G. MEHKOTRA, J.: This is a Second Appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts, Silchar, in Appeal No. 20 of 1957. (2) Briefly the facts giving rise to the pre­sent litigation are that the present appellant brought a suit against the State of Assam and some other defendants for a declaration that the disputed land has accreted to the plaintiffs land of Dag No. 496 of periodically settled patta No. 106 of the village Gosaipur and for the confirma­tion of her possession over the aforesaid land. In the alternative, she also prayed for possession in cases he was considered to have been dispossessed from the land or any portion there­of. It was also prayed that the State Govern­ment be directed to assess revenue on the accret­ed land. The suit was dismissed by the Mun­siff on 22-12-1947 on the ground that it was barred by S. 154(1) of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge set aside the decree of the Munsiff and remanded the case for a decision of other issues. The parties were not allowed to adduce any further evi­dence. On remand, the Munsiff decreed the -suit and directed that the land of Dag No. 1016 (ka) and 1073 (ka), the area of which is 1B-2K, be settled with the plaintiff as accretion to the dag No. 496. On appeal, the Subordi­nate Judge set aside the decision of the munsiff and dismissed the suit. The present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against the decision of the Subordinate Judge. (3) The plaintiff admittedly is the owner of the periodically settled land of dag No. 496 of Revenue Settlement Patta No. 106. Her case in the plaint was that the lands which are described in the schedule attached to the plaint, imperceptibly and gradually accreted to her aforesaid dag by the river Madhura and as such they should be regarded as addition to her peri­odically settled land in dag No. 496, in ac­cordance with the provisions 08 the Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation of 1825. The plaintiff also claimed to> have been all along in possession over the accreted land. She stated that she applied to the Deputy Commis­sioner, Cachar, for settlement of this land, but it was refused and she was asked to vacate the land under Rule 13(3) of the -Settlement Rules. The plaintiff also claimed to> have been all along in possession over the accreted land. She stated that she applied to the Deputy Commis­sioner, Cachar, for settlement of this land, but it was refused and she was asked to vacate the land under Rule 13(3) of the -Settlement Rules. Persons who were granted settlement of the accreted land were impleaded as defendants 2 to 4 to the suit and two sets of written sta!e-ments were filed. In para 2 of the plaint it is stated that as the land has gradually and im­perceptibly accreted to plaintiff's periodically settled land, she was entitled to the land under the provisions of the Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation of 1825 as part of the estate to which the said land has accreted. In the plaint, therefore, the claim was based on the provisions of the Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation of 1825. It is, how­ever, not disputed now that the provisions of the Bengal Regulation do not apply to the suit land. Clause 4 of the Bengal Regulation, 1825 is as follows: "(1) When land may be gained by gradual accretion, whether from the recess of a river or of the sea, it shall be considered an increment to the tenure of the person to whose land or estate it is thus annexed, whether such land or estate be held immediately from (the Crown) by a zamindar or other superior land-holder, or as a subordinate tenure, by any description of under-tenant whatever." In the present suit, no custom has been pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant nor is there any evi­dence produced to establish custom. The ground! now taken by the appellant is that she is entitl­ed to claim the disputed land of dag No. 1016 (ka) and 1017 (ka) as accretion to her own land on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It is contended that in cases where neither the provisions of Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation, 1825 apply, nor has any custom been proved, the owners of lands will be entitled to any accretion to their lands on' the principles of justice, equity and good con­science. As the land has imperceptibly and gradual­ly come out of the recess of the river, and has accreted to the plaintiff's dag, it should be treated as part of the plaintiffs settled land and the plaintiff was entitled to claim possession over the said land. As the land has imperceptibly and gradual­ly come out of the recess of the river, and has accreted to the plaintiff's dag, it should be treated as part of the plaintiffs settled land and the plaintiff was entitled to claim possession over the said land. It is further contended that the lower appellate court was not right in hold­ing that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 154 (1) (a) of the Assam Land and Reve­nue Regulation. (4) The principle of gradual accretion to the land has been recognised in England from the very early times. In the year 1681, Lord Stair wrote as follows: "Appropriation by alluvion is admitted in all nations, for thereby the adjection of another's ground insensibly and imperceptibly, by the running of a river, becomes a part of the ground to which it is adjected because it is uncertain from whose ground such small and imperceivable particles are carried by .the water, and thereby also the frequent questions that would arise betwixt the proprietors upon the opposite banks of rivers are prevented, and though the adjection may be perceivable and considerable in a tract of time it maketh no difference if at no particular instant the adjection be consider­able; as the motion of the palm of a horologe is insensible at any instant, though it be very per­ceivable when put together in less than a quar­ter of an hour, '(Stair's Institutes of the Law of Scotland)" It has been observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Secy, of State v. Foucar and Co. Ltd., AIR 1934 PC 17 at p. 19 (A) as follows : "though the basis at different times has been differently stated, the law of accretion must be regarded as a rule of general convenience and security and as necessary for the mutual ad­justment and protection of property. In India the doctrine has been embodied in the law of Bengal Regulation 11 of 1825, and Oudh by Act 18 of 1876, and it is equally well establish­ed in Madras, where there is no statutory en­actment on the subject. In Bombay the right is recognised but is restricted by the Land Re­venue Code of 1879, S 4, to accretions not ex­ceeding an acre in extent. In Bombay the right is recognised but is restricted by the Land Re­venue Code of 1879, S 4, to accretions not ex­ceeding an acre in extent. Under there cir­cumstances it would, their Lordship^ think, be difficult to hold, as the appellant contends, that the doctrine is wholly inapplicable to Burma, where under Act 13 of 1898 the ultimate test is to be 'justice, equity and good conscience.'" (5) In the Halsbury's Laws of England, Second edition Vol. 33 item 854, the law has been summed up as follows: "Where tidal water recedes gradually and imperceptibly from the land, or land by al­luvion or dereliction is added to the dry land or foreshore, so that it becomes situate above the high-wafer mark of ordinary tides, or above the low-water mark, it belongs, if above the high-water mark, to the owner of the dry land to which it is added, and if above the low-water mark to the owner of the foreshore." "The whole doctrine of accretion is based upon the theory that from day to day, week to week and month to month, a man cannot see where his old line of boundary was, and that which cannot be perceived in its progress is taken to be as if it never existed at all." (6) In the case of Lopez v. Mnddun Mohun Thakor 13 Moo Ind App 467 (B), their Lord­ships of the Privy Council observed that: "There is, however, another principle re­cognised in the English law, derived from the Civil law, which is this, that where there is an acquisition of land from the sea or a river by gradual, slow and imperceptible means, there, from the supposed necessity of the case, and the difficulty of having to determine, year by year, to whom an inch, or a toot, or a yard belongs, the accretion by alluvion is held to belong to the owner of the adjoining land.' (7) In the case of Province of Assam v. Mohamed Raja, 50 Cal WN 378 (C), it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the plain­tiff having been able to establish a custom or usage in his favour, the suit will be decreed. If on the other hand, the usage is proved on the side of the defendant according to which the-riparian proprietor secures no right to the accret­ed lands, the suit will be dismissed. If on the other hand, the usage is proved on the side of the defendant according to which the-riparian proprietor secures no right to the accret­ed lands, the suit will be dismissed. If there is no evidence of usage, the court will decide according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. (8) It is therefore clear that it is an universal law, recognised by all that a land which has gradually and imperceptibly come out of the: river bed and added to the land of a riparian; owner becomes part of the land belonging to him and is to be considered as his property. This, in some cases, is based on the specific pro­visions of the Bengal Regulation or other enact­ments, in some on custom, and in some cases on the principles of justice, equity and good con­science. The contentions raised however by the respondent are two-fold. Firstly, it is urged that in the present case, the right of the appellant being based on the principles of justice, equity arid good conscience, this must be subject to the express provisions of law. Under the provisions of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, the appellant has acquir­ed no title to the disputed land, and title to no land to which the provisions of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation applies can be acquired otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of said Regulation. (9) Reliance has been placed on S. 6 of the. Regulation which is as follows: "No right of any description shall be deem­ed to have been, or shall be, acquirer by any person over any land to which this Chapter ap­plies, except the following: (a) rights of proprietors, land-holders and settlement holders other than land-holders, as defined in this Regulation and other rights ac­quired in manner provided by this Regulation; (b) rights legally derived from any right mentioned in clause (a); (c) rights acquired under Ss. 26 and 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877." We do not think that the provisions of S. 6 is-any way affect the rights of the plaintiff which she may have acquired under any other law. 26 and 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877." We do not think that the provisions of S. 6 is-any way affect the rights of the plaintiff which she may have acquired under any other law. Explanation added to S. 3 of the Assam Regulation provides as follows: "Any land gained by alluvion or by dereliction of a river to any estate as here defined, which under the laws in force is considered an increment to the tenure to which the land has accreted, shall be deemed to be part of that estate." (10) It is not denied that the appellant was the owner of the periodically settled land of dag. No. 496 appertaining to reset lament No. 106 and that is an estate under the regulation. If that is so, the disputed land which had been a gain to the estate, shall be deemed to be a-part of that estate if under the law in force it is considered an increment to the tenure of the land to which it has accreted. The law in force it is not been defined anywhere in the Regulation and we see no reason to confine it to the statutory law. If the law in force is that the accreted land becomes part of the land to which f it has accreted, even though that may be based on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the land becomes an increment by accretion to the tenure to which it has accreted. The accreted land under the explanation will be deemed to be the part of the original estate to which it has accreted. (11) Section 34, proviso ,(b) of this Regula­tion also lays down that in the case of gain by alluvion, or by dereliction of a river, or loss by diluvion during the currency of the settlement, increment shall be assessed and reductions granted by the Deputy Commissioner according to such limitations as to the extent of gain or loss and such other conditions as may be pres­cribed. This sub-section also, to our mind, clearly provides that any land which has been gained by alluvion, will be considered as an increment to the tenure and will be liable to further assessment. This sub-section also, to our mind, clearly provides that any land which has been gained by alluvion, will be considered as an increment to the tenure and will be liable to further assessment. (12) In the case of AIR 1934 PC 17 (A), their Lordships of the Privy Council had to con­sider the provisions of S. 6 of the Burma Land Revenue Act, 1876 which was pleaded as a bar to the maintainability of a suit for alluvial land based on the right claimed on the ground of jus­tice, equity and good conscience. Section 6 of the Burma Land Revenue Act was in the follow­ing terms: "No right of any description shall be deem-•d to have been or shall be acquired by any person over any land to which this part applies except the following: (a) Rights created by any giant or lease made by or on behalf of the British Government; (b) rights acquired under Ss. 27 and 28, Lim. Act 1871; (c) rights created or originating in any of the modes hereinafter in that behalf specified; (d) rights legally derived from any right mentioned in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of this section." It was held by their Lordships that these words could not be said to prohibit the acquisition of right over the gradual addition to the land by the river. It was observed as follows: "It is not that their Lordships are asked to presume that additional lands were granted by the Crown, but only that the Crown made grants which might be either added to or diminished by the water. The chance was inherent in the grant. The river gives, just it may take away, and if the gift is gradual, little by little, from day to day, or from week to week, the law for the reasons explained above, deems what is added to have been part of what was granted: in the words of Baron Alderson (In re, Hull and Selby Railway, 1839-5 M and W 327 (D) ) _ that which cannot be perceived in its progress is , taken to be as if it never had existed at all." Section 6 sub-section (b) of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation also provides for the acquisition of rights legally derived from the rights I Mentioned in clause (a). If therefore, by virtue of the ownership under the periodical settlement of dag No. 496, the plaintiff is entitled o the accreted land, he acquires right over the ac­creted land as right derived from his right as a settlement holder of dag No. 496. Thus, the-plaintiff can acquire right to the gradual addi­tion under S. 6(b) and further the words of S. 6 are not clear enough to exclude the doctrine of gradual accretion. (13) The next point urged by the learned counsel for the respondent was that the suit is barred by provisions of S. 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. Section 154 provides as follows : "Except when otherwise expressly provid­ed in this Regulation, or in rules issued under this Regulation, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction in any of the following matters: (a) questions as to the validity or effect of any set­tlement, or as to whether the conditions of any settlement are still in force." This section is subject to any express provisions of the Regulation. Section 3°) of the Land and Revenue Regulation provides that: "Subject to the provisions of S. 151 of this Regulation the order of a Settlement officer as to the person to whom a settlement should be offered, the amount of revenue to be assessed, and the nature and term of the settlement to be offered, shall be final, and a settlement con­cluded with that person shall be binding on all persons from time to time interested in the estate; but, except as provided by Ss. 35 and 36', no-person shall, merely on the ground- that a settle­ment has been made with him or with some person through whom he claims, be deemed to have acquired any right to or over any estate, as against any other person claiming rights to or over that estate." This section, therefore, clearly lays down that the settlement made in favour of any person will not affect the rights of any other person claim­ing in respect of the said estate. This is an express provision which will over-ride the provi­sions of S. 154 of the Regulation. (14) In the case of Dharmeswar Sarma v. Lakhyadhar Borgohain, AIR 1950 Assam 107 (E), it has been held that S. 154 is subject to S. 39 of the Assam Laud and Revenue Regula­tion. This is an express provision which will over-ride the provi­sions of S. 154 of the Regulation. (14) In the case of Dharmeswar Sarma v. Lakhyadhar Borgohain, AIR 1950 Assam 107 (E), it has been held that S. 154 is subject to S. 39 of the Assam Laud and Revenue Regula­tion. Apart from this, the scope of S 1>J is not to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in suit like the present one. What the plaintiff is asking the Civil Court to adjudcate upon is her civil right to the disputed property. Her contention is that under the law as well as un­der the provisions of the Assam Laud and Reve­nue Regulation, the disputed property having imperceptibly and gradually accreted to her dag No. 496 has become an addition to her land, it is liable to further assessment; but cannot be a subject matter of a fresh settlement by the State Government. The question raised in the suit is not on relating to the validity of the settlement, but is a suit based on title and in derogation of the settlement in favour of the opposite party Nos. 2 to 4. The settlement in favour of the opposite party Nos. 2 to 4 is contended to be without jurisdiction by the plaintiff. It is con­ceded by the respondent that if the appellant had a right to the land under the Bengal Regula­tion or under the custom, no suit to enforces such right would be barred by the provisions of S. 154. No reasonable distinction can be drawn between a suit claiming right to the prop r on the ground of the provisions of the Bengal ' Regulation and custom and one based on like principles of justice, equity and good consci­ence. If the appellant fails to establish her right, 'her suit may fail on merits. But there is no bar to the maintainability of the suit under S. 154. (15) The learned Subordinate Judge has also not given any clear finding on this ques­tion. Some of his observations, no doubt, tend to point out that he was inclined to the view that the suit was not maintainable in view of S. 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. (15) The learned Subordinate Judge has also not given any clear finding on this ques­tion. Some of his observations, no doubt, tend to point out that he was inclined to the view that the suit was not maintainable in view of S. 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. He, however, has observed that: "Even assuming that the suit was maintain­able, the plaintiff was to prove that the Revenue Authorities violated any recognised principles or any custom in the matter of settlement of the disputed land." Coming to the facts of the present case, the ques­tion which the courts below had to decide was •the distribution of the land amongst the different claimants on the ground that the land his been added to their own lands imperceptibly and gradually. (16) As has been observed by the learned Subordinate Judge that "the defendant No. 2 is admittedly the owner of the periodic lands covered by dag No. 496 and the disputed dag No. 1016". The plaintiff has also admitted that some of the lands are contiguous to the dag of the defendants and can be regarded as haying 'been added to their land which has been right­ly settled with them. It is, therefore, not dis­puted that a number of persons including the plaintiff claim the land which has come out of the recess of the river as additions to their own estate. In the circumstances, the civil court which has to determine the rights, inter se, of different persons who claim accreted land as their own, has to distribute land on principles of equity, justice and good conscience. After consideration of all circumstances and the respective position of the lands, belonging to the plaintiff and the defendants, and their conveniences, the lower appellate court has come to the conclusion that the distribution made by the Settlement Authorities was not pal­pably unreasonable or could not be regarded as contradictory to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience and has endorsed the said distribution, and we would not upset that finding in a second appeal. We have also considered this matter independently and in our opinion, it cannot be said that the learned Subordinate Judge has acted contrary to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in distributing the land in the manner done by the Settle-j ment Authorities. We have also considered this matter independently and in our opinion, it cannot be said that the learned Subordinate Judge has acted contrary to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in distributing the land in the manner done by the Settle-j ment Authorities. Great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on certain' observations in the case of Sahabaddin Sarkar v.j Kafiladdin Tapadar 41 OWN 1353 (F). It wad observed at p. 1355 by Mitter J. : "The fundamental principles governing the! apportionment of accreted lands among the riparian proprietors whose lands abut on the sea is that the division must be made fairly amongst them, giving each of them a share in the new frontage in proportion to the extent of their old frontage. This principle had been recognised by Roman law which has furnished the foundation of the important prin­ciples of the law of alluvion. In the Institutes of Justinian the law is stated thus - 'When an island is formed in the sea, which rarely hap­pens, it is the property of the first occupant, fort before occupation it belonged to no one. But; when an island is formed in a river, which fre­quently happens, if it is placed in the middle, it belongs in common to those who possess lands I near the banks on each side of the river, of proportion to the extent of each man's land adjoining the banks.' The manner of distribution in such a case is a simple one. It is only a simple problem of rule of three. The old and the new river fron­tages are to be measured, and each riparian proprietor is to be given a frontage on the existing river bank in proportion to their old frontages. It is only a simple problem of rule of three. The old and the new river fron­tages are to be measured, and each riparian proprietor is to be given a frontage on the existing river bank in proportion to their old frontages. The boundary points on the new bank are thus obtained, and the boundary lines of the accreted lands would be obtained by joining by straight lines these points with their boundary points on the old bank." The judgment of Mitter J. was appealed against and it was observed by Nasim Ali J. as follows, at p. 1359: "The principles of equity require that each party of the riparian owners should get a fair and proportionate share of the new frontage so' that he may get a fair share of the future accretion by the river receding further towards the east." Mukherjea J. observed that "the case should go back to be tried on the fresh issues framed on the basis of additional pleadings. If an usage is established, the court would certainly determine the rights of the par­ties in accordance with that usage. In case the plaintiffs fail to establish an usage, it would be the duty of the court to determine the proper method of division in that case. A material fact which would require con­sideration in this connection is that the subject-matter of dispute in this case is not the entire extent of the alluvial accretion that has formed at the front of the land of the parties to that suit. The land in dispute is only a small por­tion of the whole accretion and the way in which the rights of the parties have already adjusted, with regard to the rest of the accretion would be an important thing to be taken into consideration by the court in arriving at the con­clusion regarding the method of division to be applied." This case does not lay down any absolute principle of division of the accreted land amongst various claimants. It only lays down that the division should be a fair one which itself is a matter depending upon various factors. It only lays down that the division should be a fair one which itself is a matter depending upon various factors. If the court of fact after consideration of all the facts has come to the conclusion that the distribution made by the Revenue Authorities cannot be re­garded as unreasonable or unequitable and has accepted the distribution by the Settlement Authorities as equitable, this court, in second appeal, will not disturb such a finding of the lower appellate court. (17) In the result, therefore, we dismiss this appeal; but under the circumstances of the lease, the parties will bear their own costs. .(18) SARJOO PROSAD C. J. I agree. 'D.H.Z. Appeal dismissed.