Judgment :- 1. His appeal is preferred by the petitioner in W. P. 585 of 1956 of the Madras High Court against the order of Somasundaram, J. dismissing the petition when it came on for admission before him. It was transferred to the file of this Court along with other proceedings under S.60 (3) of the States Re-organisation Act 1956 (37 of 1956). 2. The appellant is C. Rama Varma Raja, the Valia Raja of Chirakkal and karnavan of Chirakal Kovilakam in North Malabar. On or about 9-10-1953, three inspectors of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Adm.) Department, of the Cannanore, Taliparamba and Chirakkal Division of the North Malabar District filed 24 applications Nos. 108 to 131 of 1955, under S.57 (a) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 19 of 1951 praying for declaration that the 24 temples referred to therein and which were under the management of the appellant, were public religious institutions. The Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and "Charitable Endowments, Tanjore, before whom the petitions came on, issued notice on each of them to the appellant intimating that an enquiry into the matter will be held before him. The appellant's position was that the temples concerned, along with several others appertained to his Kovilakam and the enquiries proposed were in any event unauthorised. Accordingly he took preliminary objection before the Deputy Commissioner as regards the maintainability of the enquiries but the objection was overruled. He then preferred appeal before the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras again without success. Thereupon the appellant filed the W. P. herein on 22 -5-1956, praying for issue of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Deputy Commissioner impleaded as the 1st respondent to the petition, from proceeding with the enquiries as per his notices. The three inspectors were made respondents 2 to 4 and the State of Madras was made the 5th respondent in that petition. 3. The main grounds of attack taken in the affidavit filed in support were, firstly one of jurisdiction in that S.57 of the Act did not contemplate the initiation of proceedings by the Inspectors of the Department and again that none of the applications referred to contained an essential requisite, viz., the subsistence of a dispute as to the character of the institution between the petitioner's family and any member of the public. Secondly it was affirmed that the enquiries contemplated under S.57 were violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Art.14 and 19 (1) of the Constitution. 4. The petitioner's affidavit itself averred that a prior Writ Petition No. 810 of 1953 was filed before the High Court of Madras as herein in connection with a proposed enquiry, at the instance of the Inspector, Chirakkal Division as regards eight other temples and that that petition was dismissed on 24-11-1954. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition was also referred to apparently to show that the grounds of attack as above, were not then urged or dealt with. Anyhow Somasundaram, J. summarily dismissed the present writ petition in the following words: "The matter is still in the enquiry stage. There is absolutely no ground for interfering at this stage. The petition is dismissed". Learned counsel for the appellant says that this order has proceeded on a total misapprehension as to the scope of the petition For it was the very starting of the enquiry that the petitioner was complaining against and the pendency of the enquiry was not therefore a matter standing against him. But having heard the whole matter, we also have found no reason to interfere with the enquiries concerned. 5. Now S.57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 19 of 1951 says : 57. "Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to enquire into and decide the following disputes and matters. (a) whether an Institution is a religious institution" Cls. (b) to (g) are not relevant to our purpose and are therefore omitted. S.6(15) defines a'religious institution ' as meaning a math, temple or specific endowment and 'temple' is defined by S.6(17) as meaning "a place by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship". S. 61 provides for an appeal to the Commissioner by any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in his enquiry under S.57 and S.62 then provides for the institution of a suit in the court against orders passed by the Commissioner in appeal under S.61 and the court is given power to modify or cancel such order and the party aggrieved by the decree of the court has a right of appeal to the High Court. Finally S.93 provides : "No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter of dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act." 6. Our attention has not been invited to any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, limiting the person or persons who could initiate the enquiry under S.57 (a). There does not therefore seem to be any objection to the inclusion of the Inspectors, herein within the category. Learned counsel says that the Inspector does not come in for mention among the Authorities under the Act provided for under S.7. But that is obviously because he is not one of the controlling authorities dealt with by that section and is only part of the administrative set up. Learned counsel then referred to S.45 (4) which provides for motion by the Assistant Commissioner before the Deputy Commissioner to take action under sub-section (1) of that section as regards suspension and dismissal of certain classes of trustees. The argument is apparently that when departmental initiation is called for, it is specifically provided. But this provision is to meet a special case and has no relevancy for our purpose. Learned counsel finally said that if Inspectors were allowed to function under S.57 (a), the department would be functioning as a judge in its own cause which was opposed to the principles of natural justice. But this provision is to meet a special case and has no relevancy for our purpose. Learned counsel finally said that if Inspectors were allowed to function under S.57 (a), the department would be functioning as a judge in its own cause which was opposed to the principles of natural justice. In our opinion, however, the fact that a departmental subordinate is one of the parties to a quasi-judicial proceeding before his official superior does not necessarily involve a hazard For, apart from the possibility that the superior may not be biassed, the interests of the opposite party if aggrieved, are in the ultimate analysis sufficiently safeguarded, e.g. by the reservation of a right of suit and appeal from the decree therein to the High Court. Reference may be made in this connection to Uuikanta v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, A.I R.1929 Mad. 85. There the contention was set up that the Board constituted under the prior Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 2 of 1927 precluded itself from exercising the functions of a tribunal and deciding the question whether a temple was public or private, because two of its five members had filed written statements denying the allegation in the plaint that the temple was a private temple and stated that it was a public temple. And support was sought from the principle of Frome Unted Brewries Co. v. Bath Justices (1926 A. C. 586) and Rex v. Essex Justices, Perkins Ex-parte 1927, 2 K. B. 475) that where a body having judicial or quasi-judicial powers had decided against a party that body would not be qualified to act in its judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in deciding any question affecting the opposite party. Kumaraswamy Sastry, J., in rejecting the contention held that the fact that one member of a Board acted in a particular matter would not disqualify the other members of the Board who did not take part in the matter from acting in the same matter. Indeed the order against the petitioner in the prior W. P. 810 of 1953 has already pronounced on this question, that "Merely because the Deputy Commissioner is invested with the statutory authority to decide the disputes referred to in S.57 of the Act, it cannot be said that he has been made by the statute itself as a judge in his own cause. It is not as if the Deputy Commissioner who issued notice in this case under S.57 (1) of the Act, claimed any interest in these temples nor can it really be said that the department as a whole, or the Government or the State claimed that these temples belonged to them. The question is whether they are public temples as defined in the Act, and that question the Deputy Commissioner is entitled to decide under S.57(1)". It is clear therefore that there is no merit in this contention as to jurisdiction. Really except that the contention was put in slightly different form in the writ petition herein it had been, as we saw, already raised and found against in the prior writ proceedings. 7. Coming to the second limb of the argument as to jurisdiction, viz., that the petitions by the Inspectors do not mention the existence of a dispute* between the members of the public and the appellant, regarding the character of the temple, it is difficult to understand on what other basis the enquiries themselves were or could be started. Even otherwise the section itself provides for enquiry and decision not alone in respect of 'disputes' but also of 'matters' and without doubt the 'matter' under C (a) can form a fit subject of an enquiry. There is no substance in this objection as well. 8. On the question raised as to the violation of Art.14, it is difficult here also to understand how exactly it arises. The only ground on which the aspect of discrimination is stressed in the affidavit and also before us is, that in the face of the provision for finality by decree of court, the preliminary enquiry before the Deputy Commissioner and in appeal before the Commissioner conduced unnecessarily to saddle the petitioner with expense, and trouble while placing the department in a better position. But this is really in the nature of an objection to the system of administrative tribunals-raised rather too late in the day. The system was necessitated by the expansion of State activities and having been once introduced has come to stay and indeed grow more and more. But all necessary safeguards, e. g. the insistence of the procedural requirements as under the C. P. C. See S.95, and ultimate resort to the civil courts are there. The complaint on this score is therefore without substance. 9. But all necessary safeguards, e. g. the insistence of the procedural requirements as under the C. P. C. See S.95, and ultimate resort to the civil courts are there. The complaint on this score is therefore without substance. 9. The ground under Art.19 (1) (f) was not pressed before us. Even otherwise the aspect of violation of the fundamental right under Art.19(1)(f) would arise only if there is a private property of the petitioner. Where that is the very question in issue, this aspect can hardly arise. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs, Dismissed.