JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a petition in revision against the appellate judgment of the Sessions Judge of Koraput-Jeypore, maintaining the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 409 I.P.C. and the sentence of six months' rigorous Imprisonment and the fine of Rs. 1600/- passed by the Stationary Sub. Magistrate, First Class, Rayaghada. 2. The Petitioner is a registered petition-writer at Rayaghada who formerly held the Agency Sanad to practise in law courts ill Koraput Agency tracts. After the Introduction of the normal judicial administration in Koraput district he has not been permitted to practise in any Civil Court and has been relegated to the position of a mere petition ani document-writer. He has, however, a working knowledge of English and of the law and procedure in law courts. 3. During the period from the 17th November, 1950 to the 4th September 1953 the Petitioner was the Director-in-charge of the procurement operations of the Rayaghada Co-operative Purchase and Sales Society. The Stationary Sub. Magistrate, Rayaghada, was t e President of that Society. It was alleged that the main duty of, the Petitioner as the Director in charge of procurement was to take money from the Manager of the Society from time to time after executing valid receipts and utilize the same for the purpose of purchasing food grains on behalf of the Government from the various producers. The Petitioner as the Director in charge executed the usual purchasing agency agreement with the Government on behalf of the society. The terms of contract between the Petitioner, on the one hand, and the society on the other were not clearly put in writing but were mainly of an implied nature. It is however admitted by the prosecution witnesses that the Petitioner was entitled to travelling allowance and daily allowance, and also to a commission of 8 per cent on the net profits of the society (See Ext. A). 4. The prosecution case is that on the 13th March 1953 the Petitioner received Rs. 1105/. for the purpose of procurement in Rayaghada, but failed to utilize the same for procurement and also that, on some pretext or other, he refused to refund the money. It was further alleged that on the 4th June 1953 he received another sum of Rs. 435/. for the same purpose and neither refunded the money nor did any procurement work. for the purpose of procurement in Rayaghada, but failed to utilize the same for procurement and also that, on some pretext or other, he refused to refund the money. It was further alleged that on the 4th June 1953 he received another sum of Rs. 435/. for the same purpose and neither refunded the money nor did any procurement work. Two receipts, admittedly signed by the Petitioner and acknowledging receipt of the two sums for the aforesaid purpose, were proved by the prosecution and were relied upon to support the case against the Petitioner. The contents of the receipts (Exts. 19 and 20) may be quoted in full: Ext. 19 dated 13.3.1953 "Taken Rs. 1105/. (Rupees eleven hundred and five) only for the purpose of procurement in Rayaghada from the Gash balance. Sd/- A. Misra. 13-3-1953. Ext. 20 dated 4-6-1953. "Rayaghada Co-operative Purchase & Sale Society Ltd. No. 8166 Voucher No. 668 Rayaghada, Dated 4th June 1953. Received Rs. 435/- (Rupees four hundred and thirty five only) as, further advance for, procurement purpose from the Secretary, Rayaghada Co-operative Purchase and Sales Society, Ltd. Sd/- A. Misra, 4-6-1953. 5. The Petitioner's main defence was that he was not given a fair chance to complete his procurement work but that when there was a delay of two to three months due to other unforeseen circumstances the President of the Society asked him to refund the money some time in July 1958 and that the Petitioner while he was always ready and willing to refund the money received by him, was engaged in correspondence with the society regarding some amounts due to him from the society and that suddenly the society terminated his services as Director in Charge of procurement on the 4th September 1953. He urged that this was a case of civil liability which has to be decided after settlement of accounts and that a dispute regarding civil liability was actually raised before the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies as permitted by the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act. Mr. Panda on behalf of the Petitioner further urged that the criminal prosecution was entirely misconceived. 6. It appears to me that even if the entire evidence for the prosecution be believed, the offence of criminal breach of trust has not been made out. The entrustment of Rs. 1105/- on the 13th March 1953 and of Rs. Mr. Panda on behalf of the Petitioner further urged that the criminal prosecution was entirely misconceived. 6. It appears to me that even if the entire evidence for the prosecution be believed, the offence of criminal breach of trust has not been made out. The entrustment of Rs. 1105/- on the 13th March 1953 and of Rs. 435/- on the 4th June 1953, is admitted. It is also admitted that the sums were entrusted with him for the purpose of procurement. It may also be taken as admitted that no procurement was done, but the period within which the Petitioner was required to complete the procurement operation was not specified in the receipts Exts.19 and 20. Nor is there any evidence on the side of the prosecution witnesses to prove this very important fact. As a matter of fact, the prosecution seems to have completely lost sight of the necessity of proving the period during which the Petitioner was expected to complete procurement in respect of the aforesaid two sums. On the other hand, from the documents of the Petitioner exhibited by the prosecution itself it appears that the period for completing the procurement Was the end of the Kharif season of 1953 which according to him was the 31st October 1953. In Ext.25 which is a letter sent by him to the Secretary of the Society on the 30th September 1953 he mentions this fact clearly. He has specially referred to resolution No. 8 passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Society held on the 24th December 1952 (Exts. E and X) where his appointment as Director in Charge of procurement for the Khariff year 1952-53 is specially mentioned. None of the prosecution witnesses has stated as to when the Khariff year 1952.53 ended and in the absence of the evidence on the prosecution side, I see no reason to disbelieve the statement of the Petitioner in Ext. 25 to the effect that it ended on the 31st October 1953. Hence, the reasonable inference would be that when he received the aforesaid two sums on the 13th March & 4th June, 1953, he was given time till 31-10-1953 to complete the procurement operations. There is also no evidence to show that he was required to procure every month any specified quantity of food grain. Hence, the reasonable inference would be that when he received the aforesaid two sums on the 13th March & 4th June, 1953, he was given time till 31-10-1953 to complete the procurement operations. There is also no evidence to show that he was required to procure every month any specified quantity of food grain. The Board of Directors did not give him sufficient time to complete the procurement operations. On the 10th May 1953, a letter was sent to him (Ext. 6) by the President of the Society commenting on his slackness and asking him to pay up his dues to the society in final settlement of accounts within seven days from the receipt of that letter. To that he sent a reply dated the 16th May 1953 (Ext. 7) giving some reasons for the delay in continuing the procurement operations, emphatically denying the suggestion that he intended to misappropriate the money, and assuring the society that he would complete the operations in due course. In this letter also he frankly admitted that he had received Rs. 1105/- for the purpose of procurement. Apparently, the President o( the Society was not satisfied with the Petitioner's explanation, In his letter dated the 21st May 1958 (Ext. 8) he asked him to refund the sum of Rs. 11051-, There was further correspondence between the two. But the very fact that on the 4th June 1953 another sum of Rs. 435/- was advanced to him shows that the persons in charge of the society were willing to give him some more time. But his further work was not found to be satisfactory and again, on the 5th August 1953 he was asked to pay up an his dues (Ext 12). Thereafter the Petitioner by his reply dated the 6th August 1953 (Ext. 13) stated while acknowledging having received the sum for procurement purposes that some remuneration was due to him for the work done from 1950 and that it may be adjusted towards the amount due from him to the Society. The President was not satisfied with this explanation, nor with his subsequent explanation dated the 30th August 1953 (Ext. 24) ; and hence at a meeting o( the Board of Directors of the Society held on the 4th September 1953 (Ext. 15) another person named Sri R.K. Tullo was appointed Director in Charge of Procurement (see also Ext. The President was not satisfied with this explanation, nor with his subsequent explanation dated the 30th August 1953 (Ext. 24) ; and hence at a meeting o( the Board of Directors of the Society held on the 4th September 1953 (Ext. 15) another person named Sri R.K. Tullo was appointed Director in Charge of Procurement (see also Ext. B dated the 17th September 1953). It was also decided that a dispute should be filed before the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (or the recovery of a sum of Rs. 2490/. due from the Petitioner. The latter then filed a letter of protest on the 30th September 1953 (Ext. 25) stating the sums due to him from the society and adding that it was the action of the Society in removing him from his office of Director in Charge of Procurement, in the middle of the Khariff season, that was to a large extent responsible for his inability to complete the procurement operations. 7. To establish the offence of criminal breach of trust the prosecution must prove (i) entrustment of property with the accused; (ii) dishonest appropriation or conversion to his own use, of that property or (iii) dishonest use or disposal of that property in violation of (a) any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or (b) any legal contract, express or implied which he has made touching the discharge of the trust. 8. Here, admittedly there is no direct evidence to show that the Petitioner dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use the two sums of money received by him. In fact the Secretary of the Society (P.W. 1) frankly admitted as follows: I have no personal knowledge about the procurement side of the Society and I do not know if the accused has actually received the amounts and misappropriated the amounts and converted them to his own use. The two lower courts however inferred such dishonest conversion or misappropriation from the fact that for several more months after the admitted receipt of the amounts, the Petitioner did no procurement work, nor did he refund the money though pressed repeatedly by the society; and subsequently claimed a set-off on the basis of some amounts due to him from the Society. From this conduct however his criminal intention cannot be inferred. From this conduct however his criminal intention cannot be inferred. It is admitted by the prosecution witnesses themselves that the Petitioner was entitled to travelling allowance and daily allowance for his procurement work. His remuneration was also fixed at 8 per cent of the net profits, at a meeting of the Board of Directors held so late as the 4th June 1953 (Ext. A). The prosecution has led no evidence to show that the amount due to the Petitioner from the society was so negligible as to render his explanation (or retention of the money to be a mere pretence. On the other hand P.W. 6 admitted in cross-examination that some amount was due to the Petitioner which he could ascertain at the time of lodging the F.I.R. on the 27th October 1953. This witness was not asked by the prosecution to specify what was the exact sum due. Doubtless, if the plea of the Petitioner that the amount due to him from the society was a pretence and he was evading repayment of the money received by him, there may be some justification (or inferring dishonest intention. But when it is admitted by the prosecution itself that some amount was due to him from the society and yet it would not clarify the exact amount due to him, the dispute between the parties becomes a bona fide civil dispute for settlement of accounts. 9. Moreover until the end of the Khariff season of 1953, there can be no question of the Petitioner committing breach of trust in respect of the sums received by him for procurement work. It was only when procurement work was not completed by the end of the Khariff season of that year that the Petitioner can be said to have violated the terms of the contract, express or Implied, between him and the society which is a condition pre-requisite to the further examination of the question whether the sums were dishonestly used or disposed of by the Petitioner. The Society did not give him an adequate opportunity to complete his part of the bargain. On the 10th May 1953 the society called upon him to refund the sum of Rs. 1105/. taken by him in March of that year thereby stopping all procurement work. His plea (or further time (Ext. 7) was practically rejected and again on the 21st May 1953 (Ext. On the 10th May 1953 the society called upon him to refund the sum of Rs. 1105/. taken by him in March of that year thereby stopping all procurement work. His plea (or further time (Ext. 7) was practically rejected and again on the 21st May 1953 (Ext. 8) he was asked to pay back the sum. The correspondence between the two thus continued for some time and, on the 4th September 1953, he was removed from his office as Director in Charge of Procurement and some other person was appointed in his place. Hence, the society by its own action prevented him from completing the procurement work within the period as agreed upon between the parties and there can be no question of any criminal liability. I do not, however wish to say anything as to whether the society was justified or not in removing him from the post of Director in Charge of Procurement, terminating the contract with him and putting some other person in charge of that work by its resolution dated the 5th September 1953. These are matters to be decided in any civil litigation that may be fought out between the parties, but so far as his criminal liability is concerned, the Petitioner can reasonably urge that until the expiry of the period agreed upon between the parties, he was not bound under the terms of the contract, either to refund the sums received by him or to account for the same or to complete the procurement work. 10. Where an agent is entrusted with certain sums by the principal for a specific purpose to be completed within a specified period, the criminal liability of the agent would not ordinarily arise until the termination of that period. In Nurul Hassan v. Emperor AIR 1920 Pat. 168, it was pointed out that where a servant collected some sums on behalf of his master, the question of criminal liability of the servant for breach of trust would not arise unless there is evidence to show that the master had fixed any period for the deposit of such sums on his behalf and that period had expired. The same principle would apply in the present case also. The same principle would apply in the present case also. This is essentially a civil dispute relating to settlement of accounts and ought not to have been dragged to the criminal court at all See Gani Setti v. Venkanna In re: 1957 M.L.J. (Cr.) 535. 11. Before concluding this revision I should refer to an important preliminary question of procedure raised by Mr. Panda on behalf of the Petitioner, regarding the right of a person sentenced to imprisonment, whose conviction and sentence are maintained on appeal by the appellate court, to receive a free copy of the judgment of that appellate court. The Petitioner was convicted by the Magistrate on the 6th November 1956, and the learned Magistrate granted him a free copy of his judgment. The Petitioner was undoubtedly entitled to the same by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His appeal was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on the 29th December 1947. Mr. Panda urged that, though in terms Sub-section (4) of Section 371, Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to judgments of the original court, It should also be deemed to apply to judgments of the appellate court (other than the High Court) when it affirms the conviction and sentence of imprisonment by virtue of Section 424, Code of Criminal Procedure which says: The roles contained in Chapter XXVI as to the judgment of a criminal court of original jurisdiction shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgment of any appellate court other than a High Court. Section 371 occurs In Chapter XXVI and, as far as I can see, there is nothing impracticable in applying Sub-section (4) of Section 371 Code of Criminal Procedure to the judgment of any appellate court other than High Court. On a matter of construction, therefore, Mr. Panda's argument seems to be correct and a person whose conviction and sentence by the trying magistrate are upheld by an appellate court (other than the High Court) is, I think, entitled to a free copy of the judgment of the appellate Court also. The only decision brought to my notice where this point has been considered Is that reported in Anil Kumar v. The State AIR 1954 Ca1. 206, where in paragraph 9 the aforesaid view was taken. No decision to the contrary has been cited before me. The only decision brought to my notice where this point has been considered Is that reported in Anil Kumar v. The State AIR 1954 Ca1. 206, where in paragraph 9 the aforesaid view was taken. No decision to the contrary has been cited before me. In the latest Edition of the Criminal Procedure by Chitaley (Fifth Edition, 1956) also this is the only decision cited on the subject. 12. Doubtless, the judgment of the High Court either on appeal or revision will not come within the scope of Section 424 Code of Criminal Procedure and the right of a person to obtain a free copy of the judgment of a High Court under such circumstances will depend on the exercise of discretion under the proviso to' Section 548 Code of Criminal Procedure. But so far as the lower appellate courts are concerned, Section 424 Code of Criminal Procedure is decisive. 13. The learned Government Advocate invited my attention to the rules framed by the State Government u/s 35 of the Court Fees Act as re-produced in paragraph 12, Clauses (c), (d) and (f) at page 81 of the General Rules and Circular Orders of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa, Criminal, Volume I, and urged that payment of court-fee in respect of copies of appellate court judgments has not been remitted, But in construing Section 425 Code of Criminal Procedure any rule made by the State Government u/s 35 of the Court Fees Act will not be relevant These rules are meant to be ancillary to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and they cannot affect the construction of these provisions. It may be that because this question was never raised on any previous occasion, and because there is no reported decision on the subject except the one in Anil Kumar v. State AIR 1954 Cal. 206, the State Government did not provide for remission of court lee on copies of judgments of appellate courts (except the High Court). I am sure consequential amendment will be made to the rules in the light of this decision. 14. I would therefore accept Mr. panda's contention that where the conviction and sentence of imprisonment passed on an accused by a subordinate court are upheld on appeal by an appellate court (other than the High Court) he is entitled to a free copy of the judgment of that appellate court also. 14. I would therefore accept Mr. panda's contention that where the conviction and sentence of imprisonment passed on an accused by a subordinate court are upheld on appeal by an appellate court (other than the High Court) he is entitled to a free copy of the judgment of that appellate court also. 15. The revision petition is allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside and the Petitioner is acquitted. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed