JUDGMENT This is a second appeal which arises out of a suit for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of land which comprises the eastern half of the land covered by patta No. 30/23 I.E., and the only question that arises for decision is whether the suit is governed by Art. 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act, and that was also the only point pressed before me. 2 The case of the plaintiff (respondent) was that the land belonged to her and four years before the institution of the suit i.e. in 1950 she let it out to the defendant (appellant) on condition that he would give her half the share of the produce. Defendant accordingly delivered to the plaintiff half share of the crops for the first year, but failed to do so thereafter and later on in the year 1952 got the land fraudulently mutated in his name. 3 Defendants defence relevant to this appeal was that he had orally purchased the land from the plaintiff in July, 1942 for a consideration of Rs. 600/-and was in possession in his own right since then. The lease set up by the plaintiff and payment of half tire produce were denied by him, and he contended that the claim of the plaintiff, if any, had become time-barred by his adverse possession. 4 The learned Munsiff found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the alleged lease and the case was governed by Art. 142. Finding further that the defendant had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years, he dismissed the claim of the plaintiff. 5 The learned District Judge in the first appeal, held that the case was governed by Art. 144, as admittedly the land once belonged to the plaintiff and she was in possession. He therefore held that the onus to prove that the defendant had been in adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years next before the institution of the suit was on the defendant. Finding further that defendant had failed to prove his possession before 1950 and also the oral sale he reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, and gave the plaintiff a decree for possession. Finding further that defendant had failed to prove his possession before 1950 and also the oral sale he reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, and gave the plaintiff a decree for possession. 6 The contention put forward on behalf of the appellant was that the case was governed by Art. 142, and the plaintiff having failed to prove that she was in possession of the suit land within 12 years next before the institution of the suit, could not succeed. 7 It will be seen from the pleadings already stated, that the case of the plaintiff necessarily was that she was in possession before she let out the land to the defendant in 1950, and even then the possession of defendant was a permissive one, and if that were admitted by the defendant or proved by the plaintiff then there can be no doubt that it would not be a case of dispossession or discontinuance of possession as contemplated under Art. 142. But mere allegation in the plaint to such an effect without proof will not be enough, as in that case it will always be possible to frame a suit as if there was no dispossession and thereby to attract Art. 144 with the result that the burden would be thrown on the defendant. Therefore to ascertain which Article applies, it becomes necessary to consider the facts and circumstances admitted or proved in the case and the mere fact that plaintiff does not allege dispossession in his plaint cannot render Art. 142 inapplicable if the facts show that the defendant must have entered on the land in the possession of the plaintiff and that such entry must have been adverse from the beginning (see Badrikhatik v. Narain Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 185 (A)). 8. There are other cases also (see Gangoobai v. Soni, 1942 Nag LJ 99 (B); and Premesvvar Das v. Madhab Chandra, AIR 1950 Assam 55 (C) and Roshmat Ali v. Bigaru Mandal, AIR 1950 Assam 57 (D)), which lay down the view and with which I am in respectful agreement that where in a suit for possession the plaintiff alleges that the defendants possession is permissive and defendant denies the same there is a discontinuance of possession and the suit is governed by Art. 142 and not by Art. 144. 9 It must then be found that the present suit was governed by Art. 142, and prima facie the onus was on the plaintiff to show that she was in possession of the suit land within 12 years next before the institution of the suit. 10 I was taken through the evidence and must say that there was neither enough nor satisfactory evidence to prove the lease set up by the plaintiff or the payment of rent in the shape of half share of crops for the first year. But there was enough evidence and better than that was led on the side of the defendant to show that defendant had been cultivating the land only since about 1950. It is true that plaintiff who is Pardanashin, did not go into the witness-box, but possession can be proved by other evidence also. The case reported in Mt. Shubratan v. Shabbir Ali, AIR 1940 Oudh 266 (E), relied upon on behalf of the appellant is distinguishable on facts, as the question in that case was one of denying the assertion of the vendor who entered the witness-box and swore that he had offered the land tried to be pre-empted to the plaintiff who did not enter the witness-box. Still in that case, the vendor was disbelieved on other grounds. 11 Parties are related to each other and so are the witnesses, but that does not necessarily mean that the witnesses are untruthful or unworthy of credit. On the side of defendant, besides himself we have only the word of his full brother in support of the allegation that defendant has been in possession from 1942. The story put forward at the stage of trial, namely, that the consideration of Rs. 600/- for the alleged oral sale was paid in instalments spread over a period of 10 years also, appears to be an artificial one and knocks the bottom away from that part of the case of the defendant. If defendant had really paid such a large amount, he would have certainly taken at least a receipt from the plaintiff. 12 Much reliance cannot also be placed on D. W. 2 who is a Process Server and went to serve the notice about mutation on the plaintiff. If defendant had really paid such a large amount, he would have certainly taken at least a receipt from the plaintiff. 12 Much reliance cannot also be placed on D. W. 2 who is a Process Server and went to serve the notice about mutation on the plaintiff. He went out of his way to record on the back of the notice that he had enquired from the plaintiff and she had no objection to make to the application. His own admission goes to show that this notice was served on the plaintiff at the house of the defendant, and it is not unlikely that the witness recorded that plaintiff had no objection at the instance of the defendant and without knowledge of plaintiff, who is illiterate and Pardanashin. Her thumb mark was also not taken as regards that statement. Then her conduct in appealing against the order of mutation and on failure of the appeals to have followed it up by the present suit also goes to show that she could not have been in all probability a willing party to the mutation. Her appeals failed as time-barred, because due to ignorance, it appears, that she first moved the officer who had sanctioned mutation to cancel it, and time was lost in that proceeding. 13 The findings on these questions of fact reached by the learned District Judge were thus correct, and there is nothing to show that those findings could not be reasonably reached, even though the onus was wrongly put on the defendant. But the question of onus of proof ceases to have importance after both the parties have led evidence because then the court decides the question after weighing the evidence for and against that point. 14 There is thus no substance in this second appeal and it is dismissed. In the circumstances there shall be no order for costs incurred in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.