JUDGMENT Asthana, J. - This revision is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge Agra, dated 21-6-1956 allowing the appeal of the applicants and setting aside the order of the trial magistrate binding them u/s 110, Code of Criminal Procedure and sending back the case for a de novo trial from the stage of the notice. 2. It Appears that the applicants were served with notices under Clause and (f) of Section 100. Code of Criminal Procedure requiring them to furnish personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 1,000 with two reliable sureties each in sum of Rs. 500/ - to be of good behaviour for a period of one year, and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for the same period. the applicants disputed the notices. The learned Magistrate after a consideration of the evidence on the record finally passed an order on 15-3-1956 requiring them to execute a personal bond for Rs. 1,000/ - and furnish two sureties of Rs. 500/ - each to be of good behaviour during a period of one year, or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the same period. This order was set aside in appeal by the learned Sessions Judge and by the same order he directed a de novo trial of the applicants. 3. It has been contended before me on behalf of the applicants that the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing a de novo trial was illegal as u/s 423, Code of Criminal Procedure he could only alter or reverse such order but had no power to send back the case for re-trial. Section 423 defines the powers of the appellate courts in disposing of an appeal and deals with three classes of cases. Clause (a) deals with an appeal from an order of acquittal, Clause (b) deals with an appeal from an order of conviction, Clause (c) deals with an appeal from any other order which is not covered under (a) and (b), and Clause (d) provide that the appellate court may make any amendment or any cosequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Clauses (a) and (b) which deal with the power of the appellate court in an appeal from an order of acquittal or conviction, expressly provide that the appellate court may send back the case fore re-trial if it considers necessary. Clauses (a) and (b) which deal with the power of the appellate court in an appeal from an order of acquittal or conviction, expressly provide that the appellate court may send back the case fore re-trial if it considers necessary. No doubt this power is not expressly provided in Clause (c) in dealing with appeals from any other order Which is not an order of acquittal or conviction. I have however, not been able to understand why Clause (d), which empowers the appellate court to make any consequential or incidental order which may be just and proper in the case, does not cover an order for sending back the case to the trial court for further inquiry or re-trial if in the circumstances it appears to be just and proper. In this connection reference may be made to some decisions of this Court On this point. 4. Emperor v. Bhagwat Singh ILR 48 All 501 it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that it was competent to a court hearing an appeal in a case u/s 107, Code of Criminal Procedure direct that the case before it be retried. 5. The next case is Ram Swarup v. State 1956 A.W.R. (H.C) 587. This case was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court who followed the decision in the case of Emperor v. Bhagvat Singh referred to above, and did not agree with the views of the Avadh Chief Court in Sheikh Abdullah v. Emperor AIR 1944 Avadh, 416 wherein it. was held that it was not competent for a court hearing an appeal from an order passed u/s 107 to order a re-trial. 6. In Prakasa Reddi and Others Vs. Jonnala Pitchareddi and Another, AIR 1955 AP 55 it was held by a learned Single Judge of that Court that Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 423 were of wider import and included the power to remit a matter to the lower court after setting aside an order passed u/s 107 or Section 110 and Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure and also included power to order further inquiry. 7. Learned Counsel for the applicants has referred to two cases in support of his contention that the learned Session Judge in his appellate jurisdiction could not send back the case for re-trial before the magistrate. The first case is of AIR 1929 28 (Lahore) . 7. Learned Counsel for the applicants has referred to two cases in support of his contention that the learned Session Judge in his appellate jurisdiction could not send back the case for re-trial before the magistrate. The first case is of AIR 1929 28 (Lahore) . It is a single Judge decision. It appears from a perusal of this case that the attention of the learned judge was not invited to Clause (d) of Section 423, Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned judge was of the opinion that in view of Clause (c) of that section the appellate court could only alter or reverse the order and had no further powers. 8. The other case is of Sheikh Abdullah v. Emperor AIR 1944 Avadh, 416. In this case also there is nothing which shows as to why Clause (d) of Section 423. Code of Criminal Procedure does not empower an appellate court to send back a case for further inquiry or retrial, nor it has been considered as to what is the exact meaning of the words "make any consequential or incidental order that may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case". 9. I am inclined to agree with the view of this Court in Emperor v. Bhagwat singh ILR 48 All 501 referred to above, that the appellate court in an appeal from an order which does not amount to an appeal from conviction has got the power to send back the case for further inquiry or retrial in case it is considered just and proper in the circumstances of the case. In this view of the matter l am of opinion that so far as the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing the re-trial of the applicants is concerned it cannot be said that it is illegal. 10. It has next been contended that no useful purpose would be served by sending back the case to lower court for a de novo trial when the period during which the applicants were required to be of good behaviour has practically expired and there is nothing on the record to show that during this period they have not been of good behaviour. As has already been mentioned above, the applicants were bound over by the learned Magistrate on 15-3-1956 for a period of one year which will expire on 15- 3-1957. As has already been mentioned above, the applicants were bound over by the learned Magistrate on 15-3-1956 for a period of one year which will expire on 15- 3-1957. In my opinion this contention is not without some force and I think that the revision may be accepted on this ground. 11. In view of the above I allow this application in revision and set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing a de novo trial of the applicants.