Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The only point raised by Mr. H.K. Banerji in support of the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of reversal of the court of appeal below disallowing costs to them against the defendants first party -- respondents is that the court of appeal below has erred in law in reversing the decree for costs awarded to the plaintiffs against the mo-itgagees defendants first party on their appeal against the decree for costs only to the court of appeal below. Mr Banerji has contended relying on Sapenswar Pati V/s. Brindaban Panda, AIR 3934 Pat 397 (A) that the question of cost was within the discretion of the first court which awarded to cost to the plaintiffs, and therefore, the lower appellate court should not have interfered with the discretion of the first court and substituted its own discretion in its place and set aside the order of costs awarded to the plaintiffs against the mortgagees, defendants first party, on their appeal to it. 2. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. It is true the question of awarding costs is within the discretion of the court, and, the appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with such a discretion and substitute its own discretion in its place, but where the question of principle is involved, and a court has awarded or disallowed costs without having regard to the well known principles in the matter, it is open to the appellate court to interfere with such a discretion, if it finds that such a discretion has been exercised in violation of settled principles of law, and that the ends of justice require that an order for cost should be set aside. 3. The just mentioned case relied upon by Mr. Banerji as well as the cases of Mangobinda Sadhu V/s. Satya Niranjan Cbakraverty, I.L.R. 8 Pat 190: (AIR 1928 Pat 482) (B) and Lakshmi Narain V/s. Mt. Mohamdi Begam, AIR 1932 Oudh 123 (C) which have been relied upon by the court of appeal below, clearly lay down the principle that in a redemption suit the mortgagee is entitled to costs, unless he hast been guilty of misconduct or has refused a valid tender of the amount due to him. Mohamdi Begam, AIR 1932 Oudh 123 (C) which have been relied upon by the court of appeal below, clearly lay down the principle that in a redemption suit the mortgagee is entitled to costs, unless he hast been guilty of misconduct or has refused a valid tender of the amount due to him. The court of appeal below has held that the principles laid down in Order 34, Rule 7 have not been followed by the first court in allowing costs to the plaintiffs. Order 34, Rule 7(1)(a) and (b), with which we are concerned, are in the following terms: "7.(1) In a suit for redemption, if the plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree (a) ordering that an account be taken of what was due to the defendant at the date of such decree for- (i) principal and interest on the mortgage, (ii) the costs of suit, if any, awarded to him, and (iii) other costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by him up to that date, in respect of his mortgage-security, together with interest thereon; or (b) declaring the amount so due at that date; and ......" It is manifest, therefore, that in a suit for redemption, on the success of the plaintiffs the court has to pass a preliminary decree ordering that an account be taken of what was due to the defendant at the date of such decree for principal and interest on the mortgage, and, also the cost of the suit, if any, awarded to him besides other costs etc. and to declare the amount so due on that date. Order 34, Rule 10 further provides that in finally adjusting the amount to be paid to a mortgagee in case of a foreclosure, sale or redemption, the Court shall, unless in the case of costs of the suit the conduct of the mortgagee has been such as to disentitle him thereto, add to the mortgage money such costs of the suit and other costs, charges and expenses as have been properly incurred by him since the date of the preliminary decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption up to the time of actual payment. It follows therefore, that in a suit for redemption, the mortgagee-defendant is entitled to the costs of the suit up to the date of the preliminary decree as well as to costs after the preliminary decree, unless the conduct of the mortgagee has been such as to disentitle him thereto. 4. In the present case, the first court found that the deposit of the mortgage money under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act was insufficient, and, therefore, not valid. It further found that notice of the deposit of the mortgage money under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act was not served on the properly constituted guardian of the minor rehandars. On these findings, it was obvious that there was no misconduct on the part of the mortgagees, defendants first party, in not accepting the deposit and giving up possession of the mortgaged property. Further, it will be found that even on the institution of the suit for redemption, the plaintiffs set up the plea of oral tender of the mortgage money to the defendants first party, but this story of oral tender was disbelieved by the first court. It cannot, therefore, be said, as it was contended by Mr. Banerji, that the institution of the redemption suit itself should have been considered to be a tender, and, that the mortgagee-defendants should not have contested the suit but should have withdrawn the mortgage money and given up possession immediately if their conduct was bona fide. In my opinion, they could not have done so, because the plaintiffs took up the plea of oral tender to them, and therefore, that question had to be investigated and as long as it was not negatived, it was not possible for the first court to determine whether the plaintiffs story of oral tender was valid or not, arid, whether in such circumstances, the plaintiffs should be allowed costs against the mortgagees defendants, or, the mortgagees defendants should be awarded costs as provided by Order 34, Rule 7(1) (a)(ii). It will, therefore, appear that the defendants first party contested the suit mainly on the ground that the story of oral tender set up in the plaint was false, the deposit under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act was insufficient and that no notice of deposit was served on them. It will, therefore, appear that the defendants first party contested the suit mainly on the ground that the story of oral tender set up in the plaint was false, the deposit under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act was insufficient and that no notice of deposit was served on them. These three main pleas of the defendants first party, were upheld, and the plaintiffs case on these three points was rejected. No doubt, it was said in the written statement that they got a kebala executed by the mortgagors, defendants second party, in respect of the mortgaged property, and that under the terms of which Rs. 8,355/- the rehan money and the mortgage money outstanding in favour of the plaintiffs were kept in amanat with the defendants, but, in my opinion, that question was immaterial. The plaintiffs were subsequent rehandars of the equity of redemption, whereas the mortgages defendants were prior mortgagees, and, therefore, the plaintiffs brought the suit for redemption. The case of the defendants first party, rehandars, that there had been a change in their status because of having subsequently purchased the mortgaged properties was negatived by the first court which held that their status as rehandars was not extinguished by the subsequent kebala, as there was no evidence on the record to show that there was any change kt their status, or that the rehan in question was extinguished on a subseqent kebala. The first court, therefore, found that the plaintiffs, who are bharnadars of the equity of redemption, were entitled to a decree for redemption on payment of the bharna money plus the Government revenue and cess paid by the defendants first party, and therefore, they were entitled to redeem the defendants first party, who were prior mortgagees. It will, therefore, appear that all the findings were in favour of the defendants first party, and, the several pleas of the plaintiffs to show that the conduct of the defendants first party was mala fide inasmuch as they refused a valid tender of the amount due to them, were negatived. On these findings, in my opinion, it could not be contended that the conduct of the defendants first party was, mala fide, or, that they were guilty of any misconduct so as to disentitle them of the cost of the suit to which they were entitled under Order 34, Rule 7(1) (a) (ii). On these findings, in my opinion, it could not be contended that the conduct of the defendants first party was, mala fide, or, that they were guilty of any misconduct so as to disentitle them of the cost of the suit to which they were entitled under Order 34, Rule 7(1) (a) (ii). In my judgment, therefore, the court of appeal below exercised its discretion properly in reversing the order for costs allowed to the plaintiffs against the defendants first party. 5. I may mention here that the question of the maintainability of the appeal before the court of appeal below was raised, but the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, rightly overruled that contention on the ground that although ordinarily no appeal lies against an order for cost only, but an appeal would He when any principle was involved. He found that as the principles laid down in Order 34, Rule 7 had been violated by the first court, therefore, an appeal by the mortgagees-defendants first party before him was maintainable, as it involved a matter of principle. 6. For these reasons, I would overrule the contention of Mr. Banerji, and hold that there is no merit in the appeal, and, therefore, it must be dismissed. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.