JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - This revision is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Puri confirming an order of a Magistrate 1st class, Puri, convicting the accused-Petitioner u/s 188 Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to pay a fine of rupees fifty one or in default simple imprisonment for one month Case No. C(II) 29 of 1926. 2. The facts shortly are these On November 5, 1954, the Rent Suit Officer, Puri, made a prohibitory order u/s 79 of the Orissa Tenancy Act for appraisement and division of the crop in respect of the plot Nos. 287 and 374/506 in village Ugresardeuli. It is alleged that the accused-Petitioner was the recorded tenant in respect of the said land and that he had sold the said land by a registered Kabala which, however, is not n record in the present case. I shall not rely on this document in deciding the present application. On November 22, 1954 it is said that notice was served on the accused-Petitioner and the prohibitory order was duly proclaimed by beat of drums on the land. The accused-Petitioner is said to have refused to accept personal service of the notice and thereupon it was affixed on his front door. Subsequently, as the prosecution case is, the accused-Petitioner cut the crops and thereby disobeyed the prohibitory order passed by a public servant for which he was prosecuted u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. 3. The defence is that he sold the disputed land long ago to one Kokila Dei by a registered Kabala as aforesaid and that he had no concern with that land and that he had not cut the crop nor committed any offence as alleged. 4. It appears from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, that the process-server (P. W. 4) had served the prohibitory order (ext. 2) on the accused Petitioner. P.W. 3 was a witness to the attachment of the crop in the land in question P.W. 1 was the landlords agent who identified the land to the said process-server. P.W. 2, who was a neighbouring tenant, stated that he was present when the attachment order was promulgated and that the crop was standing on the land at the time. 5. Mr. P.W. 2, who was a neighbouring tenant, stated that he was present when the attachment order was promulgated and that the crop was standing on the land at the time. 5. Mr. R.K. Mohapatra, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-Petitioner, raised two points, namely, first that assuming that there was disobedience d the prohibitory order, mere disobedience by itself would not attract the operation of Section 188 Indian Penal Code, unless such disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance, or injury to any person lawfully employed to promulgate such order (paragraph 2 of Section 188) and secondly, that Section 188 is not applicable to an order passed in a civil or revenue proceeding-it is applicable to orders which are made for maintenance of public peace and security. On the first point Mr. R.K. Mohapatra contended that there was no evidence that the accused-Petitioner's alleged disobedience of the said prohibitory order caused or tended to cause any obstruction, annoyance or injury nor there was any risk thereof and so the case did not fall within the terms of Section 188 Indian Penal Code. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Fakir Charan Das v. State 23 C.L.T. 176, where Narasimham C.J., held as follows: Mere disobedience of an order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, does not render a person liable to punishment u/s 188, Penal Code. It must be further shown that such disobedience had either of the two tendencies described in the second and third paragraphs of that section. These tendencies have to be inferred from the proved facts and circumstances of each case and are not capable of direct proof. The facts in this case shortly were these in consequence of the agitation against the report of the States Reorganisation Commission, acute disturbances arose in the town of Puri resulting in the burning of the Railway Station, attack on the houses of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, and commission of various acts of violence on other public buildings. Consequently, the sub-Divisional Magistrate issued an order u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting an assemblage of five or more persons within the municipal area. The order was in force for seven day. Consequently, the sub-Divisional Magistrate issued an order u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting an assemblage of five or more persons within the municipal area. The order was in force for seven day. By subsequent order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the period of the operation of the order was extended because the exigencies of the situation so required. The order was duly promulgated at various public places in Puri town. The prosecution case was that on 31-1-1956 in contravention of this order the Petitioner, at about 7 P.M. attended a meeting of about 40 to 50 persons at Lion's Gate, Puri, and there read aloud a printed pamphlet in which the various acts of alleged oppression committed by the authorities were mentioned. He was immediately taken into custody for an offence u/s 188 Indian Penal Code and duly prosecuted. The High Court came to the conclusion that the action of the said accused in reading out the pamphlet did not produce any of the tendencies described u/s 188 Penal Code and the order of conviction and sentence was set aside and the accused was acquitted. I must observe that facts in the case just discussed above were much stronger than in the Case before me. In the present case, it was a simple order of Rent Suit Officer made in a civil proceeding and there was no evidence that the accused-Petitioner in disobeying the order had caused or there was any occasion for causing any obstruction or annoyance or injury within the terms of the Section 188 Indian Penal Code. The next case relied on by the learned Counsel was a decision of the Nagpur High Court in N.G. Sabde and Ors. v. The Crown AIR 1950 Nag 12 where it was held that there can be no conviction u/s 188 Indian Penal Code unless the likely consequences of the breach of the order are proved affirmatively. The gap cannot be filled up by resort to judicial notice. It is a fact to be proved. In that case also Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) took the same view as our High Court in the case cited above. In the Nagpur case also there was no proof that any untoward consequences would have ensued due to the breach of the order. This was required to be proved u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. In that case also Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) took the same view as our High Court in the case cited above. In the Nagpur case also there was no proof that any untoward consequences would have ensued due to the breach of the order. This was required to be proved u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. The prosecution led no evidence to prove this and in the opinion of the Nagpur High Court, the accused were justified in saying that there was no proof of any untoward incident as was incumbent to he proved u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. The Court could not take any judicial notice of any fact. This must be proved affirmative in each case. There can be no conviction unless the likely consequences of the breach are proved. The Court proceeded further to observe that the particular order was passed to prevent unrest among the labourers and one would expect something proved in relation to it. Since there was no evidence of any likely consequences following the breach of the order, the conviction u/s 188 Indian Penal Code could not be upheld, and accordingly the Nagpur High Court set it aside and acquitted the accused u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. 6. Then coming to the next point as to the non-applicability of Section 188 Indian Penal Code to an order passed in civil or revenue proceeding the prohibitory order was admittedly in a civil proceeding having been made u/s 79 of the Orissa Tenancy Act. In support of his contention on this point, the learned Counsel relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dalganjan Koeri and Others Vs. State. 630. In this case the proceedings arose out of a suit u/s 60 of the U.P. Tanancy Act in the Court of the Judicial Officer in respect of a certain plot of land. The facts giving rise to the revision application before the High Court were that the accused-Petitioners against whom the said suit was filed, were alleged to have cut and removed the crop of the land in question, in disobedience of an order made in the said suit. The order passed in the suit was for attachment of the crop and the crop was ordered to be attached through a Commissioner. An order of injunction was served by the Commissioner on the parties not to damage the crop in question. The order passed in the suit was for attachment of the crop and the crop was ordered to be attached through a Commissioner. An order of injunction was served by the Commissioner on the parties not to damage the crop in question. After the alleged breach of order, an application was made for disobedience of the order of injunction for cutting away the crop. On those facts, there was a prosecution case under Sections 379 and 188 Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate convicted the Applicants and the conviction was confirmed in appeal. Relying on certain earlier decisions in In the matter of Chandrakant De ILR Cal. 445; Quian v. Keshah chandra Mukherjee AIR 1949 Cal. 349; Pommani Chintakath Manmali v. Kutti Ammu AIR 1916 Mad 640; Mallappa Tavargi v. Emperor AIR 1915 Bom 22; Bishan Dutt and Another Vs. Emperor, ; the Allahabad High Court accepted the view that orders contemplated by Section 188 Indian Penal Code are orders made by public functionaries for public purposes and not an order made in a civil suit. Operation of Section 188 is limited. Promulgation of such order by a public servant contemplates that the disobedience of the order is likely to result in annoyance or injury or tend to cause danger to human life, health or safety or cause or tend to cause a riot or affray. Just disobedience of an order issued, for instance, under Order 21, Rule 46 Code of Civil Procedure, is not punishable under this section; but the appropriate remedy for disobedience of an order of injunction passed by a Civil Court is committal for contempt. But orders under Sections 60 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) stand on a different footing. Those orders are not quite civil in nature as the primary purpose of orders made u/s 69 is to prevent the breaches of the peace. Disobedience of such orders is punishable u/s 188 Indian Penal Code. 7. In the present case, the prohibitory order was made by the Rent Suit Officer for the purpose of appraisement and division of the crop in respect of the land in question and the purpose of the order was to maintain the status quo until the appraisement and division of the crop was completed. There was no apprehension of breach of the peace underlying this prohibitory order made by the Rent Suit Officer. There was no apprehension of breach of the peace underlying this prohibitory order made by the Rent Suit Officer. The order by the Rent Suit Collector was made presumably under Sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Orissa Tenancy Act. This was in the nature of an interlocutory order as appointment of a Receiver or an interim injunction in a civil suit. No breach of the peace is apprehended by the Rent Suit Collector in making such an order and this feature distinguishes this case from other cases where breach of peace was apprehended I therefore, find in favour of the accused-Petitioner on both the points. 8. The result, therefore, is that the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside and the accused-Petitioner is acquitted. This revision is allowed. Final Result : Allowed