Judgment.- The plaintiff-respondent instituted O.S. No. 99 of 1947 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai, praying for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the properties described in Schedules A, B and C and in the alternative, if the Court found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the properties, then for possession of those properties. Against the Subordinate Judge’s judgment and decree, there was an appeal to the District Court, Madurai, and a Second Appeal, S.A. No. 1846 of 1950, to this Court. In the Second Appeal, this Court granted a decree for possesssion in relation to some items in the plaint A and C Schedules, and an order of injunction in relation to some other items in plaint Schedules A and G. So far as items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule were concerned, this Court passed a decree in these terms: “That the plaintiff is also entitled to one half of items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule and that the said items shall be divided into two equal halves and possession of one such half shall be delivered over to the plaintiff.” The plaintiff applied to the lower Court to pass a final decree dividing items 10 to 12 into two halves and allotting one such half to the share of the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the plaintiffs’ case that in relation to items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule, this Court’s decree was a preliminary decree and appointed a Commissioner to effect the division of the properties into two halves. The defendants prefer this Civil Revision Petition and contend that the decree passed by this Court in relation to items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule was a final decree and that, therefore, no action could be taken in respect of these items without the decree being duly stamped as an instrument of partition. The defendants prefer this Civil Revision Petition and contend that the decree passed by this Court in relation to items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule was a final decree and that, therefore, no action could be taken in respect of these items without the decree being duly stamped as an instrument of partition. The course adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge would lead to the position that, after the division of items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule into two separate shares and allotment of one such share to the plaintiff, the decree under which the said share would be finally allotted to him would be stamped as an instrument of partition and, in execution of such final decree, the portion of the properties allotted to the plaintiff would be delivered to him. What the learned counsel for the defendants says is that, unless the decree passed by this Court is stamped, no further action can be taken. Neither from the point of view of the Government nor from the point of view of abstract justice nor indeed with reference to practical consequences in relation to payment of stamp duty or Court-fee, is it of the least significance whether stamp duty on the decree is paid at this stage, that is to say, before the division of the properties into separate specific shares, or whether stamp duty is paid after specific portions of the property are allotted to the shares of the parties. If now the Court holds that the decree passed by this Court is an instrument of partition in relation to these items and requires it to be stamped as such instrument before any further action is taken, the only result would be that the parties would be kept hovering round our Courts much longer than is just, necessary or proper. An application would have to be filed by the parties praying that the decree be stamped. Objection would be taken that the application is belated and that, in any event, the decree could not be stamped without its being amended so as to have it expressly styled a final decree in relation to these items. There would be arguments and counter-arguments. Objection would be taken that the application is belated and that, in any event, the decree could not be stamped without its being amended so as to have it expressly styled a final decree in relation to these items. There would be arguments and counter-arguments. In the result an order would be passed either that the decree be stamped and sent down for further steps being taken, or that the decree does not require to be stamped and that action may be taken in the lower Court to have the properties divided and have the proper stamp duty collected after the division is effected and when a final decree is passed. It subserves the convenience of parties and meets the genuine ends of justice that all such circumambulatory processes be eliminated and that the decree be so interpreted and given effect to as to enable the plaintiff to reap the rewards of the declaration that he has obtained from this Court with the minimum possible expenditure of time, money and effort. The Explanation to section 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code states that a decree is a preliminary decree when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. So far as items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule are concerned, the plaintiff asked for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the properties and, in the alternative, for possession of the properties. This Court by its decree said that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share in items 10 to 12 and that that share should be separated and that the plaintiff should be put in possession of such separated half share. The particular portions of those items of which the plaintiff has to be placed in possession have thus not yet been determined. Until the specific portions of those items of which the plaintiff would be granted exclusive possession are separately demarcated and specified, the suit cannot be said to be finally disposed of in relation to those items. Therefore, having regard to the prayer the plaintiff made in the plaint, the suit cannot be said to have been finally disposed of in relation to those items until the particular portions of the items of which the plaintiff has to be put in exclusive possession are ascertained and allotted to his share. Therefore, having regard to the prayer the plaintiff made in the plaint, the suit cannot be said to have been finally disposed of in relation to those items until the particular portions of the items of which the plaintiff has to be put in exclusive possession are ascertained and allotted to his share. I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that, in relation to these items, the decree of this Court is a preliminary decree. Learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants says, however, that the Court could not take any action on the basis of the decree being a preliminary decree unless there are words in the decree itself to the effect that the suit was remanded to the lower Court for final disposal in regard to these items. No such procedure is usual or necessary. Let us take a case where a plaintiff sues for possession of a house from the defendant and the defendant claims to be entitled to a half share in the house. Let us assume that in such a case the trial Court grants a decree for possession of the entire house and that the appellate Court modifies the decree by stating that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share only and that the other half belongs to the defendant. It would be unnecessary in such a case for the appellate Court to state that the suit is remanded to the lower Court for further steps being taken. No such specific direction by the appellate Court is necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to move the Court of first instance to have the property divided, to have a separated half share allotted to him and to pass a final decree for possession of such share. The decree passed by be appellate Court in such a case would be a preliminary decree without the appellate Court expressly styling it a preliminary decree. If, in this particular case, this Court’s decree is stamped as an instrument of partition, then, after the division is effected in the lower Court, the document effecting the division would require to be stamped with a stamp of 8 annas under Article 45 of the Indian Stamp Act. On the other hand, if no stamp duty is levied now, the stamp duty payable on the final decree as an instrument of partition will be collected before the final decree is drawn up. On the other hand, if no stamp duty is levied now, the stamp duty payable on the final decree as an instrument of partition will be collected before the final decree is drawn up. The proper thing in a case like the present is. to levy the stamp duty after the division, because stamp duty has to be collected on the basis of the value of the largest share remaining after the property is partitioned. The only difference is that, if the procedure advocated by the petitioners’ counsel is adopted, the Government will gain 8 annas which it might lose if there is no stamping of the decree of this Court in the first instance as an instrument of partition.. I am unable to hold that that possible loss of 8 annas would be sufficient ground for interference in revision with the order of the lower Court. I find that the decree of this Court in relation to items 10 to 12 of the plaint C Schedule is a preliminary decree. The learned Subordinate Judge’s order appointing a Commissioner to divide the properties in order that a final decree may be passed allotting specified portion of these items to the plaintiff and directing delivery of the portions is correct. Petition is dismissed. V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.