Kesaven Govindan v. Janerdhanan Damodara Plappalli
1958-06-10
T.K.JOSEPH
body1958
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The point arising for decision in both the second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition is the same, viz., whether the sub-lessee of Kandukrishi tenants are entitled to protection against eviction under s.3 of the Kerala stay of Eviction Proceedings Act (1 of 1957). s.3 (a) excludes lands owned by Government from the operation of this Act. The courts below have held that Kandukrishi lands being lands owned by Government, the sub-lessees of such lands are not entitled to the benefit of the Act. The two cases were heard together. 2. Before considering the main question, a point arising in C. R. P. 36/58 may be disposed of. The court below at first passed an order staying eviction, but this was reviewed on the application of the decree-holder and the order sought to be revised was passed. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Court below had no jurisdiction to allow the review. The provision of this statute was over-looked in passing the earlier order. The learned Munsiff who passed the first order admitted the review and I do not consider that interference is called for, as the provisions of Act I of 1957 were overlooked by the court when the first order was passed. 3. Coming to the main point, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner in the revision petition and the appellant in the second appeal is that Kandukrishi lands in the erstwhile state of Travancore cannot be treated as lands owned by Government. It is admitted by both sides that Kandukrishi lands were the home farms of the sovereign and the tenure under which the property was held was tenancy at will. The Maharaja of Travancore promulgated a Proclamation on 27-5-1949 transferring right, title and interest in respect of Kandukrishi lands of every description and tenure to the Government. If the Government have not thereafter been divested of such right, title and interest acquired under this Proclamation, it cannot be said that these are not lands owned by Government. Various statutes were relied on in support of the argument that these are not lands owned by Government. "Government lands" are defined in s.2 of Travancore-Cochin Government Land Assignment Act 33 of 1950 as follows: "2.
Various statutes were relied on in support of the argument that these are not lands owned by Government. "Government lands" are defined in s.2 of Travancore-Cochin Government Land Assignment Act 33 of 1950 as follows: "2. (1) All public roads, streets, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches, dykes and fences on or besides the same; the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high water-mark; the beds and banks of rivers, streams, irrigation and drainage channels; canals, tanks, lakes, backwaters and water-courses; and all lands wherever situated; save in so far as the same are the property of - (a) proprietors of Edavagais or Jenmis or holders of inams; or (b) all holders of land in any way subject to the payment of land revenue to the Government; or (c) any other registered holder of land in proprietory right; (d) any person holding land under grant from the Government otherwise than by way of lease or licence; or (e) any person claiming through or holding under any of the persons referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c)or (d); are, and are hereby declared to be, Government lands, except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force subject to all rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easement rights of other land owners and to all customary rights legally subsisting. Explanation I: Lands registered in the name of a person but subsequently abandoned or relinquished and all lands held by right of escheat, purchase, resumption, reversion or acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act for the time being in force are Government lands within the meaning: of this section. Explanation II: In this section, the expression 'high-water mark' means the highest point reached by the ordinary spring-tide at any season of the year." There is a definition of property of Government in s.3 of the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act 19 of 1951 which is extracted below: "3.
Explanation II: In this section, the expression 'high-water mark' means the highest point reached by the ordinary spring-tide at any season of the year." There is a definition of property of Government in s.3 of the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act 19 of 1951 which is extracted below: "3. (1) All Public roads, streets, lanes and paths, bridges, ditches, dykes and fences on or beside the same; the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below highwater mark; the beds and banks of rivers, streams, irrigation and drainage channels, canals, tanks, lakes, backwaters and water courses; all standing and flowing water; and all lands wheresoever situated, save in so far as the same are the property of - a) proprietors of Edavagais or Jenmies or holders of Inams; or b) holders of lands in any way subject to the payment of land revenue to Government; or c) any other registered holder of land in proprietory right; or d) any person holding land under grant from the Government otherwise than by way of a licence; or e) any person claiming through or holding under any of the persons referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d); are, and are hereby declared to be, the property of Government, except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, subject to all rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easement rights of other land owners and to all customary rights legally subsisting." 4. In both these definitions lands held subject to the payment of land revenue to the Government is excluded from the definition of lands owned by Government or the property of Government. It was argued that rent due on Kandukrishi lands has been treated as public revenue due on land in the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. This argument is based on the explanation to s.2 (a; of the Act which is given below: "Explanation: Pattom due on Kandukrishi and sripadom lands are within the meaning of this definition." 5. It is contended that these definitions in statute passed by the Legislature after the date of the Proclamation of 1949 should be deemed to have divested the Government of ownership over such lands, I am unable to accept this argument.
It is contended that these definitions in statute passed by the Legislature after the date of the Proclamation of 1949 should be deemed to have divested the Government of ownership over such lands, I am unable to accept this argument. The supreme Court has pointed out in Ram Narain v. The state of Uttar Pradesh and others (A.I.R.1957 s.C.18) that it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act and that the meanings of words and expression used in any Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. The definitions of "Government land," Property of Government" & "Public Revenue on due land" were only for the purposes of the particular Acts in which the same occur. There is the further fact that the corresponding statutes of Travancore, viz , The Travancore Government Land Assignment Act 3/1097, The Travancore Land Conservancy Act 4/1091 and The Travancore Revenue Recovery Act 1/1068, all of which were in force on the dates of the Proclamation of 1949 contained identical definitions of the Government lands, Property of Government and Public Revenue due on land It is not contended that these statutes in any way affected the rights of the sovereign who transferred such rights to the Government by the proclamation. The provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act were made applicable to Kandukrishi lands only for the purpose of speedier collection of the rent due on the same. It cannot therefore be said that Kandukrishi lands ceased to be owned by the Government alter the Travancore-Cochin Acts referred to above were passed. 6. Another argument advanced was that the Kerala stay of Eviction Proceedings Act was passed to give protection to tenants and that it has to be taken that the exception was intended only for safe guarding that the provisions of the Act were not used against the Government. It is not possible to gather such an intention from the provisions of the Act. What is exempted is lands owned by Government and what the Legislature did was to confer on lands owned by Government an immunity from the operation of the Act. A similar argument was advanced in Messrs.
It is not possible to gather such an intention from the provisions of the Act. What is exempted is lands owned by Government and what the Legislature did was to confer on lands owned by Government an immunity from the operation of the Act. A similar argument was advanced in Messrs. Battia Co-operative sousing society Limited v. D.C. Patel (A.I.R.1953 s. C.16), regarding construction of the provision in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which provided that the Act would not apply to any premises belonging to the Government or a Local Authority. The dispute was between the lessee of the board of trustees for the improvement of the city of Bombay and his lessee. The relevant provision in the Act is s.4 (1) which is extracted below: "This Act shall not apply to any premises belonging to the Government or a local authority or apply as against the Government to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government; but it shall apply in respect of premises let to the Government or a local authority." It was pointed out by the supreme Court that it was not correct to say that the immunity given by this should be held to be available only to the Government or a Local Authority to which the premises belonged and that if that were the intention, then the Legislature would have used phraseology such as "as against the Government or the Local Authority." The provision in Act 1 of 1957 is plain and there is complete exclusion of all lands owned by the Government from the operation of the Act, irrespective of the nature of the tenancy. The Act as it stands does not warrant the interpretation put on it by the petitioner and the appellant in the two cases. 7. No other point arises in these cases. The decisions of the Courts below are therefore confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition and second Appeal are dismissed with costs. Dismissed.