Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal under Clause.15 of the Letters Patent against the decree and judgment of Mr. Justice Mack of the Madras High Court confirming the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Palghat dismissing the plaintiff's suit, O. S.39/1949. 2. The facts leading up to the institution of the suit are as follows: The suit properties, among others belonged to a joint undivided Hindu family consisting of the father Naganatha Ayyar and his four sons. One Subbulakshmi Ammal a creditor of the said family, filed O. S.59/38 in the sub court of South Malabar at Palghat for recovery of certain amounts due to her. After instituting the suit, she obtained an attachment before judgment of the rights of Naganatha Ayyar and his sons over the suit properties and other properties. The order of attachment is stated to have been obtained sometime between 15th and 19th December 1938. Ultimately, a decree was passed in that and the order of attachment was also made absolute on 18-2-1939. 3. In the meanwhile, on 22-12-1938, I. P. 15/38 was filed in the Palghat court for adjudicating Naganatha Ayyar as an insolvent and on 1-4-1939, the said Naganatha Ayyar was adjudicated an insolvent. In the course of the administration of the estate, the Official Receiver sold the suit properties and other properties of the insolvent's family on 31-7-1939 and the plaint items were pur chased by the third defendant. On 16-8-1939, the Official Receiver executed a sale-deed, Ext. BI in favour of the third defendant. The first and second defendants, who are the tenants on the land, appear to have subsequently attorned to the third defendant, the purchaser. 4. On 18-8-1939, Subbulakshmi Ammal the decree-holder in O. S.59/38 filed an application Ext. B3 directing the Official Receiver to bring into court the sale proceeds of the properties already attached by her and also praying for a payment to her of a 4/5th share from and out of the sale proceeds. In that application, Subbulakshmi Ammal has stated about her attachment before judgment of the properties and she also contended that it is only the 1/5th share in the attached properties namely, the share of Naganatha Ayyar alone will vest in the Official Receiver. In that application, Subbulakshmi Ammal has stated about her attachment before judgment of the properties and she also contended that it is only the 1/5th share in the attached properties namely, the share of Naganatha Ayyar alone will vest in the Official Receiver. Though the Official Receiver has sold the entire properties, she stated, that she is entitled to the amounts representing the shares of the sons of Naganatha Ayyar namely the 4/5th share in the sale proceeds. She wound up her petition by stating that if her prayer is granted, she does not propose to attack the sale by the Official Receiver. 5. On this application, notice was served by the learned judge on the Official Receiver and interested parties and the learned judge passed an order on 25-3-1940 accepting the contentions of Subbulakshmi Ammal, the decree-holder in O.S. 59/38. The learned judge has stated in his order that the Official Receiver has no power to sell the sons' shares & therefore, the sale proceeds representing the sons' share was directed to be brought to the court by the Official Receiver and in course of time it appears that the said Subbulakshmi Ammal received her share of rateable in the amount deposited by the Official Receiver representing the share of the sons. 6. One Vanchi Ayyar, another creditor of the insolvent Naganatha Ayyar filed S.C.S. 236/40, sub-court, Palghat against Naganatha Ayyar and his four minor sons and also impleading the Official Receiver as the sixth defendant and the suit was decreed on 5-8-1941. This decreeholder took out execution and on 8-12-1941, filed an execution petition Ext. A8 and prayed for an attachment and sale of the 4/5th share of the properties both movable and immovable belonging to the four sons of Naganatha Ayyar. In that application, it is also stated that the sale by the Official Receiver held already, is not binding on Vanchi Ayyar. The attachment of 4/5th share of the sons in the properties shown therein including the present suit properties was ordered on 21-1-1942. Ultimately, on 17-4-1947, there was a court sale in execution of the decree in the small cause suit of the 4/5th share of the sons which was purchased by the present plaintiff and the sale was confirmed on 8-12-1947 and the sale certificate Ext. A2 was issued in his favour for Rs. 1001. 7. Ultimately, on 17-4-1947, there was a court sale in execution of the decree in the small cause suit of the 4/5th share of the sons which was purchased by the present plaintiff and the sale was confirmed on 8-12-1947 and the sale certificate Ext. A2 was issued in his favour for Rs. 1001. 7. After the purchase in court auction, the present plaintiff demanded the rent in respect of the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2 and they pleaded discharge by payment to the third defendant who had already purchased the properties under Ext. Bl. As the third defendant disputed the right of the plaintiff in the suit properties, the plaintiff filed 0. S.39/49, sub court Palghat, out of which these proceedings arise, for a declaration that the Official Receiver had no right to sell the rights of the sons of Naganatha Ayyar in the insolvency sale and that the third defendant has not obtained any rights by virtue of his purchase on 16-8-1939 and in consequence, he also prayed for partition of the properties into 5 equal shares and for allotment of 4/5th share to the plaintiff. He also asked for certain other consequential reliefs. 8. The first and second defendants filed written-statements to the effect that the rents have been regularly paid by them to the third defendant and that in case the plaintiff is held entitled to the suit properties, it is only the third defendant who is answerable for the claim. 9. The third defendant contested the suit on the ground that on adjudication of Naganatha Ayyar, the right of the said insolvent to sell the share of his sons in the family properties vested in the Official Receiver and in the exercise of that power, the Receiver has sold the family properties including the shares of the sons. 10. A mere attachment of the properties by the decree-holder in O. S.59/38 will not have the effect in law of preventing the vesting of the father's right to sell the sons' share in the Official Receiver. Even otherwise, the attaching decreeholder in O. S.59/38 has, by virtue of subsequent proceedings taken by her, accepted the sale of the entire properties by the Official Receiver and has received her share of the ratables from and out of the 4/5th share of the sale proceeds deposited by the receiver. Even otherwise, the attaching decreeholder in O. S.59/38 has, by virtue of subsequent proceedings taken by her, accepted the sale of the entire properties by the Official Receiver and has received her share of the ratables from and out of the 4/5th share of the sale proceeds deposited by the receiver. In view of the fact that the entire properties including the share of the sons has already been sold, there was nothing that could be brought to sale by the decreeholder in S.C. S.236/40 and in consequence, there was also nothing that the present plaintiff could have purchased in that execution sale. There was no subsisting 4/5th right of the sons in the suit properties after they have been already sold by the Official Receiver. The only person, if at all, who was entitled to object was the decreeholder in O. S.59/38 and she has settled her claims. Therefore, the purchase by the third defendant under Ext. BI is valid and binding on everybody including the present plaintiff. On these grounds, the third defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 11. The learned Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Palghat negatived all the contentions of the plaintiff and dismissed this suit. The learned judge held that by virtue of S.28-A incorporated in the Provincial Insolvency Act by Central Act 25 of 1948, the power of disposal over the sons' share in the family properties possessed by the father, vested in the Official Receiver. The learned judge also negatived the contention of the plaintiff that the attachment before judgment in O. S.59/1938 operated as a bar to the exercise of the power of disposal by the father. The learned judge further held that under S.64 of the Code of Civil Procedure the power destroyed or affected by the attachment in O. S.59/38 was only to the extent of preventing an alienation which can prevail as against that decreeholder. In view of the fact that the decreeholder in that suit has accepted and adjusted her claim, in the insolvency proceedings it was not open to the present plaintiff to challenge those proceedings and rely upon the said attachment in his favour. In the end, the learned judge held that the third defendant has a valid title to the property which plaintiff was not entitled to disturb. In this view, the learned judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 12. In the end, the learned judge held that the third defendant has a valid title to the property which plaintiff was not entitled to disturb. In this view, the learned judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 12. The plaintiff filed A. S.182/51 in the High Court at Madras against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. 13. Mr. Justice Mack, who heard the appeal, accepted the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial judge and has held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share of the suit properties by virtue of his purchase in a court auction on a very belated attachment long after the court has accorded sanction, to a sale by the Official Receiver with a direction that 4/5th of the sale proceeds should be paid to the attaching decreeholder who had prior rights by virtue of an attachment even before the insolvent's adjudication. In the end, the learned judge confirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 14. The plaintiff has come up in Letters Patent Appeal against the decree and judgment of Mr. Justice Mack confirming the decree of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The same contentions that have been raised in the trial court and also before the learned Judge Mr. Justice Mack have been advanced before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer. The learned counsel very strenuously contended that after the attachment before judgment obtained by the decreeholder in O. S.59/38, the representative character of the father, Nagahatha Ayyer disappears and as and from that date, the father has no further power of disposal over sons' share. If the father himself loses that power, the insolvency of the father will not vest such a power in the Official Receiver. Though Mr. Subramania Ayyer contended that it was open to any creditor to take advantage of an attachment effected already by another creditor, to a straight question by us, be has very fairly and frankly stated that there is no judicial authority in support of this contention. 15. Mr. Subramania Ayyer is no doubt, correct in his contentions that it is only if the father himself had the power of disposal, such a power will vest in the Official Receiver. 16. But the question is, in this case, whether the father had that power? 15. Mr. Subramania Ayyer is no doubt, correct in his contentions that it is only if the father himself had the power of disposal, such a power will vest in the Official Receiver. 16. But the question is, in this case, whether the father had that power? Did the attachment obtained by the decree-holder in O. S.59/1938 operate as a complete bar to the exercise of a right of disposal by the father which could be taken advantage of by the Official Receiver; if so against whom will that bar operate? According to Mr. Subramania Ayyer, it is a complete bar which could be availed of by any creditor who attaches the property even subsequently long after the proceedings in insolvency. 17. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the contesting third defendant appearing for Mr. K. Kuttikrishna Menon, has maintained that the principles of S.64 C. P. C., will apply and if there is a bar, if at all, it will enure only to the benefit of the decreeholder in O.S. 59/1938. The decree-holder having accepted the sale in respect of the rights attached by her and got her share of the amount, the sale proceedings in insolvency have become perfectly legal and valid. It is not open to a party like the plaintiff to challenge those proceedings and even when the bar of attachment was continuing, it will not prevent the exercise by the father of the power of sale of the sons' share, but such a sale will only be subject to the rights of the attaching decreeholder. Such a sale is perfectly valid as against everybody else. So ran the argument of Mr. V. Balakrishna Eradi 18. No doubt, prior to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in Rama Sastralu v. T. Balakrishna Rao and another (A.I.R.1942 Mad. 682 F.B), the view was that the father's power to dispose of the son's property vested in the Official Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act also. But the Full Bench held that the power to dispose of the son's share is not property under Provincial Insolvency Act and as such, it will not vest in the Official Receiver. 19. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court had taken a contrary view -See Viswanath v. Official Receiver (A.I.R.1937 Patna 185 F. B). 20. But the Full Bench held that the power to dispose of the son's share is not property under Provincial Insolvency Act and as such, it will not vest in the Official Receiver. 19. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court had taken a contrary view -See Viswanath v. Official Receiver (A.I.R.1937 Patna 185 F. B). 20. But the conflict was set at rest by the Legislature stepping in and enacting S.28-A in the Provincial Insolvency Act. The said section came into effect on 12-4 -1948. The section has been held to be retrospective. The scope of the amendment has been expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows, in the decision reported in Nageswaraswami v. Viswasundara (A. I. R 1953 S.C. 370 at 372). "There was some difference of judicial opinion as to whether the powers of a father under the Mitakshara Law to alienate the joint family property including the interest of his sons in the same for discharge of an antecedent debt not contracted for illegal or immoral purposes vests in the Receiver on the adjudication of the father as an insolvent. Under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, this power was held to vest in the Official Assignee under S.52 (2) of the Act - Sat Narain v. Sri Kishen Das (A. I. R.1936 p. C. 277). As regards cases governed by Provincial Insolvency Act, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that the father's power to dispose of his son's interest in the joint family property for satisfaction of his untainted debts was not 'property' within the meaning of S.28 (2) (d). Provincial Insolvency Act - Ramasastrulu v. Balakrishna Rao (A. I. R.1942 Mad. 682 F.B); while a contrary view was taken by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court - Vide Bishwanath v. Official Receiver (A. I. R.1937 Pat. 185 F. B). The conflict has now been set at rest by the enactment of S.28 - A in the Provincial Insolvency Amendment Act of 1948 which came into force on 12-4-1948. 682 F.B); while a contrary view was taken by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court - Vide Bishwanath v. Official Receiver (A. I. R.1937 Pat. 185 F. B). The conflict has now been set at rest by the enactment of S.28 - A in the Provincial Insolvency Amendment Act of 1948 which came into force on 12-4-1948. The new section reads as follows: 'The property of the insolvent shall comprise and shall always be deemed to have comprised also the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency or before his discharge.' The language of the section indicates that its operation has been expressly made retrospective. The result, therefore, is that the power of defendant 1 to alienate the, interest of his sons, defendants 2 and 3, in the mortgaged properties for satisfaction of his antecedent debts, did pass to the Receiver as 'property' within the meaning of the Provincial Insolvency Act and consequently on a sale by the Receiver the interest of defendants 2 and 3 did vest in the sixth defendant, and he alone must be held competent to exercise the right of redemption." It may be stated that the sale by the Official Receiver referred to by their Lordships, was on 19-4-1937. 21. Though according to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court referred to above, the power of sale of the son's share would not have vested in the Official Receiver on the adjudication of Naganatha Ayyar on 1-4-1939, by virtue of the enactment of S.28-A, we must hold, that subject to the applicability of the provisos, the power of Naganatha Ayyar to alienate the interest of his sons in the suit properties did pass to the Official Receiver as property within the meaning of the Provincial Insolvency Act and consequently, on a sale by the Official Receiver under Ex. BI, such an interest also passed to the third defendant, if there was no other bar to the exercise of such a power. 22. As already stated, the contention of Mr. BI, such an interest also passed to the third defendant, if there was no other bar to the exercise of such a power. 22. As already stated, the contention of Mr. Subramania Ayyar is that the attachment obtained by the decree-holder in O. S.59/38 has deprived the father Naganatha Ayyar of his right to dispose of the sons share and from this it follows, according to him, that the Official Receiver also does not get such a right. 23. In support of this contention Mr. Subramania Ayyar has relied upon some passages in Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edition on pages 443 and 444. The relevant passage is as follows: " The Official Assignee, in the case of insolvency of a Hindu father under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, has therefore the power to sell the joint family property for the payment of the debts of the insolvent father which are not immoral or illegal But as the father's power of sale for his antecedent debts exists only so long as the joint family property is undivided, the capacity of the Official Assignee exists only so long as there has been no partition or even division in status. It has accordingly been held that the Official Assignee cannot sell the joint estate for the payment of the father's debts after a suit for partition had been instituted by any of the sons, which constitutes a severance in interest. Any unilateral declaration of intention to sever in interest equally puts an end to the power of the Official Assignee to sell the son's share for the father's debts. Similarly when the son's interest in the family property has been attached in execution of any decree against him, the power of the Official Assignee to sell it for the payment of the debts of the insolvent father is gone". 24. There is no dispute that the father's power of sale of the son's share exists only so long as the joint family properties are undivided. As observed by Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Rao in Thirumaleswara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta, (1952-1-M.L.J. 681 at 683) a notice issued by the son to his father demanding partition, would bring about division in status and prevent the Official Receiver from exercising the power of sale. As observed by Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Rao in Thirumaleswara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta, (1952-1-M.L.J. 681 at 683) a notice issued by the son to his father demanding partition, would bring about division in status and prevent the Official Receiver from exercising the power of sale. The power of sale of the father is dependent upon the existence of co-parcenery and if that co-parcenary is terminated by division in status, the power ceases to exist. In this case, it is nobody's case that such a disruption has occurred and therefore, the passage relied upon by the learned counsel in Mayne's Hindu Law regarding the effect of a partition or a demand for partition, does not apply. 25. Then the learned counsel very strongly relied upon the subsequent statement by the learned author that when the son's interest in the family property has been attached in execution of any decree against him, the power of the Official Receiver to sell the same for the debts of the insolvent father is gone. The learned author at page 444 in Note (v) has cited certain decisions in support of this statement. The learned counsel, Mr. Subramania Iyer has also quoted before us most of the decisions cited in the foot-note, namely Gopalakrishnayya v. Gopalan (I. L R.51 Mad. 342); Official Receiver v. Arunachala (66 M. L. J. 412); Subbarao v. Official Receiver, Guntur (A.I.R.1935 Mad. 427) and Palaniappa v. Palani (71 M. L. J. 541) We do not propose to go into these decisions in any great detail because those decisions have been reviewed by Varadachariar and Gentle, JJ., in Diravyam v. Veeranan Ambalam (A. I.R.1)39 Mad.702) and by Venkataramana Rao and Somayya, JJ., in Rayanji v. Janakiramayya (1942. 1. M.L.J. 318) and the scope of those decisions have been clearly explained by the learned Judges. With great respect, we fully agree with the reasoning of Varadachariar and Gentle, JJ., and of Venkataramana Rao and Somayya, JJ., in the two decisions referred to above. 26. In the decision in Diravyam v. Veeranan, Ambalam (A. I. R.1939 Mad. 702), there was an attachment on 15th March 1930 of the interest of the sons and there was a sale deed executed by the Official Receiver on 6th November 1931 including the sons' share. 26. In the decision in Diravyam v. Veeranan, Ambalam (A. I. R.1939 Mad. 702), there was an attachment on 15th March 1930 of the interest of the sons and there was a sale deed executed by the Official Receiver on 6th November 1931 including the sons' share. It was contended before the learned judges that according to a long course of decisions of the Madras High Court, the power of the insolvent and the Official Receiver as representing their estate to convey the interest of the sons in the joint family estate must be deemed to have come to an end, when the interest of the sons were attached by the appellants in execution of that decree. In support of that contention, reliance was placed upon most of the decisions cited in Mayne's Hindu Law under Note (v) on page 444 and which we have referred to above as cited by Mr. Subramania Iyer in support of his contention. Mr. Justice Varadachariar, who delivered the leading judgment of the court, on page 705, observes as follows: "Though the sale deed was executed by the Official Receiver in this case, it must be taken that he had no larger power than the insolvents themselves would have had, and if, for any reason, the insolvents had lost the power to sell their sons' interests, the conveyance executed by the Official Receiver could have no greater effect; see Sat Narain v. Sri Kishan Das (17 Lah. 644 P. C.) The point for consideration therefore is whether as a result of the attachment placed by the appellants on 15th March 1930 on the interests of the sons, the power of the father to sell the joint family property including the sons, interests for the satisfaction of debts binding on the sons came to an end". 27. In discussing the various decisions quoted before them, the learned judge stated that in some of those Madras decisions very general language has been used which may appear to support the contention that the power of the father in such cases does not exist. 27. In discussing the various decisions quoted before them, the learned judge stated that in some of those Madras decisions very general language has been used which may appear to support the contention that the power of the father in such cases does not exist. But the learned judge further examined the facts in all those cases and observes at page 705 as follows: "But on examination it well be found that in all those cases the question arose between the attaching creditor and the Official Receiver and all that was intended to be laid down by the learned judges was that the attaching creditor was entitled to proceed to bring the sons' interest to sale and that the Official Receiver could not claim the proceeds of the sons' shares for the benefit of the general body of creditors" 28. After referring to the decision of the Privy Council in Nanomi Babuasin v. Mohdunmohun (I.L.R.13 Cal. 21) Mr. Justice Varadachariar at page 706 observed: "They observed that the recognition of the father's power to sell the son's interest for the discharge of his own debts was destructive of the principle of independent co-parcenery rights The proper interpretation of this statement of the rule seems to us to be, that to the extent required to satisfy the father's proper debts, the father and his creditors are entitled to ignore the son's co¬parcenery right in the family property." 29. After considering certain Bombay and Calcutta decisions, the learned judge stated that the result of those decisions is only to impose on the father the same disability imposed upon the son by S.64 C. P. C. The learned judge further observes at page 705: "We are not aware of any other rule of law which sets a limitation either on the son's power or on the father's power in circumstances like those of the present case. All that S.64 of the Code provides is that any private transfer by the judgment-debtor of the property attached shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. It will not be accurate to read S.64 as putting an end to the power of sale, because as between the transferor and the transferee, the alienation will undoubtedly be operative If the attaching creditor is paid off or for any reason the attachment ceases to subsist, the alienee's title will be unassailable. It will not be accurate to read S.64 as putting an end to the power of sale, because as between the transferor and the transferee, the alienation will undoubtedly be operative If the attaching creditor is paid off or for any reason the attachment ceases to subsist, the alienee's title will be unassailable. The only effect of S.64 is that such transfer shall not prejudice the rights of the attaching creditor." 30. To a similar effect is the decision of Mr. Justice Vankataramana Rao and Mr. Justice Somayya in Rayanji v. Janakiramayya (1942-I-M.L.J. 318). In that case, there was an attachment before judgment of the family properties on lath March 1931 and 25th February 1932. Subsequent to the date, the Official Receiver sold the properties to various parties. The plaintiff, one of the sons of the insolvent, filed the suit for partition ignoring the sales made by the. Official Receiver His main contention was that after the attachment of his share on 18th March 1931 and 29th February 1932 the father had no power to dispose of his rights and equally, the Official Receiver also had no such right. 31. The learned trial judge upheld the plea of the plaintiff and decreed his suit on the ground that as the sales by the Official Receiver were subsequent to the attachment, the Official Receiver was not competent to sell the plaintiff's share in the suit properties therein. 32. In appeal, the learned judges reversed the decision of the trial court Mr. Justice Venkataramana Rao, who delivered the leading judgment of the Bench, at page 321 observes as follows: "It is also well settled that the power of a father to alienate his son's share for his debts which are neither illegal nor immoral would however vest in the Official Receiver, but the power is subject to the same qualifications as it is in the father's hands. The power of a father to dispose of his son's share only subsists so long as the family continues joint. But the power ceases when the family becomes divided- Therefore while that status lasts, if an attachment of the son's share takes place, the question is, what is the effect of that attachment on the vesting of the said power in the Official Assignee?" 33. But the power ceases when the family becomes divided- Therefore while that status lasts, if an attachment of the son's share takes place, the question is, what is the effect of that attachment on the vesting of the said power in the Official Assignee?" 33. After posing this question, the learned judge deals with most of the cases cited in Note (v) on page 444 of Mayne's Hindu Law and referred to above. The learned judge also referred to the statement in Mayne's Hindu Law contained in the older edition which was substantially the same as that extracted above. The learned judge then observes at page 322 as follows: "The question is to what extent this proposition can be said to be sound in principle? S.64, Civil Procedure Code provides that where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. If for any reason the attachment is withdrawn or released, the sale during the pendency of that attachment of the said property or interest would be valid. Therefore during the pendency of the attachment of the joint family property of the son's interest therein, should the father sell the son's share, as between the alienee and the father and the son, it would be perfectly valid though such an alienation would not avail against the attaching creditor". 34. The learned judge then referred with approval to the observations of Mr. Justice Varadachariar in Diravyam v. Veeranan (1939 2 M. L. J. 822) regarding the true scope of S.64 C. P. C. After agreeing with Mr. Justice Varadachariar, the learned judge further observes at page 322: "The cases on which the proposition in Mayne is based are all cases where the question arose between the attaching creditor and the Official Receiver. As against the attaching creditor certainly the father's power would not prevail. But to say that once the attachment takes place the father's power is destroyed will be stating the proposition too broadly.........It The learned judge further observes at page 323: "It would be open to the father to exercise the power of sale but the alienee would get a defeasible title as the alienation under the attachment would prevail. But to say that once the attachment takes place the father's power is destroyed will be stating the proposition too broadly.........It The learned judge further observes at page 323: "It would be open to the father to exercise the power of sale but the alienee would get a defeasible title as the alienation under the attachment would prevail. Therefore if the power of disposal subsisted, I do not see any reason why it could not vest in the Official Receiver subject to the same disabilities it was subject to in the father's hands at the date of vesting. During the pendency of the attachment, if the Official Receiver chooses to exercise the right of sale, the alienees will get a title which will prevail against the son though it may not prevail against the claims enforceable under the attachment 35. The learned judge after again considering the Madras cases quoted before him finally approved of the reasoning of Mr. Justice Varadachariar in Diravyam v Veeranan (1939-2 M.L.J. 822). In the end, the learned judge held that the Official Receiver, inspite of the attachment effected on 18th March 1931 and 29th February 1932, was competent to sell the son's interest and that the son (plaintiff) has no right to ask for any partition in view of the fact that his interest had been sold. Mr. Justice Somayya, the other learned judge agreed with the decision of Mr. Justice Venkitaramana Rao and observed as follows at page 325: "The son at any rate should I think, be bound by the sale effected by the Official Receiver. The disability of the Official Receiver should be limited to a case where the question is between the Official Receiver and the attaching decree-holder or a person claiming under the attachment". 36. The decision in Diravyam v. Veeranan (1939.2. M. L. J. 822) was quoted with approval by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court-Grille, C. J. and Puranik, J., in the decision quoted in Lakshminarayan Barsidas Agarwal Marwari and others v. Dinker Shanker Rao Deshpande and others (A.I. R 1943 Nag. 101). Almost all the Madras cases referred to in Note (v) of Mayne's Hindu Law at page 444 have been dealt with by the learned judges in the Nagpur case. The learned judges agreed with the views expressed by Mr. 101). Almost all the Madras cases referred to in Note (v) of Mayne's Hindu Law at page 444 have been dealt with by the learned judges in the Nagpur case. The learned judges agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Varadachariar regarding all these cases and observed at page 107 as follows: "It is not correct to read S.64 as putting an end to the power of sale because as between the transferor and transferee the alienation will undoubtedly be operative if the attaching creditor is paid off or for any reason the attachment ceases to subsist the alienee's right will be unassailable." 37. "The learned judges further observed that so long as there was no dispute raised by any attaching creditor regarding the sale neither the son nor anybody else have a right to challenge the sales of the Official Receiver on the ground of an attachment by another creditor. 38. We ourselves have also looked into the several decisions cited by Mr.T. N. Subramania Iyer and we are in full agreement with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Varadachariar regarding those decisions. In every one of those decisions there was a dispute between the attaching decreeholder and the purchaser or by some person claiming through the attaching decreeholder but relying on the same attachment. 39. We respectfully agree with the decision in Diravyam v. Veeranan (1939.2. M. L. J. 822); Rayanji v. Janakiramayya (1942. 1. M. L.J. 316) and that of the Nagpur High Court in Laxminarayanan Barse Das Agarwal Marwari & others v. Dinker Shanker Rao Deshpande & others (A.I. R.1943 Nag. 101) Therefore, it follows that the contention of Mr. T.N. Subramania Iyer that the attachment by the decreeholder in O.S. 59/39 deprives the father of the power of sale cannot be accepted. 40. We have already stated that the attaching decreeholder Subbulakshmi Ammal came on the scene immediately after the sale by the Official Receiver and ultimately was responsible for the Official Receiver depositing in the court 4/6th share in the property which was ultimately drawn by Subbulakshmi Ammal and also several other decreeholders in a ratable distribution. 40. We have already stated that the attaching decreeholder Subbulakshmi Ammal came on the scene immediately after the sale by the Official Receiver and ultimately was responsible for the Official Receiver depositing in the court 4/6th share in the property which was ultimately drawn by Subbulakshmi Ammal and also several other decreeholders in a ratable distribution. The sons' shares having been already sold, there was nothing that could be brought to sale in execution of the decree in S.C. S.236/1940 and it follows that the plaintiff did not acquire any valid legal title in the sale that followed the decree in the said small cause suit. 41. Mr.T. N. Subramania Iyer further contended that Ext. BI did not convey the sons' share in the properties to the third defendant. We have gone through the various recitals in Ext. B1 and we are satisfied that it is a sale of not only the insolvent's interest in the suit properties but also of the sons' share therein. 42. In view of what we have stated above, it follows that the plaintiff's suit must fail. We confirm the decree and judgment of Mr. Justice Mack and dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal with costs of the third defendant. Dismissed.