Judgment S.C.Misra, J. 1. These two cases have been transferred to this Court under Art. 228 of the Constitution of India from the Court of a Magistrate, with first class powers, at Bettiah, Criminal Case No. 1 of 1956 arises out of G.R.P. Narkatiaganj Case No. 9 of the 12th of December, 1947, and Criminal Case No. 2 of 1956 arises out of G.R.P. Narkatiaganj Case No. 3 of March 1948. 2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that certain packages containing textile goods, such as cotton-cloth and yarn, were detected in the postal van at Narkatiaganj by the police containing prohibited articles, inasmuch as they were not to be carried through the postal agency under the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Transmission by Post) Prohibition Order of 1946. This Order was promulgated under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance 1946 and it continued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946), which took the place of the Ordinance in due course. This Order prohibited the transmission by post of any cotton-cloth or yarn. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Tarkeshwar Prasad Sinha, on suspicion, examined the packages in the postal van and being satisfied about their character made a first information report and the accused persons were, accordingly, proceeded against for violation of the above order as also for conspiracy under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. A similar first information report was submitted later. Criminal Case No. 1 is based on the first information report of 1947 and Criminal Case No. 2 is based on the first information report of March 1948. 3. The accused persons are 18 in number. Their names may be put down in the following order: 1. Dewat Ram, 2. Satnarayan son of Damn Mull, 3. M. L. Gupta, 4. K. D. Narain, 5. Hafizur Rehman, 6. Rampeayare Ram, 7. Jugeshwar Singh, 8. Deosaran Rai, 9. Baleshwar Singh, 10. Ruli Ram Marwari, 11. Ramswaroop Agrawal, 12. Satuanarain Agrawal, 13. Tillu Ram, 14. Ramanand alias Ramji, 15. Ramkishun Agarwala, 16. Basudeo Bahera, 17. Sarat Kumar Das, 18. A. K. Barik. Accused Nos. 1 to 9 are from Raxaul and are either postal employees or private individuals being the consignees to whom the packages were addressed. Accused Nos. 10 to 15 are the consignors who belong to the State of Patna which was an Indian State in Orissa, and accused Nos. Basudeo Bahera, 17. Sarat Kumar Das, 18. A. K. Barik. Accused Nos. 1 to 9 are from Raxaul and are either postal employees or private individuals being the consignees to whom the packages were addressed. Accused Nos. 10 to 15 are the consignors who belong to the State of Patna which was an Indian State in Orissa, and accused Nos. 16 to 18 are the persons who were Sub-Postmasters at Kanta Bhanji Sub-Post Office within the State of Patna. According to the prosecution, the packages containing cotton-cloth and yarn were received at the Sub-Post Office Kanta Bhanki or Kharaiya Road. It is unnecessary to mention other facts as they do not arise for the decision of the preliminary question which has been raised before us by learned counsel on behalf of the accused persons. 4. It has been urged that the two cases should be dropped against the accused as the case as laid in the first information report against the accused does not disclose the commission of any offence by them. A number of points have been formulated which might arise for consideration in the case, but the principal question pressed is, as I have stated above, with regard to whether an offence has been disclosed in terms of the above Cotton-Cloth and Yarn (Transmission by Post) Prohibition Order, 1946. Clause 3 of the Order runs thus: "No inland postal article containing, otherwise than as outside overing, any cloth or yarn shall be received at or despatched from any post office in British India; and no person shall deliver or cause to be delivered any such postal article for trans mission by post to any place within or outside British India: "Provided that this clause shall not apply to the despatch or receipt by post of cloth or yam by any of the authorities mentioned in the "Schedule to this order". Learned counsel has urged that assuming all the facts of the prosecution case to be true that the consignors from Patna State, viz. Learned counsel has urged that assuming all the facts of the prosecution case to be true that the consignors from Patna State, viz. Ruli Ram Marwari Ramswaroop Agrawal, Satyanarain Agrawal, Tillu Ram, Ramanand alias Ramji and Ramkishun Agrawala, had despached the packages which were addressed to Dewat Ram, Satuanarain and M. L. Gupta at Raxaul and that the remaining accused persons are postal employees either at Raxaul or Kanta Bhanji within the State of Patna, no contravention of Clause 3 of this Order can be said to have been made out which will make the act of despatch on transmission in this case an offence within the terms of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. It has been contended that in order that the despatch of packages containing cloth or yarn may be held to be a penal act, the packages must fulfil the definition of inland postal article, inasmuch as Clause 3 refers to inland postal articles. Inland postal article has been defined in the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898) in Sec.2 Clause (b) as follows: "(b) The expression inland used in relation to a postal article, means (i) posted in the Provinces and addressed to any place in the Provinces or to any place for which a post office is established by the Central Government beyond the limits of the Provinces; or (ii) posted at any post office established by the Central Government beyond the limits of the Provinces and addressed to any place for which any such post office is established or to any place in the Provinces; Provided that the expression inland shall not apply in any class of postal articles "which may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, when posted in or at or addressed to any places or post offices which may he described in such notification;" Learned Counsel has laid stress on the fact that before a postal article may be classed within the category of inland postal article it must be posted in and addressed to any place in the Provinces or to any place for which a post office is established by the Central Government, or posted at any post office established by the Central Government and addressed to any place for which any such post office is established, or to any place in the Provinces. The essential element, therefore, in giving an article the character of inland postal article is that it must be posted in a post office established by the Central Government, in so far as the place of despatch is concerned; and even in so far as the place to which it is addressed, it must be addressed to any place in the Provinces in British India or to any place for which a post office is established by the Central Government. Evidently, the Legislature contemplated by these provisions in these two clauses posting at a place within British India or at a post office outside the provinces established by the Central Government, and addressed to a place within British India, or to a place for which a post office is established by the Central Government. It is contended that the State of Patna was an Indian State and its territory was not within British India. The post office of Kanta Bhanji or Kharaiya Road was not a post office established by the Central Government nor were these situate in a territory which could be called part of British India. In terms of this definition, therefore, the packages would not be classed as inland postal article. It has been urged in the next place that even in terms of Clause 3 the despatch of the inland postal article, which has been detected, must be at any post office in British India, because it is only in relation to such a post office that it has been provided that any such inland postal article shall not be received at or despatched from such post office. Learned Counsel for the State concedes the position that the packages in the present case cannot be held to have been received at or despatched from any post office in British India, but he has relied upon the second part of this clause which lays down that no person shall deliver or cause to be delivered any such postal article for transmission by post to any place within or outside Britsh India. The contention formulated is that this part of the clause is wider than the first part, inasmuch as it prohibits transmission of such postal article altogether. The policy behind this clause is that Indian Postal system shall not transmit any such article at any stage whatsoever. The contention formulated is that this part of the clause is wider than the first part, inasmuch as it prohibits transmission of such postal article altogether. The policy behind this clause is that Indian Postal system shall not transmit any such article at any stage whatsoever. Even, therefore, it the despatch was from a post office outside British India, but since the packages were meant for transmission by post in India, it must necessarily follow that an offence in the nature of contravention of this clause was committed by the accused persons concerned either in despatch or in receipt of the delivery of the packages concerned. In my opinion, however, it is difficult to accede to this contention. A plain reading of Clause 3 shows that the second part of the clause must be read in conjunction with and not in disjunction from this part because the words used are "any such postal article" which, evidently, refers to postal articles which shall not be received at or despatched from any post office in British India. The construction sought to be put upon this part of the clause by learned counsel for the State is not consistent with the words used in this clause, and would further imply that this Order was indirectly to operate even outside the limits of British India which, evidently, could not have been the intention in promulgating this order. In the result, it must be held that the present packages sent from the State of Patna do not come within the mischief of this clause and no offence, accordingly, in the nature of contravention of the order can be deemed to have been made out. The accused persons who belong to the State of Patna, either as consignors or as postal employees, are not liable to be proceeded against for any criminal act. 5. Learned counsel for the State has, however, contended that even if this would apply to the accused from Patna State, the Raxaul accused, who were either consignees of the goods or postal employees, cannot take advantage of this legal position which is available to the accused from Patna State. 5. Learned counsel for the State has, however, contended that even if this would apply to the accused from Patna State, the Raxaul accused, who were either consignees of the goods or postal employees, cannot take advantage of this legal position which is available to the accused from Patna State. The consignees must be taken to be men who can be taken to have aided in the transmission of the goods through the Indian Postal system and the postal employees of Raxaul appear to be men who received or could receive the goods in due course. In my opinion, the argument is too much stretched. So far as the consignees are concerned, it cannot be held that they were in any manner concerned in the transmission. It was the consignors who despatched the packages who could be held to have made over the goods for transmission to the postal authorities. The consignees can not be held to have in any manner been concerned in the transmission. In any case, they cannot be held to be persons who delivered or caused to be delivered the postal articles for transmission, because the words used in the clause are not transmission as such but deliver or cause to be delivered a postal article for transmission. Transmission and delivery, therefore, go together. They are consignees or recipients for the consignees. That cannot be brought within the terms of part two of Clause 3. In my opinion, therefore, the consignees cannot he held to be guilty of the contravention of the clause. 6. As for the postal employees, learned counsel for the State has objected that they, at any rate, can be made out to be, concerned in the receipt of the articles. In my opinion, it is difficult to entertain this argument as well because the word receive in this clause is in connection with the post office of despatch, inasmuch as the words received at or despatched from occurred together so as to lead to that inference. They have got reference to the postal authorities where the article in question would be received to be despatched, The first part, therefore, of this clause deals with the original post office and the second part relates to the person delivering the article for transmission. They have got reference to the postal authorities where the article in question would be received to be despatched, The first part, therefore, of this clause deals with the original post office and the second part relates to the person delivering the article for transmission. So far as delivery at Raxaul is concerned, the fact is irrelevant and it is clear that the postal employees at Raxaul had not yet handled the articles as they were intercepted at the intermediate station of Narkatiaganj; and so far as receipt of the articles is concerned, as I have said this would apply to the postal authorities within the State of Patna and the word received is not applicable to the postal employees of the office of destination. In my opinion, therefore, none of the sets of the accused, who were consignors, from the post office in the Patna State or were consignees at the post office at Raxaul, can come within the mischief of the contravention of this order. 7. Learned counsel for the State, however, has urged that the Raxaul accused can be proceeded against for entering into a conspiracy with the Patna State accused inasmuch as the report of the Sub-Inspector shows that such prohibited articles were being received in volumes and with an amount of frequency which would show that it was evidently a well-arranged scheme to which the postal employees at Raxaul were parties, in order to defeat the provisions of this Order. In my opinion, however, the question of conspiracy is not relevant because a charge of conspiracy can only be sustained if prosecution alleges and Droves the committing of an illegal act by the conspirators concerned. If the despatch of the consignments from the Patna State cannot be made out to be an illegal act, there can be no conviction of the accused for committing that act or, for that matter, even so far as the postal employees of Raxaul are concemed. The result is that even the case of conspiracy in prima facie not sustainable, and this argument must be rejected. 8. Learned counsel for the State urged before us a number of other points which might arise if we accepted the contention urged by him on the preliminary question. The result is that even the case of conspiracy in prima facie not sustainable, and this argument must be rejected. 8. Learned counsel for the State urged before us a number of other points which might arise if we accepted the contention urged by him on the preliminary question. As it is, however, since I have not yet found it possible to accept his contention on the preliminary question, it is superfluous to refer in detail to the other subsidiary points which might arise in the case. 9. The accused persons are accordingly discharged. U.N.Sinha, J. 10 I agree.