Bapna, J.—This is a revision against the decision of the judge, Small Cause Court, Jaipur City, dated 20th December, 1956. 2. The respondent had sued the petitioner on a bond dated 1st January, 1953. The defendant denied the execution or the consideration. The court, on evidence, found for the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that the suit was beyond limitation, if the limitation was taken to have started from the date of the bond. The judgment mentioned that the stipulation of repayment was that the debtor would repay the loan in 12 months. If the limitation were to be reckoned from 1st January,1954, it was conceded that it was within time. Learned counsel urged that in a case of stipulation of that nature, the time runs from the date of the bond, and relied on, Shivanarain vs. Badal (1). 4. The relevant Article is 66 of the Limitation Act, which runs as follows:— Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 66. On a single bond, where a day is specified for payment. Three years. The day so specified. 5. The contention is that while in the present case the period is specified, the day is not so specified. The contention has no force, for by taking into consideration the period specified, the day of repayment also becomes specified. The Oudh authority is not relevant, because in that case there was a further stipulation that in case of default of payment of interest, which was agreed to be paid every month the creditor will have the right to sue for the entire loan. Limitation in that case was counted from the date of default in the payment of interest as stipulated, and Art. 66 was not held to be applicable. The present is not a case of that nature. The court has rightly held limitation to start in the present case from 1st January, 1954. From that date the suit was obviously within time under Art,, 66 of the Limitation Act. 6. It was next contended that the plaintiff had not produced any of the attesting witnesses. The production of attesting witnesses is only necessary in case where a document is required by law to be attested. From that date the suit was obviously within time under Art,, 66 of the Limitation Act. 6. It was next contended that the plaintiff had not produced any of the attesting witnesses. The production of attesting witnesses is only necessary in case where a document is required by law to be attested. There was explanation on behalf of the plaintiff that the attesting witnesses were near relations or under the influence of the defendant. The lower court, after taking into consideration the evidence on record and the explanation given, has thought fit to rely on the plaintiffs evidence. There is no question of law involved in this argument. 7. There is no force in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. The stay application automatically fails and is dismissed.