JUDGMENT Hari Shankar, J. - This second appeal by the Defendant arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass. It is admitted that the Defendant-Appellant is a tenant of a house situate in the city of Lucknow of which the Plaintiff-Respondent is the landlord. It appears that the Defendant has been a tenant of this house for a long time on a monthly rent of Rs. 37/8/. The Plaintiff-Respondent based his suit for ejectment of the Defendant on the ground that the Appellant had made a wilful default in paying rent of the premises. It was alleged, and the fact is not disputed that before the suit was brought the Plaintiff had served a notice of demand on the Appellant to pay the arrears for the period beginning from 1-10-1947, to October 1949. The Appellant having failed to pay up the arrears, the suit was brought. 3. The Appellant in his defence denied the right of the Plaintiff-Respondent to eject him. It was admitted on behalf of the Appellant that the, arrears claimed by the Plaintiff-Respondent were due He, however, took the position that as the arrears were not recoverable under the law of limitation, he had a right to withhold the payment of those arrears and non-payment of time-barred arrears could not be construed as wilful default within the meaning of Section 3 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 4. The trial Court as also the lower appellate Court repelled this contention of the Appellant. Both the Courts held on an interpretation of the provision of Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act that non-payment of arrears of rent which had become time-barred would entitle the landlord to sue for ejectment under the provisions of the said section. The Courts below came to this conclusion on a reading of Section 3(a) of the Control of Rent and Eviction. Act, which is as follows: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within it month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the landlord. 5. The Courts below came to this conclusion on a reading of Section 3(a) of the Control of Rent and Eviction. Act, which is as follows: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within it month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the landlord. 5. When the second appeal came up before one of us, it was thought advisable to refer the appeal to a Division Bench in view of the importance of the question raised relating to the interpretation of Section 3(a) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act quoted above. 6. The point raised before us is whether the words "any arrears of rent" occurring in Section 3(a) would include even those arrears the recovery of which had become time-barred. If the answer is in the affirmative and the tenant knowingly refuted to pay the time-barred arrears, then there would be no difficulty in holding that the tenant made a wilful default within the meaning of Section 3 of the Control of Kent and Eviction Act. 7. Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act has been enacted with a view to restrict the general power of eviction which landlord enjoyed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The right to eject is still recognized by Section 3 but it restricts the exercise of the right to eject by laying down the particular grounds under which that right could be exercised by all and lord. One of these grounds is contained in Clause (1) of Section 3 quoted above. If there is any arrears of rent due from the tenant and he wilfully fails to pay up the arrears on a demand being made by the landlord, the latter has been given the right to eject the tenant. In the present case it is not disputed that the tenant (Appellant) was in arrears for a period of above two years. (October 1949 to October 1949 and had refused to pay those arrears on the ground that those could not be recovered under the law of limitation. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that as the arrears were not recoverable under the law of limitation, those arrears ceased to be arrears on that account. In our opinion this contention is not correct. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that as the arrears were not recoverable under the law of limitation, those arrears ceased to be arrears on that account. In our opinion this contention is not correct. The plain and natural meaning of the expression "arrears of rent" is that the rent for a certain period which should have been paid when became due was not paid. The recovery of past arrears may barred by law of limitation, nevertheless the default made in the payment of rent remains an arrear. The expression arrears of rent is wide enough to include even those arrears which could not be recovered in a court of law. The reason is obvious. The remedy of a landlord to recover an arrear may be lost by reason of the law of limitation but the tenants liability in equity to pay the past rent subsists. Clause (1) of Section 3 made the position very clear by using the words 'any arrears.' By the use of the word 'any,' the Legislature wanted to emphasize that if a tenant is desirous of preventing the landlord from exercising his right of forfeiture by reason of the default made by the tenant in the payment of rent, then irrespective of the fact whether arrears due were time barred, the tenant should put the landlord in the same position as if no default in payment was made. If the tenant is not prepared to pay up all arrears, he cannot in equity ask the landlord not to exercise his right of forfeiture allowed to him under Clause (1) of Section 3. In our opinion, therefore, the words 'any arrears' occurring in Clause (1) of Section 3 include even those arrears the recovery of which has become barred under the law of limitation. 9. It is not disputed that when the Respondent made the demand for payment of all past arrears, the Appellant refused to pay up those which were time barred. The default was therefore wilful and the two courts below were right in decreeing the suit for ejectment. We therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. The stay order dated 14-4-1955, is hereby vacated.