appeal or objection raised thereafter to the ac­ceptance of the document on the ground of its not-being duly stamped. The Court accepted the undertaking contained in the instrument and made it a part of its order. Indeed, the respondents claimed all the time until now that the docu­ment did not require any further stamps under the law and it was the plaintiff, who had raised the question of insufficiency of stamps, which he eventually abandoned. The matter, therefore, should now rest where it is and the validity of the document is no longer open to challenge on this ground. This being so, it is unnecessary for me to examine the decision in the case in reference under S. 113 read with O. 46, R. 1, C. P. C., AIR 1925 Cal 906 (PB), (C), on which Mr. Bhattacharjee relies to sup­port his contention that the security bond in question was not duly stamped. (7) The appeals must, therefore, be allowed and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge must be set aside. Bhattacharjee relies to sup­port his contention that the security bond in question was not duly stamped. (7) The appeals must, therefore, be allowed and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge must be set aside. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs, which will include one set of hearing fee for all the analogous appeals. The case should go back to the Court below for disposal of the execution case according to law, on the assump­tion that the security bond is a valid document and that it could be enforced in execution against the present respondents. D.H.Z. Appeal allowed.