JUDGMENT : Das, J. - This is a Plaintiffs' petition in revision directed against an order of the learned Additional District Judge, Berhampur, dated October 22, 1956, vacating the order of injunction passed by the trial Judge. 2. The Plaintiffs filed a title suit (No. 292 of 1955) in the court of the Munsif, Berhampur, for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the possession of the mango trees standing on the disputed lands and for damages for appropriating certain mango crop of the year 1955. Plaintiff 1 is the adopted son of one Baishnab and Plaintiff-2 is his daughter. Baishnab by 3 deed of adoption dated May 12, 1954, took the Plaintiff-1 in adoption. Defendants are the separated brothers of Baishnab (O.S. No. 32 of 1922), In which a partition decree, on compromise, was passed on March 5, 1923. According to that partition decree, the entire joint family property was partitioned except 1. 43 acres. That too remained under the management of Baishnab. Long after the partition in the year 19.32.33, Baishnab purchased two acres of land by means of six sale-deeds of which he has in possession being his self-acquired property, and the Plaintiffs came into possession thereof after his death. On April 18, 1954, Baishnab executed a deed of settlement in favour of Plaintiff-2, his daughter, in respect of a portion of these disputed plots along with certain others. He died in about July, 1954. Immediately after his death, the Defendants, in 1955, removed the mango fruits from the trees standing on the disputed land. Accordingly the Plaintiffs claimed damages for the crop of 1955. Thus, the Plaintiffs filed the suit on December 12, 1955, with two prayers: (1) for a permanent injunction; and (2) for damages for the mango crop of 1955, as stated above. Along with the plaint, they filed a petition under Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, which came up for hearing, in due course, after notice to the Defendants. The trial judge by his order dated May 8, 1956, passed the final order of temporary injunction, and restrained the Defendants from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiffs with regard to the self-acquired properties of Baishnab only, that is, to say the two acres which were purchased by him in about 1932-33. The trial judge by his order dated May 8, 1956, passed the final order of temporary injunction, and restrained the Defendants from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiffs with regard to the self-acquired properties of Baishnab only, that is, to say the two acres which were purchased by him in about 1932-33. The Plaintiffs seem to have been satisfied with that order, because a part of their prayer with regard to 1.43 acres though rejected was not appealed against. But the Defendants carried an appeal to the learned District Judge against the order of the Munsif who, on a fresh consideration of the matter, set aside the order of the trial judge and dismissed the petition under Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The ground on which the learned District Judge dismissed the petition was that since after the death of Baishnab the Defendants removed the mangoes; the Plaintiffs cannot be said to be in possession, and accordingly, the status quo of the Defendants should be maintained. Further, the learned Additional District Judge did not appreciate the rule of balance of convenience as has been referred to in the judgment of the trial judge. 4. Granting of temporary injunction is at the discretion of the trial judge. But once the judicial discretion is exercised, the appellate court ought not to lightly set It aside. That does not mean that the appellate court would not in any event interfere with the order passed by the trial judge. Certainly, it can, if the order is not based on sound judicial discretion. The true view of the matter is that the Court which grants the injunction must rightly appreciate the facts and apply those facts to correct principles, which would mean that there has been a sound exercise of judicial discretion. The principle for the sound exercise of judicial discretion is that the court in granting a temporary injunction must first see that there is a bonafide contention between the parties and then on which side will lie the balance of inconvenience if the injunction does not issue. If the learned Additional District Judge had kept these principles in view, he would not have set aside the order so lightly as he has done' in the present case. If the learned Additional District Judge had kept these principles in view, he would not have set aside the order so lightly as he has done' in the present case. Without prejudicing the issue, the learned District Judge should have come to the conclusion that there was a prima facie and bonafide contention to be gone into in the suit itself. In this case, it appears that Baishnab had adopted Plaintiff-I, and Plaintiff-2 is his daughter. Until the death of Baishnab in 1954, both Baishnab and the Plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed properties. It is only after his death that one year's crop had been taken away by the Defendants who are admittedly his separated brothers vide the partition decree in O.S. 32 of 1922. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, it is evident from the facts that the Plaintiffs have a bonafide contention at least against the self-acquired properties of Baishnab. Thus, in my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge has entirely gone wrong in setting aside the order of injunction as passed by the learned trial judge. Accordingly, I would set aside the order of the learned Additional District Judge and restore that of the learned Munsif, 5. Although the name of Mr. R.C. Misra, Advocate appears for the opposite parties, nobody appeared before this Court at the time of hearing. 6. In the result, I would allow this application, make the rule absolute; but in the circumstances, there would be no order for costs. Application allowed Final Result : Allowed