JUDGMENT : Rao, J. - These two appeals, Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1956 & Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1956, arise out of the judgment of Shri J.K. Misra, Sessions Judge of Sambalpur who, after a joint trial of the two Appellants and three other persons under Sections 895, 397, 207147, 395109 and 396109 I.P.C., convicted the two Appellants u/s 825109 I.P.C. and acquitted the remaining three accused. He sentenced Appellant Charan Singh to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and Appellant Chanchal Singh to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. 2. The prosecution story is that on 7th July 1954 a dacoity was committed in the house of one Krutartha Padhy (P.W. 42) in village Telitikra, P.S. Bheden and a large amount of cash and valuables were taken away by the dacoits. Some of the dacoits were armed with guns and pistols and Krutartha Padhy was injured in his chest by the firing of a pistol by one of the dacoits. The injury did not prove fatal. Krutartha Padhy sent a report (Ext. 15) to the Officer-in charge of Naikul Police Station (P. W. 48) who instituted a regular First Information Report on the 8th July 1954 and investigated the case. During Inspection of Krutartha Padhy's house, he found ample corroborative circumstances to show that a dacoity had been committed. Some empty cartridges and shots (pellets) were also seized from the house. None of the intimates could, however, identify any of the dacoits. Hence, for several months nothing could be done by the police. But in February 1955, however, two other dacoities (in Sasan, Attabira P.S.) were committed and in connection with those dacoities, Appellant Charan Singh was arrested on the 3rd February 1955 Appellant Chanchal Singh was arrested on the 12th February 1955. Baghel Singh who is the approver in the present case (P.W. 11) was also arrested on the 12th January 1955. On the confessional statements of these persons, the Investigation of the present dacoity case was reopened and a charge-sheet was submitted. Baghel Singh was granted pardon by the District Magistrate and as approver he has given a full a description of the circumstances leading to the commission of the dacoity in the house of Krutartha Padhy. The two Appellants Char an Singh and Chanchal Singh are Panjabi Sikhs who were residing respectively at Burta and Hirakud. Baghel Singh was granted pardon by the District Magistrate and as approver he has given a full a description of the circumstances leading to the commission of the dacoity in the house of Krutartha Padhy. The two Appellants Char an Singh and Chanchal Singh are Panjabi Sikhs who were residing respectively at Burta and Hirakud. The story as put forward by the approver Baghel Singh (who is also a Panjabi Sikh) is that these Sikhs were hired by one Benudhar Padhy, an agnate of Krutartha Padhy for the purpose of committing dacoity in the house of Kutartha Padhy with whom he was on terms of bitter enmity and that Benudhar Padhy went to the extent of promising a reward of Rs. 5,000/- if the dacoits, while committing dacoity, would kill his arch-enemy Krutartha. It was also stated that one Lal Jhankar who is a distant relation of Benudhar was utilised by him to contact the Sikhs at Burla and Hirakud and to arrange for the commission of the dacoity. Benudhar further facilitated the commission of the crime by helping the approver and his associates to make a preliminary, reconnaissance of the house of Krutartha and its vicinity and also supplying them with a plan of that house and giving them full particulars about the places where Krutartha used to keep his cash. The dacoits first assembled at Appellant Char an Singh place and then went "in his car along the Sambalpur-Bargarh road upto Gudbhaga, and then taking the diversion on the Turns road they went to a place known as Nuabandh. The car was kept in a corner and Appellant Charan Singh remained in charge of the same. The remaining five (sic) is including the approver went to village 'Telitikra, committed dacoity and returned to Hirakud in the car. The booty was subsequently divided amongst the various participants. 3. The commission of dacoity at the house of Krutartha Padhy on the 7th July 1954 is proved to the hilt. Apart from the evidence of the approver, he gun-shot injury found in Krutartha's chest, the pellmell condition of the house when the Police Officer went there on the next day during investigation, and the evidence of same of the villagers, leave no room for doubt on this point. Apart from the evidence of the approver, he gun-shot injury found in Krutartha's chest, the pellmell condition of the house when the Police Officer went there on the next day during investigation, and the evidence of same of the villagers, leave no room for doubt on this point. The approver's evidence about the commission of the crime and his part in the same has been well corroborated by other evidence which has been carefully analysed by the learned Sessions Judge. But the learned Judge thought that the evidence of the approver regarding the part played by accused Jit Singh, Lal, Shankar and Benudhar Padhy in the commission of the dacoity was not corroborated by independent sources and therefore acquitted them. He how ever hold that the part played by Appellant Charan Singh in the commission of the decoity was spoken to by the approver Baghel Singh and was amply corroborated by his own judicial confession though subsequently retracted and by other circumstances. He also held that the part played by Appellant Chanchal Singh Was contained his retracted confession and was corroborated by the evidence of the approver. The main questions to be decided In these appeals re whether the evidence of the approver as against Charan Singh was corroborated by Independent evidence in material particulars and whether the retracted confession of Chanchal Singh was corroborated by the evidence of the approver. 4. The appellate Charan Singh was running a hotel at Hirakud island during the relevant months. He was arrested by the pollee at Jharsuguda on the 3rd February 1955 as already stated above. He was produced before the Magistrate for the purpose of recording his confession on the 5th February 1955 at 2 P.M. The Magistrate (P.W. 2) gave him half an hour's time for reflection and then, after giving him the usual caution recorded his confession. Though the period of reflection was rather short, the nature of the questions put to this Appellant and the answers given by him are, I think, sufficient to show that the confession was made voluntarily. Though the Appellant alleged police torture soon after his arrest, no question regarding the same was put to the Police Officer (P.W. 51) during cross-examination. 5. Though the Appellant alleged police torture soon after his arrest, no question regarding the same was put to the Police Officer (P.W. 51) during cross-examination. 5. The items of evidence against this Appellant are (1) the evidence of the approver, (2) the confession of the Appellant which was retracted, (8, the identity of the car used by the dacoits as his own car No. ORS 1336, (4) the recovery of a 12-bore pistol from his possession which was the pistol used at the scene of dacoity, and (5) his identification by P.W. 34 as being seen in the car that proceeded to the scene of dacoity. In his confession before the Magistrate which is Ext. 2, he stated that Tara Singh Induced him to take his car one day and Tara Singh and four others gave him Rs. 20/-; that he filled the car with petrol at the cost of Tara Singh; that the four persons with Tara Singh were Baghel, Bir, Jit and Pandit; that at their direction he drove the car towards Bargarh; that Baghel Singh was sitting in the front seat; that on the Bargarh road near Gudbhaga by the side of the road there are two or three shops; that Baghel gave indication to take the Car on the Kachha road towards the left; that after they had gone for some distance on the Kachha road, Baghel directed to take the car away from the road towards the right and down wards; that before arriving at the place a bus crossed the car; that when the car was stopped these five persons got down; that Tara Singh had a 803 rifle, Jit had a 12-bore pistol and Baghel had a short revolver that he was asked by them to. He down in the car and to cover his face with a cloth that he remained In charge of the car so covering his face out of fear; that at about 9 P.M. those five persons returned and aroused him; that an started back on their return journey; that on the way a new car crossed them; that they reached Hirakud at 11 P.M.; that each of the six persons got a share In the booty and Baghel took two more shares for giving to the informants; that he got his share for taking the dacoits in his car; that some days afterwards when he got a second suggestion to similarly take his car for another dacoity he sold away his car to avoid that unpleasant situation and that Tara Singh had entrusted a 12-bor pistol and five cartridges to him which he later on gave recovery to the police after he was arrested by the police on suspicion. 6. This confession was retracted both before the committing Magistrate as well as before the learned Sessions Judge. 7. The approver's evidence as against this Appellant was that ORS 1336 (M.O. II) was used for the commission of the dacoity and that it was this Appellant who drove the car with the dacoits upto the village Nuabandh and remained in charge of the car when the dacoits went to commit the crime and that they all returned In the same car. 8. The approver's evidence against this Appellant which was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge is also corroborated not only by his retracted confession, but two other incriminating circumstances, namely the identity of the car used by the dacoits (M.O. II) as his own car ORS 1336 and the recovery of a 12-bore pistol from a place pointed out by him and the evidence of the Arms Expert (P. W. 50) to show that the pistol was used at the time of the commission of the dacoity. 9. A confession though retracted can be used to corroborate the evidence of the approver. In Wigmore's Book on Evidence, Vol. VII, Third Edition, it is pointed out at page 327 that the evidence of an accomplice may be corroborated by the confession of an accused. Similarly, in Cr.L.R. Vot. 9. A confession though retracted can be used to corroborate the evidence of the approver. In Wigmore's Book on Evidence, Vol. VII, Third Edition, it is pointed out at page 327 that the evidence of an accomplice may be corroborated by the confession of an accused. Similarly, in Cr.L.R. Vot. IV p. 165 (Edward Lucy) it was observed that the evidence of an accomplice could, In Law, be corroborated by the statement of the accused which, though not a confession in express terms, implied an admission of guilt. In Lalla Mallik v. Emperor 15 I.C. 987, Pallia v. Emperor 49 I.C. 604, and Bhairon Lal Vs. The State to which decisions will refer later on in dealing with the case of Chanchal Singh, it was laid down that a retracted confession is a sufficient corroborative evidence of the story of the approver in order to sustain a conviction. The evidence contained in the confession of an accused is not, as far as he is concerned, tainted evidence, as laid down in the case of Muthuswami Vs. State of Madras, . 10. In addition to the approver's evidence being corroborated by the confession of the Appellant, as already stated, there are two other incriminating circumstances against this Appellant. The first is the identity of the car (M.O. II) used by the dacoits as his own car ORS 1330. This car was seized by the police on the 6th February 1955 from the possession of one Lal Chand Kapani on the Information given by this Appellant himself. This Lal Chand Kapani is P.W. 26 and he has stated that he had sold it to the Appellant some time in 1952 and had purchased it again from him in August 1954. His evidence by itself may not carry much weight, but for the sale deed and the receipts (Exts. 8 and 9) signed by the Appellant which corroborate his evidence regarding the sale. They were produced when the (sic) seized the car at the house of this witness. Another contractor of Hirakud named Sitaram Pati (P.W. 800 corroborated the evidence of Lal Chand Kapani. There is no reason to disbelieve this witness. A petrol dealer of Hirakud, named Radhanath Misra (P W. 25) proved that seven gallons of petrol were issued for this car on the 7th July 1954 (the date of commission of the dacoit). Another contractor of Hirakud named Sitaram Pati (P.W. 800 corroborated the evidence of Lal Chand Kapani. There is no reason to disbelieve this witness. A petrol dealer of Hirakud, named Radhanath Misra (P W. 25) proved that seven gallons of petrol were issued for this car on the 7th July 1954 (the date of commission of the dacoit). Nanda Das, a bus conductor (P.W. 84) attached to Sambalpur Kutchi Motor Service Ltd. has also stated that he saw this car proceeding from Sambalpur side and turning at Godbhaga Junction on the evening of the 7th July 1954 and that several bearded persons with (sic) were sitting in the car. He was able to identify Appellant Charan Singh in the Test Identification Parade also. The evidence of this witness on the question of identification has been corroborated by the Test Identification Parade and should not have been rejected on a mere promise that he might have seen the Appellant when he was brought to Court on several days for remand. The conductor is a complete stranger to the Appellant and there is no reason for him to falsely implicate the latter. There is moreover the evidence of another Panjabi resident of Hirakud, Banta Singh (P.W. 27) to the effect that this Appellant got the car (M.O. II) repaired and the colour changed at his workshop. The learned Sessions Judge therefore rightly held that the evidence of the approver regarding the case of this Appellants car for the commission of the dacoity by the Appellants and the driving of the dacoits in the car to a place near the scene of the dacoity, is amply corroborated by the aforesaid circumstances. Further the recovery of a 12 bore pistol, on the statement made by this Appellant, is amply proved by the police officer (P. W. 51). The Appellant told him that he had kept the pistol concealed and would produce the same. He then took the pollee officer to a hotel and from inside the thatch brought not a bag in which was found a pistol with five cartridges (M.O. V). There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the police officer regarding the circumstances in which this pistol was recovered, especially when it is corroborated by the search witness (P. W. 46). There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the police officer regarding the circumstances in which this pistol was recovered, especially when it is corroborated by the search witness (P. W. 46). The pistol was sent to the Fire Arms Expert (P. W. 50) along with some of the spent up cartridges seized from the scene of the dacoity and the Express evidence is that the cartridges most have come from that pistol and no other pistol. 11. Thus, the evidence of the approver against this Appellant gets ample corroboration from his own retracted confession, the use of his car for the commission of the dacoity, the recovery of a petrol from his possession and the clear evidence of the Fire Arms Expert (P. W. 50) of its having been used in the commission of the dacoity. In my opinion, therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Sessions Judge and the sentence does not appear to be severe. His appeal, therefore, ails and is dismissed. 12. With regard to the case of Appellant Chanchal Singh, he was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Sambalpur for abetment of the office of dacoity punishable u/s 395109, Indian Penal Code. He was arrested on the 12th February 1955 at 9 A.M. and was produced before the Magistrate at Sambalpur at 2 P.M. on the same day. After giving him only half an hour's time for reflection and after giving him the usual caution, the Magistrate recorded his confession (Ext. 3). This confession was retracted by the Appellant before the committing Magistrate as also before the sessions Court. In his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, but the learned Sessions Judge, the Appellant stated that he made the confession under pollee influence being in police custody for about twelve days. But there is no suggestion in cross-examination on his behalf of the concerned police officer on this aspect. The records show that he was arrested on the 12th February 1955 at 9 A.M. and on the same day was produced before the Magistrate at 2 P.M. After a discussion of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the confession was voluntary. I accept the finding of the trial court that the confession made by Chanchal Singh was a voluntary confession. 13. I accept the finding of the trial court that the confession made by Chanchal Singh was a voluntary confession. 13. The learned Sessions Judge convicted this Appellant on the basis of the retracted confession corroborated, as he said in his judgment, by the evidence of the approver Baghel Singh (P.W.11). The other piece of evidence against this Appellant was the evidence of P.W. 39 Bhimsen, a hotel-keeper of Bargarh who identified the Appellant as one of the persons who Came to his hotel on 2-7-1954, Rath Jatraday, in the company of the approver and Lal Jhankar, one of the accused who was acquitted in the case. The learned Sessions Judge refused to accept the credibility of his evidence and consequently did not rely upon the same as corroborative evidence. 14. Mr. R.K. Das, learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the confession of the Appellant was exculpatory and as such the learned Sessions Judge ought not to have taken that Into consideration as it did not amount to a confession of the offence. 15. In Ext. S, the confession recorded by the Magistrate, the Appellant stated that he was first approached by Lal Jhankar for the purpose of committing dacoity in the house of a Brahmin Gountia In a village of Bheden P.S.; that the police came to him subsequently in connection with a dacoity committed at Bheden and he denied all knowledge of the occurrence; that 20 days before it Lal Jhankar came to him and told him that the Gountia wanted a dacoity to be committed in the house of his rival; that he (the Appellant) told him that he did not commit acts like that and Lal Jhankar knew that Baghel Singh did such acts; that so they could go to him and tell him; that both of them went to Baghel Singh; that when Baghel Singh was told, he agreed to commit the dacoity; that the Appellant asked Lal Jhankar to show them the house; that the three went to the hotel of Bhimsen and took tea there; that Bhimsen brought a cycle on which Baghel and Lal Jhankar went out to see the house; and that the Appellant returned to Barla and did not go with them. Finally the Appellant stated that 15 or 20 days after the commission of the dacoity, Lal Jhankar came to him and asked him to get his share of the booty from Baghel Singh as Baghel Singh would terrorise him and consequently asked the Appellant to accompany him for getting his share from Baghel Singh. The Appellant then accompanied him. Baghel Singh paid Lal Jhankar Rs. 100/- and 1? months afterwards he paid the Appellant Rs. 50/-. Though there are some statements in the confession which are exculpatory, yet the confession taken as whole leaves no room for doubt that the Appellant confessed of having done some acts amounting to abetment of the dacoity. Consequently Ext. S the confession of the Appellant, in my opinion, implicates him with the offence with which he was charged, but this confession having been retracted by him the question to be considered is whether the conviction based upon this retracted confession corroborated, as stated by the learned Sessions Judge, by the evidence of the accomplice, is justified and whether there is any credible evidence of the approver connecting the accused with the offence to amount to corroboration of his retracted confession. 16. The learned Standing Counsel contended that the evidence of the approver P.W. 11 connects this Appellant with the various conspiracies to commit dacoity and that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have based the conviction of the Appellant on the evidence of the approver corroborated by the retracted confession of the Appellant. In support of his contention, he relied upon three decisions in the cases of Lallan Mallik v. Emperor 15 I.C. 987; Pallia v. Emperor 49 I.C. 604 and Bhairon Lal Vs. The State, . 17. In Lallan Mallik v. Emperor 15 I.C. 987 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that in all cases depending on the evidence of an informer, the degree of support that the evidence required must depend on the amount of the credit In each particular case to be attached to the informer and that the retracted confession of an accused was ample evidence to corroborate the approver. Similarly in the case of Pallia v. Emperor 49 I.C. 604. It was held that the retracted confession of an accused person may be sufficient corroboration of the approver's story as against himself. In the case of Bhairon Lal Vs. Similarly in the case of Pallia v. Emperor 49 I.C. 604. It was held that the retracted confession of an accused person may be sufficient corroboration of the approver's story as against himself. In the case of Bhairon Lal Vs. The State also it was held that the retracted confession of an accused, if voluntary and proved, is good corroboration of accomplice's evidence. But; in my opinion, these cases do not in any way help the contention of the learned Standing Counsel as the learned Sessions Judge did not accept the evidence of P.W. 11 the accomplice connecting this Appellant as credible. In all those cases the learned Judges accepted the evidence of the approver as credible and it is only afterwards that they looked to the retracted confession and relied upon the same as corroboration of the accomplice's evidence of an approver, even if credible is tainted evidence and requires corroboration to enable the Court to convict the accused. In the Rajasthan case, Mst. Bhonri was the approver. Chief Justice Wenched in the course of the judgment observed. The main evidence for the prosecution In this ease is the statement of Mst. Bhonri. We have been taken through that evidence and have no hesitation in believing it to be true. In a later portion of the judgment, after discussing the decisions in 15 Indian Cases 604, the learned Chief Justice observed in para 6: In this case we are satisfied as to the truth of the statement of Mst. Bhonri. We have already pointed out that there is circumstantial evidence which goes to show that statement is true. It in corroborated by the retracted confession of the accused, which we have believed to be voluntary and true.... It is therefore clear that in this case the conviction was based upon the approver's evidence corroborated by the retracted confession because the approver's evidence was accepted as true. In the case of Pallia v. Emperor 49 I.C. 604, Bacha was the approver and the judgment shows that his evidence was accepted and conviction of the Appellant was confirmed on the corroboration of that evidence by his retracted confessions. In Lalan Mallik's case, Jagadish was the approver. Haringhton, J in his judgment observed with regard to Jagadish, evidence,: It Is a very long and detailed statement and Is one which it is extremely unlikely that he would be invent. In Lalan Mallik's case, Jagadish was the approver. Haringhton, J in his judgment observed with regard to Jagadish, evidence,: It Is a very long and detailed statement and Is one which it is extremely unlikely that he would be invent. When Jagadish went into the witness box, he narrated his story in a way which commended itself to those who heard him giving the evidence. He gave the names of no fewer than 19 persons. He described how the eight people, amongst whom were Sajani and Lallan, assembled in his bad and how they went on to Budhai Mandal's gulli, where eleven other persons were waiting, amongst whom were the other seven out of the nine Appellants. So In this case also the retracted confession was taken as corroboration of accomplice's evidence as the evidence of accomplice was accepted by the Court. 18. The learned Sessions Judge, in discussing the evidence of the approver P.W. 11 as far as the Appellant Chanchal Singh is concerned, did not accept the approver's evidence with regard to the reason given by him as to why the Appellant was not taken to the scene of occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge also categorically stated that the story of the approver as to in what circumstances he came in contact with Chanchal the Appellant and how he became kith and kin with him managing his hotel for some time did not empire confidence. After a discussion of the evidence, he did not also accept the statement of the approver that he paid Rs. 50/- out of the booty to the Appellant a few days after he made payment to Lal, Jhankar and finally concluded by saying, "So the approver's story about Chanchal by itself does not Inspire much confidence". In the earlier portion of the judgment dealing with the alleged conspiracies which constitute the abetment of dacoity as against this Appellant, the learned Sessions Judge definitely and expressly stated, "In the circumstances, while I do not accept the approver to be a positive liar because of his failing to be consistent about the different conspiracies, I can not accept any of the particular conspiracies that he has referred to have taken place at Hirakud and Burla to be correct. I therefore, do not enter into any discussion into the details of any of those conspiracies." It is therefore, in my opinion, clear that the learned Sessions Judge did not accept the approver's evidence as credible as far as this Appellant is concerned. If the evidence of the approver is not accepted by the Court, then no question of seeking for corroboration of the approver's evidence arises. The decisions quoted above do not therefore in any way help the prosecution. It is for this reason that learned Sessions Judge did not have recourse to the principle of approver's evidence 'being corroborated by the retracted confession in convicting the Appellant, but had to base his conviction on the retracted confession of the Appellant corroborated by the approver's evidence. After discussing the statements made in the confession and the discrepancies in the confession and the approver's evidence, the learned Sessions Judge observed that excepting certain variations noted by him the story of the approver and the story given in the confession agreed in other substantial respects and then observed, "In the present case this confession may be utilised in corroboration of the approver's evidence or the tatter can be utilised in corroboration of the confession itself and the second alternative is more cogent as the approver's story about this accused by itself is not very much inspiring confidence." It is here, in my opinion, that the learned Sessions Judge fen into an error. If the evidence of the approver does not inspire confidence and if as already shown above he did not accept the evidence of the approver as far as this Appellant is concerned, I fail to understand how the retracted confession of the Appellant my be said to have been corroborated by the evidence of the approver. If the approver's evidence is to' be taken as corroboration of the retracted confession, it must be only when the approver's story regarding the Appellant Is accepted. The evidence not accepted can never amount to evidence sufficient to corroborate. I am therefore of opinion that the retracted confession of the Appellant cannot be said to have been corroborated by the evidence of the approver. 19. Then the question arises if the retracted confession requires corroboration so as to convict the Appellant or can the Appellant be convicted on the strength of the retracted confession alone. I am therefore of opinion that the retracted confession of the Appellant cannot be said to have been corroborated by the evidence of the approver. 19. Then the question arises if the retracted confession requires corroboration so as to convict the Appellant or can the Appellant be convicted on the strength of the retracted confession alone. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act says: When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Explanation: - 'Offence', as used in this Section, Includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence. According to this section the confession may be taken into consideration. It is now clear on the authority of various decisions that the confession of a co-accused cannot be taken as evidence, but that the confession as far as the confessing accused is concerned is evidence though the section only says that it may be taken into consideration. In the case of AIR 1949 257 (Privy Council) his Lordship Sir John Beaumont observed: Section 30 seems to be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his confession against others as well as himself. 'But a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. I t does not indeed come within the definition of evidence' contained in Section 3, Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence. Their Lordships think that the view which has prevailed in most of the High Courts in India, namely, that the confession of a co-accused can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction, is correct. As far as the confessing accused Is concerned, the confession Is evidence as it amounts to an admission and as such the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that a retracted confession cannot be evidence cannot prevailed but on the question whether the conviction of an accused can be based only on his retracted confession, there was some divergence of opinion between the various High Courts. In 1952 there is a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in which it was categorically laid down that the retracted confession of an accused requires corroboration so as to sustain a conviction. In the case of Purnananda Das Gupta and Others Vs. Emperor, a decision of a fun Bench of the Calcutta High Court, it was held that if a confession is retracted, It Is desirable that there should be some corroboration of what the accused had said about himself even in respect of his own action. The learned Judges observed,: If a confession is made and is not withdrawn, that may furnish the strongest possible evidence of guilt of an accused, because unless there is some thing to raise a different inference what a man says about his own actions and his own intentions, must be even more potent evidence against him than what others say as to that man's intentions. Therefore, normally a confession of guilt is the most conclusive evidence which one can have. Therefore, normally a confession of guilt is the most conclusive evidence which one can have. But if that confession is retracted, to use the word which has almost become a word of art, then it is certainly desirable, if not absolutely necessary that there should be some corroboration of what the accused had said about himself, even in respect of his own actions. In the case of Emperor Vs. Manu Chik and Another a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that: As a rule of prudence a retracted confession should not be the basis of a conviction unless It Is substantially corroborated by independent evidence. The object for looking for corroboration is to find out how far the confession is true and whether it can be acted upon for the purpose of a conviction. This question came up for decision before their-Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Muthuswami Vs. State of Madras in which their Lordships held that no hard and first rule can be laid down regarding the necessity of corroboration In the case of a retracted confession In order to base a conviction thereon and that apart from the general rule of prudence where the circumstances of a particular case cast a suspicion on the genuineness of the confession, It would get sufficient to require corroboration of the retracted confession. They also held that a confession should not be accepted merely because it contains a wealth of detail which could not have been Invented and that unless the main features of the story are shown to be true, it is unsafe to regard mere wealth of uncorroborated detail as a safeguard of truth. The question was raised before their Lordships whether a conviction can be based on a retracted and uncorroborated confession of an accused. Their Lordships observed In this case,: We do not intend to answer this in a general way because on the facts of this case it is enough to say that it would be unsafe to act on this particular confession. The judgment of their Lordships In this case was delivered by his Lordship Bose, J. But in a later decision in the case of Pangambam Kalanjoy Singh Vs. State of Manipur it was held: Even if a confession is inculpatory, corroboration is necessary if the confession is retracted. The judgment of their Lordships In this case was delivered by his Lordship Bose, J. But in a later decision in the case of Pangambam Kalanjoy Singh Vs. State of Manipur it was held: Even if a confession is inculpatory, corroboration is necessary if the confession is retracted. In this case also the judgment was delivered by this Lordship Base, J. In the course of the judgment his Lordship held,: The confession is inculpatory, but corroboration is necessary because of the retraction. This, In my opinion, is an unambiguous statement of judicial opinion of their Lordships of the Supreme Court regarding the rule of prudence which has become a rule of law that a retracted confession requires Independent corroboration so as to sustain a conviction of the accused. It is no longer open to doubt that a retracted confession of an accused cannot be the basis for the conviction unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. 20. The approver's evidence, as far as this Appellant is concerned, as has been already shown above, was not accepted by the learned Sessions Judge and therefore it cannot be taken into account and made the basis of a conviction on the ground that the evidence of the approver is corroborated by the retracted confession of the Appellant. The retracted confession of the Appellant, as already shown, contains some statements to the effect that he is not aware of the dacoity and certain statements made in the confession are contrary to the statement of the approver. It cannot therefore be said that it is in all particulars a true confession. As the approver's evidence in not credible and is not accepted, that evidence cannot be taken to corroborate the retracted confession of the Appellant. It is now established that it is not safe to convict an accused on his retracted confession atone and that the rule of prudence that a retracted confession should be corroborated by independent evidence in material particulars has now become practically a rule of law. In this case there is no such corroboration of the retracted confession. So the conviction of the Appellant by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal of this Appellant Chanchal Singh should, therefore, be allowed and his conviction and sentence set aside. I direct that he be set at liberty forthwith. 21. In this case there is no such corroboration of the retracted confession. So the conviction of the Appellant by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal of this Appellant Chanchal Singh should, therefore, be allowed and his conviction and sentence set aside. I direct that he be set at liberty forthwith. 21. I cannot close this judgment without commenting upon the conduct of the police during the course of the trial in this case as a specific statement to that effect is made by the learned Sessions Judge in the course of his judgment. The learned Sessions Judge observed, 'I may incidentally note here that while the approver was examined for about 7 days at the trial stage he had always kept to the story, both during examination-In-chief and cross-examination, that 2-7-1954 was never the date of his visiting any of those places and that it was a prior date, In the minimum 4 days prior to 2-7-1954. But after his cross-examination was closed and when he was leaving the box he made a statement voluntarily that it was on the Ratha Jatra day, that is, 2-7-1954 that he bad gone to see the village. The approver was an under trial accused in two other dacoity cases and as an approver in the present case he was in Jail custody, being kept at Bargarh Jail for purpose of segregation from the accused persons who were being kept at the Sambalpur Jail. During the period of his production in court during trial, the approver, without the permission of the court, was keept in the custody of Sambalpur Police Station and from there was being produced daily in court, a fact which was surprisingly revealed by the approver himself during his cross-examination. During the period of his examination in court, the approver was being let off from the box daily before 4 P.M. with the express intention that he could be taken to Bargarh Jail before sunset. During the period of his examination in court, the approver was being let off from the box daily before 4 P.M. with the express intention that he could be taken to Bargarh Jail before sunset. "The conduct of the police officer concerned who detained the approver for 7 days during the trial stage at Sambalpur Sadar P.S. without the knowledge and permission of the court is to be highly deplored." I am constrained to remark that the learned Sessions Judge failed in his duty when he came across such glaring violation of law and disregard of his authority to make immediately an enquiry and report to this Court for necessary action for contempt of court. According to the observation made by the learned Sessions Judge every day during all the 7 days file approver Baghel Singh Was being examined before him, he was sent to Jail custody of Bargarh earlier than the closing of the court hours so as to reach Bargarh Jail before sunset. The witness Baghel Singh was not taken to the Bargarh Jail, but was detained in custody at the Sambalpur Police Station and was produced the next day and the learned Sessions Judge was under the impression that he was being produced from the jail custody so as to be taken to Bargarh Jail. The conduct of the police officers appears to me to be primacies contempt of Court. In the record 1 could not find the names of the officers responsible for this. The Sessions Judge is, therefore, directed forthwith to submit to this Court the names of all the persons who were entrusted with the custody of Baghel Singh for production before the court and for being taken away to Bargarh Jail every day and the names of the officers attached to the Sambalpur Police Station who were responsible to detain Baghel Singh, who was sent by the Sessions Judge to jail custody in Bargarh Jail, at the Police Station for disobedience of that order for about 7 days. After the names are received from the Sessions Judge, steps for further action will be considered against those officers and constables concerned. Narasimham, C.J. 22. I agree. 23. Cr. Appl. 86/56 Dismissed & Cr. Appl. 57/56 Allowed. Final Result : Allowed