JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This miscellaneous second appeal has been filed by the receiver-judgment-debtors against the order of Sri R.C. Misra, District Judge of Cuttack, reversing the order of the trial Court. The Respondents brought Original suit No. 151 of 1941 against the present Appellants for declaration of their title and for recovery of possession. Eventually they obtained a decree declaring their title and for recovery of possession. 2. It is to be mentioned, during the pendency of the suit, the Defendants were appointed as receivers by the Court. The suit continued upto the stage of second appeal which ultimately confirmed the decree in favour of the Plaintiffs. Thereafter the Court had to fix the liability of the Defendants who were also receivers in possession of the disputed property. By its order dated 6.3.1952 the Court fixed the liability of the receivers at Rs. 951/11/6. The order Is to the effect that the Defendants are liable to pay up the aforesaid amount to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs in the same Court filed an execution petition which was numbered as Execution Case No. 172 of 1952 and in that the properties of the Defendants receivers were sold and the sale was ultimately confirmed. Thereafter the receivers have put in a petition out of which the present appeal arises that the entire proceedings of execution are ultra vires as the provisions of Order XL, Rules 3 and 4, which are mandatory, had not been followed, and the Court which held the sate bad no jurisdiction to initiate execution proceedings and to bond sale. The Court of first instance upheld the contentions of the Receivers, but the lower appellate Court has negatived these contentions and rejected the petition of the receivers. 3. Mr. Swain, appearing on behalf of the receivers-judgment-debtors who are Appellants before me, has taken up the first point that there is no order directing the receivers to make the payment as provided for under the provisions of Order XL, Rules 3 and 4. The order has simply fixed the liability but there is a lacuna that the Defendants are to pay. I am not prepared to accept this contention. It is too ticklish a point. The order amounts to a direction that the Defendant-receivers, whose liability was fixed at a certain amount, were to pay the same in favour of the Plaintiffs. The order has simply fixed the liability but there is a lacuna that the Defendants are to pay. I am not prepared to accept this contention. It is too ticklish a point. The order amounts to a direction that the Defendant-receivers, whose liability was fixed at a certain amount, were to pay the same in favour of the Plaintiffs. This being the substance of the order, in my opinion, there has been no violation of the provisions of Order XL to that extent. 4. The further contention of Mr. Swain is that the execution proceedings are absolutely ultravires as the provisions under which only such amount is realisable are contained in Order XL, Rule 4. The provisions run thus: Where a receiver (a) fails to submit his accounts and in such form as the Court directs, or (b) fails to pay the amount due from him as the Court directs, or (c) occasions loss to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence, the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell the property, and may apply the proceed to make good any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the receiver. It is to be mentioned here that in the particular case the Court did not do anything more than attaching and selling the property of the Defendants-receiver. So the remedies, which are provided for under Order XL, Rule 4, had been strictly followed, the only difference being that an execution case was started at the instance of the Plaintiffs who are entitled to receive the money. In my opinion it cannot be taken to be a material irregularity at an. There is no daunt that it is the Plaintiffs alone who are interested in the payment and they are bound to move the Court for realization of the amount on account of the non-payment by the Defendants as directed by the Court. If really the Court would have proceeded beyond the remedies available to the Plaintiffs, decree-holders under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 4. that is, by arresting the judgment, debtors-receivers, the procedure would have been ultravires the provisions of Order XL. Rule 4. If really the Court would have proceeded beyond the remedies available to the Plaintiffs, decree-holders under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 4. that is, by arresting the judgment, debtors-receivers, the procedure would have been ultravires the provisions of Order XL. Rule 4. But as 1 have stated above, when in the instance case, the property of the judgment, debtors was attached and sold, there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of the Rule. 5. Mr. wain further contends that the Executing Court is not the same Court who appointed the Receiver. Manifestly in the present case the same court entertained the application and proceeded to attach and sell the property. The order binding the receivers was passed by this Court who also finally fixed the liability on 6-3-1952 and it is he who had issued the process of attachment and sale of the property which was ultimately sold. The contention of Mr. Swain, therefore, must fail and in my opinion the same Court had issued the process for realisation of the amount by proper procedure laid down in law. The Court had indeed to follow the procedure laid down in Order XXI for the purpose of attaching the property. The procedure provided for under Order XXI for holding the sale also had to be followed. If he had not followed this mandatory provision the proceedings would have been liable to be attacked as having been vitiated by material irregularities. There is no point at all that in fact the Court had committed material irregularities in conducting or putting the sale or in attaching the property. In my opinion, the Court had proceeded legally and the sale was absolutely legal and the confirmation of it cannot be questioned as being void on any grounds whatsoever. 6. Mr. Swain, however, relies upon a decision reported in Chaparaddi alias Saparaddi Gazi Vs. Kabil Molla, Receiver of estate of Chaparaddi alias Saparaddi Gazi and Others in support of his contention that the same Court who appointed the receiver ought to take steps under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 4. The point has been sufficiently answered in the discussions in the foregoing paragraph. Kabil Molla, Receiver of estate of Chaparaddi alias Saparaddi Gazi and Others in support of his contention that the same Court who appointed the receiver ought to take steps under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 4. The point has been sufficiently answered in the discussions in the foregoing paragraph. I may mention that the question that arise for determination before their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court was whether the order of the Court under Order XL, Rule 4 was enforceable by the same Court in summary manner or that a separate suit was to be levied for the purpose of realising the amount. The answer was that the Court had jurisdiction to realise the amount in summary procedure and no separate suit was called for. The position has been well settled and the position does not arise in the present case. 7. Mr. Swain also relies upon another decision of the Madras High Court reported in G. Gurumurthi Aiyar Vs. Ramaswami Chettiar. This,position also had been answered by me in my foregoing discussion. Their Lordships laid down that the remedies available for the realisation of the amout fixed under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 4 are only confined to the remedies provided for under the Rule and not otherwise. That was a case where there was a prayer for arrest of the receiver This was ultravires the provisions of Rule 4. Such a contingency does not arise in our case. 8. I may note also that I have already found that the Court had jurisdiction to hold the sale and the sale was properly and legally held so as not to be assailed. But I may observe also that this question could and should have been raised at the stage of the execution proceedings, that is, when the property was being attached and the sale was to take effect. The points not having been raised, they are barred by the principles of constructive resjudicata which applies to execution and other proceedings also even though Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure, in terms does not apply. 9. In conclusion, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed