JUDGMENT V.R. Nevasker, J. 1. This is a plaintiff's first appeal. His suit for permanent injunction and for refund of customs duty, said to have been illegally recovered from him by the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat, was dismissed by the trial Court. 2. The facts giving rise to the present suit are not much in dispute. 3. Prior to the integration of the princely States in Central India into a single unit known as Madhya Bharat there were twenty-two different States who ruled their respective territories practically as sovereign in all internal matters. The State of Jaora was one of such States, Nawab of Jaora and also his Government were anxious to stimulate industries in the State of Jaora. Plaintiff, who happened to be an industrialist resident in Jaora, submitted a petition on 12-8-1945 to the Chief Minister of Jaora and therein proposed to set up an oil-mill in the town of Jaora in case he was granted certain concessions in the shape of exemptions from customs duty for certain articles required for construction and working of the mill, for the manufacture of its products or for export of its products and by-products and from Municipal taxes on all building materials needed for the concern. There were other terms therein with which we are not concerned. At the end of negotiations the Government agreed to grant certain concessions. These were incorporated in a document Ex. P/2 entitled as ''Conditions for Establishment of an Oil-Mill in jaora" and by order dated 24-2-1946 under the signature of Chief Minister of Jaora sanction was accorded for establishment of an Oil-Mill on these terms and conditions. The plaintiff set up an Oil-Mill accordingly and until the formation of Madhya Bharat these terms and conditions had been adhered to by the State of Jaora. 4. One of the conditions contained in the document Ex. P/2 aforesaid, which is material for the purpose of the present suit, was as follows :-- After the period of one year, all vegetable oil and oil-cake shall respectively be subject to an export duty at the rate of annas 4 and anna 1 per Bengal maund provided that no exports will be made unless local requirements are fully met. 5. 5. On 22-4-1948 the States of Indore, Gwalior and some of the Central Indian States entered into Covenant for merger of their States into a single unit with a provision for joining by other adjoining States at a later date. The State of Jaora joined this union shortly known as Madhya Bharat some time in August 1948. 6. Article VI (1) of the Covenant provided for making over the administration of their respective States to a single head called Raj Pramukh and further provided inter alia that thereupon : -- (a) all rights and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State and shall hereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder; (b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall devolve on the United State and shall be discharged by it. 7. Sub- section (2) of this Covenant made a provision for applicability of similar terms to any subsequently merged State. 8. When these different princely States with their separate territories and different legal systems including those for customs and tariffs merged into a single unit, the question of establishing uniformity in laws engaged the attentions of those charged with the duty of administering these areas. Customs was one such subject where immediate action was felt necessary. 9. With that view an Ordinance was promulgated as Ordinance No. 8 of 1948 by the Raj Pramukh in pursuance of the authority vested in him. This was known as Madhya Bharat Customs Regulation Ordinance Samvat 2005. It came into force on 15-8-1948. The object mentioned in the title of the Ordinance, and also in the preamble was to provide for the regulation of the existing Customs duty in the areas comprised in the territories of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). 10. By Section 3 of the Ordinance the internal barriers of Customs were removed by providing for cessation of import and export duties between the merged States inter (sic) 11. 10. By Section 3 of the Ordinance the internal barriers of Customs were removed by providing for cessation of import and export duties between the merged States inter (sic) 11. Section 4 of the Ordinance which is material for our present purpose is as follows;-- As soon as this Ordinance comes into force, the Customs duty of the Covenanting States shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, rule, regulation or order of any of the Covenanting States and subject to the provisions of Section 6, be deemed to have been abolished and the duty charged on the imports and exports to or from the territories of the United State shall be such as may be fixed by the Government from time to time. 12. Section 5 of the Ordinance provided for abolition of all duty-free zones in the United State and for termination of all concessions regarding exemptions from or reduction of customs duty in respect of 'Hats' ('Weekly Bazars). 13. The Ordinance No. 8 of 1948 was repealed and its provisions were practically re enacted by Act No. 16 of 1949 which came into force on 12-2-1949 and the repealing clauses saved rules framed, orders passed etc and conferred validity to them as having been done under the Act. 14. This Act on its turn was repealed by Act No. 47 of 1949 which come into force on 9-7-1949. This Act No. 47 practically re-cast the entire law of Customs applicable to the State and by the repealing clause it too saved rules framed, orders passed etc. not inconsistent with the new Act as having been done under it. 15. In pursuance of the power vested in the Government under Section 4 of the Ordinance, the Government provided for a uniform tariff applicable throughout the State. Under the same export duty was chargeable for oil and oil-cakes at the rate of Rs. 1-12-0 and Annas 8 per maund respectively which continued to be the rate of export duty throughout the impugned period. Customs duty on these products of the plaintiff's concern amounting to Rs. 32,110-3-0 was consequently recovered by the Customs Department of the State for the period between 19-9-1949 to 1-10-1950 in addition to the duty to which these products were subject on the basis of conditions referred to in Ex. P/2. Customs duty on these products of the plaintiff's concern amounting to Rs. 32,110-3-0 was consequently recovered by the Customs Department of the State for the period between 19-9-1949 to 1-10-1950 in addition to the duty to which these products were subject on the basis of conditions referred to in Ex. P/2. Plaintiff therefore brought the percent suit claiming refund of excessive duty thus recovered and for injunction against future recovery. 16. Plaintiff" asserted that the conditions contained in the document Ex. P/2 constituted a contract between the plaintiff and the State of Jaora and that the obligation thereunder devolved upon the State of Madhya Bharat by reason of term No. VI or the Covenant and that for that reason the State of Madhya Bharat is bound to abide by those terms and conditions in as much as had those conditions been not agreed to, he would not have set up the Oil-Mill in Jaora. 17. On behalf of the State of Madhya Bharat it was inter alia contended that the conditions in Ex P/2 though agreed to between the parties do not constitute a contract. They are merely concessions granted to the plaintiff for enabling him to set up the required industrial concern. One of such concessions, according to the defendant, related to Customs duty on a favoured tariff rate. Authority of the person granting concession was challenged as also the legality of the manner in which it was done. It was denied that the conditions in Ex. P/2 involved any obligations and liabilities within the meaning of those terms in term No.VI of the Covenant. It was asserted that the collection of duty under the new tariff rate fixed by the Madhya Bharat Government was lawful. There were other contentions raised on behalf of the defendant which have not become the subject-matter of argument on either side. 18. The trial Court after recording evidence came to the conclusion that valid contractual obligation had been incurred between the plaintiff and the Ruler of Jaora and that plaintiff erected the Oil-Mill relying upon the terms and conditions in Ex. P/2. 18. The trial Court after recording evidence came to the conclusion that valid contractual obligation had been incurred between the plaintiff and the Ruler of Jaora and that plaintiff erected the Oil-Mill relying upon the terms and conditions in Ex. P/2. He however held that it was open for the Madhya Bharat Government not to accept certain obligation of the erstwhile sovereign and that therefore this having been done and a uniform tariff rate for export of oil and oil-cakes for the entire State having been provided, obligation or liability which might have devolved for a while until the new tariff rates had been fixed and notified no longer subsisted. He therefore held the suit to be incompetent and dismissed the same. 19. In this appeal against that decision Mr. M.P. Amin for the appellant contended that the contract or arrangement, whatever it may be called, was on the findings of the learned District Judge made by the plaintiff-appellant with the Ruler of Jaora State. The concessions granted were as a result of bilateral obligations. The plaintiff was on his part, required to set up the Oil Mill and to do certain other things. The State on its part was to allow him certain concessions, advantages or privileges. There was acceptance of these bilateral terms and the will of the person possessing the powers of the sovereign, may be by delegation was imprinted on this arrangement The obligation thus incurred by the erstwhile Jaora Ruler had the force of Law. By term No. VI of the covenant which bound both the Ruler of Jaora and the New State of Madhya Bharat these obligations and liabilities became the liabilities of the new State and that by Section 2 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Regulation of Government Ordinance No. 1 of Samvat Year 2005 the new State gave statutory recognisance to those obligations. An Act later was passed which contained identical provisions. The result therefore was that the obligations to which the Ruler of Jaora was subject assumed the status of law. He in this connection referred to and relied upon the Division Bench case of this Court in 1958 J.L.J. 83, The State of Madhya Bharat (Madhya Pradesh) vs. Messrs Behramji Dungaji and Co., Ratlam. 20. The result therefore was that the obligations to which the Ruler of Jaora was subject assumed the status of law. He in this connection referred to and relied upon the Division Bench case of this Court in 1958 J.L.J. 83, The State of Madhya Bharat (Madhya Pradesh) vs. Messrs Behramji Dungaji and Co., Ratlam. 20. It was next contended that the Legislature of the new State no doubt possessed plenary powers so far as the subject matter of this suit is concerned and could make law so as to render those obligations incurred and recongnised by the former Jaora Ruler ineffective but that the law must be specific in that respect. The learned counsel then referred to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Madhya Bharat Customs Regulation Ordinance No. 8 of 1948 which came into force on 15-8-48 and contended that the present should be taken to be a case of exemption, partial though it be and that in as much as Section 5 which deals with the topic of exemption does not cover the case in hand, it ought to be held that that exemption was not intended to be touched. The learned counsel referred to pages 348-49 of Craies on Statute law 5th Edition and suggested that what Section 4 intended to deal with was the Customs Law with reference to general tariff and not any special tariff based on any special arrangement, grant or any other consideration. This section therefore, according to him, should not be taken to have abolished special tariffs which had the force of law on the data when the Ordinance came into force. The principle of GENERALLY SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT was called in aid by him for the purpose. 21. In my opinion the contentions raised by the learned counsel cannot prevail. 22. Assuming that the Special tariff rates fixed by the Jaora Ruler for the plaintiff's concern had the force of law by reason of term No. 6 of the Covenant which received statutory recognition and also by reason of continuation of Laws Ordinance, that provision was subject to the power of the Legislature of the new State to alter the same. 23. The powers of the Legislature of the State of Madhya Bharat were plenary with reference to the subject-matter of the present suit. 23. The powers of the Legislature of the State of Madhya Bharat were plenary with reference to the subject-matter of the present suit. It could therefore make law repealing prior law on the subject including any special tariff rates fixed by any former State which merged into Madhya Bharat. This competency of the new State to alter or repeal the preexisting law is not challenged before us. The question therefore boils down to this. Whether the provisions of the Ordinance had the effect of repealing the special concessional rates to which the plaintiff was entitled under the arrangement with the Jaora Ruler or in other words whether the provisions of the Ordinance and the special concessional rates of export duty in respect of the products of plaintiff's concern could stand together. 24. In my opinion provisions of Section 4 or the Ordinance are clear enough. The words Customs duty of the Covenanting States notwithstanding anything contained in any law, rule, regulation or order of any of the Covenanting States be deemed to be abolished" are wide enough to include every kind of duty including the one based on general as well as special tariff. Concessional rates of export duty allowed to the plaintiff by the erstwhile Jaora Ruler were abolished by this provision. It cannot be doubted that it was the Customs duty on export of oil and oil-cakes and this duty would therefore be abolished by Section 4 of the Ordinance and in its place the duty which the new Government fixed for the purpose would begin to operate. Mr. Amin's contention was that the arrangement operated as law in force in Jaora State. I grant it. But this law could be repealed and it was so repealed by the new State. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that Section 4 of the Ordinance is not relevant for the purpose but Section 5, His contention that in case Section 4 covered the case of entire law of Customs duty including exemptions complete or partial there was no point in enacting Section 5, does not appeal to me. Sections 3, 4 and 5 were intended for different purposes. By Section 3 internal barriers inter-se existing between all the Covenanting States were removed and the State became one and homogeneous for the purpose of Customs duty on export or import of goods. Sections 3, 4 and 5 were intended for different purposes. By Section 3 internal barriers inter-se existing between all the Covenanting States were removed and the State became one and homogeneous for the purpose of Customs duty on export or import of goods. Section 4 abolished all Customs duties of the pre-existing Covenanting States. This included cases of every kind of duty chargeable either on the basis of general or special tariff rates. It covered even the cases of partial or total exemptions. It further provided for charging of such duty as might be fixed by the new Government. The provision was destructive of the old and creative of the new. Section 5 was directed towards abolishing islands within the dutiable zones enjoying exemptions, total or partial. That Section applied to those cases where exemptions had territorial applications within a dutiable zone of a State and had no reference to persons who by reason of an arrangement with the Ruler or by reason of his gracious will were enjoying exemption complete or partial. 25. I am not persuaded to hold, as was argued by Mr. Amin, that Section 5 was the only provision which had a bearing on the subject of exemptions, total or partial, and that if a particular case even of partial exemption were not touched by that Section it was not intended by the Ordinance to be affected. To my mind even assuming that there is some over-lapping in Sections 4 and 5 I should at the most be taken to have been introduced ABUNDANS CAUTELA. By Section 7 (2) even the case of any State, wherein there was no law relating to Customs was covered and the area of that State too was included within the dutiable territory of the new State and became subject to Customs duty. 26. The effect of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 (2) of the Ordinance read together was to bring about regional homogeneity throughout the area constituting the new State, brought into being as a result of merger for the purpose of Customs duty and to impose duty under a fresh pattern sanctioned by the new Government in pursuance of the power conferred upon it thereunder and to make it applicable to all and sundry. The legislation was the result of a policy decision of the legislature of the new State, the competency of which, for doing so, has not been and could not be assailed before us. 27. I am therefore clearly of the view that the recovery of Customs duty made by the Customs authorities from the applicant was legally valid and proper and the plaintiff is not entitled to claim permanent injunction in respect of the period subsequent to 1-10-1950. 28. After the arguments were heard Mr. Rege for the appellant submitted a petition seeking leave to raise a new point based on the fact that the Ordinance No. 8 of 1948 preceded the merger of Jaora State into the Madhya Bharat. It was contended that the Ordinance No. 8 came into force on 14-8-1948 whereas the State of Jaora was included in Madhya Bharat on 25-8-1948 and that for that reason the laws of Jaora State including concessional tariff rates would continue to have the force of law unaffected by Ordinance No. 8 which by its wording repealed only the then existing Customs duties in force in the Covenanting States. 29. The argument now raised seeks almost to nullify the argument advanced by Mr. Amin who based his argument on the assumption that the Ordinance applied. However the new contention sought to be raised is-also without force. Article II Clause (1) (a) of the Covenant permits merger of a new State into the United State (Madhya Bharat) and Article II Clause (2) provides that the agreement of merger referred to in Clause (b) of Clause (1) of Article II shall be binding upon the United State and shall be deemed to be part of the Covenant. Under Clause VI all the rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State was to vest in the United State and by Clause (2) of Article vi this would be so even when a State subsequently merges. Under Article X of the Covenant the Raj Pramukh is given the power to make Ordinances having the force of law throughout the new Stat.; although such Ordinances could last for six months only while the Legislature of the new State could make laws which may either confirm, control or supersede the same. 30. Under Article X of the Covenant the Raj Pramukh is given the power to make Ordinances having the force of law throughout the new Stat.; although such Ordinances could last for six months only while the Legislature of the new State could make laws which may either confirm, control or supersede the same. 30. In pursuance of this power the Raj Pramukh issued first Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 known as the United State of Madhya Bharat Regulation of Government Ordinance, 1948 It provided by Section 2 [2] that when in pursuance of Clause (b) of paragraph (1)of Article 11 any State has been included in the State of Madhya Bharat, provisions of para 2 of Article VI would immediately come into force. Section 3 provided for continuance of all laws of the merged State until repealed or amended. 31. Ordinance No. 8 by section 4 provided that on its coming into force the Customs duty of the Covenanting States should notwithstanding anything contained in any law, rule, regulation or order of any of the Covenanting States be deemed to be abolished. The words "be deemed to be abolished" appear to have been advisedly used to cover the cases of merger also. After this Ordinance came into force Jaora State merged. The agreement of merger became a part of the Covenant and by the Regulation of Government Ordinance the Legislative power of the Ruler of Jaora Vested in the new State. The Ordinance of Raj Pramukh assumed the force of legislative enactment and although the laws, rules etc. of Jaora State were to continue until repealed or amended, still on the date of merger the law, rules, regulation or order regarding Customs duty got abolished by the operation of Section 4 of Ordinance No. 8 of 1948. Subsequently this Ordinance was repealed and the Madhya Bharat Customs Regulation Act No 16 of 1949 came into force. This contained provision similar to Section 4 of Ordinance No. 8 of 1948. 32. It is conceded by Mr. Rege that this Act applied equally to Jaora territory. If that be so that Act abolished the Customs duty in question even if it were in force upto the date when the Act came into force and applied duty at the rate fixed by the Madhya Bharat Government. 32. It is conceded by Mr. Rege that this Act applied equally to Jaora territory. If that be so that Act abolished the Customs duty in question even if it were in force upto the date when the Act came into force and applied duty at the rate fixed by the Madhya Bharat Government. In that view so far as the amount claimed by way of refund is concerned the claim becomes untenable. 33. Even as regards the claim for permanent injunction in respect of the earlier period not covered by the Act on the view discussed above, that Ordinance No. 8 had the effect of abolishing duty in Jaora State from 25-8-1948 that claim also cannot succeed. 34. The contention raised by Mr. Rege in the special application is without force. 35. The appeal therefore is without any force and is hereby dismissed with costs. 36. I agree. Appeal dismissed