ORDER The dispute giving rise to this petition for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is as regards some land abutting on the west of river Thoubal which flows between the two villages involved, namely Tungou and Lambui, within the Hill sub-division of Ukhrul. 2. It is an admitted fact that some land to the west of river Thoubal was given to village Lambui, long ago, and while according to Tungou that area happens to be bounded by letters and figures GHK 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. OQ (map-document No. 1 of the petitioner) and will be hereafter referred to as A for the sake of convenience, according to Lambui it is a much bigger area, tot course including area A) which is bounded on the said map by letters and figures XYNS LK, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, OQ. This bigger area, will be similarly referred to hereafter for the sake of convenience as area B. 3. There was some previous litigation also about this land, between the two villages, from about the year 1916-17, as will appear from the copies of various orders and judgments filed in this case, and it is enough to state, that in Misc. Case No, 264 of 1931-32 of the Court of Mr. S.J. Duncan, S.D.O. Ukhrul the matter was decided by oath and ordeal as was customary in those days. The order was as follows :- "Mahangthei takes an oath that the land as shown above in red line was given to Lambui by Thawaijao Khulakpa of Hundung. If Mahangthei or any member of his house-hold does not die within a year from to-day, the land as claimed by him will belong to Lambui, in the event of any death the land between Kuraira, Tungreiehing and the Kachikhuiching will belong to Tungou." 4. Mahangthei, the Khullakpa of Lambui did not die within one year. He died after seven years of having taken die oath (see copy of order in civil case No. 353 of 1940-41-document No. 3 of petitioner of the court of Mr. S.J. Duncan, S.D.O., Ukhrul) and therefore the land covered by that order went to Lambui village. 5. In 1949-50 the Khullakpa of Lambui sued the Khullakpa of Tungou for Rs. He died after seven years of having taken die oath (see copy of order in civil case No. 353 of 1940-41-document No. 3 of petitioner of the court of Mr. S.J. Duncan, S.D.O., Ukhrul) and therefore the land covered by that order went to Lambui village. 5. In 1949-50 the Khullakpa of Lambui sued the Khullakpa of Tungou for Rs. 50/- on account of Maithi (penalty or damages) in respect of this land in the court of S.D.O., Ukhrul (CS No. 254 of 1949-50) and the S.D.O., finding that, that land was within the land surrounded by Khuraira and Khuchikuiching that is, formed part of the area A, gave a decree in favour of Lambui as claimed. Tungou appealed to Dy. Commissioner (Hill Bench) and in Hill Appeal No. 5 of 1952, the Deputy Commissioner remanded the case to the S.D.O., for retrial, because, the SDO had failed to examine the witnesses produced by the parties. The claim being for less than Rs. 100/- no appeal lay but the Dy. Commissioner exercised his power of remand, as stated by him in his order of remand, under Section 50 of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, which occurs in the said Regulation, under Chapter IV-C with the heading "Civil Courts and Proceedings." 6. After the remand, the SDO held a spot enquiry and prepared a map (the map filed by the petitioner being its copy) and went into the question, whether the whole land B or only A belonged to the Lambui people, and decided that only land A belonged to them, and directed that the boundary marks at H and 10 along G.L. be restored. It does not appear from his judgment, nor is it otherwise clear as to what happened as regards the claim of the Lambui people regarding damages and whether the land in respect of which die damages were claimed was within the land A. In these circumstances and since the original decree had been set aside by the Deputy Commissioner, the only conclusion that is possible to draw, would be that the SDO by his judgment after remand, by necessary implication found the land in respect of which damages were claimed to be Outside A. and in view of his finding that the land A alone belonged to Lambui did not give Lambui a decree For damages. 7. 7. An appeal was then carried to the Dy. Commissioner (Hill Bench) by the Lambui people (Hill Appeal Case No. 29 of 1953) and the Dy. Commissioner finding that Tungreiching existed along the line ZN on the map prepared by the SDO, accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the SDO and declared the land B to belong to Lambur. But here again his order is silent as regards the claim of Lambui for damages. The appeal to the Chief Commissioner also tailed. Tungou people then applied to the Chief Commissioner for a review of his order, but that petition was also dismissed by him on 9-11-1953. 8. It was held in the case of Konsam Amujao Singh v. Paejathang Haokip, AIR 1955 Manipur 30 , by Brijnaraiu J.C., that the constitution of the Dy. Commissioner as Hill Bench and of the Chief Commissioner as the Chief Court for the purposes of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, by the Chief Commissioner by his order No. J/18/51/23 dated 23-5-51, was void and of no force, as the Chief Commissioner did not have the power to amend the said Regulation. I am in respectful agreement, with that view, and that position is also evident from the fact that the amendments that became necessary in the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, as a result of the changes brought about by the merger of Manipur State with India, were effected, not by an order of the Chief Commissioner, but by an order of the President in the exercise of his powers under Sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 and all other powers enabling him in that behalf. That order of the President was called the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950. 9. The present petition has therefore been filed by Tungou, taking advantage of the above-mentioned position for a writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the decisions of the Dy. Commissioner (Hill Bench) and the Chief Commissioner, which were respectively given in the appeals and review petition to them, after the judgment of the SDO which was passed after remand. A declaration is also claimed that the decision of the SDO dated 31-1-1953, whereby, after remand he declared that the land A alone belonged to Lambui, is valid and binding. 10. A declaration is also claimed that the decision of the SDO dated 31-1-1953, whereby, after remand he declared that the land A alone belonged to Lambui, is valid and binding. 10. In the premises there can be no doubt that the decisions of the Dy. Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner referred to in the last para, were without jurisdiction, since their constitution respectively as the Hill Bench and the Second Appellate Court, was void. They thus lacked even inherent jurisdiction in the matter and it is well settled, that when such is the case, the decision will be a nullity, (see Piru Pramanik v, Pabna Dhanabhandar Co. Ltd., AIR 1937 Cal 427; Rajlakshmi Dassee v. Katyayani Dasseei ILR 38 Cal 639; Reference under Stamp Act S. 46, ILR 11 Mad. 216 (FB); Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Ind. App. 134 (PC). The point was considered by me in Rajkumar Lukhoisana Singh v. A.A. Singh, FA No. 33 of 1955 : ( AIR 1958 Manipur 7 ), and the view taken was the same. There is a difference between want of jurisdiction and irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. In the former case, that is when the Judge does not possess even inherent jurisdiction, the well acknowledged principle that, it is a fundamental rule that a judgment of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, will be attracted. This was also conceded by the learned counsel; appearing on behalf of the opposite parties in this case. But what they contended was that in that case the order of remand dated 2-5-1952 by the Dy. Commissioner (Hill Bench) was also a nullity with the consequence that the order or decree of the SDO, after that remand, which was passed on 31-1-1953, declaring that the land A alone belonged to Lambui would suffer from the same consequence. The force of this argument cannot be doubted, and it follows automatically from the position which has already been adverted. In the case of AIR 1937 Cal. 427 the facts were similar and the Calcutta High Court set aside the remand order of the District Judge and the decree passed by the trial court after remand; and restored the original order of the trial court. 11. In the case of AIR 1937 Cal. 427 the facts were similar and the Calcutta High Court set aside the remand order of the District Judge and the decree passed by the trial court after remand; and restored the original order of the trial court. 11. In fact the learned Counsel for the petitioner could not meet this argument and had nothing to say except, that in that case the order of the SDO after remand may also be set aside. I will consider that aspect at the proper place. It is thus clear that the two appeals to the Dy. Commissioner as the Hill Bench and the appeal and review petition to the Chief Commissioner, were incompetent and their orders in them are nullities, as also the enquiry and order of the SDO after remand. 12. The question also cropped up as regards the jurisdiction of the SDO to entertain the suit, which was filed after the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947 and the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947 had come into force. Under Chapter IV-C of the said Regulation which governed the constitution and powers of the civil court, the SDO does not find a place, and according to the value of the suit, the suit lay before the Village Authority, the appellate authority thereafter being the Circle Bench, and no further appeal was permissible as the value of the suit was less than Rs. 100/-. 13. But it appears, that in respect of cases regarding land and village settlement a different procedure was prescribed under the Regulation, namely, that laid down in Chapter IV-E, but there also, the matter had to go in the first instance before the Village Authority, and on their failure to get the matter settled by a compromise, the case had to go before the Circle Bench for trial and decision. An appeal then lay to the SDO and a second appeal to the Hill Bench. Sections 60 and 61 which are reproduced below, will speak for themselves :- "60. Where any dispute arises regarding the ownership of land or the right of cultivation over land, the village authority shall where the land in dispute falls within their jurisdiction and where both parties to the dispute reside within their jurisdiction take all steps necessary to effect a compromise between the parties. Where any dispute arises regarding the ownership of land or the right of cultivation over land, the village authority shall where the land in dispute falls within their jurisdiction and where both parties to the dispute reside within their jurisdiction take all steps necessary to effect a compromise between the parties. If compromise proves impossible or if the parties to the dispute reside within the jurisdiction of two or more Village Authorities, the dispute shall be placed before the Circle Bench who shall decide the case. 61. (a) An appeal shall lie against any decision of the Circle Bench under Section 60 above, to the Sub-Divisional Officer and second appeal shall lie from the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer to the Hill Bench, whose decision shall be final. (b) The Hill Bench may call for the proceedings of any Subordinate Court and may amend any decision of that Court if in the opinion of the Hill Bench gross injustice has been done." 14. The parties were not able to enlighten me as to how the suit went in the first instance to the SDO and he entertained it. It is not unlikely that this happened, because the Circles were abolished after merger, and therefore no circle Bench was functioning. But that was done by the order of the Chief Commissioner in 1950, and even then that would not have the effect of abolishing the Circle Bench, under the law. If so all the proceedings before the SDO were also nullities. 15. It is well settled that a certiorari does not issue where the proceedings of the interior court or tribunal are not merely voidable, but are absolutely null and void, for in such a. case, no benefit will accrue from the issue of the writ, and the parties are entitled to ignore them, or to question them or to have them set aside in the regular competent courts, whenever the occasion for it arises or they so desire. If, therefore the SDO also suffered from Appellant want of inherent jurisdiction, then in the circumstances of the case, no certiorari shall go in suck matters. 16. An attempt was also made to bring the case under Section 62 of the Regulation, but I do not think that it was a case involving village boundaries within the meaning of that section. The boundaries between the two villages were not in dispute. 16. An attempt was also made to bring the case under Section 62 of the Regulation, but I do not think that it was a case involving village boundaries within the meaning of that section. The boundaries between the two villages were not in dispute. What was in dispute, was clearly this, that what was the land of Tungou over which according to the oath, the ownership or right of cultivation bad passed to the people of Lambui. But even if it were to be assumed for the sake of argument that the case fell within the purview of Section 62, then also it will be the first decision of the SDO dated 20-12-1951, by which he decreed the claim for Rs. 50/- holding the disputed land to be within land A which will prevail. That decision as already noticed is not in favour of the petitioner, and it is not expected that he would ordinarily come to court for having it restored. 17. There is also no force in the argument advanced on behalf of Lambui that the case came within the purview of Section 64 of the Regulation, and therefore the order of the Chief Commissioner was good, as under that section he was competent to set aside the order of the SDO. That section, relates to a new settlement or the formation of a Machet (sub-village), and could not be attracted to the facts of the present case. 18. Now, may be pointed out certain facts, which would go to show that this is not a fit case for being dealt with under Article 226, because, the facts are not only in dispute, but the material placed before this court is not at all sufficient on which the questions in dispute, can be adjudicated upon. The various orders and judgments of the past are also such that they do not throw much light on the salient facts, rather leave the matter in a confused state. Elaborate pleadings and much evidence will be necessary, before the truth can be found. It is well settled that this court in a proceeding under Article 226 will not enter into such an enquiry, when the remedy of a suit is open to the parties, and when the relief under Article 226, as regards rights other than fundamental rights is an extra-ordinary and discretionary remedy. 19. It is well settled that this court in a proceeding under Article 226 will not enter into such an enquiry, when the remedy of a suit is open to the parties, and when the relief under Article 226, as regards rights other than fundamental rights is an extra-ordinary and discretionary remedy. 19. The map filed by the petitioner is a copy of the map prepared by the SDO on 28-1-1958 after the case had been remanded by the Deputy Commissioner, and that map and the order of the SDO go to show that the parties were not agreed as regards the exact location of the Hill called Tungrei or Tuirei. While according to Lambui it was the hill shown along the line XY, the contention of Toungu was that there was no hill with that name, and Tungrei was wrongly put down no the previous orders, for Lungrei (a rock) which was at the foot of Kuiraira Hill. The SDO in his order after remand, accepted this contention, but the Dy. Commissioner and Chief Commissioner did not, because in a previous decision, namely, in case No. 353 of 1940-41 Mr. Duncan had fined Tungou in respect of a piece of land to the south of G.L. as lousal (rent) was allowed previously in respect of it to Lambui, and for other reasons mentioned in their judgments. The petitioners own allegations go to show that this piece of land was the piece, which is marked P-2 in red ink on the map. Petitioner himself also alleges that there has been a confusion about the identity of the different pieces of land in the past litigation and from the circumstances already referred to, it is not unlikely. All this can then be only settled after a complete enquiry and trial according to law and procedure. It might be mentioned here that "TUNGREI" which occurs in the copy of the map filed by the petitioner was put down after the copy was obtained. It is in a different hand and ink and does not occur in the certified copy filed by the opposite party. It was obviously put down to show the place of Tungrei according to Tungou and should not be taken to mean that the SDO found it to be there. 20. An objection as regards delay in filing this petition under Article 226 was also raised. It was obviously put down to show the place of Tungrei according to Tungou and should not be taken to mean that the SDO found it to be there. 20. An objection as regards delay in filing this petition under Article 226 was also raised. The order of the Chief Commissioner in the Review Case was passed on 9-11-1953, while the present petition was filed on 28-9-1956, that is nearly 3 years after the impugned proceedings came to a termination. There is no rule of limitation as regards such applications, and whether an application should be refused on the ground of laches depends on the circumstances of each case. Three years is a long period, and no explanation for the delay has been offered, and taking all the surrounding circumstances into consideration, I think that the petitioner has been guilty of laches and that would also be an additional reason why the petition should not be entertained (see Nathamooni Chetti v. Viswanatha Sastri, AIR 1951 Mad 250 , and Nanda Kumar v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta AIR 1957 Cal 578 ). 21. The result is that this writ petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order for costs. Petition dismissed.