Modi, J.—This is a writ application by Jairamdas under Arty. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and has come before this Full Bench as it involves the determination of a question as to the true scope and meaning of sec. 64(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which has been differently answered by two bench decisions of this Court in M/s. Mohammad Jamil vs. The State Transport Authority (1) (civil writ petition No. 122 of 1955 decided on 7th September, 1955) and Sainiks Motors vs. The State Transport Authority 2) (civil writ petition No. 37 of 1955 decided on the 3rd October, 1955). The former decision is by a bench consisting of Bapna and Bhandari JJ. sitting at Jaipur and was given earlier and the other one was given by the Chief Justice and Dave J. sitting at Jodhpur, and this bench was obviously unaware of the earlier decision. 2. The facts of the present case may be shortly stated. The petitioner was granted two permits for plying two stage-carriages on the Pokaran— Phalsoond route by the State Transport Authority by its order dated the 11th June, 1953 By this Older two other permit-holders on this route were dislodged, one of which is opposite party No. 3 here and the other forwent his claim in favour of the petitioner. A condition was imposed on the petitioner by the State Transport Authority that he shall put on the route new buses of not earlier than 1950 Model within a period of two months. It may be mentioned before proceeding further that there are two routes between Pokaran and Phalsoond the longer route is via Sankda and Bhaisara and is 84 miles Jong, while the shorter route is via Ujlan and Bhaniyana, and covers a distance of 42 miles only. It may also be mentioned here that a road on the shorter route comes into existence some time later, and originally it was the longer route which was in force. The petitioners case is that the Regional Transport Authority revoked one of his permits as he was not able to put a bus of the required model on the shorter route, and granted a permit instead to Laxminarain Gandhi. It appears that Laxminarain Gandhi was being granted temporary permits by the Regional Transport Authority on the shorter route after the 11th June, 1953. It appears that Laxminarain Gandhi was being granted temporary permits by the Regional Transport Authority on the shorter route after the 11th June, 1953. The petitioner then represented to the Regional Transport Authority that the permit granted to him upto 31st December, 1955, fell short of the statutory period of three years and further that the intention of the State Transport Authority while it passed its order dated the 11th June, 1953, was that the petitioner should have been granted permit to ply his buses on the Ujlan Bhaniyana route which was shorter, instead of via Sankda and Bhaisara. Consequently, the Regional Transport Authority by its Resolution No. 98, dated the 16th March, 1956, held that the petitioner was rightly entitled to a permit for the shorter route, and not via Sankda and Bhaisara, and ordered the necessary correction in the permit, and further directed that the permit should have been granted for the full period of three years, and validated it accordingly from the date of the original order. Laxminarain felt aggrieved by this order, and preferred an appeal against it to the appellate tribunal of the State Transport Authority. The tribunal by its order dated the 18th July, 1956, partly allowed Laxminarains appeal, and while it held that the validation of the permit for the statutory period of three years was correct and should stand, it directed that the correction of the petitioners permit so as to be effect-tive via Ujlan and Bhaniyana should be disallowed. The petitioner has now come to this Court, and his main grievance is that the appellate tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated the 16th March, 1956, and prays, therefore, that the order of the tribunal dated the 18th July, 1956, was and is ultra vires and illegal and deserves to be quashed. 3. Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act (which I shall hereafter refer to as the Act) provides for appeals. This section reads as follows— "64. 3. Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act (which I shall hereafter refer to as the Act) provides for appeals. This section reads as follows— "64. Appeals—Any person— (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or (b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any vacation of the conditions thereof, or (c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the holder of a permit, or (d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit, or by any condition attached to such countersignature, or (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or (g) being the holder of licence, who is aggrieved by the refusal of a Regional Transport Authority to grant an authorisation to drive a public service vehicle, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." 4. The contention of petitioner is that any appeal by Laxminarain Gandhi against the order of the Regional Transport Authority parsed in the petitioners favour could, if at all, have been filed under clause (b), but no such appeal was competent as it has been held by a bench decision of this Court in Sainiks Motor vs. The State Transport Authority (2) that under that clause only the permit-holder had a right of appeal and no body else. Reliance is placed by the other side on the decision of another bench of this Court in M/s. Mohammad Jamil vs. The State Transport Authority (1) which has, briefly put, held the view that sec. 64 (b) was very wide in its terms and permits an appeal by any person aggrieved by any variation of the conditions of the permit, and does not restrict the right of appeal to the permit-holder alone. 5. 64 (b) was very wide in its terms and permits an appeal by any person aggrieved by any variation of the conditions of the permit, and does not restrict the right of appeal to the permit-holder alone. 5. As the two decisions stand, they are indeed not quite consistent with each other and it is, therefore, necessary to examine the position closely and lay down the law with certainty so far as this Court is concerned. The question, therfore is what is the true import of sec. 64 (b) which permits "any person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof" to appeal within the prescribed time to the prescribed authority. Does this clause permit all and sundry for example the inhabitants of a locality, to file an appeal, say, against a variation in the conditions of the permit, or, is it only the holder of the permit who can file the appeal and no body else, or, is a rival permit-holder competent to file an appeal against such a variation also assuming that his case does not fall under clause (f) of sec 64 ? 6. I shall first examine that two cases of our own Court referred to above. The facts of the Sainik Motors case were these. The applicants were permit holders for plying buses from Jodhpur to Beawar. There were also other permit-holders in a bus service from Bilara and Beawar. Both these permit-holders obtained an order from the Regional Transport Authority. Jodhpur, according to which the extension granted to them up to Beawar (which was then in the Ajmer State), was to be subject to the condition that the Jodhpur Beawar operators were to make daily to return trips between Bar and Beawar, and the Bilara Bar operators were to make one daily trip between Bar and Beawar As this was found to be a inconvenience by certain persons who had to travel from Bilara to Beawar, they filed an appeal before the appellate authority against this order. That authority issued a stay order. That authority issued a stay order. The Sainiks Motors then filed a writ application, in this Court and their principal prayer was that this Court should issue a writ of prohibition against the appellate authority, as the applicants had no right of appeal under sec 64 of the Act, and the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to hear the same. The bench examined the whole position, referred to an earlier case of this Court namely, Malchand vs. State Transport Authority (Civil Writ Case No. 260 of 1954) to which I was a party, and expressed its disagreement with the view of Subba Rao J. in Vedachala Mudaliar vs. The State of Madras (3), and came to the conclusion that the word "person" within the meaning of clause (b) is only the person whose permit is revoked or suspended or conditions of whose permit have been varied, and, therefore, laid down that the opposite party had no right of appeal under clause (b) of sec. 64. On the facts of the case, I am disposed to think with all respect, that the actual decision arrived at was correct, although it seems to have been taken for granted in that case that just as the revocation or suspension of a permit could and would really effect the holder only, a variation in the conditions of the permit must also necessarily affect him and nobody else. This was, however, a somewhat over simplification of the correct legal position as I shall endeavour to show presently. Now there is little doubt that a consideration of the various clauses of sec. 64 of the Act which I have set forth above shows that thereunder the Legislature has thought fit to provide a somewhat narrow right of appeal, and it is only against certain oders passed under the Act that a right of appeal has been provided, and these have been specified in the various clauses of the section. 64 of the Act which I have set forth above shows that thereunder the Legislature has thought fit to provide a somewhat narrow right of appeal, and it is only against certain oders passed under the Act that a right of appeal has been provided, and these have been specified in the various clauses of the section. This right, broadly speaking has been given either to the applicant for a permit against refusal thereof or its grant subject to an unwanted condition or to a permit-holder against an order revoking or suspending his permit or varying the conditions thereof, or to a pemit-holder where renewal is refused to him, or again to a local or police authority or an association of persons, or to a person who has been providing transport facilities, when any such authority, association or person had opposed the grant; of permit but the same has nevertheless been granted, it seems to me, therefore, that the right of appeal given under sec. 64 should not be given an unduly wide meaning, and such a situation would certainly arise if we were to hold, for example, that the inhabitants of a locality catered for by a particular bus service have a right of appeal on account of any variation in the conditions of the permit because they may feel aggrieved by such variation. The bench which decided the Sainik Motors case, had before it a case of this type, and it would be going too far, in my opinion, if an indeterminate body of persons are held to have a right of appeal under this clause on the mere ground that the language of the clause is very wide. Nonetheless, what seems to have been overlooked, when this case was decided was that a case of the variation of a condition of a permit may possibly arise where such variation may not only affect the holder thereof, or indeed may not affect him adversely at all; but it may adversely affect a person who has been already providing transport facilities in or near that very area. It would clearly appear, on further consideration, that such a possibility cannot be entirely eliminated out of consideration in adjudging the true scope and attractability of clause (b) of sec. 64. It would clearly appear, on further consideration, that such a possibility cannot be entirely eliminated out of consideration in adjudging the true scope and attractability of clause (b) of sec. 64. To say that where there has been a variation of a condition of a permit-holder and such variation has also adversely affected the interests of the rival permit-holder but still he cannot have a right of appeal under clause (b) would be, in my respectful opinion, a clear nagation of the language of clause (b). I may add here, however, that it would of course be a different matter if the variation complained against is not of the conditions in the permit but of something else, in which case clearly clause (b) will have no application. I may briefly explain Malchands case at this place, as I was a party to it. That was a case where the Regional Transport Authority had fixed a certain place as a bus stop under sec. 76 of the Act read with rule 131 of the Rules made under the Act. The Secretary of a Yuwak Mandal filed an appeal before the appellate authority against this order. The appellate authority set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority, and fixed another place for the purpose. The bus operators filed a writ application against the order of the appellate authority, and it was held with reference to clause (b) of sec. 64 that that clause gave a right of appeal to the person whose permit was revoked or suspended or in whose permit any variation had been made, and that it did not give a right to all and sundry to go in appeal because of some variation in the conditions of the permit. I would point out that sec. 64 (b) did not come up for any full or critical examination in this case, and it further clearly appears from the judgment that there was nothing alleged or proved to show that the fixture of some halting place or places was one of the conditions of the permit, and, therefore, neither clause (b) nor claise (f) of sec. 64 was held to have been attracted so as to give any right of appeal. 7. This brings me to M/s Mohammad Jamils case (1). 64 was held to have been attracted so as to give any right of appeal. 7. This brings me to M/s Mohammad Jamils case (1). This was a case in which the petitioners who were assignees of a permit for running a stage carriage on Baran—Chhipabarod—Chhabra route applied to the Regional Trans-port Authority lor curtailing the route beyond Chhipabarod on the ground that there was no motorable road from the lastmentioned place to Chhabra. The Regional Transport Authority sanctioned the curtailment. Then the Kotah Transport Ltd. preferred an appeal to the State Transport Authority on the ground that the Regional Transport Authority had not considered the objection filed by it. The appellate tribunal remanded the case to the Regional Transport Authority for a fresh decision after consideration of the objection filed by the Kotah Transport Ltd. The petitioners then filed a writ application in the High Court, and the contention on their behalf was that the appeal before the appellate tribunal was incompetent. What the bench said with respect to the competency of the appeal was this : "It does not require much argument to see that the specification of the route in the permit is one of the conditions of the permit, bee 48 (d), mentions the conditions which may be attached to a stage-carriage permit, and sub-clause (ii-a) directs the specification of the routes which are to be used by the stage-carriage. Sec. 64 (b) permits appeal by any person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof. It was argued that the varation of the conditions of a permit only allows an appeal to be filed by the holder of the permit in respect whereof the conditions are varied. Reliance is placed on M Kali Mudaliar vs. A. Vedachala Mudariar (3). There is no reasoning behind the case, and with great respect, we are not prepared to take such a narrow view of sec. 64 (b). Reliance is placed on M Kali Mudaliar vs. A. Vedachala Mudariar (3). There is no reasoning behind the case, and with great respect, we are not prepared to take such a narrow view of sec. 64 (b). it is very wide in its terms, and permits an appeal by any person aggrieved by any variation of the conditions of the permit, and does not restrict the right of appeal to the holder alone." Towards the end of their judgment, the learned Judges further observed as follows— "We may mention that the conditions of a permit specifying the route is one of the important conditions of the permit, and R.T. A. has done well to publish the application and to invite objections, because in running a stage carriage, it is not only the permit-holder but the inhabitants of the locality also and the persons providing transport facilities in that area, who are equally interested in the result of such application." The petition was thus dismissed. 8. Now a brief reference to M. Kali Mudaliar vs. Vedachala (4) would not be out of place here. This was a Letters Patent appeal from the decision of Subba Rao J. in Vedachala Mudaliar vs. State of Madras (3). The petitioner in that case had been granted two stage-carriage permits for running two buses. They were required to start at certain time. The contesting respondent was also a permit-holder for plying another bus, and timings had also been fixed for him. The latter moved the Regional Transport Authority for revision of the timings. That authority fixed fresh timings. The petitioner then went in appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board which restored the previous timings whereupon the contesting respondent preferred a revision to the Government and the Govren-ment set aside he order of the Central Road Traffic Board. In a writ application filed by the petitioner. K. Subba Rao J. in quashing the order of the Government observed, though not without some reluctance, that sec. 64(b) was not confined to the permit-holder the conditions of whose permit had been varied but to any person who was affected by the variation of the conditions in the permit issued to another. K. Subba Rao J. in quashing the order of the Government observed, though not without some reluctance, that sec. 64(b) was not confined to the permit-holder the conditions of whose permit had been varied but to any person who was affected by the variation of the conditions in the permit issued to another. The learned Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, who delivered the judgment in the Letters Patent appeal observed that there was considerable doubt as to the correctness of the learned Judges conclusion so far as clause (b) was concerned. The matter was, however, not pursued further because the bench was of the view that the change in the timings of the petitioners bus could not beheld to be a variation of any of the conditions of the permit, and that if that was so neither clause (b) nor clause (f) would apply and the judgment of Subba Rao J. was set aside. It is therefore, clear that so far as this case is concerned, all that it decided positively was that a variation as to the timings of a bus was not a variation of any of the conditions of the permit a conclusion with which there need be no disagreement. But so far as the interpretation of clause (b) of sec.64 goes, the precise, effect of this decision was no more than to throw a serious doubt on the view held by Subba Rao J. It is true however, that towards the end of their judgment, the learned Judges also went on to consider that even if the timing was held to be a condition attached to a permit, the contesting respondent could not be treated as a person aggrieved, because the expression "permit" in clause (b) referred to the permit mentioned in clause (a). The learned Judges therefore concluded that the proper construction of clause (b) was to confine its application to persons aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permits granted to them, or again aggrieved by any variations of the conditions of such permits granted to them, and that the clause in question did not confer a right on one person to appeal against an order varying the condition of a permit granted to another person. 9 Now raverting to the case of Mohammed Jamil (1) decided by Bapna and Bhandari JJ., I would like to say, with all respect, that the learned Judges were in my opinion, right in not following the last mentioned observations of the bench in the Madras case to the case before them inasmuch as it is not possible to exclude from the ambit of this clause, as it is worded that type of cases whereto variation of the conditions of the permit of a permit-holder adversely affect the rights of a person who has been Providing transport facilities in that or connected area. Such a person, in my judgment, would certainly be aggrieved by the variation complained against and I cannot sea how a right of appeal under sec. 61 (b) may be denied in such cases. 10 I would like to say at this juncture that where a case falls within the plain meaning of a provision of law, its application thereto cannot be denied on any a priori considerations as to the supposed intentions of the Legislature I may usefully refer to the observations of Lord Watson in Solomon vs. A. Soloman & Co Ltd. (5) : " Intention of the Legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a court of law or equity, what the Legislature intended, to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication." Again even though a court may be satisfied that the Legislature had not contemplated a particular consequence while enacting a law, the court is still bound to give effect to its clear language. This is what Lord Herschell satisfied that the Legislature had not is still said in Coz vs. Bakes (6). This is what Lord Herschell satisfied that the Legislature had not is still said in Coz vs. Bakes (6). It is not easy to exaggerate the magnitude of this change (i.e., that discharge from custody by a Court of competent jurisdiction does not protect from further proceedings); nevertheless, it must be admitted that if the language of the Legislature, interpreted according to the recognised canons of construction, involves this result, your lordships must frankly yield to it, even if you should be satisfied that it was not in the contempla-tion of the Legislature. 11. The correct position as to the right of appeal available under clause (b) of sec. 64 therefore boils down, in my view, to this : Ordinarily and in the vast majority of cases, it is only the permit-holder under this clause who would be competent to file an appeal against an order varying the conditions of his permit, because such variation would by and large adversely affect his interests only. But a class of cases also arises where such variation may or may not adversely affect the holder of the permit a condition whereof is under variation but adversely affect another permit-holder in the same area or a neighbouring area and if so the applicability of clause (b) cannot be legitimately denied in a case of this type or in such other similar cases and where such a situation arises, this clause cannot but be held also to permit an appeal by the party so affected. In this view of the matter, the view taken in the Sainiks Motors case appears to me to have been enunciated somewhat too narrowly and the view taken in Mohammed Jamils case is the sounder one. In this view of the matter, the view taken in the Sainiks Motors case appears to me to have been enunciated somewhat too narrowly and the view taken in Mohammed Jamils case is the sounder one. But while I so agree, I wish to add, with great respect, that though the language used by the learned Judge when they say that clause (b) is very wide in its terms and permits an appeal by any person aggrieved by any variation in the conditions of the permit and does not restrict the right of appeal to the holder alone is strictly and in the abstract unexceptionable, its applicability in the concrete calls for caution, and in my view, it should be clearly understood that this clause is not intended to permit an appeal by an indeterminate and indeterminable body of persons such as the public at large or the inhabitants generally of the area concerned. In order to achieve this result, I would be prepared, if necessary, to say that the word "aggrieved" has a positive and tangible content and there can be no real aggrievement where a number of the public is affected as much as another member of that indeterminate body and such a person can scarcely be a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of the section. It may be open to such persons to move a local authority or a police authority or an association and their case may possibly fall within clause (i) of sec. 64 but where it does not so fall, they would be entirely outside the ambit of clause (b) of sec. 64. It is scarcely necessary also to emphasise that it is only the variation in the conditions of a permit laid down by sec. 99 generally or a condition falling within the four walls of sec. 48 which would attract the application of sec. 64 (b). This, in my opinion, is the correct position as to the right of appeal under this clause. 12. Let us apply the principles formulated above to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 99 generally or a condition falling within the four walls of sec. 48 which would attract the application of sec. 64 (b). This, in my opinion, is the correct position as to the right of appeal under this clause. 12. Let us apply the principles formulated above to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the first place, the question that falls for determination is whether the change in the route applicable to the petitioner as made by the Regional Transport Authority by its order dated the 16th March, 1956, amounts to a change in the variation of the conditions of his contract, because if that is not so, then sec. 64 (b) would not be attracted at all. Now, the relevant sections in this connection are secs. 48 and 59 of the Act Sec. 59 lays down the general conditions which attach to all permits. Sec. 48 lays down that a Regional Transport Authority may, after consideration of the matters set forth in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 47, such as the adequacy of the existing transport facilities, the condition of the roads and the interest of the public and the like, attach to a stage-carriage permit any one or more of the following conditions which are enumerated in clauses 1 to 6 of that section. Condition No. (ii) fa) therein is that the stage carriages shall be used only on specified routes or in a specified area. This amendment was introduced by sec. 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act (No. XXVI) of 19*0. Any variation, therefore, in the route or area is undoubtedly a change in the conditions of the permit. The next question is whether the person who seeks to appeal is aggrieved by the change which is objected to. Normally and generally speaking, it is the holder of the permit who would be affected by a change of this character ; but there may be other cases where another person is in reality adversely affected by the change and the case before us appears to fall within this exceptional category. Here the petitioner obtained a change in his route and that change undoubtedly affected the contesting opposite-party Laxminarain Gandhi. Here the petitioner obtained a change in his route and that change undoubtedly affected the contesting opposite-party Laxminarain Gandhi. In this view of the matter, the conclusion seems to be irresistible that the latter had a right to go to the appellate tribunal in appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority, and the appeal so filed by him must be held to be competent, and I would hold accordingly. 13. An argument was also raised before us on a procedural matter, and it was this. The contention of the petitioner was that when an appeal is received by the appellate tribunal according to sub-rule (a) of rule l08 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules the appellate, authority must appoint a time for the hearing of the appeal so as to give not less than 30 days notice to the Regional Transport Authority, and the appellant, and that this requirement was not observed in the present case inasmuch as the notice to the Regional Transport Authority was given on the l9ch Jane, 1956, and the appeal was heard and decided on the 18th July, 1936, with the result that the order of the appellate tribunal is thereby vitiated. This contention in my opinion, has no substance whatever. All that the rule properly means is that when an appeal is filed before the appellate authority, it should, as a rule, fix the hearing of the appeal in such a way that the appellant and the Regional Transport Authority, have at least 30 days notice of the hearing. The intention behind the rule is to give sufficient time to the appellant and to the Regional Transport Authority, or for that matter, to any other person concerned. The question however, is, what is he effect of an omission to do so ? Is such an omission a sufficient ground for invalidating the decision altogether ? The answer, to my mind, is an emphatic negative. Where 30 days notice as required by rule 108(b) is not given, the proper thing for the aggrieved party is to bring the miter to the notice of the appellate tribunal and on that having been done, it would be for the tribunal to postpone the hearing to such due as would permit the fulfilment of the condition of 30 days notice. But where a hearing has been fixed earlier than 30 days of the date of the notice to any of the parties concerned and such parties fail to raise any objection at the proper time, the correct view to take is that the objection on that score was waived, and this ground cannot be allowed to be raised later to invalidate the decision given. 14. As my view is that the contesting respondent Laxminarain Gandhi had a right of appeal in this case within in the meaning of sec. 64 (b) of the Act and consequently the appellate tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the same, this application has no force and must be dismissed. I would, however, leave the partners to bear their own costs in the circumstances of the case. 15. After the foregoing judgment was ready, learned counsel for the petitioner has made an application in which he has submitted that sec. 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act. (No. 100) of 1956, this Act having come into force on the 15th February, 1957. whereby clause (d)(ii)(a) of sec. 48 has been removed from its present position and has been incorporated as sub-sec. (2) as follows — (2) Every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a special route or routes far a specified area. Then follows sub-sec. (3) which specifies the various conditions subject to which the permit may be granted and as many as 23 clauses have been provided in this connection. It is contended that the amended sec. 48 makes it impossible for the Regional or the State Transport Authority to vary the route or routs applicable to a particular permit, and, therefore, we would not be justified in putting a wider interpretation on sec. 64 (b) of the Act than that adopted in the Sainiks Motors case. I have carefully considered this argument and think that the conclusion at which I have arrived above as to the precise ambit and import of clause (b) of sec. 64 does not require any modification so far as the case before me or similar other cases decided before the coming into operation of the amended section are concerned. The reason is this. The amended sec. 64 does not require any modification so far as the case before me or similar other cases decided before the coming into operation of the amended section are concerned. The reason is this. The amended sec. 48 clearly has no retrospective operation, and in order to find out whether any variation in the conditions of a permit gives rise to a right of appeal by a person, other than the holder of the permit, a condition whereof has been varied, one must look at the combined effect of sec. 48 and sec. 64. Again, what one must keep in view in sec. 48 as it was when the variation Complained against was made because it is then that a right of appeal would arise, and once it has so arisen, and has thus become vested in a person who is aggrieved thereby, a subsequent change in the law cannot be allowed to defeat such a right. Sea Colonial Suger Rifining Co. vs. Irving (7). The correct legal position, therefore, is that if the opposite party, Laxminarain Gandhi, had a right of appeal against a variation in the conditions of the petitioners permit according to sec. 64 (b) read with sec. 48(d)(ii)(a), as it then stood, I am clearly of opinion that a subsequent change in the law will not and cannot affect that right of appeal. Consequently, whether Laxminarain had a right of appeal or nut against the order of the Regional Transport Authority in question must inevitably fall to be determined by the State of the law at the time the order was passed, irrespective of any subsequent amendment of the law. In this view of the matter, I am unhesitatingly of the view that the order of the Regional Transport Authority varying a condition of the petitioners permit such condition being as respects the route and being covered by sec. 48(d)(ii)(a), as it then stood, was appealable by the rival permit-holder, who was certainly aggrieved by such variation, and that a subsequent change in the structure of sec. 48 cannot affect the right of appeal which came into existence the moment that order was passed. I would, therefore, adhere to the conclusion to which 1 have come in the foregoing part of the judgment. I may add in passing that whether or not an appeal would lie in such a case arising under the amended sec. 48 cannot affect the right of appeal which came into existence the moment that order was passed. I would, therefore, adhere to the conclusion to which 1 have come in the foregoing part of the judgment. I may add in passing that whether or not an appeal would lie in such a case arising under the amended sec. 48 is a question which does not strictly arise for determination in this case; but if I were to venture an opinion I would say that, as at present advised, think an appeal would perhaps still He against such an order and, in any case, such an order would certainly be open to revision by the State Transport Authority under sec. 64-A which has been introduced by the Amendment Act of 1956. To sum up, I would maintain that on the interpretation, which I have felt persuaded to accept, of sec. 64 (b) read with sec. 48 as it stood at all material times, the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority in favour of the petitioner was appealable to the State Transport Authority by the rival permit-holder Laxminarain who was really aggrieved by it, and that this conclusion is not, in any way, affected by the subsequent amendment of sec. 48 by the Amendemnt Act of 1956, and, therefore, the present application ought to be dismissed and I would dismiss it accordingly.