ORDER The petitioners filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for an order cancelling the decision of the Government not to renew the leases of the land in question in their favour for the year, 1956-57 on the ground that they were land holders under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. The plea of the petitioners was negatived by this Court and the petition was dismissed by the judgment of this Court, dated 27-6-1956 (in Writ application No. 8 of 1956). Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner started proceedings to eject the petitioners from the land, presumably under R. 18 framed under the said regulation. 2. On 28-8-1956, a petition was presented on behalf of the petitioners for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. A petition for an interim order to stay eviction of the petitioners from the land was also presented and notices to show cause against these petitions were directed to be issued to the opposite party, and in the meantime the eviction proceedings were stayed. This order relates to the stay petition only. 3. On behalf of the Government (opposite party) the petition for stay of eviction proceedings was opposed mainly on two grounds. 4. The first of those grounds is that this Court became functus officio after the dismissal of the writ petition on 27-6-1956, and therefore has no jurisdiction to stay the ejectment proceedings pending the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 5. It is not disputed that the Court has in such cases the power to grant stay but what is contended is that it can exercise this power only after the admission of the appeal. 6. The case-law as regards the stay of execution during the pendency of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been correctly and succinctly summarized in Note 3 under R. 13 of O. 45 in Chitaleys C. P. C. and I respectfully agree with the view taken in - Narumall v. Jagatmal, AIR 1925 Sind 216 (A), which was that even if it were construed that O. 45, R. 13 does not give specifically the power to grant stay before the admission of the appeal, it was clear that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 of the Code to stay execution after receipt of a petition for leave to appeal. Any other view would amount to a denial of justice and render the protection granted under O. 45, R. 13 meaningless and unavailable in the majority of cases. 7. It might be said that the present one is not a case of execution of decree or order appealed against, and therefore what may be applicable to the latter may not be applicable to the former. I do not, however, see any difference between the two, inasmuch as the order of the Revenue Officer, which will be executed by eviction has been confirmed by this Court by the rejection of the writ petition. Again, it is not disputed and it is obvious that it cannot be disputed that after the admission of the appeal this court can grant a stay. If so the same argument as in the case of a decree would apply to the present case with equal force, with the result that S. 151 of the Code can be invoked in such cases also. 8. The second contention is that under the powers conferred by Regulation of 1886 and the rules made thereunder the Deputy Commissioner had already evicted the petitioners and confiscated the crops and handed over possession of the land to the Agricultural Department before the applications for leave to appeal and for stay of eviction, were filed, and therefore the application for stay of eviction does not lie and no order staying it can or could be passed. These allegations were supported by an affidavit and the record of the case was also produced to substantiate those allegations. A counter-affidavit was later filed on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that they had no knowledge that an order had been passed evicting them and that physical possession was accordingly taken and that the petitioners were still in possession. It is difficult to believe this when wide publicity of the fact was given by publication of notices and by beat of drum. In fact, Sri Iyenger the learned counsel for petitioners did not press this point and proceeded on the assumption that eviction had been affected and possession taken by the Government on 9-8-1956. It is difficult to believe this when wide publicity of the fact was given by publication of notices and by beat of drum. In fact, Sri Iyenger the learned counsel for petitioners did not press this point and proceeded on the assumption that eviction had been affected and possession taken by the Government on 9-8-1956. He also frankly admitted that in view of this the question of stay of eviction did not arise, but his further submission was that the Court could pass an order restoring the possession to the petitioners so that status quo might be maintained and the petitioners saved from irreparable loss. 9. I am afraid that this cannot be done, and even if it were permissible the circumstances do not justify such a course. The inherent powers of the Court to stay execution should be sparingly used. Under O. 45, R. 13 also stay can be granted only when special cause is shown even after the grant of the certificate. No such cause has been shown in the present case, and if the petitioners are successful in the appeal, restitution will be possible and afford adequate relief. 10. The result is that the petition for grant of stay is rejected with cost, and the ex-parte stay granted is vacated. Counsels fee Rs. 25/-. Petition rejected.