This second appeal has been filed against the appellate order of the learned Additional Commissioner, dated 21.9.56 and arises out of the following circumstances:— 2. Mst. Anni, widow of Chhotelal, brought the suit for recovery of possession against Kalu in respect of the land in dispute and obtained a decree from the court of the Assistant Collector, Alwar on 16.8.54. Kalu preferred an appeal against his decree in the court of the learned Additional Commissioner which was rejected on 26.11.54. Second appeal was filed before the Board by Kalu and it appears that during the pendency of the same Mst. Anni died. Sheelchand was brought on record in that second appeal as a legal representative of the deceased, Mst. Anni and thereafter Kalus appeal was rejected and the concurrent decrees of the lower courts were upheld. Subsequently, Sheelchand applied for execution of the decree and Kalu Judgment-debtor raised an objection before the executing court that Sheet Chand was not entitled to seek execution of the decree which was in favour of the deceased Mst. Anni. The executing court finding that Sheelchands name appeared in the decree drawn up by the Board as decree-holder, refused to entertain this objection. Kalu went up in appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner who held that the executing court "acted hastily in rejecting the application in a summary manner without making necessary enquiry as to how Sheelchand, respondent, canclaim to be the successor of Mst. Anni." He, therefore, remanded the case for further enquiry on the point. Sheelchand has challenged this order before us in second appeal. 3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have examined the record as well. Sheelchand brought on record was under the provisions of Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. As provided in Rule 5 of this order, where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased party, such question shall be determined by the court. An order under this rule will enable the person to represent the estate in the suit and will make an adjudication therein binding on the estate. To this extent and in this sense, it is final. An order under this rule will enable the person to represent the estate in the suit and will make an adjudication therein binding on the estate. To this extent and in this sense, it is final. The mere admission of a person as a legal representative for the purpose of further prosecution of the suit will not, however, conclusively establish his right to do so, if his legal position is one of the main or vital issues in the suit itself. (Chitaley C. P. C. 2707 note 7, Order 22 Rule 5 No. 7.). 4. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that the existence of the appellants name in the decree of the Board is potent enough to establish his right to seek execution of the decree irrespective of the fact whether Sheelchand can legally inherit the tenancy rights of the deceased or not and that the executing court cannot question the right of he person whose name is on the record to execute the decree. A number of rulings have been cited in this connection. They are as below: 1. 21 Suth W.R. 2l9 and 141, 2. 1925 Cal. page 203, 3. 1937 Patna, page 618, 4. 1934 Lah. page 15(2), 5. 1937 Cal., page 4, 6. 1932 Mad. 7, 7, 1940 Lah 7(c), 8. 1943 Nag. 233, 9.1946 Bom., 27, 10. 1932 Bom., 378. 5. We will examine these decisions briefly. In 21 Suth W.R. 219, the court which actually passed the decree was the court of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya and the manner in which thePaitia Court proceeded to execute the decree without receiving a copy of the decree-from the Gaya Court was held highly irregular. It was observed that the judge of Patna ought not to have before him anything more than a copy and the certificate. , "Indeed he wants nothing more because the Civil Procedure Code does not give him any jurisdiction to entertain or determine any question as to the right of the person asking for the execution to have that execution." In the ruling reported at page 141 of this Reporter, it was held that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the executing court to entertain any question as to the transferees right to the execution sought. 1925 Calcutta 203:—It was observed that an executing court has no power to set aside the decree though passed against the wrong party and in a suit wrongly framed. 1937 Patna 618:—The proposition laid down was that the duty of the executing court was to execute the decree as it stands whether right or wrong unless the decree was without jurisdiction. In A.I.R. 1934, Lahore, 115 (2), it was held that to entertain objection as to whether the judgment debtor was personally liable or not when he was mentioned as being so liable in the decree under execution was not permissible as it would tantamount to allowing the case to be reopened on its merits. 1937 Calcutta 4.—An objection was by the judgment debtor as to conclusive nature of the assignment of the decree and the executing court was held to be incompetent to enter-tain the same. 1932 Madras 7.—It was observed that the executing court could not inquire whether the decree should have been passed by the court or not for it would be going behind the decree. 1943 Nagpur 233—The provisions of Order 22 Rule 5 were considered and it was held that the question as to whether a particular person is a legal representative of the deceased or not is a matter to be decided in the suit itself and the enquiry cannot be postponed to execution proceedings. 1946 Bombay 27.—It was observed that the decree holder can ordinarily apply for execution of a decree. 1932 Bombay 378—It was observed that the executing court was not competent to satisfy itself that the provision of the decree sought to be enforced was favourable to the decree holder as the fact that he applies for execution should be sufficient for the purpose. 6. All these cases evidently have not much applicability to the present case. The decree in the trial court was passed in favour of Mst. Anni and it was held therein that she being the tenant of the land in dispute and having been ejected wrongfully by Kalu was entitled to reinstatement. The first appellate court also upheld this decree. During the second appeal Mst. Anni died and Sheelchand was brought on record as her legal representative and thereafter the appeal was dismissed. As pointed out above Sheelchands being brought on record had a limited objective only i.e. adjudication of the dispute between the parties. The first appellate court also upheld this decree. During the second appeal Mst. Anni died and Sheelchand was brought on record as her legal representative and thereafter the appeal was dismissed. As pointed out above Sheelchands being brought on record had a limited objective only i.e. adjudication of the dispute between the parties. The question as to whether Sheelchand can or cannot succeed to the tenancy rights of the deceased Mst. Anni was not determined in that appeal and the same has to be determined during the execution proceedings as it is a matter relating to the "execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree" under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited some rulings in support of this contention. In A.I.R. 1939, Nagpur 147, it was held that the question whether the person is or is not a representative of a party to a decree must be decided by the executing court and not in a separate suit and once decided it becomes final, subject to revision or review or appeal so far as matters relating to the execution discbarge or satisfaction of that decree are concerned. In 1923 Nagpur 209, it was laid down that the admission of a person as a legal representative for the purpose of prosecuting the suit does not conclusively establish his right to do so if his legal position is one of the main issues in the suit itself. But the decision that a person is a legal representative only to a limited extent does not preclude him from proving what his full rights are. In A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 142, It was observed that a decision under Order 22 Rule 5 should be limited to the purpose of carrying on the suit and cannot have the effect of conferring any right to the heirship or to the property. In A.I.R. 1939 Lahore 580, it was observed that a decision under Order 22 Rule 5 is not subject to an appeal and hence the matter decided thereby cannot be deemed to have been finally decided 8. Looking to these authorities it becomes clear that a decision under Order 22 Rule 5 C.P.C has a limited scope only i.e. continence and eventual determination of a proceeding upon the demise of a party to it. Looking to these authorities it becomes clear that a decision under Order 22 Rule 5 C.P.C has a limited scope only i.e. continence and eventual determination of a proceeding upon the demise of a party to it. The question as to whether a legal representative so brought on record can legally claim execution to the decree or not where such execution depends upon fulfilment of certain other conditions as alleged in the case is clearly a question going within the scope of sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and hence deserves to be examined and decided in execution proceedings. For these reasons, we hold that the learned Additional Commissioner came to a correct conclusion of the case. The appeal is hereby rejected.