Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S.No. 401 of 1951 of the Munsiff's Court of Tirur, is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was to recover a sum of Rs. 1014-10-0 as damages for the breach of a covenant for title in respect of item 64 of the sale deed Ext. A2 dated 31-5-1938. It was contended before me that the suit should be considered as a suit for damages for the breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment as well. 2. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The decree was reversed by the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Kozhikode by his judgment in A.S. No. 110 of 1953 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The facts leading up to the present litigation are summarised as follows in Para.2 of the appellate judgment: "The facts leading up to this litigation are that originally one Gopalakrishna Pattar, who was the kariasthan of the illom of defendants, and who was the father of the plaintiff, took a possessory mortgage deed Exhibit A-1 in respect of several items of properties from the illom on 27-10-1933. That document was subsequently followed by an assignment deed Exhibit A-2, the consideration for which was the mortgage amount deed under Exhibit A-1. Item 64 in Exhibit A-2 is the plaint item. There are 105 items in that document. On the strength of the assignment deed Exhibit A-2, Gopalakrishna Pattar filed O. S.279 of 1938 in the Court of the District Munsiff, Tirur for recovery of possession of the plaint item, which was then outstanding in the possession of one Kunhalan's legal representatives, Kunhalan being the original tenant under a kychit of the year 2-2-1915, executed by him to the illom. In the suit, the illom was represented by the 14th therein, Damodaran Moosad, father of the present 1st defendant. The suit ended in a decree and the legal representatives of Kunhalan were directed to surrender possession to Gopalakrishna Pattar with past and future rent. Exhibit B-1 is the certified copy of the decree in that suit while Exhibit B-2 is the certified copy of the judgment. In pursuance of the decree, Gopalakrishna Pattar took out execution and he got actual recovery of possession from the tenants as seen from Exhibits B-3 and B-4, the certified copy of the delivery order and the Amin's account. Exhibit B-1 is the certified copy of the decree in that suit while Exhibit B-2 is the certified copy of the judgment. In pursuance of the decree, Gopalakrishna Pattar took out execution and he got actual recovery of possession from the tenants as seen from Exhibits B-3 and B-4, the certified copy of the delivery order and the Amin's account. Subsequently it would appear that Gopalakrishna Pattar leased the properties after he was in possession for some time, to one Velu Nair, whom he evicted out of court, and again leased to him and to his daughter Cherona Amma. Since it was found that Velu Nair was not sufficiently solvent for arrears of rent if any which might be maintained, his daughter also was taken in as she had some property. On that lease a suit was instituted against both these persons as 0. S.483 of 1942, the certified copy of the plaint in that being Exhibit B-5. After some contest, it was decreed on 20-10-1942, as is evidenced from Exhibit B-6 the copy of the decree and Exhibit B7 the certified copy of the judgment. In pursuance of the decree, Gopalakrishna Pattar took out execution. Then he was met with resistance put forward by one Moindinkutti and his son Mohammad. Against them, he put in an application for removal of resistance as per E. A. 586 of 1943 and that was allowed as seen from Exhibit X-2 the certified copy of the petition and order. While he went to take delivery, he was again met with resistance, this time the resistance being offered by one Illath parambil Muhammad. So against that Muhammad and the defendants in the suit, he filed E.A. 2016 of 1943 for removal of resistance and the copy of that application is Exhibit B-8. The resistance was upheld by the trial Court and the petition was dismissed as seen from the certified copy of the order Exhibit B-10. The result was that Gopalakrishna Pattar did not get possession as against that resistor. Then what happened was, he instituted a suit O. S.669 of 1944 in the trial Court for setting aside the order in E. A. 2016 of 1943. In that suit the resistor, Velu Nair, Cherona Amma, the karanavan of the plaintiff's illom and the Zamorin Raja who claimed rival title were all impleaded along with some others. Then what happened was, he instituted a suit O. S.669 of 1944 in the trial Court for setting aside the order in E. A. 2016 of 1943. In that suit the resistor, Velu Nair, Cherona Amma, the karanavan of the plaintiff's illom and the Zamorin Raja who claimed rival title were all impleaded along with some others. Muhammad set up title in the property with the Zamorin Raja, who was the 14th defendant. The suit was dismissed in the trial Court, and the decree was confirmed in appeal as is seen from Exhibit A-4. The result was that Gopalakrishna Pattar could not get possession. By the time of the appeal Gopalakrishna Pattar had died and the present plaintiff was impleaded as his legal representative. It is said that then the plaintiff wanted to take the matter to the High Court in Second appeal, but he was advised by his lawyer at Madras, that it would not be possible to get the second appeal admitted and accordingly he desisted from that task. Then he sent the notice Exhibit A-8 to the 1st defendant, the karnavan of the illom, for damages for breach of warranty of title and getting the unfavourable reply evidenced by Exhibit A-9, launched this action in the trial Court". 4. Ext. A3 as already stated is dated 31-5-1938 and the suit was instituted only on 2-8-1951, that is, beyond the six years provided by Art.116 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. As pointed out in Mulla's commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4th Edition, page 307): "A covenant for title is a covenant that the vendor has a present title to convey and is broken on the execution of a sale deed containing such a covenant. It might therefore be supposed that if the vendee is put into possession and subsequently dispossessed owing to a defect of title limitation under Art.116 would still run from the date of the sale deed. But Macleod, C. J., in 1921 Bombay 252, pointed out that the discovery of the defect and dispossession might occur more than six years from the date of sale so that the terminus a quo for limitation, should be the date of dispossession". There can be no doubt that the defendants had no title to convey in respect of item 64 on the date of Ext. A2 or at any time thereafter. There can be no doubt that the defendants had no title to convey in respect of item 64 on the date of Ext. A2 or at any time thereafter. In the light of Exts. B10, A3 and A4 it has also to be held that no possession passed in pursuance of Ext. A2. 5. Ext. B10 is the order dated 12-7-1944 dismissing the application made by the appellant in respect of the property under Order XXI R.97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Ext. A3 is the judgment against him by the District Munsiff of Tirur in the suit filed by him under Order XXI R.103, and Ext. A4 is the appellate judgment of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Kozhikode affirming the said judgment, Ext. A7 is a letter of Counsel advising against a second appeal and it is agreed that no second appeal was as a matter of fact filed before the High Court of Madras. 6. In I.L.B. 38 Madras 887 Seshagiri Iyer, J., said that the cases regarding the date on which the cause of action arises can roughly be classified under three heads: "(a) where from the inception the vendor had no title to convey and the vendee has not been put in possession of the property: (b) where the sale is only voidable on the objection of third parties and possession is taken under the voidable sale; and (c) where though the title is known to be imperfect, the contract is in part carried out by giving possession of the properties" and: "In the first class of cases, the starting point of limitation will be the date of the sale". In the light of what is stated in the last preceding paragraph there can be no doubt that this case comes under the first of the three categories enumerated by Seshargiri Iyer, J., and that the suit was barred by limitation having been brought beyond the period of six years from the date of Ext. A3. 7. Even if it is assumed that possession passed in pursuance of Ext. A2 and that the date of dispossession is the material date as held by Macleod, C. J., in A.I.R. 1921 Bombay 252, the suit should be considered as barred by limitation as the date of dispossession should at any rate be taken as some date prior to the date of Ext. A2 and that the date of dispossession is the material date as held by Macleod, C. J., in A.I.R. 1921 Bombay 252, the suit should be considered as barred by limitation as the date of dispossession should at any rate be taken as some date prior to the date of Ext. B10, that is, prior to 12 71944. 8. The learned Subordinate Judge has held: "There is no covenant in the document guaranteeing quiet possession and enjoyment" and according to Mulla the Indian covenant for title does not include a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It has also to be remembered that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is a restricted covenant "limited to disturbance by the covenantor or persons claiming under him". 9. That is why Mitra in his treatise on Vendor & Purchaser says: "It is therefore better to insert a covenant for quiet enjoyment in every conveyance, so that the purchaser may have a distinct remedy on breach thereof, whether his remedy for breach of covenant for title is still available or barred by limitation. The covenant should be so framed as to include in its operation any interruption or disturbance by the vendor and any person claiming through or under him and also any lawful disturbance or interruption by any other person or persons". (page 349) 10. Even on the assumption that a covenant of the type suggested by Mitra is expressed in Ext. A2 or can be implied therein the date of dispossession being as already pointed out anterior to Ext. B10 (12-7-1944) the appellant is not entitled to succeed. 11. It follows that the second appeal should be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Dismissed.